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This study began more than a decade ago in somewhat predictable aca-
demic fashion. In the summer of 1983, I first traveled to Lisbon to under-
take archival work relating to my doctoral dissertation in French history
at The University of Minnesota on jean-Baptists Cofbert's attempt to
break into the Indian Ocean trade. My original intent at that time was to
search the Portuguese archives for references to Colbert's strategy, and in
conjunction with archival work in the Netherlands, England, and France
to compile a more complete analysis of his Compagnie Roya/e des Indes
Orientales and the Third Dutch War in Asia than had hitherto been at-
tempted. In the midst of that quest, I quickly became enamored with both
Portugal and the Portuguese. Much to my surprise, I also discovered that
virtually no scholarly work had been completed on the Estado da India
for the period coinciding with Colbert's grand Asian project. Just as im-
portantly, after a good deal of time poring over manuscript documents re-
lating to the Estado, I became convinced that the main historiographical
orthodoxy of the rather scant literature that did exist seemed to be at odds
with what the manuscript sources contained. The traditional view had
postulated a radical, sustained, almost inevitable decline, for the late ryth
century Estado, while the documents I perused suggested an earnest effort
at change, reform, and rehabilitation. Thus began a new quest that has
mandated more than three years in the archives of Lisbon and Goa, and
concurrently the opportunity to indulge my growing passion for Portu-
guese history and culture.
The academic validity of the cliche "everyone loves a winner", and a
variety of other factors, have long conspired to largely reduce the rich his-
tory of Portugal to the backwaters of scholarly scrutiny in the United
States. The number of monographs and articles published each year on
Portuguese history remains small in comparison to those that appear on
the national histories of the other European powers such as France, Brit-
ain, Germany or Italy. Academic positions for specialists in Portuguese
history are also rare. Even the amount of space devoted to Portugal in the
textbooks we utilize in our introductory courses remains minuscule: with
the obligatory section on Prince Henry the Navigator and Albuquerque
and then a dearth of information for 400 years or so when we find a refer-
ence to Salazar, the Estado Novo, and the decolonization warfare of the
1960s and 1970s. This state of affairs IS indeed sad, Since the Portuguese ex-
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 7
perience both at home and overseas furnishes vital comparative evidence
for the historian of the medieval, early modern, and modern periods. As
this study will hopefully demonstrate, the major structural and intellec-
tual shifts affecting Europe during the age of absolutism were well re-
flected III Portugal. During the Aviz and Braganza periods, the kingdom
retained a reputation and importance for contemporary European pow-
ers that belies the scant attention it has received in modern historiogra-
phy. Moreover, it is clear that early modern Portugal was far from the
rigid, traditional society that some historians have postulated. Elements
within both the privileged estates and the middle class embraced theoreti-
cal and material innovations of Baroque Europe and sought to adapt
them to the Portuguese model. As this study will show, men like the
Prince Regent Pedro of Braganza and the Viceroy Luis de Mendonca
Furrado had learned from the example of the Dutch and English Com-
panies and utilized such lessons on their own reformation campaign of
[he ASian empire.
In the course of the research for this study, I have obviously accumu-
lated a long list of both personal and professional debts. First, I would like
to thank Anne Blais who originally convinced me of the wisdom of the re-
search trip to Lisbon for the Colbert project and who helped tremen-
dously with the language at the outset. At the Filmoteca Ultramarina
Portuguesa, the entire staff was incredibly generous with their time and
support, in particular the late D. Filomena Duke Goncalves Colombo
Games and D. Maria Augusta da Veiga e Sousa. The directors and staffs
at the Arquivo Hisrorico Ultramarine, the Arquivo Nacional da Torre do
Tomho, the Biblioreca da Ajuda, the Biblioreca Nacional of Lisbon, the
Arquivo Hist6rico de Misericordia de Lisboa, and the Arquivo Hisrorico
Militar were all exceedingly helpful. During my year in India, the Xavier
Centre for Historical Research and its kind Director at the time, Teotonio
de Souza; P.P Shirodkar, Director of the Historical Archive of Goa; and
P.R. Mehendirara of the American Institute of Indian Studies all facili-
tated my work. The Noronha family of Panjim taught me much about
Goan life. Over the years, I have also benefited greatly from the friend-
ship, advice, and encouragement of the Sa Fernandes, Vidal, Tudella, and
Role families in Portugal, who have made my frequent trips there reward-
ing in both personal and professional terms. For financial support to facil-
itate archival work in Europe and India, I would like to thank the
Graduate School of The University of Minnesota, the Prancis E. Andrews-
Minneapolis Fund, the American Institute of Indian Studies, the Portu-
guese Ministry of Education, the Leverhulme Trust in London for a gen-
erous post-doctoral fellowship in Britain, as well as several summer
RENASCENT EMPIRE?
fellowships from The University of Toledo in recent years to complete the
research for this study.
I have also benefited greatly from kind professional advice over the
these years. Professor C.R. Boxer, the doyen of European expansion stud-
ies, in particular gave me very crucial advice and encouragment in the for-
mative stage of my quest to investigate the late r-th century Estado. He
was also very gracious in allowing me to visit him at his home in England
and peruse his vast private library. I would also like to thank Paul W.
Bamford and Stuart Schwatz of The University of Minnesota; M.N.
Pearson of The University of New South Wales, A.R. Disney of La Trobe
University; james C. Boyajian my friend from the Goa archives; and Larry
D. Wilcox of The University of Toledo. I would also like to acknowledge
the sage advice of Henry Scholberg of the Charles Wesley Ames Library at
Minnesota, for his apt dictum on archival research and living abroad: "If
you are not enjoying it, you are not doing it right." Finally, a very special





The rzth century decline of Portugal's Asian empire or Estado da India is
generally considered to be one of the great historical "facts" of the early
modern period. Erected over the course of the late rsrh and early reth cen-
turies by soldier-adventurers like Vasco da Gama and Afonso de Albu-
querque, the Estado was based on a series of fortified trading cities along
the rim of the Indian Ocean basin and the South China Sea. By 1580, these
strategic [ortalezas of the "State of India" included Mozambique,
Mombassa, Maskar (Muscat), Hurmuz (Ormuz), Diu, Goa, Cochin, Cey-
Ion, Melaka (Malacca), Timer, and Macau, to name but a few. These for-
tified settlements were usually at the cross-roads of local trading routes as
well as multi-cultural enclaves that witnessed a constant mixture of Euro-
pean, African, and Asian peoples, laws, customs, and traditions. The
[ortalezas, moreover, served important economic and military functions.
They acted as vital collection points for the highly-prized products of the
Asian trade in preparation for their eventual shipment to Europe. They
were also utilized as bases for the fleets that were sent out each year to
scour the eastern seas for interlopers in the Crown monopoly trade in
pepper and other products that the Portuguese had boldly declared upon
their arrival in Asia, and at least nominally strove to achieve and protect
during the course of the rerh century.'
A historiographical debate has raged for some time over the question
of how effective the Portuguese Crown was in its quest to establish and
enforce a monopoly in the Asian spice trade. Portugal's relatively meager
demographic, maritime, and economic resources along with Albuquer-
que's failure to capture the strategic port of Aden at the entrance to the
Red Sea have traditionally been viewed as fatal flaws in the system.' There
is little doubt, however, that during the first decades of the reth century
the Portuguese succeeded in largely shutting off the flow of spices to Eu-
rope via the long-standing caravan routes through the Levant. As a result,
profits sometimes exceeding 250% were made on the sale of spices by the
Crown during these heady years.' Although F.C Lane, V. M. Godinho,
CH.H. Wake, and Niels Steensgaard vary significantly in their estimates
on the annual traffic in spices via the Cape of Good Hope route for the
sixteenth century, a figure of 4°,000 quintals (hundredweights) for 1550
seems a reasonable compromise.' This new-found mercantile wealth
thrust a largely unprepared and still essentially feudal Portuguese society
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and state into the forefront of European geo-political power struggles.
The impressive Manueline architecture on the monastery of jeronimos on
the banks of the Tagus at Belem, built with money from the spice trade,
stands as a fitting testament to that golden age in Portugal's history.
By the mid-r-th century, all this had changed. In December 1662, Ante-
nio de Mello de Castro, the newly arrived Governor of the Estado da In-
dia wrote an insightful letter to the Queen Regent D. Luisa de Gusmao in
Lisbon. After consulting with his immediate predecessors on the Fourth
Governing Council in Goa, D. Pedro de Lencastre, Luis de Mendonca
Furrado, and D. Manuel Mascarenhas, as well as the members of the
Treasury Council, Mello de Casrro was forced to report that the Estado
was nearly bankrupt: "The needs of this State are so many and so great ...
and there is not even a single penny to help meet pressmg and necessary
expenditures.": The new Governor soon learned that besides being finan-
cially distressed, the Estado confronted a host of commercial, religious,
and military enemies in Asia including, but not limited to, European rivals
In the corporate form of the Dutch (VOC) and English (EIC) East India
Companies, as well as local indigenous powers like the Omani Arabs, the
Mararhas under Shivaji, the Moslem sultans of Bijapur and Golconda, the
Nayakas of Ikkeri, the powerful Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, and a series
of petty rulers in littoral Africa.
In many ways, therefore, the early 1660s marked the nadir of Portu-
guese power in Asia during the early modern period. Economically, prob-
lems had begun as early as the IS70S when, as Lane has shown, the Levant
trade exploited by Portugal's European and Asiatic competitors began to
revive. By r600, the Crown managed to import "little more than 12,000
quintale, most of which was low-priced pepper" via the Cape.' Moreover,
while pepper prices generally rose in India, the price that the Crown could
command for this commodity at sale in Lisbon fell from 4S-SS cruzados per
quirual in the rs80sto 20-25 cruzados in the I620S.' These financial difficul-
ties had of course been exacerbated by the entrance of the joint-stock East
India companies of the United Provinces and England during the first de-
cade of the rvth century. The armed annexation of the Portuguese Crown
by Philip Il's armies in 1580 following D. Sebastiao's romantic debacle at
El-Ksar cl-Kcbir had also ushered in a protracted period (IS80-r640) when
Madrid, according to some, bled Portugal and her empire dry in a
doomed attempt to perpetuate Habsburg dominance in Europe.' This an-
nexation had also exposed Portuguese possessions in Brazil, Africa, and
the Indian Ocean to the onslaught of the Protestant powers, and a host of
military setbacks for the Estado characterized the middle decades of the
rxth century. Hurmuz, the key to the Persian Gulf trade, was lost to a jomr
English-Persian attack in 1622. Melaka, a major entrepot in the Indone-
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sian trade, fell to a prolonged VOC blockade in 1641. By 1658, all of the
Portuguese strongholds on Ceylon, locus of the lucrative cinnamon trade,
had been captured by the Dutch. Finally, in early 1663 immediately follow-
ing Mello de Castro's arrival in India, the Estado lost its remaining pos-
session on the pepper rich Malabar coast to the VOC: When the count of
Obidos assumed the Viceregal office in 1652, the deed of transfer had still
listed some twenty major coastal strongholds, by the 1660s only half that
number remained."
Diverse explanations have been proffered over the years to explain this
rather precipitous decline. Rather predictably, Portuguese historians and
others have long argued that this reversal of fortunes was occasioned by
Philip II's actions and the unfortunate decades of the so-called Spanish
Captivity that followed." British historians of the past century like F.e.
Danvers, R.S. Whiteway, V.A. Smith, and W.W. Hunter argued that it
was the corrupt nature of Portuguese administration in Asia, and by im-
plication the moral shortcomings of Lisbon's servants, that undermined
the work of Da Gama and Albuquerque." For OR. Boxer, the reasons for
Portugal's imperial decline were more straightforward: "the superior eco-
nomic resources, superior manpower,[and] superior firepower" of the
United Provinces." Niels Sreensgaard has more recently maintained that
the entrance of the more advanced proto-capitalist entrepreneurial com-
panies of the English and Dutch into the Asian trade doomed the monar-
chical monopolism of the Portuguese Crown to virtual extinction." One
constant, however, in this century of hisroriography is that the year 1663
indeed marks an important watershed in the history of the Estado, for the
loss of Cochin early that year is generally considered to have constituted
the death knell for Portuguese power in Asia. The loss of the Malabar
possessions coming in the wake of the earlier losses in the Moluccas,
Hurmuz, Melaka, and Ceylon has been viewed as the concluding chapter
in a century of rapid, if not inevitable "decline". The words used by the
Jesuit Manoel Godinho, who made the overland trip from Goa to Lisbon
in that fateful year, to describe the Estado have often been quoted: "If it
was a giant, it is now a pigmy; if it was great, it is now nothing. ".,
Godinho's overblown description, typical of the standard Jesuit ac-
counts of that period, along with a general acceptance of the dictum of
"stagnation and decline" have stood until now as the definitive word on
the post-1663 Estado." Consequently, while volume upon scholarly vol-
ume traces the rise of the empire and the exploits of Da Gama and Albu-
querque et al., and a notable body of work details the setbacks of 1620-
1663, not a single secondary work has yet appeared on the post-recj
Estado. This dearth of literature is unfortunate. That the Estado was re-
duced in size is undeniable, equally so is that problems and setbacks con-
INTRODUCTION
tinued for the remainder of the rzth century. Nevertheless, this should
neither detract from nor obscure the fundamental fact that the years from
c. 1663-1683 were vital ones for the Estado da India. Based on the extant
manuscript collections in Lisbon and Goa, there is every indication that
the years commencing with the reign of Prince Regent Pedro (1668) and
culminating with the Viceroyalty of Luis de Mendonca Furrado (1671-
1677) witnessed a notable reformation campaign. The wide-ranging re-
forms discussed and implemented during these years emanated from the
belief on the part of Pedro, his grandee advisors, and the members of the
Overseas Council in Lisbon, that the remaining Asian holdings, if prop-
erly administered and exploited, in conjunction with the rich Rios de
Cuama region of Mozambique could serve as the basis for a profitable
and viable Estado" The political, economic, military, and religious re-
forms that were part and parcel of this campaign would ultimately result
III a gradual srabilization of the Asian empire after a half century of set-
backs in Europe and the East.
This study will concentrate on detailing the motivations, underlying
assumptions, specific policies, and results of this reformation campaign in
Portuguese Monsoon Asia. It will also seek to examine the structurallim-
its imposed on this campaign by the internal political, cultural, and eco-
nomic structures of early modern Portuguese society. An important
consideration in this process will be to define the nature and structures of
the absolutist state in Braganza Portugal, developments that can also be
largely dated from the accession to power of Pedro and his claque of aris-
tocratic supporters in late 1667_ Much of the spirited historiographical de-
bate on the transition from feudalism to capitalism in early modern
Europe, and the concurrent rise of the absolutist state, has ignored these
developments in Portugal, the "other" Iberian kingdom. For far too long,
this historiography, like the literature on the posr-rsej Estado, has largely
reinforced the academic validity of the cliche "everyone loves a winner",
and in doing so relegated the serious study of POSt-I5th century Portugal
to the backwaters of scholarly scrutiny. The traditional hisroriography on
the absolutist state has also tended to be rather Eurocentric in approach
and focus, overlooking the role that the overseas empires of these states,
including Portugal, played In such developments. One of the seminal
events of the early modern period was obviously the creation of a world
market economy which began with the voyages of Columbus and Da
Cama. As Raynal noted in his L 'Histoire philisophique: "There has never
been an event as important for the human race in general and the peoples
of Europe in particular, as the discovery of the New World and the pas-
sage to the [East] Indies by the Cape of Good Hope. Thus began a revolu-
tion In trade, the power of nations, in money, industry, and the
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government of all peoples.'?" To exclude outre-mer considerations in the
study of the absolutist states of Europe, and especially Portugal, is there-
fore a less than satisfactory methodology to adopt.
In one fashion or another, the Crown and all segments of Portuguese
society had been influenced by the creation of an overseas empire during
the late rsth and early reth centuries and the benefits that had flowed to
the metropolis during the glory years of the Estado. This influence would
continue during the late rrrh century as well: the Crown would seek the
perceived wealth of Asia with renewed vigor, segments of the nobility, as
always, would seek lucrative positions in colonial administration, some
among the mercantile class, and particularly the New Christians would
seek to end monarchical monopolism and open the trade to all the king's
subjects, the popular classes would help, or be forced, to defend such pos-
sessions and fleetingly glimpse or sample the Asiatic goods that the car-
racks brought back from the East. A fundamental link therefore existed
between the internal structural changes inherent in the formative years of
the absolutist states of Europe and the policies adopted in the empires of
those kingdoms. Braganzan absolutism of the late r-th century and the
reformation campaign in the Estado da India were logically the product
of the varying challenges confronting Portuguese society and govemmenr
during these years. These differing challenges at home in the Reino and
abroad in the imperio would at times necessitate fundamentally different,
and even contradictory, responses from the Crown and its Viceroy.
What were these challenges? At home, the primary threat, as in most
of Europe, would come from a peasantry freed from the yoke of feudalism
and not yet enslaved by wage labor, as well as an increasingly powerful
merchant class embodied most visibly in the New Christian community."
In Europe, the primary threat was that of the military from renascent
Bourbon ambitions on the continent; ambitions that would thrust Europe
into prolonged warfare for most of the second half of the rrrh century and
in doing so most particularly threaten Portugal with renewed warfare
with Spain. Overseas, the threat would continue to come primarily from
the capitalist companies of the Dutch and English, and after 1664 the joint-
stock entities of Colbert as well. The reformation campaign undertaken in
the Estado da India from roughly 1668 until 1683 offers a prime example of
how the overseas empires of the European powers challenged, reflected,
and helped to define the nature of the absolutist state, and conversely how
the policies pursued by such states in their empires were in many cases a
reflection of these structures, and the limits such structures inevitably
placed on the Crown.
Despite such "structural" limitations, there is definitive manuscript
evidence to suggest that beginning in c. 1668 a series of reforms were initi-
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ated in the Estado that resulted in a gradual stabilization of Portugal's
Asian empire by the early 1680s. These reforms had a fundamental impact
on the fortunes of India Portuguesa and its ability to survive as a viable
entity into the eighteenth century, overcoming in the process the plethora
of daunting challenges and decades of setbacks that had confronted Anto-
010 de Mello de Castro upon his arrival in India in 1662. That these impor-
tant advances were recognized by contemporaries in the trade is
admirably reflected in statements made by Portugal's rivals in Asia.
Grudging praise for this unexpected rehabilitation is even found in the of-
ficial correspondence of the English East India Company, and especially
that from Gerald Aungier, the astute English President in Bombay. As
early as 1674, Aungier, in a letter to his Directors in London, detailed the
initial stage of the rehabilitation of Portuguese trade in the Indian Ocean.
"The Portuguese follow their trade as well in India as Europe vigorously,
they have sent this yeare fewer shipps full laden for Lisboa, two or three
shipps for China, some to Mossambique, Monbass & Patta, & in Octo-
ber last they sent an Armada consisting of 5 shipps & about 10 small
frigatts well-manned to the Persian Gulph. '''0 In its most elemental form,
this study will therefore examine the process by which the Portuguese
Crown, in the span of less than tWO decades, was able to turn the pitiful
lamentations of Mello de Casrro 1OtO the respectful, even envious, de-
scriptions of Aungier and other competitors in the trade. The details of
this significant volte-face have never hitherto been told.
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Priorities in the Reino, c. 1640-1683
The two decades beginning in r660 were crucial to Portuguese history.
Above all, this period witnessed a gradual stabilizarion of the kingdom
following the ravages of the preceding two decades. The consolidation of
what might be described as Braganzan absolutism also took place during
these years. These developments, like most crucial events affecting Crown
fortunes in the Reino, in Europe, and the imperio were tied to perhaps the
seminal event in seventeenth-century Portuguese history: the revolution
of r640 against the Spanish Habsburgs and the subsequent twenty-eight
year Restoration struggle. It is therefore difficult to understand the re-
forms of the years after r660 without understanding the initial events and
stages of the Restoration period. In the midst of the annus horribilis of
1640 for Ph/lip IV and Olivares, a group of provincial nobles had finally
convinced the duke of Braganza to accept a renascent Portuguese throne
after sixty years of foreign "captivity". The duke, the largest landowner
in Portugal and overlord of some 80,000 people, had long demonstrated
an "evasive and overcautious attitude" towards such intrigues, often dis-
heartening his supporters who for a time even considered a republican so-
lution as in the United Provinces to effect the revolt against Spain. D. joao
finally acceded to such demands in late 1640, and arrived in Lisbon on De-
cember, 6. He was crowned joao IV nine days later on a platform in the
palace square along the Tagus river, the Terreiro do Paco. While Philip IV
and Olivares, absorbed with mounting setbacks in the Thirty Years war
and facing internal revolts like the Catalan uprising, were unable to re-
conquer its erstwhile lucrative vassal state immediately; the independence
war would in fact drag on for most of the next three decades, draining the
resources of both countries in the process.'
The new Portuguese king was neither a brilliant nor particularly char-
ismatic figure. Yet, these were not prerequisites for the task at hand.
Rather, he was cautious, stubborn, and with relatively modest ambitions
that did not "extend beyond the limits of Portugal, the dominions
whereof only, he desired to preserve himself".' While joao IV may have
rather unexpectedly laid claim to a royal dynasty in 1640, his position
"was certainly not to be envied".' The break with Philip IV created a
plethora of political, economic, and religious problems that would largely
set the tone for Portuguese Crown policy in Europe and in the empire for
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the decades that followed. Not only would Lisbon find itself involved in a
bloody struggle with the Habsburgs on the continent, but the eminently
successful campaign of the East and West India Companies of the United
Provinces of the Netherlands would also continue for much of the same
period. This viCIOUS campaign in the outre-mer would not only demand
naval and military expenditures that the Crown could ill-afford, but it
also witnessed the temporary or permanent loss of a series of valuable
possessions in Brazil, Africa, and the Indian Ocean. On the religious side,
Spanish influence with the Holy See and Urban VIII ensured that Rome
would not recognize the new dynasty; and by 1668, twenty of the twenty-
eight dioceses in Portugal and overseas had no legal prelate! The tri-di-
mensional struggle in Europe, the New World and Africa, and the Estado
da India would therefore dominate the calculations of joao IV and his Im-
mediate successors after 1656; D. Luisa de Gusmao, his wife and Queen
Regent (1656-1662), D. Afonso VI, his son and king (1662-1668), and Pedro,
his son and Prince Regent (1668-1683).
The kingdom that the early Braganza rulers fought to maintain for
their Infant dynasty in many ways resembled the essentially late-medieval
kingdom that Philip ll's army had conquered for him some sixty years
previously in the wake of Dom Scbastiao's debacle in North Africa. The
traditional juridical orders or "estates" of clergy, nobility, and common-
ers remained firmly entrenched. Of a total population of ea. 1.5 million,
35,000 or so (4%) were clergy, another 150,000 (10%) nobles, and the re-
maining 86% commoners. As III most of Europe, rea! and honorific privi-
leges set the upper estates apart, as did their dominance over landed
property, by far the most important sector in the still agrarian based econ-
omy. By some estimates, the privileged orders controlled nearly two-
thirds of the land in Portugal. This wealth and a near monopoly of lucra-
tive colonial appointments from the Crown gave the nobility more than
sufficient power to meet any challenge from the urban merchant class, a
group that in any case generally aspired to noble status and remained en-
fceblcd by the lingering schism between the Old and New Christians in
Lisbon and the other port cities.' Still, the Portuguese nobility, like their
counterparts throughout continental Europe, evidently perceived that its
traditional social dominance was under attack by the twin threats of a
peasantry emerging from the bonds of feudalism and the growmg wealth
of the merchant classes. In such circumstances, following the revolution
of 1640, absolutism found favorable conditions in which to take root in
Portugal. '
The nobility therefore played a pivotal role in the rise of the absolutist
state in Portugal under the Braganzas and concurrently 10 the quest to re-
habilitate the Estado da India in the years after c. 1668. This cstarc was far
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from homogeneous. Nevertheless, all nobles in Portugal enjoyed carefully
prescribed rights, exemptions, and privileges that definitively distin-
guished them from the povo. There were six basic grades within the Por-
tuguese nobility. The titulares or grandees held the highest rank and
included dukes, marquises, and counts, some of whom could claim lineal
ties to the royal family. FidaIgos or fidaIgos do solar owned their own
castles or country manor houses and lands from which they took their ti-
tles. Fidalgos dos Lioros de El Rey had their coats of arms or escudos reg-
istered with the Crown. FidaIgos simples came from families who had not
engaged in manuallabor for at least four generations. Fidalgos de espada
were holders of the higher military ranks, while Fidalgos togados in-
cluded the chief civil ministers of the realm.'
Nobles holding the rank of Fidalgos simples and above held the right
to belong to one of the four great Portuguese military orders. Aviz, Santi-
ago, and Christ all dated to the nth and rjth centuries and had been
founded as part of the crusades against Islam. Afonso Henriques, Portu-
gal's first king, had founded the order of Saint-john of Jerusalem in the
late rath century for much the same purpose. These Orders had played a
vital role in the reconquista effort against the Moors. While initially
founded as small aristocratic and Christian brotherhoods noted for their
typically medieval quests of charitable works, chivalrous behavior, and
valiant acts in fighting the Infidel, they had soon evolved into very influ-
ential social and economic institutions, possessing huge tracts of lands
granted by a grateful Crown. These extensive properties, called
commanderies, were much coveted prizes for higher ranking nobles. For
example, the Order of Christ owned the lands of Tomar and Soura and c.
450 commanderies throughout the realm. As in Spain, the King had be-
come Grand Master of Portugal's three most important military orders,
and the Crown was thus able to bestow these properties to deserving no-
bles, usually for two generations. The commanderies guaranteed a nota-
ble economic return to their holders in the form of tithes paid by landed
peasants and tenants living on these properties, as well as clear and per-
petual titles.'
Yet, the economic position of the noble estate was far from secure.
Wedded to an agrarian regime that was increasingly anachronistic and a
social mentalite that discouraged involvement in trade, while mandating
huge expenditures on a conspicuous lifestyle, many Portuguese nobles
found it difficult to make ends meet as the rsth century, a period of gen-
eral economic decline, continued. Living largely off the collections of rev-
enues from leases and produce from rural estates, lavish expenditures at
court ensured that aristocratic indebtedness also increased after ,640. De-
spite their extensive land-holdings, the nobility was thus forced to supple-
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ment their mcomes and lifestyles by income from the imperio, that is to
say from the Crown's far-reaching colonies in Brazil, Africa, and the
Estado. The entrenched law of primogeniture also ensured that the youn-
ger sons of large noble families had also been forced into service of the
Church and in the empire to find alternative sources of wealth to increase
the economic and social position of the family and its casa, It appears that
most of the money made from service in the empire was usually re-in-
vested in landed property and not into more productive mercantile enter-
pnses that would have broken the vestigial medieval cycle of economic
uncertainty. These rather harsh economic realities meant that the Portu-
guese nobility was increasingly dependent on Crown largesse as the sev-
enteenth century progressed. The alliance or perhaps better quid pro quo
that resulted at the expense of the peasantry and bourgeoisie and sanc-
tioned by the Church, constituted the leitmotif of Braganzan absolutism
once the yoke of Habsburg sovereignty had been broken in 1640.'
By the beginning of the 17thcentury, the nobility had already been dif-
ferentiated into four functional categories: nobles of the sword, nobles of
the robe, the provincial nobility, and finally the court and administrative
nobility. While a degree of mobility certainly existed within these groups,
the primary criteria for such social movement was possessing sufficient
rank within the noble estate itself. During the Habsburg period, the court
nobility had predictably been undermined in favor of the provincial nobil-
ity as part of Madrid's strategy to dominate the kingdom by destroying ef-
fective centralized control and fostering regionalism. Nevertheless, by the
time of Philip IV, this ploy backfired. The robe nobility, schooled at the
University of Coimbra under legal scholars like Padre Francisco Suarcz,
preserved the principle of renascent rule under an indigenous dynasty.
Moreover, the provincial nobility favored during the "captivity" at the
expense of the court and administrative nobility in Lisbon, was suffi-
ciently strong by 1640 to place the leading provincial noble of the realm on
the throne, based on hereditary ties to the Aviz dynasty and the legal doc-
trines current in Coimbra.
A crucial consideration in understanding the subsequent quid pro quo
which developed between the Crown and the nobility during the forma-
rive years of the Restoration is that while the early Braganzas were Iogi-
cally forced to revive the fundamental role of the court and administrative
nobility, they did so by bringing in erstwhile members of the provincial
nobility to fill these lofty positions III the capital. The titulares of the years
after 1660 were almost invariably the sons of provincial nobles who had
supported joao IV and who followed the new king to Lisbon to receive his
grateful largesse. This largesse, of course, took the rather traditional form
of bestowing commanderies, appointments to the king's main councils, as
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well as to the most lucrative posnngs in the empire. Men like D. Nuno
Alvares Pcreira de Melo (1638-1727), the first duke of Cadaval; D. joac de
Mascarenhas (1633-1681), the marquis de Fronteira; D. Luis de Meneses,
third count of Ericeira; and especially joao Nunes da Cunha, first count
of Sac Vicenre; Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque, (d. 1677) the
first count of Lavradio, and D. Pedro de Almeida, the first count of
Assumar (d. 1679} all fit this scenario. By the reign ofPedro, first as Prince
Regent (1668-1683} and then as king (1683-IJ06), such men dominated the
administrative system of the Braganzas at home and in the imperio. Dur-
ing the crucial decades of the 1670S and 1680s as Portugal strove to consoli-
date her position once again in continental as well as imperial matters,
Cadaval, Fronteira, and Ericeira dominated the king's councils and
helped to set economic, religious, and foreign policy. Sac Vicente would
serve as Viceroy of the Estado in the late I660s. Lavradio would oversee
the rehabilitation campaign in the Asian empire in the 1670S and be suc-
ceeded by Assumar."
The administrative system after 1640 was a hybrid of legacies from the
Aviz dynasty, the eighty years of Habsburg rule, combined with a few in-
novations of the early Braganzas. The Secretariat of State dated from the
reth century and controiled the broad outlines of domestic, colonial, and
foreign policy as well as the armed forces. The Council of State (c. 1569)
was clearly the supreme administrative body for deciding issues of war
and peace as well as making the highest civil, military, and ecclesiastical
appointments. The tragic loss of most of the records of this council in the
Lisbon earthquake of 1755 certainly complicates the task of establishing
the subtleties of Crown policy during these years." The Council of War
was one innovation of the Braganza period, established by joao IV in De-
cember 1640 to muster the resources of the kingdom against the Spanish.
This Council appointed officers of the army, navy, supervised fortifica-
tion in the realm and was responsible for the conduct of war. The
Desembargo do Paco or Supreme Court was presided over by a great no-
ble and composed of 6 judges or desembargadores, one of whom was an
ecclesiastic. The Council of Finance directed economic policy and was
headed by 3 Vedores or superintendents, all noblemen. The Court of Ac-
counts, the Casa da India, the Mint, the royal dockyards or Ribeira, and
Consulates, the Customs Houses or Alfimdega and the Junta do
Comercio do Brasil were all subordinate to this Council. The Overseas or
Colonial Council dated from 1643, replacing the old Council of India. A
noble president, 6 councilors (2 nobles, 4 lawyers), and assorted secretar-
ies and clerks oversaw the government of the colonial possessions of the
Crown, the organization of the merchant fleet, and colonial mercantile
policy, expecting that of Brazil. There were ample opportunities within
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this burgeoning administrative structure to bestow royal largesse to de-
serving nobles and concurrently to create a service nobility at home as
well as in the empire."
The traditional representative body of the three juridical estates was
the Cortes. This meeting of the three estates, with each assembling in a
separate monastery was technically needed for the approval of all new
taxes. Between ,641-1698, the Cortcs in fact met only 8 times, and not at all
from 1679-1697, nor again after 1698. Perhaps the most fundamental weak-
ness of the body was that, like the Parliament in England before 1640 and
the Estates-General in France, it had never obtained more that an advi-
sory function. The Crown retained the right to convoke or close the body
and the idea that redress should precede supply had also never been estab-
lished. The Cartes narrowed in both function and composition during
these years. Matters formerly within their control were Increasingly de-
cided either by Crown officials or the guilds. Under the early Braganzas,
therefore, the chief functions of the Cartes were to rubber stamp matters
relating to the dynasty or to approve new taxation. For example, in 1641 it
met to recognize joao IV and the revolution, and in early 1668 it met to
sanction the coup against Afonso VI by Pedro. On matters of taxation,
the 1641 body approved an initial 1.8 million cruzados to fight the war
against the Habsburgs by imposing a property tax of 10% on all classes
except the clergy, which would contribute a lump sum according to the
resources of each diocese. The r668 Cartes assisted the economic recovery
of the realm under Pedro and Ericcira by sanctioning a series of excise
taxes known as the real d'agua to raise some 500,000 cruzados."
Increasingly assured of the support of an erstwhile provincial nobility
wedded to the largesse of the new regime, bolstered by the continuing eco-
nomic and moral support of the largest landowner in the realm, the Ro-
man Catholic Church, and with the Cortes under control, joao IV and his
successors could concentrate on the most pressing issues confronting the
new dynasty: the continuing Restoration struggle with Spain, and the
quest to regaIn a semblance of stability in the overseas empIre. Between
1640 and his death In r656, joao IV pursued relatively straightforward pri-
orities at home and in the imperio. Economically, his strategy was simple:
raise as much money as possible to fight the war against the Spanish and
Dutch. Sensitive to the fragile nature of the kingdom's economy, .loa 0
sought various subsidies from the four meetings of the Cartes during his
reign, hut did everything he could to avoid raising direct taxes. The first
Braganza ruler also found a ready source of cash in the form of the mer-
chant community, especially the New Christians, who were more than
willing to lend the king money in return for certain considerations regard-
mg the activities of the Inquisition. From 1649-1659, for example, in an ex-
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tremely controversial move, immunity was conferred upon the property
of New Christians sentenced by the Holy Office in Portugal. Additionally,
the administration over property that had already been confiscated was
transferred from the Inquisition to the state. joao was also anxious to de-
velop an extensive trade with Brazil and northern Europe, as a means to
break the traditional commercial ties with Spain and her trading net-
work."
Militanlv, joao IV's main task was to withstand the Spanish on-
slaught. This was a far from facile task given the generally dismal state of
the kingdom's defenses. Border fortifications had predictably lapsed into
disrepair during the Habsburg period, the royal stud farms had been dis-
continued in 1580, the army was virtually non-existent, and the once
vaunted navy was in disarray. These sizable handicaps, joao's cautious
nature, and a chronic lack of money easily explain the largely defensive
strategy adopted by the Portuguese during the first sixteen years of the
Restoration struggle. Fortunately, Philip IV and Olivares were unable to
bring the full weight of Spain's military might to bear at this juncture.
Madrid's military commitments to fighting the French down to 1659,
quelling the Catalan revolt until 1652, and overcoming the rebellion of the
duke of Medina Sidonia in Andalucia in 1641all diverted men and materi-
als from the quest to regain Portugal. The war, therefore, largely rook the
form of limited border operations centered on the main towns of
Montijo, Elvas, and Badajoz, directed by successive commanders includ-
ing the count of Obidos, Matias de Albuquerque (later the count of
Alegrete], and the marquis of Torrecusa. The most notable Portuguese
victories came at Montijo (1644) and Arronches (1653). Nevertheless, the
war in the Alentejo furnished an indispensable chivalric proving ground
for the sons of the provincial nobility that had placed joao IV on the
throne. D. Pedro de Lencastre, Anronio de Mello de Castro, Luis de
Mendonca Furtado, and D. Pedro de Alrneida would all win their spurs in
combat with the Spanish under the wilting sun of the Alentejo in prepara-
tion for their more lucrative careers in the empire in the years that fol-
lowed."
Diplomatically, joao IV's foremost priorities were to seek settlements
with the Dutch and, if possible, the Spanish, based on a much desired
League with France that would ideally be cemented by a dynastic mar-
riage between one of his daughters and Louis XIV. Despite his most dili-
gent efforts, the king and his agents were never able to achieve these goals.
The United Provinces, in the midst of stripping Portugal of some of her
most valuable overseas possessions, snubbed all entreaties to a negotiated
peace down to 1661, rejecting over that time offers of 200,000 cruzados to
the stadholder personally and between 2-3 million to the Dutch West India
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Company. Philip IV remained firmly committed to reconquering Portugal
and similarly rejected all attempts at mediation and recognition of the
new dynasty. The most logical mediator between the two Iberian powers,
England, was of course debilitated for a time by the convulsions of the
revolution and Civil War. Moreover, joao IV's rather ill-conceived sup-
port for the royalist side, especially after Charles I's execution in 1649 and
the subsequent arrival of Prince Rupert's fleet in the Tagus, ultimately re-
sulted in the Angle-Portuguese conflict of 1652-1654. This war with Crom-
well ended only with the harsh list of economic clauses incorporated into
the treaty ratified at Alcantara in June 1654. The French, moreover, under
both Richclieu and Mazarin viewed Portugal primarily as a convenient
pawn to be used for leverage in negotiations with Madrid. Despite
Richelieu's pact with joao IV of 1641 which obliged the Portuguese to en-
ter the war and a plethora of diplomatic missions, no grand League was
arranged. In fact, the most prominent characteristics of Franco-Portu-
guese relations during the reign was, on one side, the gradual diminution
of French support for joao's position in its negotiations with Madrid and,
on the other, the proffering of increasingly attractive terms by Lisbon in
its envoys to Paris, culminating in the 1656 embassy of Fr. O'Daly.'"
In the far flung imperio, the new dynasty had been acclaimed almost
unanimously. Only the tiny enclave of Ceuta in North Africa had re-
mained loyal to Philip IV. As joao IV soon discovered, however, being ac-
claimed king was one thing, attempting to maintain a global empire in the
face of the Dutch onslaught, quite another! The reign in fact witnessed the
loss or near loss of many of Portugal's most lucrative imperial holdings.
By1641, the Dutch West India Company had already taken parts of north-
ern Brazil with johan Maurits installed at Pernambuco, as well as pieces
of Angola and Solo Tome. In the Estado da India, the VOC finally cap-
tured Melaka in 1641 after periodic sieges (1616, 1629, 1633-), the Omani
Arabs had expelled them from Maskar in 1650, the Dutch had begun the
process of reducing Portuguese dominance over the lucrative island of
Ceylon in the late 1630S by capturing the bay of Batticaloa (1638) and then
Trincomalee (1640) and Calle (1644), while Goa (blockade from 1637 on-
ward), and Macau (1626,1626) were also either attacked or blockaded for
months at a time. A ten year truce with the Dutch from 1641-1651,gained at
the expense of huge commercial concessions at home, temporarily inter-
rupted this panoply of losses, but the setbacks continued in Asia after this
arrangement lapsed."
The enormity of these challenges, when juxtaposed with the paucity of
the resources at joao IV's disposal, naturally ensured that a triage took
place in attempting to defend the imperio. The traditional view of events
is that joao and his advisors ultimately decided to embrace the dcfense of
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the emerging colony of Brazil at the expense of the interests of the Estado.
In Boxer's often repeated phrase, the king viewed Brazil as the "milch-
cow" of the Reino and its empire and was determined to preserve it, even
if this meant abandoning the Asian possessions." Portuguese historians
have generally supported this view and lauded the king for his wisdom in
doing so, given the huge potential value of Brazil and the dubious nature
of future revenues from the Asian possessions. The significant level of set-
tlers in Brazil at the time, their spontaneous revolt against the Dutch
which resulted in their expulsion by the rnid-1650S, the profits made on the
sugar trade, and the ever-present allure of gold III the interior all certainly
argue in favor of this view." Nevertheless, it is also likely that this argu-
ment is somewhat Whiggish, based at least partially on Brazil's subse-
quent prosperity. In any event, the late r640sand 1650S were characterized
by a lack of serious support for the Asian empire and continuing losses
and setbacks for the Estado. Dutch blockades of Goa interrupted the
sailings of the Carreira da India for years at a time, while indigenous rul-
ers like the king of Golconda demonstrated their rising contempt for the
cartaz system by abandoning the practice of purchasing such passes. Per-
haps nothing demonstrates the weakness of Crown authority in the
Estado at the end of joao's reign better than the coup d'etat of D. Braz de
Castro in 1653, who with a group of fidaglos overthrew the legitimate
Viceroy, the count of Obidos, and held power in the Asian capital for the
next two years!" joao IV died in early November 1656, with the work of
securing the dynasty and what remained of the empire still very much in-
complete. This weighty task would instead fall to his wife and sons.
D. Luisa de Gusmao was well-suited to this challenge. Sister of the
duke of Medina Sidonia, she had married joao and then thrown "herself
heart and soul into the cause of Portugal". Intelligent, ambitious, and un-
afraid of the implications of the break with Spain, she had demonstrated
more support for the plot against the Habsburgs in its initial stages than
had her husband. The revolution of 1640 had given her royal status, and
D. Luisa was determined to maintain the future of her children and the
dynasty." At home, her main political problem related to the immediate
succession. She had borne the king three sons: Teodosio (b. 1634), Afonso
(b. 1643), and Pedro (b. 1648). From 1640, Teodosio had been groomed to
succeed his father. The Infante was an intelligent youth who, while receiv-
ing an adequate education from his tutors, also chaffed under the rigor-
ous court etiquette of his parents. In 1651, he had fled these constraints for
the adventures of the war in rhe Alentejo. There, Teodosio had rather na-
ively demonstrated his free-thinking manner by writing to his father from
Elvas, urging him to make good on the arrears in pay the Crown owed to
many of its troops. For a rime.joao IV and D. Luisa evidently feared some
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type of military coup. At length, however, the young prince was induced
back to court where he received the title of Captain-General of Arms.
Tragically, Teodosio died from an illness in 1653 at the age of nineteen."
Upon joao IV's death in the fall of 1656, therefore, Afonso, then a child
of ten, was next in line to the throne. One of the most enigmatic figures in
Portuguese history, this prince had evidently suffered some type of para-
lytic seizure early III life that had left his right arm and leg partially para-
lyzed and, according to some, also affected "his understanding". Even
though the Cartes of 1653 had proclaimed Afonso the legitimate heir upon
his brother's untimely death, there was certainly opposition to the idea of
enthroning him three years later. Members of all three Estates wanted the
youth to demonstrate his abilities before his accession to the throne,
others argued that in such perilous times a king was needed, whatever the
potential drawbacks. In the end, a de facto compromise resulted; Afonso
VI was proclaimed nine days after his father's death as a rallying point for
the povo, while D. Luisa ruled as Regent." During her Regency, the
Queen shared power with a group of conservative nobles who dominated
the Council of State. Overall, the Queen Regent pursued policies at home
and abroad that largely followed the priorities established by her hus-
band."
Milirarily, the war with Spain and the United Provinces dominated the
deliberations of the Queen and her Councils. D. Luisa made "great ef-
forts" to reorganize and encourage her troops in the Alentejo, and in the
years after 1656 there is evidence to suggest that she was much more punc-
tual in paying her army than joao IV had been. While Philip IV may have
vowed to take advantage of his rival's death to launch a decisive offensive,
his war with Cromwell conspired to keep the Spanish fleets In their har-
bars, thus relieving D. Luisa of any fear of attack by sea. Despite all of D.
Luisa's efforts, however, the military situation in early 1660 was as serious
as it had been in 1640; war with Philip and the United Provinces still raged,
the Dutch had even attacked the Portuguese mainland In 1657 and block-
aded Lisbon for 3 months, the Puritan government of England was still
unsympathetic, and the Spanish-French settlement of 1659 had allowed
Philip to dispatch veteran tercios from Flanders and Italy to the frontier
with Portugal in preparation for the great Spanish offensives that would
begin the following year. '\
Diplomatically, D. Luisa continued to pursue the elusive League and
dynastic marriage with Prance as the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign
policy. In 1657, she offered Mazarin a dowry of I million cruzados and
either Tangier or Mazagao for such an arrangement. Whl1e the wily
Cardinal still viewed such negotiations primarily as a bargaining lever in
his talks with Phiiip IV, he did send the count of Cominges to Lisbon that
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summer with a clearly unacceptable counter-offer: a League with no dy-
nastic link for 2 million cruzados, an annual subsidy of 200,000 cruzados
for the remainder of the war, Tangier, and the use of 6 Portuguese war-
ships. By the time D. joao de Costa reached France in 1659 seeking mili-
tary aid, it was dear that rather ominous events were in the offing:
preliminaries for the peace between Paris and Madrid had already been
agreed to, Louis XIV would not be marrying Cararina, the Portuguese
Infanta, but in fact the Spanish Infanta, Maria Teresa. More unnerving
was the reality that Portugal would be excluded from the terms, despite
Louis XIII's pledge "to establish the king of Portugal in his present state
by means of a general peace". A secret article in the settlement in fact
obliged France to cut off relations with Lisbon so that "the affairs of Por-
tugal shall be placed in the state they were in previous to the revolution".
Da Costa did his best to modify what amounted to a fait accompli by of-
fering Mazarin 1 million cruzados and the bishophric of Evora to include
Portugal in the settlement. He even traveled with the Cardinal to St. Jean
de Luz, all to little avail. In early November, the peace of the Pyrenees
ended the long struggle between the Bourbons and the Habsburgs and ex-
posed Portugal to the full force of Philip IV's displeasure. The only con-
cession that da Costa received from Mazarin was permission to raise sub
rosa military support in France, most notably in the able form of the
Angle-German count Schomberg."
The harsh denouement of the traditional diplomatic priorities of the
posr-tcao period embodied in the peace of the Pyreenes and continuing
losses in the imperio placed the Lisbon hierarchy in an exceedingly diffi-
cult position by 1660, one which forced D. Luisa and her noble advisors to
embrace two rather "desperate" treaties in a quest to safeguard Portu-
guese independence, the dynasty, and whatever remained of the empire.
Despite the reclamation of northern Brazil and Angola from the Dutch in
the late 1640S and 1650S, the protracted struggle with the United Provinces
in the ultramar continued to have an extremely dilatory impact on the tra-
ditional overseas trade of the realm, especially with Asia. In the summer
of 1661, a peace settlement was signed between Portugal and the States-
General. The provisions of this settlement were hardly favorable to lis-
bon. Henceforth, Dutch merchants were to enjoy the same commercial
privileges in Portugal as the English had extorted in Cromwell's treaty of
1654, including a degree of religious freedom in Lisbon, the ability to buy
and sell warehouses and other property without hindrance, the right to
appoint their own Judge-Conservator, as well as various concessions in-
cluding customs duties. To satisfy Dutch claims over lost territory in
Brazil, D. Luisa promised to pay an indemnity of some 4 million cruzados,
to be paid primarily out of proceeds from the rich salt trade centered
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around the port of Setubal. This peace was signed on August 6, 1661 and
ratified by D. Luisa and her Council on May 24,1662. The States-General
only ratified the document on December 4, 1662, while the publication of
the treaty did not take place until the spring of 1663, a delay, as noted be-
low, with great import for the continuing Dutch campaign in the Indian
Ocean."
In the Estado da India, the Regency years witnessed a continuation of
the setbacks endured under jodo IV's indifferent rule in Asia. The on-
slaught of the vac against the Crown's fortresses on Ceylon continued.
Colombo and ]affna were soon lost, and by 1658 the Portuguese were ex-
pelled from the island. On the coast of India, Negapatam {1660} and
Quilon (1658, 1661), were also captured by the Dutch. In the midst of these
hostilities, local rulers like Sivappa Nayaka of Ikkcn, a state to the south
of Goa, exploited this situation by driving the Portuguese from their own
domains. In rhc mid-late 1650SSivappa Nayaka, for example, expelled the
Portuguese from their forts on the Kanara coast at Honawar, Basur, and
Mangalore. Injanuary 1662, the Dutch Governor-General of Ceylon and
Admiral Rijckloff Van Goens captured the fort of Cranganor on the
Malabar coast. Van Goens then besieged the strategic city of Cochin on
that same coast in February 1662, and again in October of that year. By the
8th of January 1663, the articles of capitulation were agreed to and ratified
by Van Goens and the Portuguese captain Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho.
On the nth of February 1663, Van Goens also captured Cannanore, thus
completing the process of expelling the Portuguese from their most im-
portant possessions on the pepper-rich Malabar coast."
Soon after the fall of Cannanore, news of the treaty signed berween D.
Luisa and the States-General reached India. Not surprisingly, the rather
irate Portuguese claimed that both Cochin and Cannanore should be re-
turned to them since they had been captured after the treaty had been
signed and ratified. The States-General and Directors of the VOC, the
Heeren XVII saw matters somewhat differently. Invoking Clause VI of
the treaty, which stipulated that "all hostilities and offensive deeds shall
cease ... in Europe within two months from the date that this treaty shall
be signed by both parties, and in other parts of the world from the date of
publication", the Dutch refused to restore these places since the publica-
tion of the treaty had been delayed until March 1663." The loss of these
possessIOns on Ceylon and along the Indian coast from 1656 to early 1663
certainly placed the Estado in a precarious position. Nevertheless, these
military defeats at the hands of the VOC and indigenous rulers were not
the only signs of continuing decadence in the Asian empire. The commer-
cial interchange between the Reino and Estado borne by the carracks and
sailings of the Carreira da India was all but halted during these years by
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Dutch attacks, a dearth of financial and political support from the
Crown, and periodic shipwrecks. As the Queen-Regent herself confided
to a French diplomat at court in 1659 in only slightly exaggerated terms,
no news had even been received from India in three years!"
To D. Luisa's credit, the second treaty signed in 1661 did seek to arran-
ge an effective solution to the realm's continuing problems with the
Dutch. With the long cherished League and dynastic marriage a dead is-
sue in Paris, the Queen-Regent sought solace elsewhere and found a will-
ing royal suitor for her daughter's hand in the recently restored Charles II.
The idea of a marriage alliance between these two Crowns was nothing
new, since Anronio de Sousa de Macedo, the Portuguese resident in Eng-
land from 1642-46, had vainly suggested a match between Charles and
[oao IV's daughter ]oanna at that time. Luisa's envoy to the renewed Sru-
art court, Francisco de Mello e Torres, later marquis de Sande, however,
offered Charles II and Clarendon extremely favorable terms; a dowry of 2
million cruzados, the cession of Tangier and of Bombay, the confirmation
of the lucrative commercial privileges in the Reino first set forth in the
1654 treaty with Cromwell; "the same privileges and irnmunities so far as
they shall relate to trade as the Portuguese themselves in the cities and
towns of Goa, Cochin, and Diu," provided not more than four families
resided in each place, and similar privileges in Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de
Janeiro, and "throughout all the dominions of the King of Portugal in the
West Indies".'
The English king, chronically short of money and anxious to win a de-
gree of freedom from an overbearing Parliament, accepted these generous
conditions with the approval of his royal benefactor Louis XIV. The mar-
riage treaty between the two Crowns was signed on June 23, 1661 and rati-
fied on August 28, 1661. In return for D. Luisa's largesse, Charles II in
essence agreed to offer protection to Portugal, her empire, and her over-
seas trade in light of the ravages inflicted over the previous decades by the
Dutch and Spanish. In Article XVI, London promised to maintain an Eng-
lish fleet on the Portuguese coast for the protection of the maritime trade
of the kingdom in genera! and the Brazil fleets in particular. In Article XV,
Charles declared that; "In consideration of all which concessions and
privileges, contributing so manifestly to the utility and benefit of the King
of Great Britain and his subjects in general," that he "promises and de-
clares ... that he will pay the sincerest regard to the interest and welfare
and Portugal and of all its dominions, and that he will, with his utmost
power, take upon him the defence of it both by land and sea, as if it were
England itself". Moreover in a secret article to this treaty, Charles 1I
promised to mediate between the Dutch and Portugal and failing that,
when he dispatched a fleet to occupy Bombay, he would "also send such
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force, which shall go well furnished of all the necessaries as well as of in-
structions, to defend, aid, and assist all the Portuguese country in the East
Indics''. "
D. Luisa, however, would not reign long enough to see the results of
her diplomatic maneuvers of the early 1660s. The political, economic, and
societal pressures engendered by the great Spanish offensives of the years
166H662, combined with increasing difficulties relating to the continua-
tion of the Regency all conspired against her. In the spring of 1662, she was
deposed as Regent by the mercurial Afonso VI and his favorite LUlS de
Vasconcellos e Sousa, the count of Castelo-Melbor. Yet, the Regency
years had done little to prepare Afonso for the demands of kingship. Al-
though the young king had evidently learned to read and write, Afonso
spent most of his time riding, coursing bulls, watching dog and cock
fights, and carousing with his claque of favorites in the streets of Lisbon at
night. In 1659, he had been given his own household, where a group of
young nobles and the more pedestrian Antonio Conti sought his favor.
Beginning in 1661, Conri, the son of stall holders in the Terre/TO do Paco,
established himself as the royal favorire. In June 1662, the Queen-Regent
sought to solidify the succession with two significant acts: Pedro, her
youngest son, received his own household in the Corte-Real palace, while
Cadaval, now Pedro's main supporter, used a clever ruse to exile Conri
and some of Afonso's other rowdy retainers to Brazil."
Ironically, these steps ensured D. Luisa's fall. Casrelo-Mclhor, the
ablest of Afonso's claque, convinced the king that he too might soon be
deposed. The pair rode to nearby Alcantara and met troops assembled for
his defcnse. Afonso then assembled the nobility and court and declared
that the Regency was at an end and that he had taken over the reins of
government." On 12 July, Castelo-Melhor assumed the title of escrivao da
puridade or private secretary, a very powerful "office nowhere but in Por-
tugal, even here rarely taken up, and once [by D. Sebastiao] abolished, as
too much [power I to be put into anyone hand" ." Henceforth, Castelo-
Me!hor alone would have access to the king and be able to Issue orders
and decrees in his name. Faced with this stinging pronuncimento, the sup-
port that Afonso VI seemingly enjoyed in Lisbon, and the exile of her sup-
porters like Anronio Vicira from court, D. Luisa, could do little but
acquiesce to the fait accompli. A year later she retired to a convent, where
she died in 1666 without fully reconciling with her son."
While D. Luisa waited to die in her convent, Afonso and Castelo-
Melhor confronted the dizzying array of internal and foreign problems
that were the legacy of his parent's rule. Afonso can perhaps best be de-
scribed as a mercurial, rebellious, adolescent, "a creature of impulse",
whose interests and abilities never transcended those of a spoiled twelve
30 RENASCENT EMPIRE?
year old. Indulged by his tutors and the nobles who frequented his house-
hold, he had, like his siblings, chafed under the stern dotage of his mother
and the rigid, even stifling, etiquette and formalism expected at a rzth-
century Iberian court. According to Robert South well, the English resi-
dent in Lisbon at this time, his mind was "very stout and courageous, but
so puffed up with a vain fancy of being the only Hector living that, when
he heard of any criminal that had done some barbarous murder, or
slaughtered the justice, he would presently call him to the court, and at
least make him one of his guards". While Afonso VI was "in his nature
exceedingly liberal", his largesse was often bestowed "on those who were
unworthy". "He knew nothing of dissimulation, but always told the
truth, so what evil he ever heard of any man, he would in his anger up-
braid him." His nocturnal wanderings in Lisbon's seamier districts
prompted Southwell to note that he "almost changed day into night and
night into day". As for his other "vices", the Englishman lamented: "He
sometimes smokes tobacco, and drinks wine, altogether beyond the stan-
dard of Portugal. For women he had a kind of seraglio, doting on them (as
they themselves affirm) without any effect." Moreover, Afonso had,
"with his own hands" killed "bulls, boars, and other beasts; and in fre-
quent occasions has shown too little respect to the lives of men"."
From the summer of 1662 onward, the count of Castelo-Melbor was
more than happy to encourage the king's lust for such diversions, while he
in turn dominated Crown policy. Son of a former governor-general of
Brazil, Vasconcellos e Sousa was "a young man of unquestioned ability
and great ambition" .' During these years, he strove to create the founda-
tion for an absolutist system in Portugal. Castelo-Melhor and his small
claque of similarly inclined young and ambitious nobles largely succeeded
in imposing a government by ministry on the erstwhile centers of power
embodied in the councils and the high courts. All sources of potential op-
position were also banished from Afonso VI's court, including most nota-
bly Cadaval, Marialva, and Vieira, men who increasingly looked to Pedro
for succor." Nevertheless, it is somewhat exaggerated to suggest that
Vasconcellos e Sousa became the "virtual dictator of Portugal" during the
mid-recos and "in this sense the precursor of Pombal and Salazar"."
There IS very little doubt, however, that Castelo-Melhor dominated
Crown priorities at this time. As escriuao de puridade, he decided the
main outlines of royal policy, decisions that were carried out in large part
by the efficient secretary of state, Antonio de Sousa de Macedo."
Castelo-Melhor's main interests revolved around continental matters,
to the virtual exclusion of all else. Whatever else may be said of him, the
count was largely responsible for orchestrating the final victory over
Spanish arms. Casrelo-Melhor accomplished this difficult task thanks to
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the fortuitous combination of sound strategy, more efficient control over
the armed forces, and much needed reinforcements in the form of English,
French, and German mercenaries under the able command of the count of
Schomberg, legacies from the 1659 and 1661 treaties." The victories of
Ameixal (June 1663) and Mantes Claros (June 1665) effectively blunted
Philip IV's final offensives under his bastard son, Don Juan of Austria and
the marquis of Caracena. The Spanish king died in September 1665, leav-
ing behind his four year old and sickly child, Charles 11, as king. The Ma-
drid court soon degenerated into a messy power struggle during the
Regency between his widow Queen Manana and Don Juan of Austria.
This struggle did much to undermine the ability of the Spanish to wage an
effective war with Portugal, in particular during the favorable years of
1666 and 1667, and to set the stage for an eventual end to the struggle that
had begun in December 1640."
Relatively confident of the outcome of the war against Madrid follow-
mg Mantes Claros, Castelo-Melhor turned his talents to diplomacy in or-
der to improve his bargaining position with the Habsburgs, to secure the
succession, and to undermme his enemies at home who were lobbying to
replace the king with Pedro. To achieve all of these ends, the count em-
braced the traditional strategy of joao IV and D. Luisa: the illusive quest
for a League and dynastic marriage with France. As early as 1662, Turennc
had suggested that the soundest method to repair the damaged relations
between the countries inherent in the peace of the Pyrennes and concur-
rently to secure French influence in Lisbon was to marry both Afonso and
Pedro to French princesses. Louis XIV, in the midst of preparing to lay
claim to the Spanish Netherlands m the wake of Philip IV's death, was
more than willing to encourage such a match. While Pedro ironically re-
jected such overtures in 1666, Castelo-Melhor did arrange a marriage be-
tween Afonso and Mademoiselle d'Aumale, Marie Francoise Isabelle of
Savoy, second daughter of the duke of Nemours, Charles Amadeus of
Savoy in that year. The most potentially damaging source of opposition
to such a match may have been Charles 11, since England had been doing a
great deal since 1664 to mediate a peace between the Iberian Crowns. In
the end, however, Louis's influence and the desire of the English king to
receive the unpaid portion of Catherine of Braganza's dowry via Marie-
Francoise's offering to Afonso sanctioned the match. In fact, Charles gave
the bride safe conduct from La Rochelle to Lisbon, which she reached on
August 2, 1666."
Mane Prancoise was an intelligent and ambitious woman. She arrived
in the Portuguese capital with the firm intention of "dominating her con-
sort and of forwarding French interests by every means in her power"."
Her confessor, the able Jesuit Fr. Vcrjus and the clever marqUis de Saint-
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Romain, dispatched as ambassador to Lisbon with the main objective of
preventing the conclusion of a Luso-Spanish treaty, were among those
who were determined to assist her in this quest. Her marriage to Afonso
was a travesty from the outset: although he escorted her to the church, the
king found the elaborate "ceremonies boring, and left her to preside over
the celebrations while he dined heavily in bed,,:6 According to most ac-
counts, Afonso was also an utter failure in the royal conjugal bed. The
new Queen, moreover, soon discovered that the king was in essence a
pawn in the calculations of Castelo-Melhor, who had no intention of
sharing any of the power he had amassed since retiring D. Luisa to the
convent. As Sourhwell succinctly noted: she found "a total disappoint-
ment in her bed, and a perfect insignificancy in the government". To rem-
edy these shortcomings, Marie-Francoise soon embraced Pedro and his
cause both figurarivally and literaly. Casrelo-Melhor, meanwhile, finally
concluded the long desired League with France in March 1667. Among
other things, this treaty granted the French most of the favorable trading
privileges the English and Dutch already enjoyed in the kingdom, and
obliged Portugal to enter the so-called War of Devolution with Spain."
Absorbed with all of these military and diplomatic machinations in
Europe, Castelo-Mclhor did very little to arrest the alarming setbacks that
had beset the Estado from 1640 onward. Van Goens's ravages on the
Malabar coast had culminated in early 1663. Meanwhile, on the textile
rich Coromandel coast of India, the Portuguese were expelled from the
town of San Theme by the combined forces of the Qutb Shahi king of
Goiconda, Abdu'l-Iah, and a Dutch fleet in the late spring of 1662. Portu-
guese merchants resident there were forced to seek shelter with the Eng-
lish India Company settlement at nearby Fort St. George in Madras:" A
nadir of sorts for the Carreira da India had been reached that same spring,
on the eve of Afonso's pronuncimento, when the Governor Antonio de
Mello de Castro had sailed aboard an English fleet under James Ley, the
earl of Marlborough, on the way to assume his office." The sailings of the
Carreira remained intermittent at best during the years that followed.
From 1663-1667, one and at most two vessels departed the Tagus for India,
and an even smaller number made the return voyage to the Reino from
Goa." A perusal of the official Crown correspondence with Goa during
these years suggests that Castelo-Melhor was content merely to adopt
skeleton measures that, in form if not substance, fulfilled the role ex-
pected of the Crown in Asia."
Castelo-Melhor had seemingly reached the zenith of his powers with
the long desired League with France in the spring of 1667. Ironically, the
internal and foreign implications of this alliance greatly assisted those
groups in Portugal determined to see the escrivao overthrown and Afonso
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removed from the throne. By the fall of 1667, an impressive array of forces
had assembled against Castelo-Melhor. Pedro wanted both power and to
be married to his lover and sister-in-law, the Queen. Marie-Francoise was
anxious for the same scenario, thinking that the removal of Castelo-
Melhor would in fact increase the influence of the French faction at court.
Cadaval, Mariailva, and other leading nobles wanted their power and the
power of the councils restored. The peace party in Lisbon was bolstered
by the deeply held desire of the povo for a settlement with Madrid, while
Castclo-Melhor's alliance only promised more years of warfare and suf-
fermg. Louis XIV wanted the removal of Sousa de Macedo, a staunch An-
glophile. The French monarch knew that Castelo-Melhor was still
negotiating with the Spanish rhrough England, and also believed that Por-
tugal would never be a "docile ally" until the Queen had replaced
Vasconcellos e Sousa. Encouraged in his diversions, Afonso was generally
oblivious to the garhering storm around him. "Surrounding himself with
the scum of society, running about the streets at night, and behaving like a
brigand and a murdered", the king commanded very little respect, sympa-
thy and support."
Afonso's overthrow, In true operatic style, unfolded slowly over the
summer and fall of 1667. In August, Sousa de Macedo was forced out of
office on trumped up charges. Castelo-Melhor and the Infante both ap-
pealed to the nobility, juiz de povo, and the military commanders for sup-
port. The escriuao also attempted, without success, to persuade Afonso to
travel to the Alentejo and lead his army against Pedro. Although Marie
Francoisc nominally sought to mediate between the brothers, Pedro IS-
sued an ultimatum stating that either he or Vasconcellos would have to
go. Under extreme pressure, the escrwao resigned in September and began
a long exile in Spain and England. Afonso, however, refused to receive his
brother and instead recalled Sousa de Macedo. The final act of this drama
began with an abortive attempt to arrest Pedro's key supporters. In early
October, the Infante and his heavily armed claque responded by storming
the palace, rousing Afonso from bed and demanding that Sousa de
Macedo resign. Pedro also began to dispense liberal amounts of cash to
the Lisbon regiments in the days that followed. Afonso was soon forced to
agree to a meeting of the Cartes in early January to resolve the matter.
Meanwhile a French fleet, at the disposal of the Queen, arrived in late No-
vember. Marie-Francoise's fulfilled her role by retiring to the convent of
Esperanca and wrote to Afonso, declaring she was still a virgin, and thus
not his wife, demanding her dowry back, and stating her intention to re-
turn to France! Afonso's tragic attempt to visit her was rebuffed by Pedro
and his troops and on November 23, the king signed a declaration giving
over royal authority to Pedro and his legitimate descendants.'
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Pedro's accession to power was dutifully recognized by the Cortes in
January 1668. At that time, he adopted the compromise-title of Prince Re-
gent; to rule as long as his imprisoned brother lived. The Estates also de-
manded that Pedro not allow the Queen to depart "both for the great love
these realms bear to her great virtues and for the necessity of succes-
sion"." While matters of the heart certainly dictated that the Prince Re-
gent would comply with this request, the Cartes undoubtedly had matters
of the purse in mind when it made it. After all, the Queen's departure
would have meant that her sizable dowry would have to be refunded!
Thus, the infamous suit of nullity of the marriage was subsequently
played out. This farce consisted largely of a barrage of depositions de-
signed to free Marie-Prancoise from her erstwhile husband and king and
facilitate her swift marriage to Pedro. Afonso swore that he had done his
best to consummate the marriage. For rather obvious reasons, the Queen
was never physically examined to substantiate her claim of virginity. In
violation of canon law, neither party was subjected to a direct oral exami-
nation. Instead, a host of "indelicate" evidence was produced to show
Afonso's conjugal inadequacies. A day after rhe royal depositions were
presented the marriage was annulled. In the interim, Fr. Verjus had re-
ceived a dispensation from one of Marie-Prancoise's relatives, the Cardi-
nal of Vendome. As soon as Verjus appeared with this document, the
lovers married. To demonstrate the "fairness" of these proceedings, it
should be noted that Vendome's dispensation, which treated the suit of
nullity as decided, was issued in Paris some nine days before this verdict
had in fact been reached in Lisbon!"
Pedro's rule as Prince-Regent (1668-1683) constitutes one of the most
important periods in the history of early modern Portugal. According to
the chaplain of the English factory in Lisbon, John Colbatch, the Prince
Regent was "of robust and vigorous constitution, tall of person, some-
what above the ordinary size, and proportionally big; of wonderful
strength and great activity of body ... of grave and comely aspect". His
character had an "air of modesty, as may be thought unusual in persons
of his rank". Above all, the Pedro was cautious and stubborn by nature.
Like Afonso, he was "addicted to bull-fighting and to hunting". His per-
sonal habits, however, were a fat cry from those of his elder brother. In
Colbarch's words: "He is very remperate in his diet, eats commonly alone
... His meals are extremely moderate, and provided as for a single per-
son." In stark contrast to Afonso, the Prince Regent abstained from wine
and "strong liquors". This abstinence in spirits was not matched with re-
gard to the carnal pleasures. "In which, if common report ... is to be cred-
ited he hatb indulged himself very much. And they say, he has not been
wholly free from the inconveniences consequent to such a practice. But
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those he hath had this commerce with, are said to be of the lowest rank ...
and very many, and not all of the same colour." Pedro's intellectual abili-
ties impressed Colbarch and others who described the Prince "of quick
apprehension, and a piercing judgement, sensible, thoughtful and inclin-
able to melancholy". His intellectual abilities and opinions were largely, it
seems, based on personal experience and oral interchanges with advisors
since Pedro had "a rooted aversion to books", and was hardly more liter-
ate than his brother."
From 1668, Pedro and his claque of grandees sought to exploit the un-
ease of the threatened privileged segments of Portuguese society to in-
crease the power of the Crown. The societal and economic tensions
unleashed by the long struggle with Habsburg Spain; a peasantry, as in
most of Europe, emerging from the more onerous bonds of feudalism;
and an aggressive and increasingly powerful merchant class embodied
most notably in the New Christian community, all served to create a cli-
mate of fear among the long favored First and Second Estates that cer-
tainly facilitated this process. As Car! Hanson has shown, Pcdro largely
succeeded in this quest to create an absolutist state in Portugal. The Prince
Regent, in the decades that followed his accession, was able to attract the
support of the vast majority of the nobility, who "aligned themselves
closely" with the Crown and that of the largest landowner in the realm,
the Roman Catholic Church, in order to "secure the continuance of the
status quo" which had long favored their interests. The "absolutist re-
gime rooted in privilege and landed property [that] flowered," did so
largely at the expense of the povo and the emerging bourgeoisie. In this
campaign, Pcdro in part resurrected the traditional Council system and
the power of the nobility at court that had suffered during the regime of
Castelo-Melhor. He also demonstrated the admirable quality of selecting
very able ministers to staff his Councils and initiate reforms, III much the
same fashion as Louis XIV.<C
The economic policies pursued by Luis de Meneses, the count of
Ericcira, as well as the views on political economy so eloquently ex-
pressed by Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo and Anronio Vieira were based
largely on the contemporary French example set by Louis XlV's great
minister, jean-Baptisrc Colbcrt, who was in the midst of creating the in-
ternal and outre-mer mercantilist system par excellence of the Old Re-
gime." Pedro, Cadaval, and Ericeira sought to emulate Colbert's policies
and create a centralized, mercantilist system. The New Christians consti-
tuted the most powerful and dynamic sector of the economy. Since 1640,
[he Crown had been dependent on their indulgence for loans to fight the
war with Spain and they had long controlled the lucrative private trade
carried by the ships of the Carreira da India." Nevertheless, Pedro was
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wary of allowing the New Christians undue, or perhaps better, more bla-
tant influence over the country's economic affairs during his rule. Al-
though from time to time he did entertain various economic stratagem
based on their largesse. As a matter of preference, the Crown attempted to
substitute state intervention to resuscitate Portugal's flagging financial
fortunes in the wake of the long war with Spain and in an age of general
European recession. Emulating Colbert's much vaunted reforms of the
1660s, Pedro reformed the grossly inefficient tax-farming and revenue col-
lection systems. The archaic hodgepodge of internal tolls and tariffs was
also abolished by Ericeira. To address an unfavorable balance of trade
and its accompanying drain on bullion reserves, projectionist tariffs were
erected, especially on imported luxury goods. Pedro also offered royal
support to encourage internal manufacturing in various fields, including
textiles. Royal land holdings were more efficiently exploited and, with the
approval of the Cortes excise taxes were raised on tobacco, meat, and
wine."
While Pedro was no doubt willing to delegate much more power
within this framework to his noble councilors than Louis XIV ever con-
templated, it would be an exaggeration to state that anything resembling
a "virtual abdication of government by Dam Pedro" ever took place."
The Prince Regent attended council meetings, read the consultas that
were prepared for him with care, made insightful marginal comments,
and did his best to decide the overall lines of Crown policy. It is also clear
that when he perceived the vital interests of Portugal to be at stake he was
willing to stand up to powerful voices on the Councils and at court, in-
cluding most notably his wife. The best example of this was in Pedro's
diplomatic relations with France after 1668. Louis XIV had supported the
coup against Afonso largely to increase French influence at court through
Marie Francoise and her adherents Sainr-Romain and Schomberg. Pedro,
however, had other ideas and refused to become the pawn for Louis's dip-
lomatic maneuverings. Not only did he refuse to honor the provisions of
Castelo-Melhor's alliance which called for intervention in the War of De-
volution against Spain, but the Prince Regent took advantage of the diplo-
matic fallout from Louis's invasion of Flanders in 1667 to at long last sign
an English mediated peace with Madrid at St. Eloi in February 1668, end-
ing the long Restoration struggle and recognizing Portugal's independ-
ence."
Thereafter, Pedro strove to keep Portugal at peace while he sought to
rebuild his shattered kingdom and its empire. Above all, the Prince Re-
gent broke with the favoritism that his father had shown for Brazil in ou-
tre-mer matters, and with the general neglect that had characterized his
mother's Regency and his brother's reign with respect to the Estado. A
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notable effort was made, especially during the Viceroyalty of Mendonca
Furtado not only to conserve what remained of the truncated Asian em-
pire, but to initiate measures that would allow it to regam a level of stabil-
ity and prosperity after some very difficult years in Europe and the East.
These reform policies were grounded in the belief that the remaining In-
dian Ocean possessions, if properly administered, along with the develop-
ment of rhe rich Rios de Cuama region could serve as the basis for a
rehabilitated Estado" Overall, it appears that the Portuguese had learned
both from past mistakes and from the example of their European compet-
itors in the trade. Niels Steensgaard has advanced the rather strict dichot-
omy of porto-capiralisr vis-a-VIS monarchical monopolism as the most
fruitful model for analyzing the commercial struggle between the Atlantic
economies (and Asian companies) of the Dutch and English and the Por-
tuguese Estado during the 17thcentury. This, it appears, was far from the
case. The vac quickly lost its pnstine "entrepreneurial" values, and by
the r660s was squandering huge amounts of cash to defend and maintain
dearly unprofitable holdings like Ceylon." At the same time, the Portu-
guese learned to adapt to changmg technologies, business practices, ad-
ministrative reforms, and geo-political and religious realities in the Indian
Ocean trade. These lessons were served as the basis for the impressive re-




Viceroys and Governors, c. 1661-1681
At the pinnacle of the administrative hierarchy charged with governing
the extensive imperial holdings of Portugal in Asia was the office of Vice-
roy. This post had first been created for the king's chief representative in
Asia by Manoel I in 1505, and bestowed in that year upon Francisco de
Almeida. The likely precedent for this highest administrative title proba-
bly came from the Mediterranean, and particularly the empire of Aragon,
since in Columbus's original capitulacion from Isabella and Ferdinand we
find the title "Viceroy" of the Indies. Although the office of Viceroy and
that of Governor later came to have virtually identical de facto powers,
originally there was indeed a de jure difference. In 1509, Afonso de Albu-
querque was given the title of Governor for one of the three territories
carved from Almeida's earlier single jurisdiction. Albuquerque, however,
soon took over the powers of all three and a grateful Manoel allowed this
to stand. Henceforth, his successors would remain as the Crown's single
plenipotentiaries under the lesser title. In I523, the title of Viceroy was re-
vived for Vasco da Gama's appointment by joao Ill.' Although the vast
extent of the empire in the mid-rorh century prompted D. Sebastiao in 1571
to consider a short-lived reversion to a tripartite structure under a single
Viceroy and two Governors, a single Viceroy or Governor over the entire
Estado was generally the rule, with members of the higher nobility who
accepted the post given the more prestigious title.' During the period 1662-
1682, Antonio de Mello de Castro (1663-66), joao Nunes da Cunha (1666-
68), Luis de Mendonca Furtado (1671-77), and FranCISCO de Tavora {1681-
86) all held the title of Viceroy.
During the reth century, the appointee seldom held the post for more
than the traditional three year term, the same length of service usually im-
posed on all officeholders in the colonial administration. From 15°5-1605,
only 6 of 34 royal appointees received a second term. This practice, how-
ever, would change in the following century. Initially, such limitations
seemed to have been imposed to avoid entrenching any person in the posi-
tion long enough to amass dangerous powers and a large dependent
claque built through the largesse bestowed from the Viccroyal palace in
Goa. Nevertheless, there were definite shortcomings to such constraints.
The huge distances and time delays involved in royal communication via
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either the ships of the Carreira da India or the overland route through the
Levant precluded effective communication and implementation of royal
policy within such a brief period. The Viceroy, most commonly a noble
from the Reino with at best some previous experience in the Estado and
appointed for a limited time, was also forced to compete with powerful
local interests in attempting to carry out his policies. Groups like the mar-
ried Portuguese resident in the Estado or casados and the plethora of reli-
gious orders established in the Asian possessions had interests that were
frequently at odds with those of the Crown and its Viceroy, and usually
exploited the temporary nature of the appointment to their advantage.
The difficulties of establishing oneself in power, so far from the metro-
pole, and then pursuing a coherent policy all within three-years's time can
thus be easily imagined.'
These difficulties eventually convinced the Crown that it was in its best
interest to renew the position for a second term more frequently in the
quest for more efficient and effective administration. From r605-1682, 8 of
2I Viceroys and Governors served at least part of a second three-year
term: There were in fact few real limits on a Viceroy's power. Once he
had assumed this office, commonly at the church of Reis Magos near the
mouth of the Mandavi, and headed up to river to Velha Goa, sire of his
palace and seat of government for the Crown's possessions from the Cape
of Good Hope Co Macau, he could do much as he pleased. However, he
and his judges could not, for example, pronounce the death scnrence or
mutilation on (idalgos without the express permission of the king. Lisbon
also controlled the appointment of the higher public officials in the
Estado, and the Viceroy could not dismiss them outright. He could, how-
ever, refuse to install them in such positions or suspend them with cause.
At such times, the Viceroy attempted to influence the Crown on suitable
replacements.'
Aside from these limitations, the king was forced by circumstances and
distances to give his Viceroy wide powers over matters of administration,
diplomacy, finance, and war and peace. Ensconced in a region fabled for
its lavish court display, the Viceroy was also allowed many outward trap-
pings to demonstrate his power to resident Portuguese and the neighbor-
ing kings alike. His palace in Old Goa, formerly that of the Adil Shah of
Bijapur, was suitably grand. Whenever he departed from its impressive,
latticed, entrance he did so III an ornate sedan chair, escorted by halber-
dicrs and retainers, all announced by trumpeters. The most important
member of his personal staff was the secretaria da India, who also served
as the secretary of the Conselho, and managed the Viceroy's large corre-
spondence with dependent [ortalezas, neighboring kings, and Lisbon. The
Viceroy also had a personal chaplain, a barber, interpreter, chief investi-
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gator, a captain and sixty guards, as well as musicians and servants. While
his salary was 3°,000 xerafins, by the 1660'S this was hardly sufficient to
support such a lifestyle for himself and the many family members who
usually accompanied any appointee to Asia in the hope of enrichment.'
Nevertheless, as Virginia Rau and Anthony Disney have demon-
strated, "the viceroyalty of Goa was one of the most lucrative patronage
appointments in the gift of the Portuguese Crown".' The great service no-
bility of the seventeenth century that initially served the Habsburgs in
Asia, like the count of Linhares, and ultimately served the Braganzas, like
Lavradio, sought to obtain "two of the career objectives most commonly
pursued" by their class.' What were these goals? The first was, in some
sense, communal: to preserve and advance the interest of one's noble casa
or house, and family. This desire was deeply ingrained in the Portuguese
nobility of the day. The second objective was more individualistic: to ad-
vance one's own [ama and reputacao by performing notable deeds in the
service of the Crown. For a nobleman, the most acceptable means of add-
ing to one's reputation related to fama do valor (reputation for military
glory) and fama do cabedol (reputation for wealth). A Viceroy certainly
found ample opportunities to achieve both kinds of fama during an ap-
pointment in Goa. Fighting against the armies of the king of Bijapur, the
Mughal emperor, and Shivaji or the fleets of the Omani Arabs provided
ample "fields" for glory and [ama do valor. The plethora of entrepreneur-
ial opportunities found in Goa offered plenty of opportunity for [ama do
cabedal. Viceroys traditionally exploited casado and indigenous third-
party merchants to become involved in the myriad of private trade
throughout the Indian Ocean basin with ties to Goa. Socially, the most ac-
ceptable of these trades were the horse trade with the Persian Gulf and the
rice and grain trade from Kanara and the south. For the nobility, such
commodities provided familiar links with their quintas in Portugal and no
social derogeance. Upon departing for the Reino, the proceeds from such
entrepreneurialship were generally, and for obvious reasons, converted to
diamonds and other precious stones for the voyage home.'
The provincial nobility of Portugal which had done much to place
joao IV upon the throne was therefore more than happy to accept posts in
the imperio, and especially the viceroyalty in Goa, in the decades that fol-
lowed. From c. (660-1682 an examination of the background of the men
who held that position (or that of governor) reveals a clear pattern of ac-
cession for the sons of the provincial nobles who had supported the
Braganza revolution. As these noble families gradually became integrated
into the reforged court or administrative nobility under joao IV, D. Luisa
de Gusmao, Afonso VI and Pedro their sons would frequently rise to the
ranks of the titulares following a similar pattern. They won their knightly
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spurs of honor in combat against the Spanish in the Alentejo and then
usually receive an appointment at court, an initial posting in the imperio,
or a grant of income from the Crown as a reward. A commandery in the
Order of Christ or one of the other religious orders would usually follow,
as would the inheritance of the casa and its various titles; the most usual
being the post of alcaide-mor (chief constable), and eventual appointment
to the Councils of War or State of the king. At that point, given sufficient
reputacao, ties to the Crown, and influence at court, the appointment to
Viceroy would eventually follow bringing with it entrance into the ranks
of the titulares. The break with Spain thereby facilitated the nse to power
of a group of hitherto relatively minor provincial families who, by their
aggressive service to the Crown, came to dominate the administrative
structure of the Branganzan state and m doing so helped to establish and
solidify ir."
While garnering the post of Viceroy of the Estado da India thus re-
mained a cherished and potentially lucrative prize for the rising service
nobility of late r-rh century Portugal, the inherent difficulties in success-
fully carrying out the functions of that office had increased exponentially
since the days of D. Sebastiao. Not only did the Viceroy have to contend
with the continuing military threat of indigenous powers from
Monomotapa to Macau, but the English, and especially the Dutch had
demonstrated their bellicose intentions towards the Estado from the early
part of the century onward. Economically, the necessity of competing in a
complex of trading networks across the Indian Ocean and, to a degree, in-
land against well-entrenched, well-financed, and well-connected indige-
nous merchants had also been complicated with the arrival of the joint-
stock companies of the Dutch, English, and French. The Portuguese were
increasingly forced to compete with these rivals merely for a share of the
European segment of the overall trade both on the Cape route to Europe
and in the "country" or intra-Asiatic trade. Religiously, the monopoly of
spreading the faith in Asia under the Padroado had also been challenged
by the formation of the Propaganda Fide (1622) in Rome and the arrival of
the Proresrant Dutch and English who were generally more willing to
forego religious considerations, as opposed to the work of the religiosos
and Goa Inquisition (1560), in the quest for profit."
In early 1661, as D. Luisa and her advisors were completing negotia-
tions for the marriage alliance with Charles 11, the Queen wrote a series of
letters to the arh governing Conselho of the Estado relating to affairs III
Europe. Letters from her ambassadors in London and the Hague, the
counts of Ponte and Miranda, had already warned of a large fleet of some
"}O ships and 8000 soldiers" that the VOC was preparing to send to Asia
in order to capture a port near Goa, or failing that Diu or Mozambique."
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On April n, D. Luisa informed her new Governors that for some time she
had hoped to write of peace with Holland, a pact that would "improve
things there". Unfortunately, the States-General and vac were proving
obstinate in their dealings with Miranda. The Queen Regent nevertheless
exhorted the Governors not to lose hope for peace with the United Prov-
inces. She would send definitive word on these talks with the new Viceroy
the following September along with material aid, although this could not
be as much as she would have liked given "the necessitites in which this
State finds itself". Meanwhile, the Governors were ordered to continue
the policy of "the defense and conservation of the pracas and liberty of
commerce". On a more positive note, D. Luisa wrote that the war with
Spain was going well, despite the separate peace that France had con-
cluded, and that the kingdom would fight on until the last drop of blood!"
Nine days later, the Queen Regent reaffirmed her intention to appoint a
new Viceroy as soon as possible and one "of such quality" that one could
justly expect that "his experience and valor would promptly procure the
Remedy to the affliction" in which the Estado found itself. She concluded
these letters by once again warning of the large Dutch fleet that would
soon depart and ordered suitable defensive measures. Until major assis-
tance could be dispatched, she was convinced that "with your work and
industry, and above all your valor, and that of your subjects", the im-
pending challenge could be met."
The members of this Governing Council were ideally to be D. Pedro de
Lencastre, Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquerque and D. Manoel
Mascarenhas." Lencastre, the fourth son ofD. Lourenco de Lencastre and
D. Ines de Noronha, had begun his service to joao IV "in the year of his
happy acclamation in the province of the Alentejo". There, he had held
the offices of Captain of the Infantry, Captain of Cavalry, Commissario
and Mestre de Campo. Lencasrre had served in the Restoration War until
1657. In that year he first traveled to India as captiao-mor of the Naus that
conducted his uncle, the Count of Vila Pouca de Aguiar, to Goa as the
aorh Viceroy of the Estado. Vila Pouca had died on the outward voyage
and never assumed his office. Continuing Dutch blockades of the mouth
of the Mandavi had also prevented Lencastre from returning to the Reino
until the spring of 1661, when the Queen Regent'S letters had named him
as one of the Governors on the Council. D. Manoel Mascarenhas was
then Captiao of Mozambique, usually deemed a more lucrative post than
serving as one Governor of what was expected to be a short-lived Coun-
cil. He had accordingly declined the honor.'
The most experienced member of the Council was Luis de Mendonca
Furtado e Albuquerque. His father, Pedro de Mendonca, had been
alcaide-mor of Mourao, commendador of Santiago de Cassem and Vila
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Franca, senhor of Seregeira, one of the principal acclaimers of D. joao IV
in December 164-0, and later guarda-mor for the king. Luis was the eldest
child of Pedro's second marriage to D. Antonio de Mendonca, a dama of
D. Luisa de Cusmao. He had begun his career in the late 164-0S fighting in
the war in the Alenrejo, where he performed with "reputation" and "dis-
tinction". Luis had first travcled to the Estado in 1651, as capitao-mor of
the ships San Thame, S. Antonio de Maragiio, and Nassa Senhora do
Socorrc. This Carreira fleet made a swift voyage to and from Goa. In 1653,
he had repeated this impressive feat in an epoch of general maritime disas-
ters for the Estado by departing from Lisbon 011 26 March with the ships
Sacramenta da Trindade and S. [ozepb and reaching Goa on the and of
October of that year. In 1657, Mendonca Purrado had returned to the
Fstado aboard the fleet carrying the conde of Vila Pouca and Lencastre,
with the title of Admiral of the Indian Seas. Between January and March
1658, he had commanded the Portuguese fleet that unsuccessfully tried to
break a Dutch blockade of the Mandovi and relieve Jaffna, the remaining
Estado outpost 011 Ceylon. These failures were not the fault of Mendonca
Furrado, who acted with great courage and leadership. Rather, they re-
sulted from crucial lapses on the part of other fidalgo commanders who
had hesitated in the heat of battle. As the Jesuit Queiroz cells us,
Mendonca Furtado had the most impressive physique of all the Portu-
guese in India at that time. Throughout these naval encounters with the
Dutch fleet under Adriaen Roothaes: "Great was the valour and wisdom
[with] which the Portuguese Admiral acted ... infusing courage into all by
his presence.''"
On land, Mendonca Furtado's [ama do valor had also grown during
his imperial service to the Crown in the 1650S. In late 1658, the king of
Bijapur in league with the vac had invaded Salsette with some 4-00 cav-
alry and 4000 infantry troops under the general Abdula Aquimo. This
force had advanced as far as Margao, while a Dutch fleet cruised off
Murmugao awaiting word of a convenient time to disembark. The only
Portuguese force then in Salsette was some 250 men in Rachol under the
command of Gaspar Carneiro Girao. In Goa, this news prompted the dis-
patching of Mendonca Furtado as general along with some troops to meet
the challenge. In a pitched battle of sorts fought near the village of Arli,
the Portuguese inflicted a decisive defeat upon Abdula Aquimo's army
and obliged this force to retreat from Salsctte and back across the Ghats.
According to Queiroz, the most notable feat of valor performed on that
day was accomplished by Mendonca Furtado. As the armies deployed for
battle, "one of his [Abula Aquimo's] higher officers who was considered
the most valiant among them, took manifest pains to get a view of him
[Mendonca Furtado]". The Portuguese general had "sallied out of the
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ranks to meet him with only the dress sword which he had at his side and
a round target, which they had given him in Rachol by way of a shield, be-
cause the buckles were not large enough for his arms". Thus armed on
foot, Mendonca Furrado had then engaged the mounted Muslim officer,
"and when the Moor galloped at him at full speed, he got behind the hind
quarters of the horse and with his left he made the Moor's horse stumble
and from one side ran him through to the top of the opposite shoulder, the
Moor dropping dead, a feat characteristic of his strength and daring":'
Unfortunately, Mendonca Furtado's initial foray into governing the
Estado with Lencastre from June 1661 until December 1662was an anemic
reflection of his military feats of glory. The origin of many of these prob-
lems related to a blood feud that developed between Mendonca Purtado
and Barrolemeu de Vasconcelos in Goa after the former's return from the
1658 campaign in Salsette. Vasconcelos had thereupon charged Mendonca
Purtado with various excesses during the course of that campaign. These
allegations included harsh criticism for needlessly attacking local strong-
holds and segments of the indigenous populace of Salsetre for allegedly
being in league with the king of Bijapur, as well as the more inflammatory
charge of summarily executing II men in Coculim.' To avoid an open
breech in the capital, Mendonca Furtado had been sent to the strategic
fortress of Mormugao with the title of general. Upon his return to Goa in
June 1661 as Governor, however, his rather vengeful nature was given free
reign and the simmering feud between he and Vasconcelos had erupted
into street fights between their partisans. Meanwhile, the pressing pleth-
ora of problems confronting the Crown and its Viceroyalty, most notably
the continuing aggressions of the vac and the fleet of Van Goens on the
west coast of India, were largely ignored. Instead the Governors, the lead-
ing fidalgos resident in the capital and their retainers all concentrated on
settling petty personal grudges with each other. As F. Ferreria Martins
aptly noted on this Council and the government of Lencastre and
Mendonca Furtado: it was "always in discord, being sterile in [its] admin-
istrative action when precisely the opposite was indispensable". The
streets of Goa were "turned into a theater with scenes of anarchy, that
brought about its complete ruin. Nobles and Clerics hired thugs to harass
their enemies and the Governors did nothing to stop them." During the
governmental chaos of this eighteen-month period, Van Goens captured
Cranganor on the Malabar coast and then turned his attention to expel-
ling the Portuguese from the rich coastal city of Cochin in the fall of 1662:°
It was at this critical juncture in the history of the Estado da India that
the long awaited Viceroy promised by D. Luisa Gusmao at last reached
India. Anronio de Mello de Castro, the fidalgo selected for this post, at
least had the pedigree necessary for this daunting imperial assignment, as
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his family had an impressive and long-standing record of service to the
Crown in the Asian empire. His paternal grandfather, whose namesake he
was, had been Capitao of the Naus of India. Two of his uncles, Diogo and
joao de Mello de Castro had also served with distinction in the Estado,
while his brother Femao de Mendonca Furtado would serve as general of
Ccylon. Antonio and his brother were the sons of Francisco de Mello de
Castro, who had himself held the posts of capitao-mor of the seas of India
and Admiral of the Royal Fleet, and his second wife, D. Angela de
Mcndonca, whose own father had died servmg in the Estado. Antonio
had begun his service to the Crown by fighting "with valour" In the war
against Philip IV's armies in the Alentejo. He had been awarded with the
commander)' of Pornellos and the post of alcaide-mor of Colares. Even-
tually appointed to the Council of State, Mello de Castro was initially
given the title of Governor of the Estado by D. Luisa in Letters-Patent of
March tr, 1662, with permission to assume the title of Viceroy a year later
after successfully reaching Goa." The generally dismal state of the
Carreira da India at this time and the desire to exploit the terms of the se-
cret article of the r661 treaty ensured that Mello de Castro sailed to take
up his office aboard the five ship English fleet under James Ley that
Charles II and Clarendon dispatched to claim their new Asian prize. This
fleet departed from Lisbon in April 1662, and reached Bombay in late Sep-
tember. Mello de Castro would remain in Bombay for a little over two
months. By the rath of December 1662, he would reach Goa and officially
assume the office of Governor two days later."
Upon reaching India, Mello de Castro confronted the dizzying array of
difficulties that Mendonca Furtado and Lencastre had failed to address in
their brief interlude of internecine conflicts in Goa. After the long dearth
of serious Crown interest in the plight of the eastern possessions and the
loss of regular contact with the Viceroyalty In Goa, Mello de Casrro's
term of office represented a prolonged reconnaissance mission. The new
Governor was expected to observe and report on the wreckage of the pre-
vious decades of neglect, to isolate the most glarring problems, to suggest
possible remedies and, if possible, to begin to address as many of these
difficulties as possible. Viewed 111 this context, his Viceroyalty must be
judged a success. As the ample extant correspondence attests, Mello de
Castro performed his mission admirably, especially given the continuing
lack of substantial support from a Crown that was still obsessed with the
fighting the war with Spain and internal political matters relating to rhe
succession. D. Luisa de Gusmao's Viceroy would prove himself to be an
objective observer of the plethora of problems then afflicting the Estado.
His long careful letters to Lisbon reveal a meticulous eye for detail which
elaborated on many of the crucial issues confronting the Crown in its
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quest to rehabilitate the Estado. Relations with the Reis Vizinhos and
nominal European allies and enemies would have to be reevaluated; the
antiquated and easily corruptible administration would have to be re-
formed; the traditional financial structures of the Estado, including mo-
narchical monopolism and the entire contracto system would have to be
reconsidered; effective centralized control would have to be reestablished
in the outlying fortresses; and the long-standing privileges of the Roman
Catholic Church and the cost of spreading the faith in Asia would have to
be reexamined! While treatments of Antonio de Mello de Castro's tenure
have usually been restricted to his notable three year refusal to turn over
Bombay to the English, in fact his administration embodied a good deal
more. It witnessed a comprehensive survey of the straining structures of
the Estado and insightful suggestions and initiatives on how to recuperate
a semblance of its erstwhile power and wealth."
The palace coup of the late spring in 1662 that installed Afonso VI and
Casrelo-Melhor to power ensured that Mello de Castro's successor would
be selected by the good count, and reflect his priorities for the Estado. On
March n, 1666, Letters-Patent named joao Nunes da Cunha the joth Vice-
roy of the State of India. Created the tst Count of Sac Vicente by Afonso
on April 2, of that same year as an additional incentive to accept the posi-
tion, Nunes da Cunha may have had close ties with the king and Castelo-
Melhor, but he would ultimately demonstrate a rigidity of policy in Asia
that was decidedly out of step with the rather practical Machiavellian na-
ture of the king's private scribe. Nunes da Cunha possessed an impressive
familial heritage with respect to imperial service to the Crown. Son of
Nuno da Cunha and D. Francisca de Lima, his father was one of the prin-
cipal "restorers" in the quest to regain Bahia from the Dutch in the 1620S
and had died fighting in one of the galleons of the armada of D. Anronio
de Menezes two decades later. Nunes da Cunha could also trace a direct
family line to both Tristao da Cunha, ambassador to Rome for D. Manoel
I who had sailed for the Indies in 1506, "discovered" the islands that bear
his name and conquered Socotra; and Nunc da Cunha, Vedor of the
Pazenda of D. joao III and Governor of India. joao Nunes da Cunha had
been born in Lisbon in 1619. He possessed a keen mind, was extremely lit-
erate, and would publish two books in the 1650S and 1660s: Peregrinacao
de D. [oao IV and Vida de D. Pedro 0 Cruel Rei de Castela. Nunes da
Cunha, like Castelo-Melhor, had risen in court circles as much by his wits
as by any [ama de valor he had achieved on the battlefields of the
Alentejo. By the early 1660s, he was a member of the Council of War and
da cbave dourada and Deputy of the Junta of the Three Estates. He had
been a gentleman of the Camara of the Prince D. Teodosio and later
Afonso VI, and had also obtained grants of the commanderies of
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Castelejo, Sac Romao do Erdal, and Santa Maria de Vouzela from the
Order of Christ. On April u, 1666 he sailed from the Tagus aboard a four-
ship fleet that included the niio Santa Tereza de Jesus, the galeiio S. Bento,
and the navetas N.S. de Penha de Franca and Nossa Senhora da Nazereth
e S. Antonio?'
Even though Castelo-Melhor was overwhelmingly concerned with
continental affairs in general and arranging the French alliance in particu-
lar, he must have assumed that an intellectual like Nunes da Cunha would
have continued the careful and relatively frugal polices of his predecessor
m Goa. In this case, it appears that the escriviio may have misjudged his
man, as he would later do with more fateful results regarding Pedro. The
s. Teresa de Jesus reached the Mandavi in late September of 1666, and S.
Vicente took over the powers of his office from Mello de Castro in a for-
mal ceremony on the r-th of October, pledging to restore the former
greatness of the Estado by "ferro e fogo (iron and fire)" ." Thereafter,
however, the main focus of S. Vicente's energies to this end, both inrellec-
tually and as Viceroy, came to revolve around a rather misguided reli-
gious campaign aimed both at the rising power of the Omani Arabs and at
critics in Goa who had long complained against the abuses and ovcrween-
mg power of the Roman Catholic Church, the Goa Inquisition, and the
multitude of religious orders established in the Asian empire. Despite the
admirable work by Mello de Castro toward regularizing and stabilizing
the financial condition of the Estado, Nunes da Cunha managed to
squander most of these savings in outfitring a huge armada of 18 ships for
the Straits of Hurmuz to humble the Sultan of Oman and, if possible, to
rcconquer Maskat. ," As the Surat Presidency of the EIC reported to their
Directors in London in a letter of 5 April 1667: "There arrived from
Portugal! in Setember last a new Viceroy to Goa, who hath busied
himselfe ever since his coming in proxiding & setting forth a considerable
fleet ... but the designe is not completely knowne; Some say for Muscat ...
others believe to Cong a Port a little above Gombrone belonging to the
King of Persia. ,,,,
Nunes da Cunha's religiosity, moreover, transcended any mere desire
to continue the reconquista against the infidel in the Straits. Antonio de
Mello de Castro had decried the power and abuses of the religiosos in
harsh terms: "Among the greatest miseries that has existed for many year
m this State of India none is of less weight than the multitude of religiosos
that there are in it. "" Sac Vicente, on the other hand, did everything he
could to assist them and further entrench their social, political, and eco-
nomic power. In two letters of January 25, 1667 to Afonso, the Viceroy
maintained that the surest means to improve administrative efficiency
and cut down on corruption was to involve the religiosos in government,
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since "in all the parts where they do not have them" administrative thefts
were great. Sac Vicenre's exceedingly low opinion of civilian administra-
tors also led him to lament that the existing system ensured that "men
without God" dominated the empire." That same month, in opposition to
the advice of the Procurador of the Crown and the Treasury Council, the
Viceroy wrote that he opposed any attempt to tax the assets of the Com-
pany of Jesus in Goa: "One should not take from religiosos who set such
an example and show such zeal to the service of God and His Majesty in
conserving this Estado. '''" In February 1667, in the midst of attempting to
reassess the Colecta to finance more regular fleets, S. Vicente won ap-
proval from the Camara, nobles, and povo of Goa. Nevertheless, the
religiosos of the Company of Jesus, the Dominicans, the Augustinians and
the Carmelites had all opposed it. And in light of their "importance", the
Viceroy had decided to wait for advice from the Crown before proceeding
further!' In the midst of this religious revival of sorts, Sac Vicente died in
Goa on the 7 November 1668, at the age of 49 after governing a mere 2
years and 21 days. Fittingly, his support of the religiosos was not forgot-
ten. He would eventually be buried at the feet of the Alter of S. Francisco
Xavier, the apostle of the East, in the Jesuit Church of Bom]esus in Velha
Goa."
According to long-standing tradition, following Sao Vicenre's death,
the primeira via of succession kept in a locked j-key chest in the church of
S. Francisco, was brought to the Casa Profeca of the Jesuits and opened
on the vth of November before the members of the Council of State of the
Estado and other civic and ecclesiastical dignitaries." The sth Governing
Council was thereby established to rule until the arrival of a new Viceroy
from Lisbon. Of course, the unfolding uncertainties engendered by the
drama of Pedro's overthrow of his brother, the internal demands of the
kingdom in the years, the European machinations inherent in the initial
steps in Louis XIV's quest for a part of Charles II of Spain's territorial
holdings in Flanders, and the natural delays resulting from time and dis-
tance from the Reino all conspired to delay the arrival of a new Viceroy
for more than two years. The sth Council would therefore direct the
Estado's activities from November 1668 until May 1671. The three mem-
bers of this Council were Luis de Miranda Henriques, Manoel de Corte-
Rea! de Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro.
All three of the new Governors had substantial experience in the
Estado. Carte-Real de Sampaio had served on the Council of State in Goa
under Sac Vicenre, while Miranda Henriques was then the Captain of
Diu." Antonio de Mello de Castro, according to some a distant relative to
the former Viceroy of the same name, had perhaps the most impressive re-
cord of service to rhe Crown. Son of ]eronimo de Mello de Castro, gover-
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nor of the Castle of S. Filipe in Serubal, alcaide-mor of Villa Vicoza, and
capitao-mor of the Armada to the Indies of 1588, his paternal grandfather
and uncle had also served in the Estado. By the late 1660'S, Antonio had
served and lived in Asia for more than twenty years, had married three
times, had three sons there, and was considered a true casado. Of the
Council of His Majesty, Mello de Castro had occupied the posts of
capitao-mor of the campo of Ceylon (where he had distinguished himself
m the defcnse of Colombo in 1655-56), of the Armada of the North, Gen-
eral of the Armadas of the Reino, Captain of the fortress of Bassein, and,
from 1664 to 1667, Captain of Mozambique and Sofala." The tenure of the
Council of Mello de Castro, Carte-Real de Sampaio, and Miranda
Hcnriqucs was much less acrimonious than the previous Council of
Mendonca Furtado and Lencastre. Of course this was not a difficult goal
to achieve. As the Minutes of the Coa Council of State reveal, Mello de
Castro and Corte-Real de Sampaio in essence made the major decisions
affecting the Estado from the Salla Real of the Palacio da Fortaleza, as the
Viceroy's palace was known. Miranda Henriques never reached Goa to
share in the duties of government, as the devastating attack of the Omani
Arabs on Diu in December 1668 demanded all of his energies in the years
that followed in an attempt to resuscitate the trade of that vital port city
on the Gulf of Cambay."
The two and a half year governorship of this Council witnessed few
significant changes from the policies of the preceding years. From the ex-
tant documentation, it appears that Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de
Sampaio were, with a few notable exceptions, willing to allow the en-
trenched machinery of the Estado to function much as before. The fact
that only 8 major Assentos of the Council of State were taken during these
years certainly suggests such a management style." Nevertheless, both
these men were anxious to advance the long-term interest and cause of
what might be defined as the casado lobby in Goa at the expense of what
they perceived as the more transitory priorities of the reinadoe, that class
of the upper service nobility from the Reino who customarily held the
post of Viceroy for the specified term and then returned as rich men to
Portugal. One of the principal problems with the Estado, declared the
pair in a letter of January 8, 1669, was that such Viceroys and Governors
placed "little authority" in the wise opinions of the casados and others
with long years of service in Asia and instead did "what seemled] best to
[them]". This tendency "was not converuenr to the service of Your Maj-
esty", since the reinados "proceeded for themselves only little advised of
the matters of this State". Mello de Castro and Corte Real de Sampaio
also argued that in the future a reinado Viceroy should only make war
with the advice of the Council of State, preferably stacked with casados.
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After all, they pointed out, Sac Vicente had been in Goa less than a year
and was ill-informed on relations with the Reis Vizinhos when he had de-
cided to make war on Kanara against the advice of everyone else on the
Council. This was a costly enterprise that the Governors complained they
were now obliged to continue!"
The correspondence of Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio
was also dominated by beseeching letters to the new Prince Regent de-
scribing the lamentable financial condition of the Estado and, above all,
the acute need for vast material and monetary support if the Estado was
to survive against the host of indigenous and European enemies gathering
against it." The harsh lesson of Diu and perhaps Mello de Castro's experi-
ences on the East Africa coast did, however, convince the generally cau-
tious pair to mimic Sac Vicente's policy of sending a large fleet to engage
the Omani Arabs. As they were quick to point out in a letter in January
1670 to Pedro, this fleet had been a "great credit to the reputation of Your
Arms": bombarding Muscat, and defeating the Sultan's fleet off Congo,
sinking 5of his best ships and killing nearly 2000 of his men. News of this
great victory had "frightened the nations of the East" and helped to recu-
perate our reputation as "Senhores do mar"; friends had sent congratula-
tions, enemies had sent envoys to treat with us, reported the Governors."
While Pedro and Cadaval were no doubt cheered to receive these glad
martial tidings, they were nevertheless anxious to appoint a new Viceroy,
one of their own, who would once and for all alter the decades of decline
in the eastern possessions. The Prince Regent and his key advisors had al-
ready resolved upon a fundamental shift in Crown policy regarding the
tri-partiate empire, and were committed to initiating a series of reforms in
the Estado which would allow it to regain a semblence of its former glory
and economic benefit to the Crown and Reino' Just as importantly, un-
like his parents and brother, Pedro was willing to allocate significant lev-
els of monetary and material support for this daunting project. Although
Mello de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio had written to inform the
Crown of S. Vicenre's death in early January of 1669, this news probably
did not reach Lisbon until early November of that year, when the nao
Nossa Senhora dos Remedies anchored in the Tagus after a ID month voy-
age from Coa.' The search for a suitable replacement took place during
the remainder of 1669 and into early 1670, in the midst of a flurry of activ-
ity regarding the approaching Dutch War and Colbert's attempt to lure
Pedro into this conflict, especially in Asia against the Vac. In early 1670,
the Prince Regent made two exceedingly important decisions regarding
his quest to rehabilitate the Estado: (I) he definitively rejected the often re-
peated offers of an ASian alliance against the Dutch proferred to him by
Louis XlV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Romain; and (2) in Let-
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tcrs-Patent of March 9, 1670, he selected Luis de Mendonca Furrado c Al-
buquerque as the jrst Viceroy. Together these choices would have a
profound impact on the subsequent history of Estado da India.
Mendonca Furtado had returned to Portugal from Chaul aboard the
carauclla Nossa Senbora de Nazareth in January 1663. Not much is known
of his activities for the next few years, except that he gradually became in-
tegrated into that claque of young nobles in Lisbon that increasingly came
to favor the removal of Afonso and Castclo-Melhor and the acession of
Pedro to power. Mendonca Furtado not only urged the coup against
Afonso that was played out in the fall of 1667, he was one of the strongest
supporters of Pedro during these months. The fact that he had already
garnered an impressive cache of wealth from his years of service in Asia,
as well as his willingness to offer contrary advice to the new Prince Regent
when necessary, was clearly reflected by his offer in the aftermath of the
coup to repay D. Maria Francoise's dowry within the space of three days,
provided Pedro would forego marrying her. It was much to the Prince Re-
gent's credit that he did not hold this emotional difference of oprruon
against Mendonca Furtado, who subsequently served on both the Counc\
of State and of War. In those forums, Pedro continued to seek out his
views until appointing him as Viceroy in March 1670." Following what
was becoming a common practice, the Prince Regent also bestowed the ti-
tle of ist count of Lavradio upon Mendonca Furrado by Letters-Patent of
March ro, thus completing the rise of another of the provincial noble fam-
ilies that had supported the Revolution of 1640 to the ranks of the
titulares. Throughout the spring of 1670, the sizable royal fleet that would
carry Lavradio to the Indies, and signal the Crown's renewed interest in
the Estado, gathered in the Tagus. On April 10, Mendonca Furtado and
his five-ship {rota departed. This late departure forced the new VICeroy
and his entourage to "invcmar" in Mozambique, and the fleet did not
reach Goa until the May 20, 1671. Two days later, he took possession of
the office."
The two triennial terms that Mendonca Furtado served as Viceroy
marked one of the most crucial periods in the history of the Estado.
Pedro's first Viceroy had the experience, strength, force of will, as well as
the [ama do cabedal and valor to confront the challenges and entrenched
interests that typically frustrate any campaign to reform an inefficient bu-
reaucratic system. Mendonca Furtado, like most remados, had always re-
turned to the Reino after his various offices in the empire with his loot,
and had extensive and useful connections at court. Unlike many of his
predecessors, however, he had also spent considerable time living in Goa
and could certainly appreciate the inherent weaknesses of the imperial ed-
ifice as well as any casado, although he himself had not yet married. Be-
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fore his departure from Lisbon, Mendonca Purrado had been approached
by Louis XIV's ambassador, the marquis de Saint-Remain, regarding the
possibility of joint actions in the Asian trade against the much depised
Dutch East India Company. Despite his willingness to discuss the sound-
est strategy for the French to pursue in their impending campaign against
the vac, Lavradio predictably demurred on the question of Portuguese
support for any overt actions against Batavia's interests." Pedro and his
new Viceroy, after all, had already decided to reject these overtures as
"diplomatically" as possible and to instead enact a series of reforms while
their European rivals were busy warring against one another in Louis
XIV's War of 1672 that pitted the English and French against the Dutch in
both Europe, and if Colberr had his way, the Indian Ocean trade as well.
During his six years of power in Goa, Lavradio's policies focused
around four main priorities: to reestablish an adequate military presence
in the Estado that could withstand any onslaught from the Reis Vizinhos
and European rivals; to recussitare the flagging economic fortunes of the
eastern empire; to reestablish effective Crown control over the outlying
areas of the Estado that had largely fended for themselves during the pre-
ceding decades of warfare; and to address the plethora of administrative
and religious abuses that had done much to undermine the reputation and
position of the Portuguese throughout Asia. Among other things,
Mendonca Furtado's tenure would witness the foundation of the perma-
nent Terce of 500 men and officers in Goa; the relatively prompt
despatchings of the yearly fleets to the Straits and the South in search of
contraband shipping; a notable regularization of the sailings of the once
moribund Carreira da India, the economic and communcation lifeblood
of the empire; the reestablishmenr of regular trading voyages to Macau
and Timor, once a source of valued income to the Pazenda Real; and a
spirited attempt to take on the overbearing social and economic power of
the religiosos:' By 1677, great strides would be made towards placing the
Estado on a solid footing once again."
The work of consolidating these gains however fell to Mendonca
Furtado's immediate successors: the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida and the
Governor Antonio Paes de Sande. D. Pedro de Almeida's family back-
ground and record of service to the Crown in preparation for appoint-
ment to this lofty position largely mirrored that of Mello de Castro,
Nunes da Cunha and Mendonca Furtado. Born in March 1630, he was the
son of D. joao de Almeida and D. Violate Henriques. His father was of
the Casas of joao IV and Afonso VI, gentleman of the Camara Real, and
alcaide-mor of Alcobaca. His mother was the daughter of the jrd count of
Arcos. Pedro de Almeida's family also had long connections of service in
the Asian empire: his great-great grandfather, D. Lopo de Almeida had
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been Captain of Sofala, while his great grandfather and namesake had
served with "great distinction" in India, especially during the notable de-
fensc of Diu by D. joao Mascarenhas. D. Pedro de Almeida had begun his
service to the Crown in the Restoration War in the Alentejo, where he
held the posts of captain of Horse and mestre do campo in a Terce of In-
fantry. He eventually received the comrnanderies of Loures and Sal Salva-
dor de Souto in the Order of Christ for his services, D. Pedro had then
moved on the rigors of court life in Lisbon. By the early 1670S he had be-
come a Senator of the Cdmara MUnIcipal of the capital city, a deputy to
the Junta of the Three Estates, Vedor of the Casa Real, and a member of
the Council of State. In Letters-Patent of April 1677, the Prince Regent
named him the 32l1d Viceroy of the Estado and, as had increasingly be-
come practice, also bestowed the title of rst Count of Assumar upon him:'
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the rehabilitation
project of Pedro in the years after 1668 was the belief that the development
of the rich Rios de Cuama basin in Mozambique, roughly corresponding
to the Zambezi River basin, could compensate for the earlier losses suf-
fered in Melaka, Ceylon, and the Malabar coast and could indeed serve as
the basis for a renascent and profitable Estado." Antonio Alvarcs Percira
in a well-known 1661 letter to the Crown had lauded the potential mineral
wealth of this region and beseeched D. Luisa to exploit this area for the
benefit of the Crown and its subjects." Mineral samples from the Rios had
reached both Goa and Lisbon during the 1670S, further fueling interest in
the region both at the Braganza court and m Paris, based on Saint-
Romam's letters; especially since both Crowns were operating under the
spell of mercantilism at this time, a theory of political economy which
held bullionism as one of its major tenets." In a letter of January 1677,
Mendonca Furtado had reiterated the need to subdue the area and to col-
onize it with sizable numbers of gente from the Reino and elsewhere. In
his words, this area "could make Portugal opulent"." Even before receiv-
ing this letter, Pedro and his advisors were convinced that the time was at
hand to exploit the Rios de Cuama in a significant fashion, and D. Pcdro
de Almeida's brief Viceroyalty would be dominated by this quest and very
little else. Following the Prince Regent's orders, the new Viceroy sailed
from Lisbon in late April aboard the nao san Pedro de Ribeira and took
power in Goa on the jorh of October 1677. The following January, he
sailed for Mozambique to rendevous with a fleet of four ships that Pedro
had outfitted to carry out the so-called enterprise of Pate: the mission to
establish colonists in the region, while subdueing any indigenous opposi-
tion encountered in the process. Despite some initial successes, the expe-
dition of Pate ended in failure. D. Pcdro de Almeida died m March of 1679
in the midst of its execution."
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Following explicit instructions from the Crown, the primeira via of
succession had been opened in the Palacio da Portaleza on the 24th of Jan-
uary 1678, four days before the departure of Assumar for Mozambique, in
order to appoint a 6th Governing Council to rule in his absence." It nomi-
nated D. Frei Antonio Brandao, the Archbishop of Goa; Antonio Paes de
Sande, then Vedor-Geral da Fazenda, and Francisco Cabral de Almeida.
Cabral de Almeida was already dead, and Brandao would die in July 1678.
Antonio Paes de Sande, therefore, acted as sole Governor of the Estado
for most of the period down to September 1681 when Francisco de Tavora,
the count of Alvor would assume power. Paes de Sande was ideally suited
for this position and did much to consolidate the gains of the late 1660s
and r670s. Born in Extremoz in 1622, he had held various posts in both Eu-
rope and the Estado. Paes de Sande's familial background was also solidly
provincial noble. His father, jeronimo da Gama de Sande, was a fidalgo
of the Casa Real, caualeiro professa in the Order of Christ, Procurador to
the Restoration Cartes and generally "uma das principaes pessoas da
villa, e uiuia [sic} das suas [azendas a lei da Nobreza". At the order and
expense of his father, Anronio had been sent to fight in the Restoration
struggle in search of [ama do valor and social advancement in September
of 1643. He evidently distinguished himself during the next two years in
actions near Badajoz with the Company of Andre de Melo de Albuquer-
que and at Valverde under the command of joao de Mesquita Pimental.
After marrying D. Catarina de Castro Pereira Soutto-Mayor in 1645, and
with the permission of the Crown, he spent several years in Spain serving
Philip IV as provedar and corregedar of Moncaa. In 1666 he returned to
Lisbon, received a cornmandery in the Order of Christ for his services and
was named Secretary of the Estado da India."
Sailing aboard the Viceregal fleet of the count of Sac Vicente, Paes de
Sande reached Goa for this first time in September 1666, whereupon
Nuncs da Cunha had asked him to assume the office of Vedor-geral da
Fazenda during his tenure in addition to his original duties. Paes de Sande
continued in these offices as the behest of Antonio de Mello de Castro and
Manoel Carte-Real de Sampaio for the first year of their Governorship.
Returning to Lisbon in March 1671, the Prince Regent had rewarded him
for his services in the Estado by nominating him Guarda-mor of the
Ribeira de Goa, supraanumerario de Conselheiro de Capa e Espada, no
Conselho Ultramarine, and the commandery of Sac Mamede de Moga-
douro in the Order of Christ. His insightful opinions to Pedro on the
consultas of the Overseas Council during the crucial Viceroyalty of
Mendonca Furtado no doubt helped to convince the Prince Regent to
embrace many of the long overdue reforms that characterized those years.
In the spring of 1677, in recognition of these services and his previous ex-
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pericnces in Asia, Paes de Sande was nominated as the Vedor da Fazenda
Geral of the Estado, arguably the second most important position in the
imperial edifice in the east, "a mayor que tern aquelle Estado, e so a de V
Rey the excede", Departing from Lisbon with D. Pedro de Almeida
aboard the Sao Pedro da Ribeira, Paes de Sande took office on November
4, of that year and remained as Vedor until his appointment to the Gov-
erning Council in January 1678.'"
As Paes de Sande's letters to Lisbon admirably reflect, he possessed a
keen, orderly, and penetrating mind." His administraive skills, honed
over years of experience in Portugal, Spain, and the Estado, as well as his
years as Vedor of the Fazenda-Geral dealing with the financial intricacies
of the "State of India" proved of great use to him during the next three
years. What the Estado needed above all at this juncture was an asute
adminsrrator who could consolidate the long-overdue reforms of the pre-
ceding decade. Pedro and Mcndonca Purtado, exploiting their own dyna-
mism and the preoccupations of their rivals, had laudably initared this
series of radical reforms. Nevertheless, these reforms may not have sur-
vived had it not been for the subsequent policies of Paes de Sande, espe-
cially gIven the Assumar's generally disastrous expedition to Pate, a
setback which might have easily plunged the Estado back into temporary
chaos under a less competent Governor. Paes de Sande, however, had
served on the Conselho Ultramarine in rhe midst of this notable cam-
paign during the 1670S: he understood the logic and intent of the policies
and was ideally suited to entrench them "on the ground" in the Estado
during his own tenure. Just as importantly, he knew from personal expe-
rience and conversations that Pedro was firmly committed to a
rejunevared Estado da India, and would not falter in this quest, whatever
the news of a single expedition to East Africa! This conviction, one that
would have been impossible serving under joao IV, D. Luisa, or Castelo-
Melhor, no doubt sustained Paes de Sande and allowed him to carry on
with confidence in the wake of the distrubing reports from Mozambique
in the spring of 1679.
The major priorities of Antonio Paes de Sande during his three year
tenure as Governor were relatively straightforward: to pursue a measured
but aggressive foreign policy with the Reis Yizmbos that would continue
the process of regaining respect for Portuguese arms in Asia; to overcome
the debacle of Pate; and above all to consolidate the adminstrative and fi-
nancial reforms of Lavradio. To these ends, Paes de Sande would con-
tinue the ongoing war with the king of Kanara, in an effort to force this
indigenous ruler to live up to the 1671 treaty signed with Mello de Castro
and Cone-Real de Sampaio and to force him to stop giving aid to the
Ornani Arabs." Paes de Sande would do everything possible to overcome
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the legacy of Assumar's setback and death in the Pate expedition: regular
sailings would be despatched with some troops and other forms of assis-
tance, the Governor also took an active interest in the workings of the
Junta do Comercio that had been earlier set up for that lucrative trade un-
der Mendonca Furtado." As an administrator par excellence, Paes de
Sande did would also do much to entrench the bureaucratic and financial
reforms of the 1670S. Adminsrrarion controls over the Royal Ribeira
(Shipyard) and Casa de Polvara (Gunpowder Factory) in Goa were tight-
ened even further during his tenure." Paes de Sande would also attempt to
implement a controversial ruling of a 1678 Junta in Goa which sought to
halt longstanding abuses of the religiosos, the forced baptism and confis-
cation of property of "gentio" orphans in the territories of the Eetado.
These abuses had had a very detrimental economic impact and Mendonca
Purtado, in particular, had done much to see that they were ended:'
The overall impact of Paes de Sande's capable stewardship over the
fortunes of the Estado, and the impact of the reform policies that began
with Pedro's accession to power in 1668, is well reflected in the Orfa-
mento of State Budget for 1680, which revealed a positive saldo of 171,164
xeraiins for the Estado as a whole and a surplus of 148,094 for Goa and
her dependencies. These figures compare very favorably with the huge
deficits that characterized the 1630S onward." Moreover, in his document
of transfer to Francisco de Tavora in September 1681, Paes de Sande was
able to bequeath to his successor, more than 101,000 xerafins in the Royal
Treasury, 11 ships "de alto bordo," another 10 "de remo," in Goa and
Bassein, and a regular Terco with salaries paid!" This was indeed a far cry
from the lamentable financial, geo-political and military condition of the
Estado upon the arrival of Antonio de Mello de Castro aboard an English
fleet some two decades earlier. It was also a fitting testimony to the ac-
tions of the succession of Viceroys and Governors who served the Crown
in Asia during those years, men whose social background reveals a consis-
tent pattern of provincial noble families anxious to rise in the hierarchy of
the new Braganza state. Nevertheless, as the actions of Mello de Castro,
Mendonca Furtado, Paes de Sande et al. reveal, this was a service nobility
that was willing and able to provide real service to the pressing needs of
the Crown in order to rise into the ranks of the titulares and the most lu-
crative positions the court could provide. All in all, it was a quid pro quo
in the truest sense of the word, an arrangement which benefited both
sides; and in the process served the needs of an Asian empire badly in need
of assistance after long decades of neglect.
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III
Christians: Saints and Sinners, c. 1640-1683
When Vasco da Gama and his crew reached the tropical shores of the
Malabar coast of India on their epic voyage around the Cape of Good
Hope, they were almost immediately confronted by two Spanish speaking
Muslims from Tunis who demanded to know why they had come. The
answer to this rather predictable question was: "uirnos buscar cbristaos e
especiaria:" "We come in search of Christians and spices." From that
time on, the twin motivation of economic gain and the desire to spread
Christianity to the "infidels" and "gentios" of Asia had been at the very
heart of the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean basin and beyond.
As Diogo do Couro noted in his sixth Decadeof 1612 on the symbiotic re~
lationship between these two factors: "The Kings of Portugal always
aimed in this conquest of the East at so uniting the two powers, spiritual
and temporal, that one should never be exercised without the other." The
Jesuit Antonio Vieira writing nearly half a century later added: "If there
were not merchants who go to seek for earthy treasures in the East and
West Indies, who would transport thither the preachers who take heav-
enly treasures? The preachers take the Gospel and the merchants take the
preachers." This merging of geo-political, economic, and religious moti-
vation was exemplified best in the Padroado Real or "royal patronage"
over the missionary activities of the Roman Catholic Church in Asia, Af-
rica, and Brazil that had been bestowed on the kings of Portugal by a
grateful Rome in a series of bulls from the Inter caetera (1456} through the
Praecelsae devotionis (1514). This combination of rights, privileges, and
duties which in essence established the Portuguese Crown as the "stan-
dard bearer of the Faith," to quote Gil Vicente, was one of the most highly
prized, "jealously guarded and tenaciously maintained prerogatives" of
the Lusitanian kings over the centuries that followed.'
Nevertheless, in the initial decades after 1500 the quest for "spices"
dominated over the quest for souls in Asia. The House of Aviz had been
lethargic in establishing an ecclesiastical hierarchy in Asia to fulfil! the re-
ligious obligations of the Padroado: Goa became the first bishopric in
Asia only in 1534 followed by Cochin, Malacca, and Macau from 1556-1557.
Not until 1560did the Portuguese Asian capita! become the site of an arch-
bishopric. The first missionary priests had come out as early as the first
decade of the rerh century in the ships of Afonso de Albuquerque and his
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contemporaries. These Franciscans, Dominicans and others, numbered
perhaps 100 or so in Goa by 1)40. Many of these priests, however, were of-
ten ignorant of native languages "and most interested in their trade and
their concubines" and thus hardly effective as agents for the introduction
of a "new" religion CO a largely hostile continent of Hindus and Muslims.'
This laxity had been matched by flexibility in dealing with the religious
practices of the Hindus Da Gama and his successors encountered. In seek-
ing allies against Islam, it was logical that these early Portuguese adven-
turers would give the inhabitants of this newly reached land every
opportunity to demonstrate that they were indeed practicing the religion
of some strange or lapsed Christian sect. Da Gama, after viewing the tem-
ples and icons of Malabar for three months was still willing to consider
the inhabitants Christian. The great travelers Pires, Barbosa, and
Castanheda all found elements in Hinduism that either paralleled Chris-
tianity or suggested that it had once been a Christian sect lapsed under the
pressure of Islam.'
This laxity in establishing a formal administrative system for the
Padroado and flexibility in dogma regarding Hindu religious practices
came to an abrupt end m the 1540S with the arrival of the zealousness of
the Counter-Reformation Church and its talented shock troops; the Jesu-
its. The siren call for this new policy came in 1)40 when, in order to en-
courage conversions, all Hindu temples in Goa were destroyed. This act
was soon thereafter repeated in the remaining "old possessions" in the
Asian capital of Bardes (1573) and Salsetre (1584-87). In 1542, the great Jesuit
Francisco Xavier reached India and gave a notable impetus to the mis-
sionary efforts then underway in the Portuguese Asian holdings. During
the next decade, Xavier, who was called "apostle of the Indies", suc-
ceeded in making mass conversions in India, Ccylon, Japan, Melaka, and
Indonesia before dying on an island off the China coast. To facilitate this
work, Xavicr had written to joao III in May 1545 from the Moluccas call-
109for the establishment of the Inquisition in Coa. "The second necessity
for the Christians is that your majesty establish the Holy Inquisition, be-
cause there are many who live according to the Jewish law, and according
to the Mahomedan sect, without any fear of God or shame of the world.":
In 1560, the Regent Cardinal Henrique had dispatched Aleixo Diaz Falcao
to Goa with express orders to establish the Holy Office in the Asian em-
pire. The final step in entrenching this Counter-Reformation mentalite m
the Estado had come in 1567 with the work of the first Ecclesiastical Coun-
cil celebrated at Goa. This Council's deliberations were motivated by
three, somewhat contradictory, objectives; to declare that all religions
other than the orthodox Catholic faith as defined by the Council of Trent
were "intrinsically wrong and harmful m themselves," to acknowledge
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that the Portuguese Crown had the "inescapable duty of spreading the
faith and should use the secular power of the church to do so; and lastly
that conversions "must not be made by force, nor threats of force," since
no one came to Christ by faith "unless he is drawn by the Heavenly Father
with voluntary love and prevenient grace" ."
After 1570, the position of the religiosos in the Estado was character-
ized by three long-standing trends: the rapid proliferation of the number
of religious orders, a notable increase in their economic, social, and intel-
lectual power, and the enactment of a series of anti-Hindu religious laws
that sought to fulfil! the intent if not the exact letter of the 1567 Ecclesiasti-
cal Council. By the early rrth century, the Jesuits, Dominicans, Francis-
cans, Augustinians were all well-entrenched both eclessiastical!y and
financially. Goa had at least 7 parish churches, with another 60 or so scat-
tered throughout the tropical countryside's of the old possessions. The
first major Christian convent, that of Santa Monica (1606-27) on the 'Holy
Mount' looking down on the rest of the city had over IOO nuns and a
plethora of other applicants. The College of St. Paul's was the largest Je-
suit educational institution in Asia with "70 religious and in theory 2000
students". The most impressive shrine to Christendom in Goa was the Se
or Cathedral of St. Catherine, begun in 1562 and only completed in 1652
with a length of nearly 250 feet. Built on a plinth of larerite, a local build-
ing stone, this Portuguese-Gothic style masterwork has 8 chapels, 6 altars
in the transept, as well as a main altar dedicated to St. Catberine.'
According to figures found in Antonio Bocarro's Lwro das plantas de
todas as fortalezas (1635), the Crown was responsible for salaries and
other mantimentos for nearly 900 religiosos in Goa alone by the early rrrh
century, amounting to at least 59,000 xerafins a year.' The late reth and
early r-rh century also witnessed the enactment and attempted enforce-
ment of strict anti-Hindu laws in the Counter-Reformation campaign to-
ward achieving religious conformity in the Estado. These laws can be
broadly defined in two functional groups: those that sought to make con-
tinued adherence to Hindu religious practices impossible within the con-
fines of the State of India, and those that offered implicit incentives to
convert to the Catholic faith. In the wake of the gradual destruction of
Hindu temples in the old possessions, the viceroys D. Constantino de
Braganza and D. Francisco Courinho issued orders in 1560 and 1563 ban-
ishing large numbers of Brahmins in the interest of spreading the faith. In
February 1575,the Governor Antonio Moniz Barreto mandated that if any
of these Brahmins made an "unauthorized entry" into the Estado, their
estates would be confiscated and utilized to provide clothing for the New
Christians. On 13 March 1613, the Viceroy D. Hieronimo de Azevedo had
issued an order that no "infidel" would be able to marry during times of
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the year prohibited by the Church. At other times they would be able to
do so only outside of their native villages and according to the laws of the
Concilio Provincial under the pain of a rooo xerafins fine, one-third paid
to the accuser and two-thirds to cover the expenses of the High Court. In
January 1620 this policy to discourage Hindu marriages was made even
more strident: "As from the date of publication of this order, no Hindu,
of whatever nationality or status he may be, can or shall perform mar-
riages in this city of Goa, nor the islands or adjacent territories of His
Majesty, under pain of a fine of 1000 xerafins.?'
Throughout this long campaign against Hinduism, the Portuguese hi-
erarchy demonstrated a predictable effort to decapitate the rival indige-
nous religions by banning Hindu priests from Goa. One of the key
provisions of a December 1567 law by D. Sebastiao stated that in his do-
minions "there should not exist any Muslim leaiie or Hindu preachers,
joshis, joguis, Sorcerers, Gurous, of temples or any other person who
held a religious office among the Hindus or were the heads or supporters
of the religions of the Hindus". Those who failed to depart were held as
captives for service at the Ribeira, the royal dockyards of Goa along the
Mandavi. This 1567 law inter alia also mandated that Hindus who were
resident in Goa and certain other cities of the Estada were to be forced to
attend the preaching of Catholicism." As early as 1585, the third Coneilio
Provincial had recommended to the Crown that Hindus should be forbid-
den to wear the sacred thread or to initiate their sons into this practice.
Not surprisingly, other laws toward discouraging the practice of Hindu-
Ism were economic in nature. A June 1557 law by the Governor Francisco
Barreto declared: "No officials of mine, controllers of revenues, commis-
sioners of customs, treasurers, receivers of customs, accountants, lessees
of my customs or other revenues, judges, scriveners, and notaries and
other officials of revenue and justice should utilize the services in any way
whatsoever of any Brahmin or other infidel." Orders of 1573 and 1634 also
sought to deprive the Hindus of Salserte and Bardez of political domi-
nance over the traditional gauncares or "village communities" in those
areas and to prevent those who migrated to neighboring territories to es-
cape religious persecution from receiving their annual share of the income
of the gauncares- the jono."
Spearheading this assault on the indigenous religion was the Pai dos
Cbristaos (Father of Chnstians). This appointed cleric, usually a Jesuit,
was charged with the overall welfare of the converts in Goa and else-
where. According to Pyrard: "There IS another house ... called
Cathecurnenos and IS for catechizing and teaching the new Christians;
they are fed and supplied with clothing there, until such time as they are
instructed and baptized: over these the Father of the Christians has
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charge, as over the whole house.'"' The Pai dos Cbristaos also monitored
infractions of the anti-Hindu laws on the books: he kept records on the
times and dates of the main indigenous festivals and noted and punished
those who attended; he sought to prevent pilgrimages to neigh boring tem-
ples; and he prevented the celebration of Hindu marriages. His most con-
troversial and acrimonious duty was to enforce D. Sebastiao's, March
1559, decree on the forcible conversion of Hindu orphans. According to
the provisions of this decree: children of Hindus in Coa, who were left
"without father, mother, grandfather, grandmother or other ascendant
Iineals and are not of an age at which they can have understanding and
judgment, as soon as the last of such relatives is dead," were put in the
care of the Judge of Orphans and handed over to the Jesuit College of St.
Paul, "for being baptized, educated and indoctrinated," in the Catholic
faith. The Pai dos Christiios was charged with "ferreting out Hindu or-
phans if necessary by force," and then turning them over to the Judge of
Orfaos and eventually the College of St. Paul. As time went on, interpre-
tation of this 1559 law became increasingly flexible, causing much contro-
versy in the Estado. Besides the religious affront inherent in this law, there
were various cases where Hindu children were taken and forcibly con-
verted after the death of their father alone with the parent's property be-
ing confiscated in the process! Accordingly, increasing numbers of Hindu
merchants decided to vote with their feet, seeking asylum in the lands of
the Reis Vizinhos instead of risking the harsh religious and financial pen-
alties inflicted with enforcement of this law."
In addition to this wide-range of punitive measures aimed at the Hin-
dus in the years after 1560, there were other laws promulgated by the
Crown designed to encourage conversion to Catholicism. In September
'570, the Crown decided to exempt all Hindus who converted to Chris-
tianity from the dizimos land tax for fifteen years. In November 1592, the
Viceroy Marhias de Albuquerque declared that slaves of "infidels" who
converted would be freed. During the last half of the reth century, a series
of laws relating to the inheritance of property in the Estado were also en-
acted to this end. According to traditional Hindu law, a man who died
without leaving male offspring could not bequeath his inheritance to his
wife and daughters. The Crown and Governor Francisco de Barreto
sought to exploit this fact in a law of June 1557, which stated that wives
and daughters could indeedinherit, provided they became Christians; and
if they did not, the nearest Christian relatives would receive the estate. D.
Sebasnao reinforced this measure in a decree of March 1559. In 1562, the
Crown provided that a Hindu wife who became Christian and left her
husband on the grounds that he retained his old religion might claim half
of his estate during his lifetime. In 1557, a similar decree had stipulated that
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a son or daughter who converted might claim one-third of their father's
estate, provided they had no other brother, and might still additionally
claim their part of the estate on the parent's death. Official posts in the
Crown bureaucracy were also reserved for Christian converts wherever
and whenever possible."
The successes of this concerted conversion campaign on the status quo
ante helium in Goa and elsewhere in the Estado were limited. Byr6oo, it is
estimated that there were perhaps 175,000 Christians in all of India out of
a total population of some r40 million. Of this number, perhaps IOO,OOO
"were the low-caste fishers and pearl divers of the Manar coast," where
Xavier and the later Jesuits had been so successful. In Coa itself, there
were perhaps 50,000 Christians; or 25% of a population of c. 200,000 In
r6oo. Nevertheless, the harsh measures outlined above did ensure that
nearly two-thirds of the population in the city of Goa itself was Chris-
tian." The resiliency of the indigenous religion in the face of this onslaught
can be attributed to several factors: the strong opposition of the Hindus to
this foreign faith; the ease with which indigenous religious temples and
icons could be relocated to the lands of the neighboring Reis Vizinhos like
the king of Bijapur. The local business acumen and capital of Hindu mer-
chants In Goa and elsewhere also tempered the de jure zealousness of the
campaign. It was also inevitable that a de facto tolerance and intermin-
gling occurred from the outset between the two religions. Many Viceroys
and other secular officials, as well as Archbishops and clerics, for exam-
ple, utilized Hindu doctors. Nevertheless, this religious campaign and the
supposed glories of the Padroado ensured that the Reiigiosos continued
to play a vital role in the social, economic, cultural, and political life in the
Estado far out of proportion to their actual numbers, which themselves
were impressive. Moreover, it is clear that the zealousness of some of this
legislation continued especially regarding the forcible conversion of
Hindu orphans."
By the 1660s, the Braganza dynasty therefore confronted a "law of di-
minishing returns" with respect to the religiosos. Conversions continued
to lag while Crown expenditures on supporting the spate of religious or-
ders III the capital and elsewhere remained high. There is ample evidence
to suggest that the Archbishop, the Inquisitor-General and their minions
also exerted significant political power, at times frustrating Crown initia-
tives at reform due largely to the realities inherent in the Goan jingle:
Vice-reo va, vice-rei vem, Padre Paulista sempre tem {Viceroys come and
go, but the Jesuit fathers are always with us)." More damaging to the
Crown's interest was the fact that the continuing zealousness of the Inqui-
sition, the Pm dos Cbristaos, the religious orders, as well as open abuses
of existing laws all served to alienate many indigenous families, who fre-
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qucntly sought relief from such practices by leaving Portuguese held terri-
tories. Perhaps the most fundamental shift in the traditional Crown
policy, from the days of Da Gama onward, to balance sound financial and
religious policy in the empire took place in the rvth century with the en-
trance of significant European competition not only in economic matters,
but implicitly in the religious field as well. During the reth century, the
Crown had had the luxury of knowing that Hindu and Jain merchants
who abandoned residence in the Estado could only take their [azendas to
the lands of the Reis Vizinhos. After 1600 and the arrival of the Dutch,
English, and French into the Indian Ocean trade in force, this luxury van-
ished. Such merchants henceforth would and did take their capital, busi-
ness acumen, and networks to coastal enclaves controlled by Portugal's
European competitors, decidedly another matter in the quest to dominate
the rich trade of Asia. As time went on, and especially after 1663, the
Crown was increasingly forced to consider a reformation of traditional
religious excesses which had cost the Estado indigenous population and
capital."
A perusal of relevant documents for the years after 1663 reveals that
such excesses were commonplace. In the eminently quotable words of An-
tonio de Mello de Castro written in January 1666: "Among the great mis-
eries that have existed for many years in this State of India, none is of less
weigh than the multitude of Religiosos that there are in it, because they
are rich, they are making themselves Masters of everything, and those
that are poor, sustain themselves with the alms of those that are even
poorer than themselves. "'"Complaints made against the religiosos during
this period were wide-ranging. First, that they were failing in their pri-
mary mission of spreading the Catholic faith due to an ignorance of indig-
enous languages. Although a royal decree of May J656 had ordered that
all parish priests be examined for competence before their appointment,
this policy had not been strictly enforced. As a result, the Crown received
many complaints regarding the inability of clerics to instruct the indige-
nous population of Goa in the local language of Konkoni, a shortcoming
that was described by Afonso VI as "an affront to God and the souls of
new converts"."
A second category of complaints related to the hesitancy of the reli-
gious orders to contribute a "fair" share towards financing a rehabilita-
tion of the Estado in the posH663 period. The daunting fiscal crisis that
confronted the early Braganzas in their Asian empire forced them to con-
sider various financial expedients, including cutting subsidies to the reli-
gious orders and seeking significant contributions from the leading
clerical houses, that were predictably interpreted as an assault on the tra-
ditionally favored position of the Padroado in the Estado. The Jesuits as
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well as the other main orders would in one fashion or another seek to de-
lay and frustrate such efforts throughout these years. In the late 1660s, the
Company of Jesus would oppose the extension of the Coleaa, a special
food tax originally passed by a General Council of 162} as well as the
donatioo for the peace with the United Provinces. Complaints were also
common regarding the skill with which the religious houses had been able
to ahsorb landed property throughout the confines of the Estado without
express permission of the Crown or the misuse of the fazendas of territo-
ries legitimately granted to them. Other letters reaching the Terreiro do
Pace lamented the poor job priests of various orders were demonstrating
in other charitable functions including the running of the Hospital Real in
Goa. Finally, and perhaps most Importantly, Lisbon received complaints
that the Inquisition and religious orders were abusing various decrees of
the Crown with extremely adverse effects on the financial stability of the
Estado. The most glaring example of such abuses related to the taking
and forcible conversion of Hindu orphans."
All of these specific prohlems were exacerbated by the continuing rift
between Lisbon and the Holy See, dating from the Revolution of 1640,
which had undermined the ability of the Crown to fill bishopric vacancies
not only at home but also in the imperio. The actions of the missionaries
of the Propaganda Fide (1622) who, with authorization from Rome, had
begun to infiltrate the borders of the Estado, constituted yet another wor-
rying hemorrhage for the once proud hody-religioso embodied in the
Padroado." In April reor, D. Luisa de Ousmao had complained of the
dearth of information reaching Lishon regarding the activities of the
religiosos and given the Governors Luis de Mendonca Furtado and D.
Pedro de Lencastre the power to nominate qualified individuals to fill vi-
tal ecclesiastical positions." The Queen-Regent, whose sincere piety and
support for the Padroado can hardly be questioned, was no doubt anx-
ious for her new Viceroy Anronio de Mcllo de Castro to resolve this pleth-
ora of religious problems as well as the host of secular ills afflicting the
near moribund Estado in the early 1660s. In letters of March and April
1662, D. Luisa demonstrated her support for the reIigiosos by reconfirm-
ing a decree from the Viceroy Count of Tavora granting the Dominicans
of Mozambique the right to send a yearly embarkation to Sena, by order-
ing Mello de Castro to promptly pay the salanes of the Pranciscan priests
of San Theme and underwrite the construction of new churches In
Bardes, and by requiring that careful reports be assembled on any way-
ward priest before returning him to the Reino for discipline." At the same
time, extreme financial pressures in both the Reino and imperio had evi-
dently forced the Queen-Regent to consider the possibility of instituting
some type of levy on the widely reported wealth of the religious orders in
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the Eetado, a terse letter of April 4, 1662 instructed the new Viceroy to pre-
pare a careful accounting of all the "bens and propriedades" of all the re-
ligious houses in Asia, and especially Coa.'
Antonio de Mello de Castro, however, would prove to be no great
friend of the religiosos. After reaching Goa, he quickly came to the con-
clusion that the overweening economic, social, and intellectual power of
the religious orders was one of the primary obstacles the Crown and its
representatives faced in their quest to rehabilitate the remains of the
Eetadc. His immediate problem was dealing with the fallout from the
Luis de Mendonca Furtado-Barrolemeu de Vasconcelos imbroglio in
which some of the leading clerics in the capital had involved themselves.
The promise of swift punishment for any future infractions against the
peace, and Mendonca Furrado's departure for the Reino promptly solved
this dilemma. In February 1663, the Viceroy replied to D. Luisa's initial
missives. He noted that it was proper for him to sanction voyages by the
Domimcans from Mozambique to Sena only inasmuch as such voyages
did not interfere with the terms of the lucrative contraao negotiated with
the Captain of Mozambique. Mello de Castro was also quick to point out
that the religiosos entrenched in the Rios de Cuama had also been particu-
larly adept at avoiding the Crown's levy on gold and silver exported from
that region "and by this vice have diverted a very considerable sum of
capital"." As to the matter of preparing a formal accounting of all assets
possessed by the religious orders, Mello de Castro predictably pleaded for
additional time to complete this daunting task, while noting that "it is cer-
tain that the religiosos possess many fazendas, most of them only with the
bill of sale," and not necessarily with Crown permission."
Given the severe financial constraints affecting both Lisbon and the
viceroyalty during the early 1660s, it is hardly surprising that Antonio de
Mello's main struggle with the religiosos related to convincing them to
pay their share toward the defense and upkeep of the State. The Viceroy
sought to obtain such contributions in difficult negotiations from 1662-
1666 that focused on either cutting the level of Crown subsidies that each
order received or alternatively in paying a decima or other percentage of
their total revenues. These talks took on added urgency in the wake of the
loss of Cochin and the other Malabar coast possessions to Rijckloff Van
Goens in late 1662, early 1663. In a letter dated February 24, 1663, the Jesuit
Francisco Barreto, Visitador of the Company of Jesus, summarized the
initial response of perhaps the most powerful ecclesiastical order to this
initiative. He began by noting that while all loyal subjects of the Crown
were no doubt feeling the pain of the Estado's losses, the religiosos had
more reason to do so since although "we are planting in this Orient the
Faith with such zealousness, we are going to lose with such brevity what
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we have acquired with such hard work over so many years". Barreto
promised thar all the Jesuit Colleges would arrange special prayers and
penance to assist m this troublesome time, but he strenuously argued
against either cutting the royal subsidy or imposing a new regular levy m
favor of allowing the traditional system of a don gratuit of sorts operate.
As the Yizitador pointed out, the Company had been more than willing to
assist in times of need in the past: they alone had contributed toward dis-
patching galleons for the defense of Ceylon, lending the Estado some
20,000 xeratins, while during the recent siege of Cochin, the Company
had provided far more cash and silver plate for its defense from the outset
than any other order. These sentiments were no doubt repeated at the
meeting of the Three Estates called by Mello de Castro on the sth of
March I663."
The Viceroy's hand in this test of power was strengthened following
the ascension to power of Afonso VI and Casrelo-Melhor. In a letter of
March 14, 1663, the king and his escriuao instructed Mello de Castro to
strictly follow existing regimentos on the question of mandating ecclesias-
tical contributions to the Estado in time of need." To bolster his case,
Castelo-Mefhor cited the recent example of these same orders contribur-
109 up to a tenth of their revenues in the Reino to pursue the war with
Spain. The escriuiio noted that "these Religiosos being rich in money and
lands, and collecting moreover many bequeaths from living and dead lay-
men," could easily afford to pay their fair share of defense expenses.
Mello de Castro utilized such leverage as well as an implicit threat to res-
urrect the history of past scandals involving the religious orders to press
his case for more regular and significant contributions. By early 1664, the
Viceroy was able to inform Lisbon that in principal at least the Religiosos
had agreed to pay one-eighth of their secular and ecclesiastical rents and
one-fourth of their crdinarios each year to assist with the defense of the
Estado. Mello de Castro, however, was quick to point out that these lofty
ideals had not in fact been met. The Dominicans had contributed I500
xerafins and the Company had promised 10,000 xeraiins to help with new
fortifications at Mormugao. A fire that damaged the College of St. Paul in
Rachol had prevented the jesuits from sending along the final 6000
xerafins of their pledge, even though the Viceroy doubted whether this
was a legitimate excuse. These rather meager figures, moreover, had done
nothing to defray the enormous cost of the contribution to the peace with
the United Provinces, to which the Estado had ideally committed 100,000
xerafine a year!"
Throughout the remainder of I664, Mello de Castro strove to ensure
that the religious orders would not only pay their fair share toward de-
fcnse expenditures, but also toward the donativo for Holland. A special
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Junta called by the Viceroy to apportion the weight of the donativo at
which representatives of all three estates were present met in August. As
Mello de Castro informed Afonso in a letter of the rsth of that month, this
body had agreed to marginal special taxes on salt and cotton cloth to help
meet this obligation. Nevertheless, in order to raise the figure of 100,000
xeraiins a year for the 16 years of the levy, it was vital that the religiosos
contribute a significant sum as well, a degree of altruism which had been
decidedly absent in the opinions expressed at the Junta by the representa-
tives of the ecclesiastical order ." Between 20~23 August a series of letters
was exchanged on this matter between the Viceroy, Barreto, and the
Provincal of the Company of Jesus. In a letter to Mello de Castro, the
Provincal went to great lengths to praise the traditional willingness of the
Society to contribute in time of need: "we offer all that this poverty we
possess allows." On a more salient and practical note, he was also quick
to point out that the religiosos in this and similar Juntas could only be
obliged to pay "those tributes that arc in conformity with the law"."
Mello de Castro responded by emphasizing that as they both knew the
most crucial factor in assuring both the secular and ecclesiastical future of
the Estado "was peace". Since it was impossible for the Crown to pay the
contribution to the United Provinces without the assistance of the empire,
the Estado was obliged to pay its share punctually. To accomplish this
task meant that all three estates had to pay their fair share, including the
religiosos and particularly the Jesuits. After all, this "same Company of
Jesus in Portugal paid the decimas for the war with Spain," something
that "could and should be done in India for the conservation of this
Estado and in obedience to the King our Senhor in order to secure the
Faith in these parts, and to halt the calamities, and miseries, so many
times manifesting themselves first in the possessions and later in loss of so
many Pracas"."
In a letter in August 1664, Barreto sought to hold the line on the
amount of exactions that would be paid by arguing that there was a nota-
ble distinction between what the Society had agreed to contribute in the
Reino and what it should be obliged to pay in the imperio. The Vizitador
noted that his order had agreed to such substantial levels at home, and es-
pecially the decirnas on rendimentos, only because the kingdom itself was
in peril." The following day, the Viceroy responded by rather effectively
maintaining that it was in fact more important for the Society to pay
decimas in the Estado than at home. After all, in Portugal since Spain was
the enemy, "only" the Crown was at risk not the faith, while in Asia both
were in fact threatened with extinction! All three estates had agreed to a
new tax on olive oil to facilitate the payment of the donativo and in doing
so had demonstrated a desire to share the burden. The Jesuits alone
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among the religious orders had consistently sought to "impede" the cause
"so important to God, to the King, and of such utility for this State".
These selfish actions "were not just". Mello de Castro concluded:
"Speaking ro you as your friend and not as the Viceroy of India, I believe
that this method of proceeding is very strange," and one that could ulti-
mately result in problems for the Society in the Estado. The Viceroy made
it clear that even though he was a personal friend and held Barrero "and
all the holy fathers" in high regard, he would ultimately be forced to exact
the monies demanded by the Crown and agreed to by rhe Junta." This
hard line evidently had the desired effect not only on the Society of Jesus
but on the other religious orders as well since they all nominally agreed to
the provisions of the Junta. In the years that followed, however, all of
these Orders consistently maintained that they were acceding to these de-
mands under duress and complaints against the exactions were common.
Moreover, as delineated in a letter of late August 1664 from the Cabido of
the Se of Goa to Afonso, it was clear that the religiosos would have pre-
ferred, as in the past, to determine for themselves the levels and methods
of the donations made to fund secular projects and priorities."
Nonetheless, once the question of the donativo had been technically
resolved, the remainder of Mello de Castro's viceroyalty was relatively
uneventful with respect to the religiosos. In a letter in January 1663, the
Camara of the city of Chaul had complained to the Crown over the activi-
ties of the Society there, specifically charging that the Jesuits were involv-
ing themselves in the secular "jurisdiction" of the city and violating its
privileges by investing in the two voyages from Goa to Mozambique that
the Crown had conceded it to assist in maintaining the fortifications of
that valued praca. In March 1665, Afonso ordered MelJo de Castro to take
all necessary actions to ensure the exclusion of the rebgiosos from the
"administration of the said city" and with regard to their involvement in
the specified voyages from Goa to Mozambique to provide the Crown
with more particulars and evidence before a final decision could be
made." The following month, Afonso responded to a letter from Barrero,
written during the height of the donativo debate. In his missive, the
Yizitador had harangued the king with the many examples of sizable fi-
nancial assistance the Society had rendered in times of need, including the
20,000 xerafins pledged for the reinforcement of Ceylon in the 1650S.
Moreover, it pleaded poverty with respect to the donatiuo due largely to
the fire at the College of Rachol which had caused extensive damage to
this Jesuit bastion in Salserre. In no doubt welcomed terms, the king or-
dered Mello de Castro to act in this matter according to the needs of the
Estado and what he perceived as just in the circumsrances.'
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In letters to Afonso VI in January 1666, Mello de Castro proffered
some final opinions on the status of the religiosos in the Estado, giving his
rivals little quarter. His term as Viceroy had convinced him that the
Estado itself was in jeopardy, should the economic, political, and social
power of the religious orders remain unchecked. Simply put, he was no
friend to the manner in which the "true faith" was being spread in Asia. In
the Viceroy's view, the number of religiosos was far In excess of what was
needed to propagate Catholicism. "One does not find in Goa and its envi-
rons more than 320 or so permanent Portuguese residents, while the
priests exceed 700; in Chaul there are perhaps 2I and for them there are
five convents." Mello de Casrro noted that the only function that 20 fa-
thers performed was to assist the dying with their wills in order to ensure
that their [azendas reverted to the religious houses upon their demise,
while others conspired to spend this windfall "scandalously". Such prac-
tices had not only added substantial sums to the coffers of the religious or-
ders during his term, but in so doing had robbed the Crown of a source of
income. More damaging to the interests of the State was a long-standing
policy of luring recently arrived soldados into their houses, a practice
which deprived the armadas and fortalezas of badly needed manpower at
a time when the Estado confronted a host of enemies. In seeking to outfit
the ships for the 1666 monsoon, the Viceroy had discovered that more
than two dozen had deserted and fled to convents in Goa. In r665, Mello
de Castro had written letters complaining against such actions to the Au-
gustinians, Franciscans, Jesuits and Carmelites, to little effect."
In his harsh denunciation of the religiosos, Mello de Castro not only
sought to expose practices that either infringed upon or undermined the
best interests of the Crown, he also sought to critique their performance
in their legitimate function of spreading the Roman Catholic faith. De-
spite frequent and long-standing complaints on the slipshod manner in
which the faith was propagated in the Estado, the religious orders contin-
ued to resist royal efforts to address the most fundamental reason for
these shortcomings: a simple ignorance of the indigenous languages, espe-
cially Konkoni, on the part of the vast majority of the religiosos who were
charged with missionary activities. Mello de Castro argued that this state
of affairs was crippling missionary activities throughout the Estado and
particularly the "old conquests" of the island of Goa, Bardes, and
Salsette. The usually astute Jesuits had evidently demonstrated relatively
little interest in mastering local tongues. "Few or none of the Vigarios of
Salsetre, know the language." They were assisted by "native" assistants
"in the administration of the Sacraments. "I ask you to consider how one
would be able to hear a confession on a winter's night, a league from the
nearest road?" Although the Pranciscans had some "masters of the lan-
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guage'' who could adequately fulfill their duties, most of these were el-
derly with few able students to continue their work. The Dominicans and
Augustinians conducted themselves "in the same fashion". To combat
this nearly general ignorance of local languages, the Viceroy endorsed the
adoption of a plan advanced by some of his predecessors, calling for the
establishment of a testing system for all priests involved in missionary
work in the Estado to be administered by the Cabido of Goa or some
other church official."
Mello de Casrro concluded his diatribe by informing the Crown that
many of the religious orders were also doing their utmost to avoid paying
their share to the donativo. It had been a "miracle" to win the initial
agreement on the contribution, given the many interests against it and the
open opposition of the Jesuits. Subsequent efforts to actually collect on
the promises of 1664 had been anything but facile. Many of his officers
had all but suspended their activities in Goa itself, since some of the lead-
ing lay and ecclesiastical residents there were arguing that a clause of the
Junta agreement seemingly gave the parties involved the right to declare
the oitava obligation null and void should one of their number fail to pay
up! Thanks to his efforts, that part of the oitava due for the island of Goa,
Bardes, and Salsette had been promised by all the religious orders save the
Company of Jesus, which had insisted that all the others pay first. "I must
confess to your Majesty that they are terrible men." In order to suffer
them "it is necessary to be a Viceroy of bronze". In his opinion, neverthe-
less, it was vital to push this issue through to a successful conclusion since
it was a model for defining the limits of ecclesiastical power in the Estado,
and for establishing the clear primacy of Crown authority and the defer-
ence that the religiosos "owed to the service of Your Majesty" ."
The charges contained in Mello de Casrro's letters in January 1666,
even though they may have been somewhat exaggerated, certainly dem-
onstrate the fact that daunting problems remained with respect to defin-
ing the exact role the religiosos should play within a reformed Estado da
India. The task of addressing these difficult challenges feU to Mello de
Castro's successor as Viceroy, joeo Nunes da Cunha, the greatest friend
the religiosos would find in the office during the late rrrh century. After
reaching Goa in late September 1666, Sac Vicenre, as noted above, de-
voted most of his energies for the next two years to waging a religious cru-
sade against the Omani Arabs near the Straits of Hurmuz and seeking to
further entrench the power of the religiosos into the fabric of the Asian
empire. Nuncs da Cunha, however, received instructions from the Crown
that complicated his sacred quest. In January 1666, even before his depar-
ture from Lisbon, Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor had ordered him to ad-
dress the festering and bothersome problem of a lack of knowledge of
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indigenous languages on the part of the religiosos by adopting stringent
measures. The king reiterated orders originally mandated in 1656 regard-
ing the examination and appointment of parish priests throughout the
Estado. Henceforth, all such clerics in advance of their formal appoint-
ments would be expected to pass a language exam administered under the
auspices of the Inquizidor Apostolico and could not be confirmed in their
posts "if they did not know the language of their parishes well". Afonso
and Castelo-Melhor also ordered (hat the College of Reis Magos should
have a teacher in such languages with at least 20 students, and teachers
would also be appointed in other [crtalezas. The goal of such measures
was to avoid the "great complaints of carelessness that the said religiosos
have had in this important business and great damn to (he service of God
and the souls of the new converts". In an attempt to ensure compliance,
Afonso ordered that no parish priests could be paid until they had passed
an exam and spoke the language."
In January I666, Sac Vicenre also received orders to do his utmost to
collect the oitava part of the rendas in the Estado that had been pledged to
meet the donativo. As Afonso pointed out, Luis de Mendonca Furtado
had done his best on the return voyage from Chaul to convince the Portu-
guese residents of Mozambique and the Rios de Cuama to make similar
concessions. Nevertheless, based on Mello de Castro's warnings, the king
expected the Jesuits and Dominicans to oppose this exaction in a variety
of fashions. The Crown informed its new Viceroy: "I strongly order you
(as I affirm with this letter) that as soon, with the grace of God you will
have arrived in India, to generally execute this contribution in all parts of
the Estado, in the form in which it has been adjusted.":" The following
month, Sac Vicente was instructed to intercept "a Franciscan priest with
a Patent or Breve naming him commissario geral of the said order in the
Eetado", Since this cleric merely possessed authorization to assume this
post from Rome and the Crown had long considered it "very prejudicial
not only to the rights of this Court, but also to the service of God," to al-
low such appointments without first approving them, the Viceroy should
prevent his assumption of power and send him to Portugal on the first
available sailing." In March of that year, Nunes da Cunha was addition-
ally charged with resolving a dispute between his predecessor and the Je-
suits, relating to a share of the rendas of the island of Goa and adjacent
islands in the old conquests that joao III had granted to S. Francisco Xa-
vier to found the College of St. Paul and which Mello de Castro had evi-
dently been withholding at least in part. The king and Castelo-Melhor
ordered Sac Vicenre to examine all of the relevant provisoes on the matter
and implement the policies specified in the most recent order passed by
the Crown."
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While Sac Vicente concentrated a good deal of his logistical energies
toward organizing his grand Straits fleet, he also Implemented policies
that favored increasing the power of the reIigiosos in the political, eco-
nomic, and social life of the empire. This attitude was admirably reflected
in his first set of letters to the Crown in January 1667. In Sac Vicenre's
view, Chaul should continue to enJOY the two voyages to Mozambique it
had been granted in order to assist the fortifications there that "are in a
very ruinous state". As for complaints against the Jesuits involving them-
selves in the administration of that city, the new Viceroy was much less in-
clined than Mello de Castro to completely expel the religiosos from any
political role. In his view, it was always "convenient" to have these tal-
ented Padres involved in some administrative capacity, since in all places
where they were not, administrative thefts were notable. He advised
Afonso not to listen to such complaints in the future made against the So-
ciety by "interested parties" who were only seeking to criticize the Jesuits
in order to facilitate their own ability to rob the Crown and the people.'"
The Viceroy also complained about the great corruption of the Governors
of Mozambique, who despite the constant complaints of the Jesuits, had
enriched themselves at the expense of the povo in those parts. For their
trouble, the clerics had been "martyred" and "men without God, and
without Faith, and with money [are] those who triumphl?" Nunes da
Cunha also notified the king that the new commissano geral of the Fran-
ciscans was very ill and could not at present be sent back to the Reino. He
noted that he had also done his best to ensure that some 2000 xerafins had
been sent to the Jesuit College at Macau to assist their activities in China:'
Sac Viccnte's firm support for the religicsos was also evidenced in a
dispute between the Procurador da Coroa and the Society of Jesus involv-
ing the payment of certain monies that this Crown official claimed was
owed to the Royal Treasury by that order. The Viceroy's views in this
matter reveal much about his general attitude toward the importance of
the religious orders to the well-being of the Estado: "I beseeching ask that
your Majesty using your royal grandeur not take them [the monies] from
these Religiosos, who with such example and zeal to the service of God
and your Majesty have conserved themselves in this Estado." Sac Vicente
further argued that should any monies be taken they be directly applied
only to the missionary work of the Society and not used for secular pro-
jeers." In some cases, however, even Nunes da Cunha revealed some de-
gree of frustration by the policies of his religiose friends. This feeling was
evident, for example, in a letter in February 1667 regarding the extension
of the Co/ecta, the only sure means in Sao Vicenre view to raise adequate
monies to underwrite a rehabilitation of the Estado to its old splendor. In
this dispatch, the Viceroy described his successful negotiations on this
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matter with the three estates in Goa. Although the nobility and povo had
agreed to an extension of this tax, monies that Sao Vicenre desperately
needed to fund the formation of his grand armada for the Straits, it was
being strongly opposed by the Jesuits, Dominicans, Augustinians and
Carmelites. Even in this case, however, his high regard for the religiosos
and their "importance" had convinced him to delay imposing this tax un-
til the Crown could issue firm orders on the matter."
In the midst of his twin military and administrative campaign on be-
half of the religious orders, Sac Vicenre died in Goa in early November
1668, after serving a little over 2 years of his term as Viceroy." Events,
meanwhile, were transpiring in Lisbon that would also help alter the na-
ture of church-state relations in the empire. The palace coup of late 1667
that had deposed Afonso and Castelo-Melhor and installed Pedro in
power would ultimately have far reaching consequences in defining the
exact role of the religiosos in the imperial structure of absolutist Portugal.
The first stage of this transformation would come under the sth Gov-
erning Council of Luis Miranda Hennques, Manoel Carte-Real de
Sampaio, and Antonio de Mello de Castro. This process would accelerate
with the arrival of Luis de Mendonca Furtado, and culminate with the
work of D. Pedro de Almeida and Anconio Paes de Sande.
Pedro's reign coincided with that of Louis XIV's III France and there is
little doubt that he strove to implement policies along the lines of his royal
"cousin" to the north. The Prince Regent and his grandee advisors sought
to establish a more centralized administration, a state-influenced mercan-
tilist economy, a more efficient military and foreign policy, and increased
power over religious policy in his kingdom, policies that have come to be
defined as the hallmarks of the so-called absolutist State. With regard to
religion, Pedro would confront a difficult task within the very traditional
confines of the kingdom itself. The powerful clerical estate in Portugal,
numbering c. 55,000 members, had long enjoyed a favored intellectual and
economic position in the kingdom. It was in fact "a state within a state,"
that owned between one-fourth and one-third of the land in the kingdom,
held rights to the decima de Deus or a tench share of the royal revenues,
and also received a plethora of other donations through mortmain and
other devices from "pious believers". The Inquisition itself constituted yet
another bastion of clerical influence and power within the kingdom."
As in most of Europe, the Crown's campaign to increase its effective
control over this institution was long and gradual. Even during Pedro's
reign, some royal initiatives would be undermined by vestigial clerical
power, including his scheme to fund a new East India Company with
monies from the New Christians." Nevertheless, the general pattern to-
wards absolutism with regard to religious matters in the empire had al-
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ready been established. The papal bulls initially authorizing the Padroado
had given the Crown widespread power over all religious activities in
Asia. Even in the midst of the mid-r-th century imbroglio with the Holy
See following 1640, which centered around the issues of appointing bish-
ops and the increasingly active Propaganda Fide, the Crown continued to
maintain a hard line in its rights and privileges. These struggles over the
restored Crown's prerogatives over religious matters in Asia no doubt ex-
acerbated strained relations with Innocent X (1644-55), Alexander VII
(1655-67), Clement IX (1667-69), and Clement X (1670-1676).
Afonso and Castelo-Melhor had not only striven to maintain the tradi-
tional powers of the Padroado, they had also sought to increase royal
power by taking a more active role in the more mundane matters of
spreading the faith in Asia. The 1666 decree on examining all parish
priests and withholding payment for those who did not pass a language
test indicated that the Crown henceforth expected a much more efficient
return on the substantial amount of badly needed capital it was expend-
ing on the Padroado. Similarly, orders of that same year to recall the
newly arrived commiesario-geral of the Franciscans revealed that the
Crown was determined to maintain its near monopoly In spreading the
faith in Asia, even if such a policy meant further antagonizing the Holy
See. Moreover, as the 1660s and 1670S wore on, the activities of the Dutch,
English, and French Companies in the quest for Asian trade would ulti-
mately force the Crown to reexamine the economic impact of its religious
policies in the Estado? How much longer, in an increasingly competitive
economic climate, could the Crown allow religious zealotry and at times
incompetence to flourish and still expect to survive in the trade? This was
the seminal question confronting Pedro. As the Prince Regent, Mendonca
Furrado and others came to realize, the halcyon days of the mid-reth cen-
tury when the Portuguese had nearly monopolized the European share of
the trade were clearly over, as were the times when the Inquisition and re-
ligious orders could ride roughshod over the indigenous peoples of the
Estado without concern for the economic impact of such actions. It
would fall to Pedro and his viceroys to temper the long-standing zealotry
of the religiosos and their abuses in an effort to save what remained of the
Estado. Their efforts would seek to construct a model for religious activi-
ties and proselytization in a Catholic empire that would spread the faith,
while avoiding actions that would undermine the economic and political
activities of the state.
During the tenure of the srh Governing Council, Pedro was concerned
with various issues relating to the religiosos. As early as April 1668, the
Prince Regent invoked Crown prerogatives in a case involving some
12,000 cruzados that the Neapolitan Duchess of Gravina was seeking to
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bestow on the Society of Jesus to assist them in their plight on the Mala-
bar coast following the loss of Cochin in 166,." In December 1668, the
Prince Regent sought to crack down on priests from the Propaganda go-
ing to Estado without license from the Portuguese Crown." In March
1669, he resolved that 100,000 cruzados granted by Cortes would be used
to facilitate negotiations with Clement IX towards settling the dispute
over naming bishops in the kingdom and the empire. The Prince Regent
was also no doubt anxious to arrange a rapprochement with the Holy See
in order to gain recognition of the divorce of Afonso and Marie Francoise,
and his subsequent marriage to the erstwhile Queen."
In March 1669, Pedro wrote to Sac Vicente concerning the complaints
of the Inquisition on the conduct of the English in Bombay. "The
Conselho geral of the Holy Office has informed me that the English on the
island of Bombay are permitting freedom for every individual to live as
they see fit, they are not permitting the Holy Office to undertake its neces-
sary safeguards." Pedro pointed out that such actions violated the terms
of the 1661 treaty that had permitted their entrance into this praca, and
were allowing "delinquents against the Catholic Faith" to go without
their just punishment. In the Prince Regent's opinion, since the treaty with
England had allowed the Holy Office to continue its activities in Bombay,
a protest should be lodged forthwith with the appropriate authorities in
the English enclave to ensure that in the future "the orders of the Holy Of-
fice were carried out without exception" and that the clauses of the treaty
honored.'
That same month, Pedro sought to follow up on Mello de Castro's
complaints against the large amount of real estate the religiosos possessed
in the Estado and the Viceroy's promise to provide a list of such proper-
ties, a list that had not yet reached Lisbon but which could ulrmiately be
used to "limit this excess"." The Prince Regent also issued instructions to
follow up on Mello de Casrro's complaints against the financial irregular-
ities of the Jesuit Concalo Martins, while ordering the Viceroy to honor
the pledge he had made to the Provincal of the Society of Jesus to provide
funds from the Royal Treasury to assist the Jesuit colleges in Cochin,
Coulim and Cranganor, pracas lost to the Dutch in 1662-166,."" An impor-
tant consulta of the Overseas Council of December 1669 sought to rein-
force Crown prerogatives on the matter of exclusive Portuguese power to
nominate bishops for the lands nominally under the dominion of the
Estado. A bull from Clement IX had pronounced that "all Christians
were subjects of the bishops that the Propaganda had dispatched to all
parts of the world". And soon thereafter two such foreign bishops had ev-
idently been sent to India, including a French prelate."
CHRISTIANS 77
The members of the Overseas Council, Including Ruy Telles de
Menezes, urged that Pedro take three steps to combat this act which had
violated "Bulls conceded to the kings preceding Your Majesty in lands
under the jurisdiction of this Crown". Pedro should first complain strenu-
ously through his ambassador in Rome; he should then order that these
prelates not be recognized in any form by the subjects of the Estado, and
finally he should seek to preempt any further incursions by the Propa-
ganda Fide by quickly filling all vacant bishoprics in the Estado. The mar-
ginal notation of the Prince Regent on this consulta indicates that he
strongly supported these recommendations." While Pedro no doubt fa-
vorcd such actions as a means of entrenching Crown power in religious
matters in ASia, it is interesting that in the accompanying documentation
to this consulta, some of the primary reasons cited for embracing such a
policy related not so much to the religious impact that the activities of the
priests or bishops of the Propaganda would have in the Estado but the
geo-political damage that would be done, should the Portuguese Crown
be exposed as being so weak that it could not prevent such actions in its
territories. The Dutch, English and French, it was noted, would all seek to
exploit this perceived weakness at every turn." While Pedro and his Coun-
cilors may have used European diplomacy to address the Propaganda
Fide challenge, the Governors of India informed the Lisbon in January
[670 that it was nearly an impossible task III Asia to prevent the passage of
such interloping clerics on voyages to and from Rome. Despite largely
shunning the Cape route, they were able to embark in a variety of Persian
ports for "their journeys, without us being able to impede them, since the
ships In which they travel arc Dutch, English, and Moslem" .'"
As casados, both Anronio de Mello de Castro and Manoel Carte-Real
de Sarnpaio recognized the vast intellectual, social, political, and eco-
nomic power of the religiosos. Unlike the Viceroy Antonio de Mello de
Casrro, they were not willing to challenge that power during their admin-
istration, especially the vast influence of the Jesuits. After all, they and
their families would have to live with the fallout of any decisions made re-
garding the religious orders long after their temporary terms as caretaker
Governors had ended. On the issue of the large amounts of unauthorized
lands the religiosos had amassed, they maintained: "We have not con-
ceded license to any priests to buy property, the biggest complaint m this
matter is the great amount that the priests of the Company [of Jesus] pos-
sess." Yet, the Governors sought to implicitly justify any such transac-
tions that may have already taken place by argumg that "many times
Your Majesties have been informed of this, and have confirmed them
with all conditions even rather extraordinary ones"." On the issue of the
English impeding the work of the Inquisition in Bombay, the Governors
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wrote that it was not yet clear if the EIC was directly undermining the
work of rhe Holy Office, except in offering "freedom of conscience" in
the enclave. Nevertheless, in a veiled effort to defend the religious policies
of the Inquisition and the religiosos, Mello de Castro and Corte-Real de
Sampaio maintained that it was not this religious policy as much as the
desire of criminals and debtors in the Province of the North to escape
punishment that had already attracted large numbers of "indigenous sub-
jects of Your Majesty" to Bombay. The Governor of the Province of the
North had complained to his English counterpart about accepting these
erstwhile Portuguese subjects, but to very little avail."
While Pedro and his Overseas Council may have had a desire to initi-
ate religious reforms in the Estado from the outset of the regime, nothing
significant was accomplished until the tenure of Luis de Mendonca
Furtado as Viceroy. Mendonca Furtado's arrival in Coa in May 1671 sig-
naled a notable escalation in the campaign to extend royal authority over
the religiosos, to curb the most glaring abuses of the Inquisition and the
religious orders, and to resolve the inherent trade-off of economic ad-
vancement vis-a-vis religious zealotry in favor of the former. In March
1670, on the eve of his departure from Lisbon, he received a packet of let-
ters from the Prince Regent. Pedro instructed his appointee to finally com-
plete the task requested by Antonio de Mello de Castro nearly five years
earlier; that is to compile a comprehensive list of the land holdings of the
religiosos and the Jesuits in particular. In a more specific case, Mendonca
Furtado was ordered to place an ongoing dispute between the Domini-
cans and the Procurador of the Crown concerning lands which the order
had allegedly appropriated without license from the Crown to the Royal
Court for resolution. At the same time, there is little doubt that the Crown
saw the efficient expansion of Catholicism under the legitimate auspices
of the Padroado as a means of spreading the gloire of the Portuguese
monarchy. Accordingly, Pedro also instructed Mendonca Furtado to con-
tinue the work of Sac Vicenre in encouraging conversions in Bardes and
the Province of the North by, in part, building more churches to facilitate
this process."
The increasing sensitivity of the Prince Regent and his main advisors
like the duke of Cadaval to the economic consequences of spreading the
faith in Asia, was well reflected in a May 1670 consulta of the Conselho
Ultramarine" This document resurrected the question of dealing with the
chaHenge to Crown's Padroado embodied in the continuing actions of the
Propaganda Fide that "had made, and continues to make the determina-
tion to continue [to appoint] foreign subjects as bishops of Asian lands
with the title of missionaries, against rhe law and practice immemorial,
that Your Majesty enjoys thanks to the Senhores Kings, his predeces-
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sors". The Council went a step beyond their deliberations of the preced-
ing year by advising Pedro to order Mendonca Purtado to detain and
dispatch all such clerics to the Remo for Portuguese approval: "Under no
circumstances admit into the said Estado foreign clerics of any religion
that have not traveled via this kingdom with the permission of Your Maj-
esty." Pedro accepted this advice. It is significant that in addition to VOlC-
mg the traditional complaint of such actions by the Propaganda violating
the rights, power, and gloire of the kings of Portugal, the Overseas Coun-
CJ! also voiced strong concerns over the economic impact of such actions.
"Even though the motive of the]unta may be to propagate the Faith, and
to assist Christianity ... it has succeeded in accomplishing something very
different ... [these foreign priests] have applied themselves toward giving
advice and news to the Princes of which they are vassals, in order to intro-
duce the commerce of these states to the ruin of that of Your Majesty. ,,'"
In March of ,671, Pedro informed Mendonca Purrado that the recent elec-
tion of Clement X as Pope had helped to ease the rift over the appoint-
ment of bishops in the Estado, including the archbishop of Goa, bur noted
that the actions of the Propaganda Fide were still irksome."
Soon after taking power, Mendonca Furtado was forced to confront
perhaps the most damaging and troubling problem relating to the
religiosos: the taking and forcible conversion of Hindu "orphans". In a
letter dated June '9, the new Viceroy received greetings from 35 of the
leading gentio merchants of Bassein. After expressing the obligatory wel-
come, these merchants began to list problems with the rendas and
alfandegas m the rich Province of the North due to the "oppression that
we arc presently enduring". Foremost among these abuses was the taking
of Hindu orphans in violation of "ancient laws of the Kings of Portugal",
which had permitted such actions only when both parents and grandpar-
ents were dead. Instead, the religiosos in the North and elsewhere had
over time come to define "orphan" in an extremely loose fashion: when
merely the father had died, but the child still had a mother, grandparents,
and great-grandparents alive. Because of this abuse and the accompany-
ing oppression, many indigenous merchants had fled to the lands of the
neighboring kings. As the petitioners pointed out, many of these Hindus
and Jains had also gone to the burgeoning English enclave of Bombay, at-
tracted by the beacon of de facto "freedom of religion". This exodus to
Bombay was of "such rigor" that this port, "whose tobacco renda in
other times was 3000 pardaos per year, today yields to the English more
than 13,000, and it may soon reach 24,000, after yielding in our time less
than 3000, and that port is improving itself every day for merchants, since
they are safe from the assaults we suffer". This letter predictably con-
cluded by asking that Mendonca Purrado do his utmost to remedy such
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abuses by ensuring that the original decrees on this matter were hence-
forth observed by the religiosos."
Before Mendonca Furtado advised the Crown of these worrying prob-
lems, Pedro and his advisors had already begun to debate such issues and
the general question of the proper role of the religiosos in a rehabilitated
Estado. As early as March 1671, the Prince Regent had begun to have sec-
ond thoughts on the rigorous campaign that Sac Vicente had authorized
in Bardes and the North in search of new converts. The decrees in favor of
Christianity and the extension of the territory under the jurisdiction of the
Pai dos Christdos that were part and parcel of this campaign had already
resulted in some complaints to Lisbon about the taking and forced con-
versions of Hindu orphans. The Prince Regent instructed Mendonca
Furtado to "execute the orders of the Viceroys, your predecessors", in
matters of spreading Christianity but, unlike Sac Vicenre, to do so using
"the most suave methods possible", to avoid alienating the indigenous
subjects of the Estado. Should problems arise, the Prince was to be in-
formed immediately. Moreover, under no circumstances should the new
Viceroy seek to make "converts by force, if they are not voluntarily, and
above an do not take children from Hindu parents by force in order to
baptize them, only orphaned children in the form that had traditionally
been observed in this State, conforming to the extant orders"."
A landmark consulta of the Overseas Council dated September 1671
had also tempered some of the zealousness of the Sac Vicente years. The
conselho had been asked to advise Pedro on four main points raised in the
letters of Mello de Castro and Sac Vicenre between 1662-1668. Should the
number of convents be reduced in light of the disproportionate number of
religiosos in the Estado, as compared with the number of Portuguese citi-
zens there? Should the clergy in the old conquests and the Province of the
North be required to know the indigenous languages well to assist them in
their missionary functions? Should the spiritual government of Mozam-
bique, from Mombassa to Cape Correntes continue to be entrusted to a
prelate with the title of 'administrator'? And what were the surest means
to combat the infringement of the Padroado embodied in the activities of
the Propaganda Fide? It is interesting that the Overseas Council in general
deferred to the opinions of Antonio Paes de Sande on these weighty mat-
ters, the councilor with the longest "experience in the Estado da India"."
In a document of August 1671, endorsed by the Council on September 3,
and the Prince Regent the following spring, Paes de Sande proffered the
following advice. On the issue of reducing the number of convents and re-
ligious houses, the councilor recommended that while the number should
eventually be reduced given the ratios provided by Mello de Castro, fat
reasons of "religious piety" it was sufficient at present to simply avoid
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any new constructions and to refuse to pay ordinarios to any convents
with fewer than seven priests. On the matter of competency with indige-
nous languages, Paes de Sandc noted that the Archbishop of Goa should
continue to oversee this matter and should make every effort to ensure
compliance with previous Crown orders on this matter, especially in the
North where problems were greatest. On the matter of the Administrador
in Mozambique, Paes de Sande, recommended that the position he main-
tamed for this "great and most useful conquest," since this region con-
tained more territory and subjects than all the bishoprics of India
combined. Finally, Paes de Sandc argued that the surest means to combat
the infringement of the Propaganda was to encourage the clergy of the
Padroado to adhere to "the orders of You Majesty passed in favor of
Christianity," and spread the Faith in Asia in an efficient and sincere man-
ner, while seeking to intercept the offending priests of the Propaganda
and demand that they obtain proper authorization from the Crown be-
fore undertaking any missionary activities in that region."
In October 1671, Mendonca Purtado further championed the calls to
curb the abuses of the religiosos for economic reasons in his first packet of
dispatches as Viceroy. More time was needed to investigate the property
holdings of the Company of Jesus before any attempt could be made to re-
possess any illegally gained [azendas.? Mendonca Furtado asked for ad-
vice on the matter of permitting the Hindu subjects of Diu to maintain
religious shrines in their houses without incurring penalties from the cleri-
cal and secular authorities of the Estado." The Viceroy also informed
Pedro that despite the opposition of the religiosos, he had been able to ex-
tend to Colecta for another 6 years, monies that would facilitate the dIS-
patching of the traditional armadas from Goa twice a year." The petition
from Bassein had made an immediate and significant impact on the Vice-
roy. "l am obliged by the position I hold to tell Your Majesty the truth,
and this is that the order of the Count of Sao Vicente relating to the land
holders in the countryside presenting certification to the Pai dos Cbristacs
has been extremely damaging to the Service of Your Majesty." Sac
Viccnte's decrees m favor of the faith and the extension of the powers of
the Pai dus Cbristaoe had caused great damage to the royal rendas, espe-
cially harmful to the interest of the State was the increased number of "or-
phans" that had been taken "in violation of the ancient laws of your royal
predecessors". Echoing the language of the petition from Bassein, the new
Viceroy pointed out that this practice had forced the indigenous mer-
chants of the Estado to "live under oppression without Reason," and
forced many of them to emigrate to the lands of the Reis Vizmhos and es-
pccially to Bombay dramatically increasing the trade of that port and the
level of the tobacco renda there."
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In August 1672, Mendonca Furtado elaborated on the great damage be-
ing done to the economic interests of the Estado by this practice in an-
other letter. After complaining of the "insolent" and vexing behavior of
the English officials in Bombay, Mendonca Furtado was forced to admit
that a good deal of the credit "for making that island a great and opulent
city," resided in the practice of allowing a freedom of conscience in the
enclave. Such a policy, when juxtaposed with the abuses of the re/igiosos
in the Province of the North, and especially the taking of Hindu orphans
in a manner that violated the traditional decrees on the matter, had
largely resulted in this boon to English interests in the region. The Viceroy
warned that unless drastic measures were soon taken to correct such
abuses the rendas generated in the English settlement would soon outstrip
those produced in the Province of the North. "If Your Majesty does not
order a prompt and appropriate remedy to this great evil, all the rendas
that Your Majesty possesses there will soon be extinguished, and the
trade [and prosperity] of the said pracas will be reduced to great pov-
erty. ",.
In March 1672, before Mendonca Furtado's strident dispatches had
reached Lisbon, Pedro addressed a series of letters relating to religious
matters in the Estado to his Viceroy. In them, the Prince Regent recon-
firmed his commitment to spreading the faith but once again ordered his
servants to do so m the "subtlest fashion," one that would avoid the more
glaring problems engendered in the methods of Sao Viccnre." He did sup-
port one of Nunes da Cunha's initiatives: the attempt to open up trade
with the kingdom of Achem by encouraging the religiosos to build a
church there." In light of the recent bull obtained from Clement X, the
Prince Regent notified Mendonca Furtado that he intended to send out a
new Archbishop as soon as possible to fill that long vacant seat in the
Padroado hierarchy, and that this prelate would advise him on the re-
quest of D. Carlos Ferrarini to formally establish a house for the
Theatinos in Goa." The Prince Regent also reiterated his desire to see a
complete list of Jesuit properties as quickly as possible in order to resolve
long-standing complaints regarding unlawful obtainment of lands by that
order. Pedro also instructed his Viceroy to compile similar lists on the re-
maining religious orders in India. These documents would contain the ex-
act number of priests in each one, financial information on their convents
and houses, as well as the rendas received from the [azenda real"
Over the next five years, the Prince Regent and his Viceroy exchanged
correspondence on various matters relating to the religiosos. Mendonca
Furtado complained about the lamentable performance of the Francis-
cans as missionaries in Bardes due to ignorance of the indigenous lan-
guages, and other abuses. He also complained of the "scandalous"
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behavior of the Dominicans on the islands of Solar and Timor, actions
that were undermining not only the goals of the Padroado but also the
secular and economic interests of the Crown. In both cases, the Viceroy
lamented that he could not intervene in ecclesiastical matters directly and
resolve these problems. He also pointed out that even when an Arch-
bishop was installed in Goa, that cleric frequently found it difficult to
punish offending priests." On another issue troubling the Crown, he in-
formed the Prince Regent that since the clerics of the Propaganda Fide
usually traveled through the kingdoms of the Reis Yizinbos, it was nearly
impossible to follow the Crown's instructions on detaining them and pre-
venting them from undertaking missionary activities." Mendonca
Furtado also railed against the unsanctioned purchase of the lucrative
property in Bardes by the Jesuits and his attempt to force the order to sell
it to a lay person. The Jesuits were also criticized for their inept handling
of the Hospital Real in Goa and the 1000 xerafins per annum that the
royal treasury provided for that institution. Mendonca Furtado advised
that the brothers of the order of S. joao de Deus truly knew how to deal
with the infirmed and should he given control of the Hospital" The as-
sault on the overweening power of the religiosos had increased by 1676,
when Mendonca Furrado informed the Crown that: "the Augustinians
and the other religious orders possess much more capital than the Royal
Treasury and the subjects of Your Majesty." The Viceroy "dared" to sug-
gest to Pedro that the least amount of [azendas they possessed, the better.
This wealth had diverted the religiosos in Goa from living a truly monas-
tic life. It had shifted their attention from their true purpose in Asia of
spreading the faith, and instead needlessly encouraged them to meddle in
affairs that did not concern them."
Throughout the mid-I670S, Mendonca Furtado continually com-
plained about potentially the most damaging abuse of the religiosos: the
taking and forcible conversion of Hindu orphans. In January 1673, he reit-
erated that this practice had to he reformed. This matter was of "such im-
portance," since when rich Hindus lived within the confines of the
Estado, "commerce flourishes". The capital that was exiting the North
with these indigenous merchants was not only harming the economic
well-being of the Estado, it was bestowing huge amounts of cabedal upon
the undeserving English and Dutch, who were using this windfall "to en-
rich themselves" at Portuguese expense. Mendonca Purtado, writing with
nearly twenty years of experience in Asia, stated: "All the merchants com-
bined of Europe do not have as much capital as anyone of those Hindus
that are called rich." These merchants, wielding the economic power of
"Iakhs of pagodas," at two and a half million xerafins per lakh, domi-
nated "the commerce of all the ports of India". In comparison, the Euro-
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peans possessed a small portion of the trade. In Surat alone, such
merchants dispatched 50-60 great ships a year. These merchants and their
[azendas, however, would enrich the royal customs houses, only if they
could be assured of living within the confines of the Estado without the
molestation of the religiosos, most notably the taking and forced conver-
sion of Hindu orphans. The time to act was at hand, since Portugal's com-
petitors in the trade, and particularly the English, were doing their utmost
to exploit such abuses to exacerbate the economic problems of the
Estado"
Nonetheless, as the Viceroy pointed out in January 1674 any attempt to
reform this long-standing abuse was bound to be complicated. He had
initially broached the issue with the Council of State of Goa in December
1673. This body had determined that the issue should be resolved by the
letrados in the Reino in consultation with the religiosos in Goa. The pre-
ceding month, Mendonca Furtado had already attempted to gauge the re-
sponse of the ecclesiastical community to reform by calling the leading
Franciscans and Augustinians to the Casa Prcfessa and asking their views
on a number of issues including whether a Hindu child who had simply
lost his father could in fact be considered an "orphan". Much to his cha-
grin, both Francisco de Barcelor, the commissario-geral of the Francis-
cans and Augusto da Piedade, the Provincal of the Augustinians, had
indicated that legal precedents in Portugal and ecclesiastical precedents in
the Estado indeed supported such a stance. Since Pedro's initial nominee
as Archbishop had died soon after reaching the Mandavi and that office
was still vacant, the Viceroy had also sought to poll the Inquisitor-geral,
to very little result."
Francisco Delgado e Matos, the cleric who headed the Inquisition, evi-
dently had little interest in responding to such requests from the secular
authorities in Goa. "This minister is so absolute in his replies that even the
Viceroys of Your Majesty are not treated with the respect that is due to
them. '''0 The disturbing fact that very little had changed in this matter was
reflected in letter in December of 1674 when Mendonca Furtado, quoting
from a report from the captain of Bassein, outlined the continuing exodus
of Hindu and lain merchants from the North "selling their properties and
goods," much to the detriment of the royal rendas. In the opinion of this
official, this exodus was due largely to the zealous practices of the officers
of the Inquisition and others regarding the forcible conversions of or-
phans. This drain on the Estado was not only financial in terms of lost
rendas, foras, and alfandega receipts. Money from these merchants had
also traditionally been utilized either in the form of levies or loans to assist
the Estado in times of war. Although something clearly had to be done to
end these excesses, Delgado e Maros maintained that his officers and
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other religiosos were merely operating according to the long-standing or-
ders of the Crown."
Although Pedro continued to warn against the more glaring abuses of
the religiosos including the forced conversions of Hindu orphans, he took
no firm actions to correct this dangerous practice in the mid-re-os. He
did, however, order Mendonca Furtado to deal with the ill-conceived ac-
tions of the Dominicans in Indonesia." A consulta of the Conselho
Ultramarine of August r673 had reiterated taking a hard line on the issue
of foreign bishops and other clerics of the Propaganda in the Estado." The
Prince Regent also ordered Mendonca Furtado to investigate the actions
of the Franciscans on the island of Manapassar in the North. The Crown
had granted this island and its rendas to them ideally to spread the faith in
that region and to help the poor. Unfortunately, the order had apparently
not lived up to Its obligations: most of the money from the rendas had evi-
dently found its way to Rome, while the spiritual and temporal needs of
the islanders were being ignored. The Viceroy was to investigate such
complaints and determine whether the grant should be revoked.'
In late 1676, Pedro received a document from the povo gentio of Goa
that finally convinced him to address the crucial issue of the Hindu or-
phans. This packet of letters contained a formal petition from the "offi-
cials, nobles, and others of the Brahmanic Nation assisting in that City
and its environs.. , complaining against the Pai dos Christiios taking from
the possession of their mothers, children orphaned by their father to-
gether with the property that his death bestows upon them, in order to
oblige them by force to receive the baptism water against formal laws and
provisions that defends them", In the Prince Regent's own words, this
matter was of "such importance" and demanded such complete and total
consideration on the part of the Crown that he ordered a formal Junta be
held to resolve the matter. This grand meeting would include the opinions
of the newly arrived Archbishop Primaz, D. Antonio Brandao, the InqUIS-
iror Francisco Delgado de Matos, the Chancellor Francisco Cabral
d'Almeida, Antonio Paes de Sande (recently appointed Vedor da
Fazenda) with "three or four" other leading citizens, along with the Pai
dos Cbristaos, the Procurador of the Crown, and significantly the
procurador of the povo gentilico of Goa. This assemblage would examine
all the relevant documentation on the matter and seek to resolve the con-
flict, "by the means that seem most convenient to pacify and quiet the in-
digenous Hindu population", informing Pedro at the earliest possible
moment of rhe decisions taken. Reflecting the importance the Crown had
come to place on such matters, the Prince Regent noted that he would im-
mediately endorse these resolutions, even if one or two dissenting votes
were cast."
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This Junta met initially in the salla real of the Viceroy's palace on De-
cember 17, 1677, two months after D. Pedro de Almeida had assumed the
highest office of the Estado. After a long discussion of the issues and an
examination of the relevant documentation there was nearly unanimous
support among those present for reaffirming the stance initially delin-
eated in D. Scbastiao's decree on the matter of March 23, 1559."" This order
had specified that Hindu children "left without father, mother, grandfa-
ther, grandmother or other ascendant Iineals and are not of an age at
which they can have understanding and judgment, as soon as the last of
such relatives is dead", should be taken by the Pal dos Christiios and
handed over to the Jesuit College of St. Paul, "for being baptized, edu-
cated and indoctrinated by the Fathers of the said College," and eventu-
ally "placed III positions according to their respective aptitudes and
abilities":' This decree had been endorsed by the Viceroy D. Antao de
Noronha in 1564, the Governor Antonio Moniz Barrete in 157" and in
other aluarasof 1,82 and 162,. Nevertheless, what had been inrended as a
socio-religious policy in part designed to assist children in need and per-
haps to cut down on vagrancy and needless suffering had in fact been
transformed over time into an instrument of religious zealotry and eco-
nomic oppression by the ecclesiastical community in Goa and the North.
Much to their credit, and reflecting the shifting priorities of religious vis-
a-vis economic considerations among the hierarchy in both Lisbon and
Goa, the men present in the Viceroy's palace on that day sought to reaf-
firm the initial intent of D. Sebastido's decree and end the damaging exo-
dus of Hindu merchants and their capital from the Estado"
The Jesuit Gaspar Affonco, Matheus Gomes Ferreira, Vigario-geralof
the Archbishopric, Dr. Manoel Martins Madeira, Chancellor of the
Estado, Diego de Madre de Deus, mestre of the Franciscans, Amonio
Paes de Sande, Vedor-geral of the Pazenda, the Archbishop D. Antonio
Brandao, and the Viceroy D. Pedro de Almeida all voted in favor of pass-
ing a new law reaffirming the original conditions relating to defining "or-
phans" in the Estado delineated in the 1559 decree. The sole dissenting
vote on this issue was not surprisingly cast by the Inquisitor D. Francisco
Dalgado e Maros, who argued that D. Sebastiao's decree was excessive in
its criteria and should be amended to conform to legal precedents in the
Reino. Dalgado e Matos pointed out that Portuguese law defined orphan
as "everyone that does not have a father," and this definition was utilized
in the Reino to ensure "the education of minors, and the security of their
temporal possessions". In his written opinion, the head of the powerful
Inquisition noted: "I do not find any justification why one would not
adopt these same practices to Hindu orphans, in order to secure their sal-
vation, by means of the sacrament of baptism, especially since this matter
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is of such importance." It is significant that in addressing such apparent
logic those in the majority cited primarily economic reasons for justifying
and reaffirming the criteria in the 1559 decree and recognizing the practical
differences 10 adapting Portuguese law to the imperio."
According to the Chancellor Martins Madeira, the conservation of the
Estado demanded that the ecclesiastical authorities adhere to the "said
law of the king D. Sebastiao, regarding the taking of only those orphans
who do not have a father, mother, and grandparents, because the State of
India finds itself so exhausted, due to lack of capital and commerce, and
greatly assisting its total diminution and ruin, is the lack of Hindu mer-
chants that are leaving our domains, and going with their capital for Bom-
bay, that today belongs to the English, and for Baroche, Surrare, and
Gaga, because there they do not take their children against their will". In
the Chancellor's view, experience had shown that only these rich Hindu
merchants could substantially assist the royal rendas since "the Christians
have neither the capital nor the industry to augment them, and all manner
of commerce and trade, as well as spices, foodstuffs and even diamonds
move through their hands". As Vedor of the Fazenda, Antonio Paes de
Sande predictably echoed many of these same sentiments. The I559 law
should be supported since experience had shown that violating its provi-
sions had "caused the diminution of commerce, the depopulation of the
lands of His Majesty, and augmenting those of heretics and Muslims".
Pacs de Sande continued by pointing out that during his initial stay in the
Estado from I668-1671 he had witnessed the debilitating economic effects
of the abuse of this law while visiting the Province of the North. Rich Hin-
dus and jains living in Bassein, Diu, Daman and elsewhere were increas-
ingly depositing their wealth, business acumen, and ultimately their
families in the neighboring kingdoms of Bijapur, the lands of Aurangzeb,
or in Bombay to avoid having "their 'orphan' children taken from them,
in order to make them Christians" :0"
Perhaps most significantly, it was D. Antonio Brandao, the new Arch-
bishop, who sought to justify the seeming disparity between the legal in-
terpretation of orphan in Portugal and the Estado. Brandao began by
arguing for a strict adherence to the original conditions of the 1559 law.
This law was "just" theologically in that the children of Hindu parents
were only politically subjects of the Crown and could not he obliged to
embrace Christianity against their will until such time as all their immedi-
ate relatives had died. While this definition of orphan may not have
agreed with "civil law and the ordinances of the Kingdom", there could
be no doubt that the Kings of Portugal by virtue of their conquests of for-
eign lands had the right to enact "different laws conforming to the natural
differences of the subjects and vassals that live in them". D. Sebastiao's
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1559 decree had constituted, in the Archbishop's view, a contract of sorts
with the Hindus on this legal definition and the frequent violation of this
understanding had led to mass migrations, "leaving these islands and con-
quered lands without people to cultivate them" ." In another concession
of sorts to the economic power of the indigenous merchants in the Estado
and their religious sensibilities, the Junta of December 1677 also resolved
to allow Hindu marriages to take place behind closed doors provided
armed guards were posted outside to prevent Hindu priests or Bottos
from presiding and performing sacrifices or other customary rites. The
fact that such prohibitions on Bottos effectively made any such marriages
null and void would eventually prompt the Council of State in Goa and
Pedro to modify this original decree and allow customary Hindu mar-
riages on barges in the rivers separating the Estado from Bijapur and
other Muslim kingdoms, provided no Christians were present."
The religious zealotry exemplified best, or perhaps worst, by the Inqui-
sition and others did not, however, rest after the initial vote of late I677.
Long-standing religious and financial vested interests were at stake, and
those opposed to reform predictably sought to undermine it by any possi-
ble means. The Jesuit Manoel Themudo who was then serving as the Pai
dos Christiios wrote a scathing critique on January 2, 1678 indicting the en-
tire reform movement, especially those who were seeking to limit what
had become his de facto powers in dealing with gentio orphans. "As the
Hindus are the declared enemies of our Holy Catholic Faith, and as such
seek to undermine, and diminish it by every available means that they
can," Themudo warned the Crown to give little credence to what was
contained in the petition of 1676 and the other letters of complaint that
had reached Lisbon over the past decade. Spending huge amounts of capi-
tal, presumably to influence the secular authorities, and "defaming the
ministers of Christianity," were among the favored methods that these
rich gentios in unholy their quest to undermine the sacred work of spread-
ing the faith. Themudo did not "deny" that the I559 decree specified that
orphans should be defined as those Hindu children who had lost their fa-
ther, mother, and grandparents. The Pai dos Cbristaos nonetheless ar-
gued that this criteria had proven wholly inadequate to meet the daunting
challenge of converting these "enemies" of Christianity and a more rigor-
ous definition, and implicitly a more potent weapon, had been justified."
After allowing sufficient time for all interested parties to review both
the decisions of December I677 as well as the complaints of Themudo, D.
Pedro de Almeida reconvened the Junta on 12 January 1678 in order to
reach a final resolution on the matter. At this meeting, the Jesuit Pedro
Teixeira, sitting in place of his colleague Gaspar Affonco, essentially rein-
forced the argument originally expressed by Brandao at initial meeting.
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The Jesuit representative argued that the secular Prince "has the power to
prornulgarc laws that appear to him convenient to the greater good of his
vassals, and the augmentation of his temporal states, as long as the said
laws are not contrary to divine or natural law". In Teixeira's view, the
Hindus of the Fstado were "still the vassals of the Christian Princes," and
not therefore "subjects of the Church". Moreover, D. Sebastiao's anginal
law defining orphans as those children who had lost their mothers, fa-
thers, and grandparents was "not against divine law, nor natural law,"
and therefore legitimate. D. Pedro de Almeida, Brandao, Paes de Sande,
and all the others present reconfirmcd their initial votes, including the In-
quisitor Delgado de Matos who once again cast the lone dissenting vote.
The assento taken at this final meeting of the Junta denounced the recent
abuses relating to the liberal interpretation of the term orphan, abuses
which had had a demonstrable economic as well as social impact on the
fortunes of the Estado during the most crucial period in its history. The
panel also resolved to pass a new law reiterating the strict provisions of
the ISS9 decree which would serve as the basis for all future religious activ-
ities involving the Pai dos Christiios and Hindu orphans. The secretary
Luis Concalves Cotra drafted this legislation which, as the Viceroy in-
formed Pedro in a letter of January 23, had been swiftly registered and
published."
The work and legislation of the Junta of r6n-I678 embodies the most
visible manifestation of the desire during Pedro's reign to reorder the pri-
orities of the Crown in the seminal trade-off of economic vis-a-vis reli-
gious concerns operating within the Estado da India. The forceful
recommendations of Luis de Mendonca Furtado, the support of the
Prince Regent and his Overseas Council, the diligent work of D. Pedro de
Almeida and Antonio Paes de Sande III Goa, and perhaps above all the
tacit approval of Archbishop Brandao and the Jesuits allowed this signifi-
cant initiative to wind its way successfully through the labyrinth of early
modern bureaucracy that governed Portugal's Asian empire. Among
other things, this reformation campaign attests to the belated albeit criti-
cal realization on the part of the Lisbon and Goa hierarchies that Hindu
and jain merchants constituted a vital component in the economic life of
the empire, one that could no longer be ignored or alienated. Implicit in
this fundamental shift was also the recognition that the days when the
Crown and the Padroado could arrogantly operate in Asia without con-
cern for the economic impact of their policies, as it had largely done dur-
ing the glory days of the mid-r6th century, was dearly over. The arrival of
the English in Bombay touring "freedom of conscience," the continuing
vexations of the Dutch, and the free-spending habits of the newly arrived
French exerted tremendous pressure on the Portuguese to reform the
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more unsavory practices of spreading the faith in an increasingly competi-
tive Asian market. The road to such reform was strewn with pitfalls, dan-
gers, and problems. It is wise to remember, for example, that challenging
the power of the Church for men like Mendonca Furtado not only meant
criticizing an institution renowned and feared for its religious and social
power in Portugal and the Estado, but which also frequently provided lu-
crative positions for members of one's own family. One of Mendonca
Purtado's own brothers, for example, was then conego of Evora. Never-
theless, this Viceroy, his Prince, and others were willing to attempt such
reforms out of the belief that economic concerns had to take precedence




Spices: The Carreira da India, c. 1640-1683
The economic history of Portugal's Asian empire has attracted a good
deal of scholarly attention over the past century. The works of Godinho,
Boxer, Sreensgaard, De Souza, Pearson, Disney, and Boyajian have all
done much to advance our knowledge of the economic structures of the
Portuguese Estado da India during the early modern period.' As with the
general historiography on India Portuguesa, however, much of this work
has concentrated on two periods in the long history of that imperial edi-
fice. First, the glorious years of the early rerh century, when Portugal con-
structed a geo-political and commercial empire in Asia which sought to
dominate the lucrative and long-standing trading network of the Indian
Ocean and South China Sea basins. And second, the generally disastrous
years of the mid-i-rh century when that edifice was all but destroyed by
the combination of internal political strains in the metropole and the
much vaunted threat of the proto-capiralist joint stock companies of the
Dutch and English in Asia. The general acceptance of the dictum of "stag-
nation and decline" for the years after 1663, and relatively sparse and
widely scattered archival material for that period, have ensured very little
work on the economic history of the late ryrh century Estado. This dearth
of scholarly work is unfortunate, since the 1660s and 1670S witnessed a no-
table rehabilitation campaign regarding Portugal's commercial standing
in the Indian Ocean trade. This campaign to restore the economic for-
tunes of the eastern empire formed a vital component of the general at-
tempt to stabilize the Estado which followed Pedro's accession to power
in late 1667. As in other matters involving the Estado, these efforts at re-
form would, in many ways, culminate during the Viceroyalty of Luis de
Mcndonca Furtado e Albuquerque.'
A crucial aspect of this srabilizauon process is the revival that took
place during these years of the once virtually moribund Carreira da India,
the term used by the Portuguese for the voyage made by their Indiamen
between Lisbon and Goa. From the outset of the Estado, the empire of
Portuguese Monsoon Asia had been primarily a seaborne one. The
Carreira da India therefore constituted an integral part of Lisbon's Asian
empire, and especially its economic structures. For more than three centu-
ries, "from the time of Vasco da Gama until the substitution of sail by
steam," the Naos or Great Ships of the Carreira served as an economic,
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religious and administrative lifeline between Portugal and her possessions
in the East. Highly prized spices from India, Ceylon, and Indonesia, pre-
CIOUS metals and stones, saltpctcr, cotton cloth from the villages of
Cujarar, European armaments much III demand in Asia, Chinese porce-
lams, high-ranking grandees anxious to take up lucrative Imperial post-
mgs, female orphans with Crown dowries in the quest for husbands in
Golden Goa, the plethora of Jesuit, Pranciscan, Augustinian, and Domin-
rcan priests detailed in the previous chapter, ambitious younger sons of
noble houses of Portugal, as well as the dregs of Lisbon's prisons sent out
as cannon-fodder all had at least one thing in common: the necessity of
making the Cape passage. The Carreira da India was thus a quintessential
fact of econonuc and geo-poliricallife- regular sailings and successful voy-
ages usually portended stability if not prosperity, while intermittent de-
partures and shipwreck almost always signa led hard times for the bstado.
Harsh lessons on the stormy Cape route quickly taught Portuguese pi-
lots that successful sailings were largely dependent on the alternating
monsoons of the Indian Ocean. The southwest monsoon virtually dosed
all of the ports on the western coast of lndia from early June until Septem-
ber. Ideally, outward-bound ships from Lisbon therefore left between the
end of February and late March in order to round the Cape of Good Hope
in July and reach Goa in late September or October. Ships returning to
Europe were obliged to leave in late December or January in order to
profit from the favorable winds of the northeast monsoon and to avoid
the "stormy May and June 'winter' season in the latitude of the Cape". i
Over time, a series of meticulous sailing instructions or roteiros were
compiled. Among the most notable of these rutters was the 1666 Roteiro
da India Oriental corn as emmendas que novamente se [izeriio a elle, com-
piled by the Royal Cosmographer Anronio de Mariz Cameiro. The valued
knowledge contained in such roteiros was supplemented by official or-
ders or regimentos given to the captain-general of each fleet which pre-
scribed conduct for every aspect of the voyage.' The size of the ships
utilized in the Carreira changed markedly during the reth and rrth centu-
ries. In the first half of the ieth century carracks or galleons, both called
Naos in the extant documentation, of approximately 400 tons burden
were the general rule. By 1550, Indiamen of 600 to 1,000 tons were com-
mon. In the 1590S, despite attempts by the Crown to curb this alarming
trend, unwieldy monsters of up to 2,000 tons were being constructed in
the shipyards of Lisbon and Goa. As will be noted below, the rrth century
witnessed a return to smaller, marc seaworthy, frigate-type vessels along
English and Dutch lines.'
Since the archives of the Casa da India were tragically lost in the 1755
Lisbon earthquake, it is extremely difficult to arrive at precise figures for
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the sailmgs of the Carreira before that year. Based on the extensive work
of V. M. Godinho with the remaining sources, it appears that from 1500-
1635, some 9I2 ships (c. 6.78 per year) sailed for Goa with 763or 84% com-
pleting the voyage. Of the 550 ships (co 4.2 per year) that left India for the
return voyage 470 or 85% reached Portugal. These figures dropped dra-
matically from 1635-1663.6 As Boxer notes, the size of the annual outward
bound fleets also fluctuated over the history of the Carreira. The average
from 1500-1530 was from 7-14 ships, by 1550 this figure had dropped to 5,
and by r640 the average was closer to 2-3 ships a year. Meanwhile, the size
of the return fleets from Goa was probably half that of the ships leaving
Lisbon.' Moreover, sailing instructions and the departure dates specified
in the roteiros and regimentos were only intermittently attained with dire
consequences. As james Duffy and others have shown, shipwrecks were
common during the late reth and early r-th centuries, while mortality
rates approaching 50% were far from unusual.' One reason for these
problems was that outward-bound ships were usually overcrowded, and
departed late from Lisbon. This delay made many fleets miss the season
for sailing on to India and forced the captain-major to "winter" in the un-
healthy climate of Mozambique where disease took a heavy toll on crews
already weakened by months of living aboard unsanitary ships with far
from adequate diets. On the return voyage, a late departure meant that
the naos would encounter adverse weather conditions off the coast of
South East Africa, in the notoriously dangerous "roaring forties". Many a
Portuguese Indiaman was lost during these years on the "Wild Coast" of
Natal.'
Exacerbating these problems for the swift and successful completion
of Carreira voyages was the increasing allure of stopping at ports on the
Brazilian coast like Bahia, either on the outward or homeward-hound
voyage. Such stops lengthened voyages, thus delaying the arrival of
Crown spice cargoes that in many cases had already been utilized as col-
lateral for loans. They also facilitated illegal trading of products like cin-
namon that were ideally a Crown monopoly and the exchange of Asian
goods for Brazilian gold. This private entrenpreneurship was inevitable
given the fact that, despite several attempts, a satisfactory system of
wages was never established. Instead, the crews (from the captain-major
to cabin-boy) were compensated with the right to carry home caixas de
liberdade (liberty chests) loaded with spices and other products to be im-
ported into Portugal wholly or partially duty free." Various Crown de-
crees were promulgated in an attempt to stop these destructive stopovers.
On both November 14, 1660 and March 30, 1662, the Queen Regent D.
Luisa Gusmao issued firm orders forbidding homeward bound ships from
calling at either Angola or Brazil, except in dire emergencies." Following
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complaints from the Viceroy Anronio de Mello de Castro, rhis stance was
modified in January 1666 to allow smaller vessels like pinnaces or pataxos
to make such stops, but reiterated the ban on Naos." Although these re-
strictions were sometimes disregarded on the pretense of weather or the
lack of provisions, the Crown was serious in its commitment to check
such abuses, and a level of success was achieved beginning in 1668."
The nadir for the r-th century Carreira undoubtedly occurred from
1640-1663, in the midst of the protracted struggle on the continent against
Habsburg Spain and the generally disastrous campaign in Brazil, Africa
and Asia against the United Provinces. The years 1647-1649 alone wit-
nessed the loss of the Atafaia e Sacramento off southeast Africa, a fierce
storm in April 1648 that sank scores of vessels anchored in the Mandavi
river killing more than 1200 men, the loss of two naos destined for India in
1647, and the loss of the richly laden Sao Lourenco off Mozambique in
September 1649. Of the five ships that left Lisbon in April 1650 in the {rota
of the Viceroy Count of Aveiras, none reached India that year. The Sao
Francisco Xavier was forced to return to Lisbon where she was inter-
cepted by the English Commonwealth fleet under Blake then blockading
the Tagus. Aveiras perished "wintering" in Mozambique, while the Santa
Andre was captured by the Spanish on the return voyage to Portugal in
1652. After a brief and relative revival orchestrated by Luis de Mendonca
Furrado from 1651-1653, such setbacks continued." Between 1658 and 1663
an average of one ship a year arrived in Goa, while not even than number
made the return voyage successfully. In only slightly exaggerated terms,
the Queen-Regent Dona Luisa told the French ambassador in 1659 that no
news had been received from India in three years. In1660, the Sacramento
da Esperanca, the Nossa Senbora da Estreffa, and the Conceicao left Lis-
bon. Of these, the first made it to Goa in such a state that it was beached
and stripped, while the last two were lost off Madagascar. The final de-
bacle took place in 1662, when Antonio de Mello de Castro sailed to Goa
III an English fleet."
Several problems complicate the process of documenting the recovery
and stabilization of the Carreira da India that began in 1668 with the as-
sumption to power of Prince Regent Pedro. The extant manuscript
sources are sparse and Widely scattered throughout Portugal, the rest of
Europe, and India. It is therefore difficult to obtain sufficient data to con-
struct a complete record for the post-reej period. Not surprisingly, con-
flicting evidence on sailing dates, stopovers, arrival dates, type of vessel,
and cargoes is commonplace in the available sources. The Portuguese also
had the rather disconcerting habit of giving long and sometimes virtually
identical names to the Naos of the Carreira. Reflecting the continuing
power of the Catholic church in Portuguese society, most of these names
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had religious connotations or connections. Thus, we have the Nossa
Senhora de Ajuda and Nossa Senhora de Ajuda e Santo Antonio or Bom
Jesus de Trindade and Born Jesus de Trinidade e Nossa Senhora de Boa
Memoria. In the documents, of course, these would be shortened to
merely Nossa Senhora de Aiuda or Bom Jesus de Trindade complicating
the process of sorting out the seaborne traffic between Lisbon and Goa.
Fortunately, at least three major sources for the posr-reej period exist
which allow for the compilation of relatively complete statistics on the
Carreira. The Cartas das Cabedais das Naus de S.A. q' uierao desde 0
anno 667 the' de 6&of II folios and versos was put together in late 1681 by
joao Cabral de Mello Contador of the Estado. It contains a list of receipts
compiled by the [eitors (Crown factors) in Goa, listing the composition
and value of the outward and homeward bound cargoes from r667-1681.'"
Valuable for its information on products and prices, this document also
yields data on arrivals, stopovers, and departure dates. The Registro das
Cartas gerais que vao para a India, I666-I784 of ISfolios and versos for the
period 1666-1677, contains the letters from the feitors (although not bills of
lading) of the Casa da India in Lisbon and their counter-parts in Goa, list-
ing the Carreira cargoes. Arrival dates are sometimes provided, and the
dating of these letters offers clues to departure dates from Lisbon. Unfor-
tunately, there is an incomplete run of letters. From Lisbon, the yearly let-
ters from 1666-1670 survive, while the letters from Goa are from 1666-1669,
1673-1677, with a dearth until 1708." Finally, Francisco Luis Ameno's
Noticia Chronologica dos descobrimentos que [izeriio os Portugueses ate
a India Oriental, e das Armadas que os Reys de Portugal tern mandado
aquelle Estado ate 0 presente anno de I762 gives a yearly breakdown of the
Captains and ships of the Carreira, as well as relatively complete and ac-
curate arrival and departure dates. 'S
As Table I reflects, there were 31 sailings from Lisbon to Goa for the years
I668-168I, or an average of 2.2 per year. Of that number, 30 made the voy-
age successfully, an impressive 96.8%. Only the Nossa Senhora dos
Remedios of Luis de Mendonca Furtado's 1670 fleet was lost on the pas-
sage, constituting a meager 3.2% of the total. Rather surprisingly, there
were no abortive voyages or arribadas. Ten ships, or 32%, either made
stopovers at Brazil, or "wintered" at Mozambique or Socotra. Five of
these ten were part of Mendonca Furtado's fleet. The breakdown on the
duration of voyages is the following: 20 ships or 64% made the passage in
6 months, 1 ship (302%) took 7 months, 1 ship (302%) took 1I months, 7
ships or 22.4% completed the voyage in 13 months, and 1 ship (3.2%), the
Born Jesus de Trindade (1670-71), took 17 months to reach Goa. The aver-
age voyage for the 30 successful sailings was therefore a relatively swift 8.2
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C. Ferrao de Castelbranco 511V/69
D. Antonio Mascarcnhas 1O/IVI70
Ver.mo Rea Corrca
Rill' Horta Casrelbranco
Simao da Costa de
Tavora
Thomas Comes da Costa 11I1V/70
C. Ferrao de Casrelbranco 2f1V/71
Manoel Pereira 211V/71
Joao Correa de Sa 12fIH/72
jozeph Roiz da Silva 12/111/72
jeronymo de Curvalhc 12fIliI72
Pedro Lourenco 3/III/72
D. Rodrigo da Costa 15lIIU73
Bamabe de Ban-os 15/I!II73
Pedro Lamego Palha IV/73
Siman de Sousa de 21lV174
Tavora
Manocl Carvalho 2fIV/74
joao da Silva Guia 6flV/75
Andre de Sa 1I!Vf76
Francisco Roiz Lishoa 1I1V176
Francisco da Sa da Silva 191IVI77
Anronio Vaz Salgado 6I1V/78
6/IV178
D. joao Lourcnco da 1/IVI79
Cunha
Manoel Pinto da Costa 1/IV179
Vet. de Carvalho 3/1V/80
M.cI Goncalves de [V/80
Amorim
D. Joao L.o Alvarez da 25/Il!fH I
Cunha








Typc[lj Captain or Master
[GI
1110
26. S. Maria Izabel de Saboya 1Nl
27. S'1llW Antonio [F]
2B. Nossa Senhora da [P]
Vizitacao
29. S. Maria lzabel de Saboya IN]
3D. Jvossa Senhora dos IN] IX/81 6 rnos.
Millagres
31. S. Antonio e S. F. Xavier [NI D. Hennque Manoel IV/SI IXlSI 6 rnos.
[11 N=Nao or Great Ship, Carrack; C=Galeao or Galleon; P=Patacao or Pinnace; F=Frigata or Frigate
[2lLocatiol1 of Stopover on Voyage
131 Ran aground and lost off Mozambique 261IV!I(i71
[41 Rom Jesus de Trindadc e Nossa Senhora de Nazareth
15] Nossa Senhora de Nazareth c Santa Antonio
2. Nossa Senhora da Ajuda
j. Nossa Scnhora dos
Cardaes
4. Santa Carannn
5. Nossa Senhora de Guia
6. Nossa Senhorn dos
Rcmedius
7. Born jesus de Trindade /PI
8. B. Jesus de Sao Dorningos [G]
9.BJTIN Senhora de Nazererh [PI
[4[
10. Nossa Scnhora da Ajnda [N]
11. NS de Nazercth e S. An- [PI
ronio [51
12. Sao Pcdro de Rates [N]
13. NS da Ajuda c S. Amonio /PI
14. B. Jesus de S. Domingos IN]
IS. Nossa Scnhora dos IN]
Cardacs
16. BJT/N Senhora de
Nazereth
17. Nossa Senhora do
Rozario
18. BJT/NS de Boa Memoria IPI
19. Sao Pedro de Rates {NI
20. Nossa Senhora dos [NI
Remedies
21. BJNINS de Boa Memoria [P]
22. San l'edro da Ribeira 1Nl
23. Nossa Senhora do Pillar /PI
24. Nossa Senhora dos IPJ
Millagres




months. As for the average month of departure; 7 ships departed in
March (22.6%) and the remaining 24 ships {77.4%} in April. Of these, 21
arrived in Goa in September (67.7%), 7 in May (22.6%), I in March
(302%), and I in October (302%).
TABLE 2: Sailings From Goa to Lisbon, 1668-1682
Ship Type Captain or Master Departs Arrives Other Duration
1. Santa Teresa de Jesus [N] Francisco Rangcl Pinto 101H/68 Lost] 1]
2. NS dos Remedies IN] Manoel Pere.ra Countinho 15fV69 4/X1I69 Bahia 10 mos.
3. NS da Ajuda IN] 301V70 2511Xl70 g mos.
4. Sao Joao da Ribeira IF] [cao da Costa I5/Xl71 7NIII/72 Bahia 10 mos.
5. BJ de Sao Domingos IN] C. Ferrao de Castelbranco 25/1172[A] 7NIIII72 6 mos.
6. NS dos Cardaes IN] Ruy Horta de Castelbranco 25/1172[B] 7NIIII72 6 mos.
7. BJ de Nazereth IP] Sirnao de Souse T avora 22/IXl72[C] 22NIIII73? Bahia 11 mos.
S. NS da Ajuda IN] joao Ferreria 24/[/73[A] LoscjZ]
9. NS da Ajuda e S An- IP] Manoel de Souze IlIX/73[BI IS/IXl74 Bahia l Lrnos.
rnnio
10. BJ de Trindade IG] Diego Delgado ll1X173[C] 24NII1I74 Bahia 10 rues.
11. Sao Pedro de Rates IN] D. Rodrigo da Costa 211V74lA] 19NII/74 6 mos.
12. BJ de Sao Domingos 1Nl Antonio Machado 261V74[B] Abortive Go,
13. Sao Miguel IG] Ver.mo de Carvalho 101X1V74[C] 7f1Xl75 9 mos.
14. BJN/NSB Memoria IP] Jeronymo da Maya Diniz 10/XI1I741DJ 101lX/75 9 mos.
15. NS de Oliveira IF] Anronio de Banhos 25/1175 14f1X/75 8 rnos.
16. Sac Pedro de Rate, IN] Simao de Souza 28f1/76 18/XI1I76 Bahia 11 mos.
17. B1 de Sac Domingos IN] Andre da Silva 30/1177[MB] Losrjj] Bahia
18. BJNINSB Memoria IP] Manoel Borges 15/X1V77[C] IXl78 9 rnos.
19. NS dos Millagres [N] Francisco Martins 201V79 5NIV79 6 mos.
20. NS da Vizitacao [PI Manoe! Roiz 20/JJ79 14NIV79 6 mus.
21. NS da Conceicao IN] jozeph Dalgadc JJ80[NBj 6/X/80 9 mos.
22. NS do Pillar [PI U80 15NIV80 6 mos.
23. SMaria Izabel de [N] D. Lourenco Alz. da Cunha U80 211X180 Sofala 8 mos.
Saboya
24. Santa Antonio IF] [X/SO 26/1X/81 Bahia [2 mos.
25. SA de Lisboa [N) Venssimo Carvalho da U81 26/IXl81 Sofala 8 rnos.
Costa
26. NS da Viziracao [PI Manoel Roiz 1181 26/IX/81 Sofala 8 IllOS.
27. NS dos Millagres [N] IX/81 Lost[41
21{. Sap Pcdro da IN] 1/82 27f1X/S2 8 mos.
Ribeira
[1] No information
[2[ Lost off Mozambique
13] Beached and stripped at Bahia
[4] No information
Table 2 shows that there were 28 sailings from Goa to Lisbon from 1668-
1682, or an average of 1.87 per year. 23 ships completed the return passage
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successfully, or 82.8% of the total. Four ships, the Santa Teresa de Jesus
(1668), the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda (1673), the Bom Jesus de Sao
Domingos (1677) and the Nossa Senbora dos Mil/agres (1681) were lost.
This constituted 14.3% of the total. The ill-fared Bom Jesus de Sac
Dommgos also noted the sole abortive voyage (3.6%) during this period.
Although the data is incomplete, it appears that at least 8 vessels or 28.8%
made stopovers in Brazil. Only 2 of these, the Nossa Senhora dos
Remedioe and Sao Pedro de Rates were Naos and thus ideally prevented
from doing so. At least another 4 ships (14.J%) made short stopovers in
Sofala. The voyage duration breakdown is as follows: 6 ships (21.6%)
took 6 monrhs to reach Lisbon, another 6 (21,6%) vessels made the pas-
sage in 8 months, 4 ships (14.3%) rook 9 months, 3 ships (1O.7%) rook 10
months, and another 3 ships (10.7%) took It months to reach the Portu-
guese capital. The average voyage was therefore 8.2 months. Three of the
returning ships (10.7%) departed from Goa in late December, 18,a major-
ity (64-3%), left in January, 1 sailed in February (3.6%), while 3 ships
(10.7%) departed in September and another 3 (10.7%) in October. Of
these, 4 (14.3%) reached Lisbon in July, 5 (17.9%) in August and 11 (39.33%)
1Il September. One ship (3.6%) reached the Tagus in Ocrober, another
(3.6%) in November, and yet another (3.6%) in December.
What do these statistics tell us? First and foremost they reveal that as
opposed ro the dismal period from 1640-1663, when the Carreira was virtu-
ally moribund and contact between Lisbon and Goa was interrupted for
years at a time, a regular seaborne trade between the metropolis and India
was definitively re-established. Swift successful passages from Lisbon to
Goa became the rule after 1674, with 14 consecutive vessels making the
passage in approximately 6 months. This is a record that even the more
"advanced" proro-capiralist companies of the Dutch and English and
Colbert's Compagme des Indes Cnientales were no doubt hard-pressed to
equal." On the more problematic return passage relatively swift voyages
were also the rule, with only 2 of 15 vessels taking more than 9 months be-
tween 1674-1682. The reasons for this startling turnaround are not hard to
find. In general, this transformation was the result of a fundamental shift
m priorities on the part of the Portuguese Crown with respect to the "tri-
dimensional empire" of Brazil, Africa, and Asia. There are clear indica-
tions that Prince Regent Pedro had abandoned the primacy that his father
John IV had shown to Brazil and instead decided to shift Crown patron-
age and resources in an attempt to salvage and resuscitate the Estadc da
India: "the most important and glorious of all of the [Crown's] con-
quests. ","
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On a more practical level, these impressive numbers resulted from in-
creased royal supervision over the voyages and stricter controls and pun-
ishment for captains who neglected their sailing orders. As CR. Boxer
pointed out long ago, the key for successful sailings on the Cape route was
prompt departures from Lisbon and Goa." This meant that vessels had to
leave the Tagus sometime between late February and early April to reach
Goa by September or October, and to depart from the Mandovi in Janu-
ary in order to reach Lisbon by the following summer. We have a plethora
of royal decrees from 1668 on exhorting prompt departures and forbid-
ding harmful stopovers in Brazil and Africa. While this was nothing new,
it appears that Pedro and his Viceroys, unlike their immediate predeces-
sors, strove to enforce such orders. Offending captains were punished and
the number of late departures and invernos dropped. The Crown and
Viceroyalty were also diligent about ensuring prompt departures." All 31
of the Carreira ships from 1668-1682 left Lisbon in either March or April;
the earliest departed on March 3, (the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda e Santa
Antonio in 1672), while only 2 ships sailed after the nth of April. Of these,
only Luis de Mendonca Purtado's large 1670 fleet, the three ships that
sailed in March 1672 and the Nossa Senhora do Rozario in 1674 did not
make the passage in 6 month's time. On the return passage, 21 ships (75%)
left Goa in either December or January; 18 made it to Lisbon the following
summer or fall. Six of the remaining seven departures were small packet
ships that were dispatched in either September or October. Only the
Santa Teresa de Jesus failed to make a prompt departure from Goa, sail-
ing on February 10, 1668, and this galleon never reached Lisbon.
These impressive figures for the sailings of the Carreirasuggest that the
Portuguese had quite simply learned from past mistakes and were bent on
fundamental reforms in their Asian empire. Niels Steensgaard has ad-
vanced the rather strict dichotomy of proto-capitalist vis-a-vis monarchi-
cal monopolism as the most fruitful model for analyzing the commercial
struggle between the Atlantic economies (and Asian Companies) of the
Dutch and English and the Portuguese Estado da India during the r-th
century. This interpretation has proven to be both persuasive and attrac-
tive for Indo-Portuguese historians." One problem with this schema,
however, is that it assumes largely static and unchanging structures and
priorities for these combatants over the course of the r-th century. This
was far from the case. The VOC quickly lost its pristine "entrepreneurial"
values, and by the 1660s was squandering huge amounts of cash to defend
clearly unprofitable holdings like Ceylon." At the same time, the Portu-
guese learned to adapt to changing technologies and business practices. In
much the same way as absolutism in Eastern Europe developed in part as
a response to the threat of the more "advanced" absolutist states of West,
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the Portuguese responded to the military, technological, and commercial
threat of the merchant capitalist economies of the Dutch and English and
initiated their own reforms." The Asian trade revolution of the rsrh cen-
tury undoubtedly affected all the powers in that trade.
As early as mid-century, the Portuguese Crown had begun to integrate
the shipbuilding advances of the Dutch and English into the construction
of their own naos. This promising trend had been continued by Pedro af-
ter 1668. As a result, the unwieldy 1200 ton carracks of the late reth and
early rzth centuries, the monsters which had fue1ed the stories of the
Historico Tragico-Ultramarino, were abandoned. In their place sleeker,
more seaworthy galleons were built in the royal dockyards of Lisbon,
Porto, and Goa. ,t, Such galleons helped to resuscitate the Carreira and al-
lowed it to achieve the impressive 98% and 82% success rate on voyages
attained between 1668-1682. The Portuguese therefore made serious efforts
to revive and stabilize their seaborne trade between Lisbon and Goa dur-
ing the late rrth century. A fundamental precondition for any such revival
was certainly the re-establishment of regular seaborne interchange
between the metropole and Goa. As these figures from the extant manu-
script documentation, as opposed perhaps to overwrought and exagger-
ated contemporary travel accounts, demonstrates the black legend of
rapid and inevitable maritime decline regarding the rpth century Estado
and the Carreira has been vastly overstated.
An analysis of the cargoes carried at Royal expense aboard the ships of
the Carreira during this period also reveals much about the priorities of
the Crown, about questions of change and continuity in absolutist Portu-
gal, as well as about the nature of the commercial srabilization achieved in
the Estado by 1683. There are several key extant documents for detailing
the composition of the Carreira cargoes of this period. Amcno's work,
while vcry useful for analyzing the rehabilitation of the voyages of the
Carreira, contains no information on the cargoes of these vessels. The
Registro das Cartas gerais que uao para a India, 1666-1784, while valuable
for containing the letters of the Crown factors of the Casa da India in Lis-
bon and their counterparts in Goa, unfortunately provides an incomplete
run of letters from these [eitors. The Contas das Cabedais das Naus is
therefore a superior source for information on the Crown cargoes aboard
the Carreira during these years. Compiled under the direction of the
Contador of the Royal Treasury, joao Cabral de Mello, this source was
completed in January 1682. As its title suggests, the Contas das Cabedais
contains a list of receipts for revenues and expenditures relating to the
Carreira as recorded by the five Crown [eitors III Goa from 1667-1682:
Miguel d'almeida da Silva, Urbano Areja Lisboa, joao Esteves, Francisco
Games de Mello, and Agostinho Coelho de Sousa. The document lists the
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composition and value of the royal outward and homeward bound car-
goes on all the Carreira ships for this period. The Contas das Cabedais,
moreover, summarizes all of the Crown cargoes from 1668-1682, with fre-
quent references to the prices paid for these commodities. It is therefore
the most complete source available for documenting the late ryrh century
Carreira da India.
From the arrival of Vasco da Gama onward, the Europeans trading in
Asia had discovered, much to their economic detriment, that their manu-
factured goods held very little attraction in Eastern markets. The demand
for heavy woolens in Monsoon Asia proved to be indeed limited. Over
time, the Portuguese and their European competitors, would increasingly
attempt to compensate for this unwelcome reality by developing a large
"country" or inter-Asiatic trade as a means of financing the purchase and
shipments of spices and other goods to Europe. Above all, this trade
helped to avoid the "harmful" export of spices to Asia in opposition to
the bullionist tenets of mercantilism. The traditional composition of out-
ward-bound cargoes at Crown expense had thus been armaments, muni-
tions, and other products with military uses, including sulphur for use at
the Casa de Polvara or Roya! Gunpowder Factory in Goa. These military
goods could either be utilized by the Estado for its own rarher formidable
defensive purposes or at times sold to finance the purchase of return
goods for Europe. Nevertheless, it was invariably necessary to dispatch
silver to Goa to finance the purchase of return cargoes augmented by
other products like coral that were also in demand in Asia."
As noted above, 31 ships sailed from Lisbon to Goa between 1668-1682,
with all but one, the Nossa Senhora dos Remedios, making the voyage
successfully. The table below summarizes the royal cargoes aboard those
vessels."
As these figures demonstrate, the composition of Crown cargoes dis-
patched to the Estado remained fairly traditional throughout the forma-
tive years of Pedro II's "reign". Military armaments and munitions
remained staples of the outward bound cargoes. Between 1668 and 1681,
the Crown dispatched 3676 quintals (over 235 tons) of lead, 187 quintals
(nearly 12 tons) of sulphur to be used in the Royal Gunpowder Factory in
Goa, 42 quintals (2.6 tons) of lead-shot, 853 quintals (54.6 tons) of metal
chain, and 1483 quintale (nearly 95 tons) of iron. To assist the Viceroyalty
in the struggle with a host of European and Asiatic rivals and enemies,
Pedro also embarked some 143 cannon of various sizes, nearly 48,000 can-
nonball, 1200 chainshot to assist the work of the yearly armadas that left
Goa to enforce the long-standing monopolistic pretensions of the cartaz
system, nearly 700 muskets, over 200 swords, 1383 pikes, and 1000 lances.
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TABLE 3: Royal Cargoes on Outward Bound Ships of the Carrcira da India, 1668-1681
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It was certainly no coincidence that by far the most impressive concentra-
tion of such products sailed aboard the 1670 fleet of the Nossa Senhora
dos Cardaes, the Santa Catarina, the Nossa Senhora de Guia, the Nossa
Senhora dos Remedios, and the Bom Jesus de Sao Domingos. These ships
carried 41 artillery pieces, 8150 cannonballs, 1000 lances, 692 muskets, 1}82
pikes, as well as large quantities of lead, sulphur, and powder flasks."
This fleet was dispatched at a crucial moment in the history of the
Estado. Pedro and his Council of State may have resolved to rehabilitate
the Asian empire after long years of neglect, but their plans were signifi-
cantly complicated by the approaching storm of the Dutch War of 1672
and Colbert's spirited attempt to lure Lisbon into an anti-Dutch alliance
in Asia that would facilitate grandiose plans that Louis XIV's great minis-
ter harbored for his own Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales. Re-
jecting this tempting offer, Pedro had instead appointed Luis de
Mendonca Furtado and determined to provide his friend with everything
deemed necessary to effect a rehabilitation of the Estado, a fact that was
well reflected in the cargoes carried aboard the 1670 fleet. Mendonca
Furtado would make the most of this promising start in the years that fol-
lowed in the midst of the Third Dutch War in Asia, when all of his Euro-
pean competitors were preoccupied with warring against one another."
Although the return cargoes of the Carreira have been much more ex-
tensively studied than those carried aboard outward bound vessels, there
has also been a tendency to focus on the glory years of the early to mid-
reth century when the annual traffic in spices via the Cape route probably
averaged c. 40,000 quintals a year, huge profits were made for the Crown,
and fleets of 5-14 ships made the voyage annually. After the nadir of 1640-
166}, a rehabilitation also took place on the return voyage of the Carreira.
As Table 2 noted, between 1668-1682 there were 28 sailings from Goa to
Lisbon or an average of 1.87 per year. Of that number, 2} ships or 82.8%
made the passage successfully.
Chart I provides a yearly breakdown of the Crown pepper cargoes car-
ried aboard these ships."
Even a cursory examination of this evidence clearly reveals that the quan-
tity of Crown spice imports had dropped precipitously from the reth or
even early rrrh centuries: Instead of tens of thousands of quintals, we find
hundreds and at times a thousand or two quintals had become the rule.
Nevertheless, we should temper this assessment with two vital consider-
ations. First, the fact that the size of the Carreira fleets carrying these
goods had modified significantly over time. On the outward bound voy-
age the average from 1500-1530 had been from 7-14 ships. By 1550, this had
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been reduced to 5, by 1640 the average was 2-3 ships per fleet, and in the
1660s the average had fallen to 1-2 per year. Return fleets throughout these
years had generally averaged half that of the number leaving Lisbon. An-
other important consideration is that the welcomed and needed reforma-
tion in shipbuilding techniques which began in the mid-rzth century, a
campaign which ultimately yield more seaworthy vessels for the Carreira
along the lines of the English and Dutch Indiamen, had also ensured a
drop in possible cargo space aboard these vessels. The unwieldy 1500-2000
ton monsters of the IS90S were gradually reduced to sleeker, more seawor-
thy frigate-type vessels of perhaps soo-eco tons by the 1670S."
Therefore, it is perhaps more fruitful to judge these figures not in com-
parison with the glory days of the empire that had long since disappeared,
but in comparison to the dismal period immediately preceding Pedro's re-
forms. Judged in this light, these royal cargoes tell us several things. First,
they demonstrate that the stabilization of the sailings of the Carreira after
1668 also ensured a regular supply of pepper at royal expense after the lean
years of the 1650S and early 1660s. Compared to the generally dismal
sailings and cargoes of the Regency years of Dona Luisa and Afonso VI's
reign, Crown shipments of pepper remained relatively stable throughout
the first decades of Pedro II's reign, with at least 250 quintals being dis-
patched each year with the exception of 1671 and 1678. It should be noted ,
however, that the departure of the [rigata Bom Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa
Senhora de Boa Memoria in December r677 with 50 quintals of Kanara
pepper slightly distorts the figures for the latter year. The annual totals at
Crown expense (excluding 1671 and 1678) ranged from a low of 2O} quin-
tals in 1668, to a high of 1903 in 1674. An almost steady rise is also detect-
able from 1668-1674, with by far the largest amounts of 1625, 786, and 1903
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being dispatched from 1672-1674. These 4}14 quintals constituted some
48.3% of the total Crown pepper shipments for the entire period.
There can be little doubt that the timing of these "large" shipments re-
lated to both geo-political and economic factors. It is likely that Luis de
Mendonca Furtado, following the lead of Pedro and the Overseas Council
in avoiding involvement in the Dutch War of 1672, exploited the fact that
his European rivals were indeed busing warring with one another at home
and in Asia, to oversee the purchase and dispatching of significant
amounts of pepper during these three crucial years. This policy not only
confirmed the wisdom of Pedro decision on the war, but reflected a fun-
damental shift in the priorities inherent in the monarchical monopolism
that had forged the empire in the early 16th century and had largely
guided its major strategic decisions throughout the Aviz, Habsburg, and
early Braganza periods. Instead of embracing the traditional allure of mil-
itary action and conquest that had traditionally guided Lisbon's policy in
struggling against both Asiatic and European competitors from the out-
set, Pedro and Mendonca Furtado instead opted for peace, reformation,
and a practical economic strategy that in many respects surpassed the
anachronistic reversion to warfare and conquest totally unsuited to the
stated goals of the proto-capitalisr companies of England and Holland
that Colbert was in the midst of challenging. As Chart 2- demonstrates,
Mendonca Furtado was also prompted to dispatch such cargoes during
the years 1672-1674 according to the simple laws of supply and demand
and the prices resulting from these economic realities. "
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As Chart 2 demonstrates, there was a close correlation throughout this
period between the price paid by the Crown for its pepper in Kanara,
Tanor, and elsewhere on the Malabar coast of India and the amount that
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was purchased and dispatched to Lisbon. The average prices paid varied
from 17.4-32.8 xerafins per quinral for these years, certainly a significant
variation. The two periods when the price was lowest, that is from late
1668 through late 1671 for the four cargoes dispatched from January 1669
through January 1672 at an average price of 21.8, and from late 1673 to late
1674 at an average of 17.4 xerafins per quintal for four cargoes dispatched
through December 1674 resulted in by far the largest shipments of pepper
to Lisbon. These cargoes were carried by the Nossa Senhora dos
Remedios (428 quintals), the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda (712 qumtals), the
Born Jesus de Sao Domingos (902 quintals), and the Nossa dos Cardaes
(623 quintals) in the initial period; and the Sao Pedro de Rates (rooo qtdn-
tals), the Born Jesus de Sao Domingos (903 quintals), the Siio Miguel (596
qumtals), and the packet Born Jesus de Nazareth e Nossa Senhora de Boa
Memoria (292 qumtals) in the latter. The 5456 quintals carried aboard
these 8 ships alone constituted 61% of the 8921 quintals dispatched during
this period.
Although the nature of the extant sources make it difficult to trace the
precise reasons for these two troughs in prices, it is likely that the tension
and uncertainties engendered by the warfare between the English, French,
and Dutch along the western coast of India during these years may have
played a role. It is also interesting to note that Colberr's grand Asian fleet
of 1670 under jacob Blanquct de La Haye, the single greatest threat to
Dutch predominance in the trade, had been decisively defeated by the fall
of 1674, and that England had also made a separare peace, effectively end-
ing the Third Dutch War in Asia." The resumption of regular trade on the
Malabar coast was characterized by a significant jump in prices between
1675-1679, from 27.5-32.8 xerafins per quintal, nearly doubling from 1674
levels for the cargoes dispatched throughout 1677 and in January 1679.
These figures suggest that the indigenous merchants who dominated the
pepper trade in Kanara, Tanor, and elsewhere were indeed sensitive to the
vagaries of the marker, at leasr as they affected the European demand fat
such products and may have exploited the realties of the diplomatic situa-
tion in Europe and by extension Asia to increase their own profits in the
trade. At the same rime, these figures reveal that the Portuguese, in the
face of such inflated prices, eirher severely restricted their purchases, as in
the period from late r672 to late 1673, and again in late 1677, or abandoned
the purchase of pepper altogether in favor of commodities with higher po-
tential profit margins at home as from late 1680 onward, when the Vice-
royalty purchased bizalhos of diamonds instead of pepper at Royal
expense for the return cargoes."
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The composition of Royal cargoes aboard the Carreira, even during this
period of reform, remained exceedingly traditional. In terms of value,
pepper remained by far the most important commodity. Of the 246,IlI
xeratins in direct Crown expenditures on return cargoes, 188,549 xerafins
or 77% were made on pepper. The 29,799 xerafins spent on the bizalhos of
diamonds dispatched in 1681 and 1682 aboard the Santo Antonio de
Lisboa, the Nossa Senhora da vizitacao, and the Sao Pedro da Ribeira
represented 12% of overall expenditures, while the 20,216 xerafins used to
purchase saltpeter equaled 8% of the total. The remaining 7547 xerafins or
3% was used to purchase teak and angelim planks, and naval riggings.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the composition of the return cargoes
as reflected in Charts 1-2 is the fact that the Crown, even in peak years,
was only dispatching from 900-IOOO quintals per ship. The rated hold ca-
pacity of the 500-600 tonelada ships utilized on the Carreira during the
late rrth century was probably between 7500 to 8500 qumtals. Above deck
areas and living quarters that were also jammed with products probably
constituted an additional loading space of 20-25% or some 1900-2200
quinta/s to the total capacity of these ships." The obvious question is what
use was made of the remaining c. 85°0-95°0 quintals of space aboard these
vessels?
The answer to this important question is twofold: First, a reasonable
amount of this space was taken up by the caixas de liberdade or liberty
chests that had traditionally been granted to officers, crews, and noble-
men traveling aboard the Carreira in lieu of regular wages. These caixas
could be loaded with spices or other products that could be imported into
Lisbon either wholly or partially duty free. King Manual's decree of 1515
provided that captains of voyages and fortresses in India received four
chests each, gentlemen of the royal household two or three, soldiers one
chest, pilots and other officers of the ship one chest each, one chest for
each two sailors, and one chest for each three cabin boys. Boyajian esti-
mates that with a typical crew on returning Indiamen at 120 officers and
sailors, and an additional 200 soldiers and fidalgos, these liberties
amounted to c. 300 chests or 450 bales during the first half of the rerh cen-
tury. At 2 quintals per bale, these goods would have occupied some 900-
IOOO quintals of storage space, or nearly all that available above the hold.
By the late r-th century, the liberdade system, after a short-lived attempt
to abolish the system altogether and instead substitute an adequate pay
scale, was redefined in a regimento of March H, 1652. Under this decree,
the captain-major of any voyage was entitled to 15 liberty chests, 12 slaves,
300 quintals of blackwood, lOO quintals of lac-dye, and thirty of camphor.
In addition, he might designate 12 servants as men-at-arms who were al-
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lowed one chest and two fardels of cinnamon, with each fardel fixed at
the maximum weight of 1 quintal. At the bottom of the scale, each sailor
was allowed one liberty chest and 12 fardels of cinnamon and each
grummet or apprentice-sailor was allowed one [ardelof liberty goods and
ten fardels of cinnamon. In 1664, well after being expelled from Ceylon,
rhc Crown provided that under certain conditions pcpper and other spices
might be substituted for cinnamon. ,-
Based on evidence on the "Cartas Gerais" collection, it appears that
the size of the crews was nor significantly diminished on the return voy-
ages. Although the invoices for the liberdades have not survived, letters
from Manoel de Saldanha dated Goa, January 26, 1674 and from Pedro
Ferreira dated January 26, 1676 inform us that the carrack Sao Pedro de
Rates carried the following crews in those years: J6 [and 18] officers, 53
sailors, 25 apprentice sailors, 24 gunners, and 5cabin boys, for a total of
123and 125 crew members." It is not unreasonable to assume that the num-
bers of returning soldiers and other passengers must have also remained
relatively close to c. 200 per carrack. At the same time, the 1652 regimento
had increased liberdade allotments by approximately 60%: the captain-
major's limit had risen from 4 to 15chests, the common sailor's limit had
risen from half a chest to a full chest plus 12 fardels of cinnamon or other
spices. Using these figures, it is likely that the amount of cargo space de-
voted to liberdade goods, whether carried at the direct charge of those en-
titled to them or, as Saldanha's letter implies, leased out to private
merchants, was probably close to some 700 chests or I050 bales at 2 quin-
tals each or c. 2IOO quintals overall. Is it, however, possible to come to a
marc precise estimate on the makeup of Carreira cargoes during the late
r-th century? Well yes and no.
Although the dearth of construction data on the Sao Pedro de Rates
other ships plying the Cape route during these years and the destruction
of the Casa da India records in the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 prevent a de-
finitive analysis of its overall cargo, we can utilize available information
to make the following estimates. The Sao Pedro like most naos during this
period was probably close to 600 toneladas in burden with an available
cargo space (including both the hold and elsewhere) of c. IO,OOO quintals.
Based on the Saldanha's letter and the Contas das Cabedeis listing of re-
ceipts and expenditures on the Carreira for these years, we know that this
ship carried IOOO qumtals of Tanor pepper at Crown expense, c. IO% of
the total." We should assume that D. Rodrigo da Costa, the captain-ma-
jor, as well as the remaining members of his crew, all utilized their
liberdade allotments to the utmost. As Table 4 demonstrates, the cargo
space devoted to liberdade products on this nao must have been over 3000
quintals, or c. 30% of the available cargo space. Overall, then Crown pep-
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per and liberdade allowances must have constituted some 4000 quintals
or so, leaving some 6000 quintals or 60% available for strictly private
trade:"
TABLE 4: Estimated Liberdade Cargo Aboard Sao Pedro de Rates, 1674
------ ---- -------------- --------
Chests Fardels Other




























These estimates on the composition of the cargo of the Sao Pedro de Rates
suggest that various trends regarding the Carreira characteristic of the
Habsburg period continued during the initial stages of the Braganza dy-
nasty in Portugal. Above all, these estimates suggest a continuing decline
in the percentage of overall cargo weight absorbed by Royal pepper and
other products, and the increasingly vital role that private trade played in
the Carreira traffic around the Cape, a trade that in some cases reached 5
million cruzados per year. Boyajian argues that from 1620-164° the break-
down of royal vis-a-vis private trade was 54% versus 46% by total weight,
and for the entire Habsburg period (1580-164°) this ratio was 62-% versus
38%." The figures for the Sac Pedro de Rates, as rough as they are, seem
to demonstrate that the percentage of cargoes absorbed by Crown trade
continued to shrink during the Braganza period. The king's pepper ship-
ments which had once absorbed virtually all of the cargo space on such
vessels, c. 95% in the 1540S had now been reduced to a mere 10% of the to-
tal. This figure and the 30% privileged liberdade cargo still constituted
less than half of the total by weight. Moreover, since a good portion of the
liberdade allowance was no doubt leased to private traders, perhaps half
of the total, the actual cargo space absorbed by the Royal trade and crew
liberdades was probably less than 2-5% by weight. It should be noted that
the Sao Pedro de Rates carried largest Crown pepper shipment of the en-
tire period. Thus, on the other carracks of these years, which carried c. 500
or 600 quintals at Crown expense, the percentage of private trade was
even higher and at times probably approached the 90% range that
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Boyajian has proffered for the percentage by value for such cargoes for
the Habsburg period!"
Nevertheless, the increasingly important role of the pnvate trade on
the Carreira route, which these figures suggest should not be taken a pri-
ori as a definitive sign of increasing infirmity on the part of the Portuguese
Crown. In fact, such evidence may be interpreted as one sign of the logical
maturation of the Braganza dynasty and the rising centralized state in
Portugal that Pedro strove to construct for the remainder of the rrth cen-
tury. One of Lisbon's primary goals during this formative period of
Braganzan "absolutism" was to rcesrablish, once and for all, the seaborne
interchange between the metropole and Asia, a link that had been all but
severed by the years of warfare from 1640-1668. As the evidence indicates,
Pedro and his Overseas Council most assuredly succeeded in this quest in
the years after 1668." As this fundamental task was accomplished, Pedro
and his advisors looked to the example of the Dutch, English, and French
joint stock companies for lessons that would resuscitate the economic for-
tunes of the Estado.
Perhaps the most innovative and radical reform that Pedro and his
claque considered during the late 1660s and early I670S was the plan to re-
establish a privately funded East India Company along the lines of his Eu-
ropean competitors bankrolled by contributions from the powerful New
Christians. This plan to rejuvenate the Estado by attracting a large infu-
sion of money from the rich New Christian community in Portugal, a
community with long-standing ties to the private trade carried on aboard
the ships of the Carreira da India, reveals the firm commitment of the
Crown toward the fortunes of the Estado da India. The Prince Regent ini-
tially embraced this plan as early as 1669, despite the staunch opposition
of the Roman Catholic church and especially the Inquisition. In essence,
Pedro sought to utilize this font of private capital for the benefit of the
Crown's economic and geo-political interests in the ASIan empire. The
scheme revolved around a quid pro quo arrangement in which the Prince
Regent would endorse a general pardon for past "judaizing" and prom-
ised future protection from the abuses of the Inquisition in the form of a
bull to be promulgated by Pope Clement X in return for funding a new
Asian Company along the lines of the Dutch and English model. To ob-
tain such royal and papal largesse, the New Christians were also expected
to underwrite sizable military reinforcements for the Estado: sending
from 3000-)"000 men to India during the first year of the plan, and 1200-
I)"OO per annum thereafter, along with a stipend of 20,000 cruaados for the
maintenance of this force.
As Francis Parry, the English ambassador, informed London in August
1673: "The New Christians would send to the East Indies & rnainraine
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there 3000souldiers & every yeare after 1500 as long as shall be needfull.''"
These men would complement the 500-600 man permanent Terco that
was already in the process of being reestablished by the Crown with mon-
ies taken from the Estado's donativo for the peace with Holland, nomi-
nally 130,000 cruzados a year." But in the end, as Parry and other foreign
diplomats in Lisbon noted, the entrenched opposition of what might be
defined as a "medieval" coalition between the Holy Office and clergy, a
good part of the nobility, and a populace still wedded to the prejudice, ha-
treds, and superstitions of the past, undermined this plan. All three estates
of the Cortes of 1674 decried the scheme and Pedro, his resolve already
shaken by the popular fury against the New Christians following what
was called the "desecration of Odivelas" of 1671, as well as an assassina-
tion plot of 1673, backed down." A last ditch effort in 1675 to salvage the
plan, substituting Florentine capital under the auspices of the Grand
Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo III, was also "quite laid aside, being look'd on
as the offers of the Jews of Leghorne, authorized onely by y.e Duke"."
Nevertheless, the scheme for a revamped East India Company funded
by New Christian capital and the willingness of the Crown to question the
economic feasibility of erstwhile royal monopolies like the contracto for
Mozambique, which Pedro sought to open up to private investment in
1672, demonstrate that the post 1668 Lisbon hierarchy was willing to break
with centuries-old practices, traditions, and supporters in an effort to sal-
vage what remained of the Estado. In this quest for economic srabiliza-
tion, New Christian monies, a free trade of sorts, joint-stock companies,
and above all private capital were all judged to be legitimate weapons to
fight an increasingly competitive commercial struggle with the Dutch,
English, and French." The extant figures on the Carreira cargoes and the
nature of the royal seaborne interchange with the Asian empire during the
late rrrh century suggest that the percentage of private trade (and profits)
on the Cape route continued to increase throughout the years 1668-1683. It
is reasonable to assume that the well-connected New Christian families in
Lisbon and elsewhere, that Boyajian has convincingly detailed for the
Spanish period, along with enterprising Viceroys like Luis de Mendonca
Furrado, continued to extract an exceedingly reasonable return on their
investments in this trade. In short, while the direct Crown share of the
Carreira trade may have stabilized in the 1670S at levels far below what it
had once been, Pedro was willing to accept this reality as long as the lucra-
tive private trade on the Cape route was reestablished after the dismal
years of the 1650S and 1660s, and private profits (and at times those of
royal administrators) in the inter-Asiatic trade expanded as well.
Pedro and Cadaval no doubt recognized, as the lesson of the Aviz dy-
nasty in Asia and the Habsburgs in the New World demonstrated, that
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Crown monopoly did not necessarily ensure huge Crown profit nor an
expanding internal economy. The time was clearly at hand for innovation
10 the administration and exploitation of the rump empire in Asia.
Throughout the 1670S, therefore, the Crown had considered a series of
radical reforms, rnosr of which included the wealth of the New Christian
community in Lisbon, a community which had played a vital role in the
private sector of the Cape trade for a generation or more." Yet, before
such innovations could be attempted, the Carreira itself, that traditional
economic, political, and social lifeline of the Asian empire had to be se-
cured once again. By the early 1670S, this crucial task had been accom-
plished; a reasonable level of pepper was once again assured at Crown
expense, and regular sailings between Lisbon and Goa once again became
the rule. These successes, in turn, had restored an acceptable level of con-
fidence, economic and otherwise, regarding the Estado on the quays of
Lisbon, at the Casa da India, in the merchant houses of the New Chris-
tians, and in the solars of the nobility, a laudable state of affairs that had
not existed in many years.
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Administration: European Hierarchies and the
Resiliency of Indigenons Structures, 1640-1683
In September r652, when D. Vasco Mascarenhas, count of Obidos, as-
sumed the Viceregal post in Goa, the regimento confirming his position
still listed 20 major fortresses that the Crown possessed in Asia. In addi-
tion, Obidos found that some eighty ships were at his disposal in the
Estado to help implement royal policy.' In December r662, when Antonio
de Mello de Casrro took office at the chapel of Reis Magos, his regimento
could list only IQ such fortresses that the Crown possessed.' The disas-
trous intervening decade, in the midst of the continuing war at home and
in the empire, had witnessed the loss of crucial posts to the enemies of the
Estado, both European and indigenous. As noted above, the vac had al-
ready stripped the Portuguese Crown of all of its holdings on Ceylon and
others on the Coromandel coast, and would soon conquer the remaining
posts of Cochin, Cranganor, and Cannanore on the pepper-rich Malabar
coast. Sivappa Nayaka had expelled the Portuguese from posts on the
Kanara coast like Mangalor and Barcelor in the mid-I650S. Moreover, the
Moslem king of Golconda had conquered the long-standing settlement at
San Theme in 1662.' Nevertheless, while the empire that Mello de Castro
governed in the early 1660s had been severely pruned in its number of for-
tresses, the administrative structures and system that he inherited to un-
dertake reform remained largely what it had been in Linhares time or even
in the days of the house of Aviz, and administrative reform was a funda-
mental precondition to rehabilitating the truncated empire of the 1660s.
The problems confronting the new Governor and his successors in this
quest were indeed daunting. In part, they related to issues of time, dis-
tance, technology, and money. To begin with, the geographic extent of
the Estado, despite its recent losses, remained truly immense. The admin-
istrative jurisdiction that extended from the viceregal seat at Goa, "the
head of this State," still stretched thousands of miles covering six modern
time zones from Mozambique to Macau. The difficult round-trip voyage
from Lisbon to Goa "took one and a half years, and the distance rraveled
equaled the earth's diameter": Communications were also rudimentary
and fickle. The written word, when it could be put to paper and under-
stood, remained the primary means of communication within the empire.
The Crown dispatched such messages to Goa either with seaborne traffic
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via the Cape of Good Hope or utilized the old caravan routes through the
Levant. Both, however, were fraught with danger and far from reliable.
These problems were exacerbated by the Crown's desire to restrict bu-
reaucratic expenses in administering its overseas possessions, a desire
rooted both in the structural limitations of the early modern European
state and the quest to maximize profits. In turn, these realities ensured a
good deal of local autonomy for the fortresses Governors in this vast ex-
panse, who frequently paid high prices for their offices and expected a siz-
able return in trade in return. Since months and sometimes years at a time
went by with no definite orders from either Lisbon or Goa for these de
{acto fief holders, abuses and corruption were common. In organizing the
trade with Asia, such imperatives had also helped result in a system where
the Crown farmed out lucrative trading routes to private individuals, who
sometimes paid a notable price for such privileges and usually reaped
huge profits in return.'
The administrative system for the imperio as a whole from Africa to
Brazil to the Estado, had naturally been determined largely by the shifting
structures of the centralizing European state of the late medieval period,
the "new monarchies," as well as the governmental changes inherent in
the absolutist period of the rrth century. The Portuguese state, like those
throughout Europe, had experienced these shifting patterns during the
Aviz, Habsburg, and early Braganza periods. For the governance of the
Estado, these changes resulted in the formation of an administrative sys-
tem that was highly centralized and hierarchical in nature. From the out-
set, this imperial system sought to promote the economic and political
interests of the Crown above all else. To bind the most powerful segments
of Portuguese society to this system, royal largesse and a plethora of lu-
crative offices were provided for the nobility; Crown patronage and
money flowed freely to the Church, while the New Christian community
enjoyed the de facto ability to invest and profit from the rich trade with
Asia. At the outset and during the glory years of the reth century, the
lower classes had also been enticed with the lure of Golden Goa, while the
king could even fulfil! his "charitable" obligations to the "Crown or-
phans" by providing offices in the Estado as dowries for these young
women."
As in Europe, such offices were viewed as a form of personal property
by the holder for the length of his term, usually three years and generally
non-renewable. Since salaries were also rather meager, given the fiscal
priorities of the Crown, it was expected that officeholders would supple-
ment their income with monies gained through their posts. Moreover,
"any distinction between public and private funds was blurred".' Each of-
fice generally provided a series of official privileges and perquisites listed
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in the royal letter of appointment, including the right to collect cerrarn
taxes or to undertake trade on certain routes within the Estado. Neatly
two centuries of administrative tradition in Asia had also conferred de
facto customary privileges, such as demanding a gratuity before granting
a cartaz, that the officeholder had the right to expect. While certain of-
fices nominally conferred greater prestige, years of experience with the
value of these combined privileges had resulted in a hierarchy of desirabil-
ity for offices which was reflected in the prices paid for them. As Pearson
notes, in 1618 more than twice as much was paid for the office of judge of
the Goa customs house (given its wide array of perquisites) as was for the
more prestigious post of captain for the entire city. In the mid-r-th cen-
tury, the captaincies of perhaps the two most potentially profitable for-
tresses of Diu and Hurmuz yielded five and fourteen times the price paid
for the equivalent post in Goa. There was, therefore, a de facto entrepre-
neurial market of sorts for such offices operating within the official royal
system of technical monarchical rnonopolism.'
During the rcth century, it was fashionable to ascribe gross corruption
to this system and, by extension, to cite such corruption as one of the
main reasons for the decline of the Estado.' Pearson and others have
rightly demonstrated that this view was vastly overstated, a view that in
true Whiggish style judged an early modern system through the prism of
rigid Victorian conceptions on the nature of officeholding and abuse."
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that abuses did occur, and at times rather
frequently. Extortion of forced loans at favorable interest rates was one
common problem, as was illegal trade in products that were officially
deemed Crown monopolies like spices. It has recently been argued that as
the Estado experienced grave difficulties in the mid-rzrh century, and the
potential for legal and customary supplements ro one's salary narrowed,
abuses became even more common and blatant. While it is logical to as-
sume that increased competition from the Dutch and English and declin-
ing profits may have had such an effect, it is also likely that more complete
record series may be partly or even largely responsible for the numbers of
extant complaints on such matters. Above all, it is clear that the Crown
with varying degrees of success sought to combat the more serious abuses,
and that its royal servants in Asia, also had a clear idea of what practices
transcended the line of proper behavior within the de facto system of sup-
plementing one's salary. The practice of fortress captains utilizing royal
artillery from their fortresses aboard their own ships, or plundering indig-
enous craft with valid passes, or even accepting bribes to avoid custom
duties were all considered "beyond the pale". Why? The sources suggest
that while it was fine to exploit any gray areas within the official system,
such acts could not threaten the defense or integrity of the basic pillars of
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the empire. Leaving strategic fortresses undefended, undermining the
quid pro quo agreement with indigenous merchants implicit in the cartaz
system, and depriving the Crown of crucial alfandega receipts, when such
receipts furnished a sizable portion of the Estado's receipts, all violated
this dictum and were not tolerated."
Obtaining an office in the imperial bureaucracy of the Estado may
have been relatively easy to either purchase or receive in the form of royal
favor. Actually taking up the position was quite another matter. An effort
to curry favor with as many notable subjects as possible, while obliging
them to Crown patronage, and the almost constant desire for specie had
prompted the creation of a logjam for such offices. The more lucrative po-
sitions in Asia were sometimes promised for generations m advance.
Diego do Couto related the story of a noble who had been appointed to
the captaincy of Mombassa only to discover that there were some 30 other
grantees in line for the position before him!" In the interim, a candidate of
noble blood could often obtain a certificate from the Crown citing past
service to the king (usually as a soldier for 12years) that could land him an
entry level position in the bureaucracy. Non-nobles had a much more dif-
ficult time and any post that could be arranged for them was usually in a
remote fortress, at paltry pay. This class-driven reality did much to en-
courage such individuals to seek better employment in the service of an in-
fluentia! noble, a group that generally maintained a retinue of lackeys in
Goa, in the armies of the Reis Vizmhos, or in the houses of the religious
orders." Fortunately, for many office-seekers, exceedingly high mortality
rates linked to climate and disease frequently shortened the wait before
they could take up their positions. Between 1604-35, it IS estimated that
some 25,000 soldiers had died at the Royal Hospital in Goa. According to
Pedro Barrero de Rezcndc, of the 5,228 men leaving Lisbon from 1629-34,
only 2495 made it alive to Goa. These high death rates were largely blind
to class, of the 50 governors and viceroys up to 1656, 22 died during their
term of office or on the return voyage to Portugal." As a result of this real-
ity, frequent openings occurred for most of the main positions In the bu-
reaucracy, as the Livro das Homenagens records reflect. From r668-1677,
some 115 individuals were named to major posts. Of this number, 58or just
over 50% were identified as noblcs."
A noted Victorian scholar and a contemporary Indian one have both
criticized the administrative structures of the Estado as being exceedingly
simple in nature, a somewhat damning reflection of the backward social
and political system of early modern Portugal." This long-standing view,
however, is misleading. It may be true that the Imperial bureaucracy was
relatively straightforward, and a model of simplicity III comparison with
the complex Crown machinery created by Madrid in the New World.
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Nevertheless, this fact had much less to do with any shortcomings in the
governmental and societal structures in reth and rrth century Portugal,
which in fact closely resembled those of her European neighbors, than
with the relatively small number of Portuguese subjects resident in the
Estado at anyone time. According to Boxer, there were probably never
more than c. 14,000-17,000 Portuguese subjects resident in the imperio
from Mozambique to Macau, even during the glory years of the reth cen-
tury. This figure would include perhaps 7oao-w,000 men in the adminis-
tration and military service, and a similar number contained in the
religious orders, European dependents, servants, and mesticos who lived
according to European law.'? By the 1660s, this figure had declined mark-
edly. As joao Nunes da Cunha maintained: "There are fewer Portuguese
in the whole of this State than there are in Alhos Vedros," a small
Ribatejo town containing some 200 households." While this description
was certainly exaggerated, it is nonetheless likely that the number of Por-
tuguese residents in the Estado had been reduced by two thirds from the
previous century to c. 5000-6000. These numbers meant that the adminis-
trative structures that the Crown could afford to support, both financially
and demographically, were relatively simple in nature."
The pinnacle of this hierarchical system was nominally the king in Lis-
bon working with the assistance of his councils. joao IV had significantly
revamped the council system he had wrested from the Habsburgs in late
1640. He had first organized a new Conselho do Estado to replace the
Conselho de Portugal which had decided affairs relaring to the kingdom
during the Habsburg period. The Council of State was headed by the king
himself. It was usually made up of a handful of grandees and was charged
with deciding the most important matters affecting the. Next, in Decem-
ber 1640, joao IV had created the Conselho da Guerra, which dealt with
military affairs and for the first three decades of its existence focused pri-
marily on the Restoration. Next, the king revamped the existing Conselho
da Pazenda or Treasury Council set up by Philip 11 in 1591 to decide all
matters relating to finance. Finally in 1643, the first Braganza King for-
mally established a new Council, the Conselho Ultramarine or Overseas
Council, to succeed the defunct Habsburg Conselho da India (1604-16q)
and deliberate matters relating to the overseas empire; in South America,
Africa, and the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, the Overseas Council did not
have exclusive domain over imperial matters. The Treasury Council con-
tinued to be involved, for example, in the financing of royal fleets for the
imperio and in the receipt of their cargoes. Moreover, although the
Conselho Ultramarine did advise the king on all matters regarding the
day to day, or perhaps better year to year, operation of the empire, peri-
odic decisions involving the overall delegation of resources to the various
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components of the empire were usually reserved for the more powerful
Council of State. '0
Unfortunately, the loss of nearly all the Council of State records in the
Lisbon earthquake have made it exceedingly difficult for historians to ex-
amine the critical decisions affecting the Estado during these years. How-
ever, the extant records of the Conselho Ultramarine and the official
correspondence between the Crown in Lisbon and the Viceroyalty in Goa
1I1 the Monsoon Books collection frequently allow us to compensate for
this tragic loss. According to the decree which originally created it, the
Overseas Council would be presided over by the comptroller of the reve-
nue of the India house or vedor da [azenda da reparticdo da India, and in-
cluded two other members from the military nobility, one lawyer, and a
non-voting secretary. It met daily except for Sundays and holidays at 7:00
in the mormng in summer, an hour later in the winter, and divided the
workload according to geographic regions. Three councilors constituted
a quorum. Matters relating to the Estado were discussed on Monday,
Tuesday and Wednesday. Ideally, all its members were supposed to be
men who had had previous experience in the imperio. Moreover, it ap-
pears that when an issue was discussed relating to the Estado, the Council
largely deferred to the expertise of members with past experience there.
Issues for discussion could be raised by the king, the Viceroy, or the
Council itself based on its correspondence with the Asian empire. When a
unanimous decision was taken, all of the members merely signed the
consulta or recommendation to the king; when dissenting votes were cast,
all the votes and views were recorded separately. The president of the
Council then forwarded the consulta to the king for his decision. To Im-
plement policy, the Crown maintained a formal correspondence with the
Viceroyalty, letters dispatched aboard the ships of the Carreira which left
Lisbon 111 the early spring and ideally reached Goa by the end of the fall."
The Viceroy, in turn, would read these orders from home, Implement
them whenever possible, and then summarize his actions in replies that
were sent back to Lisbon on the returning Carreira ships, which departed
from the Mandovi in January "monsoon," and ideally reached Portugal
by the late summer. To assist the Viceroy in the process of making his de-
cisions and implementing Crown policy, a somewhat parallel hierarchical
bureaucracy had developed in the Estado. The Viceroy, whose office and
functions have already been detailed, stood at the top of this secondary hi-
erarchy. His mam councilor support came m the form of his own
Conselbo do Estado. From a very early date 111 the empire, such a body
seems to have existed on a de facto basis to help legitimize the decisions of
the Viceroy or Governor. In 1563, this institution gained formal and royal
recognition. By 1604, the membership of the Council had evolved to regu-
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lady include the Viceroy as president, along with the archbishop of Goa,
the chief Inquisitor, two or three leading fidalgos resident in Goa who
were usually reinados but upon occasion could be casados, the head of the
High Court, the captain of the city of Goa, the vedor da fazenda, and a
non-voting secretary. As the extant records of this body demonstrate, the
Council was charged with discussing the most weighty issues confronting
the Estado, especially those of war and peace. Its advice was contained in
formal recommendations voted upon by the members and recorded by
the secretary with individual opinions noted. Although these assentos
were strictly advisory, the Viceroy usually followed the majority view for
both practical and political reasons."
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Beneath the Viceroy and his Council were de facto departments of justice
and finance. The pinnacle of the entire Portuguese judicial system was the
Desembargo do Paro or Royal Board of Justice in Lisbon. This board, the
highest court in the kingdom, controlled the appointment of all magis-
trates and judges and oversaw the Casa de Supplicacac or Court of Ap-
peals in Lisbon as well as the high courts in the empire. In Goa, this high
court was called the Mesa da Relacao or Supreme Court and dated from
c. 1545 and the administration of [oao de Castro. Before this a maverick
network of royal judges, desembargadores and iuizes had assisted the
Viceroy. The creation of the Mesa established a supreme court for the
Estado. By the early rzth century, this body had been fixed at 6 judges: 1
senior Crown Judge or ouvidcr-geral da India and 5 associate judges or
ouuidors, with descriptive titles, who also served as the chief of a judicial
department in the State. The chanceral served as head judge of the chan-
cery; the provedor-mor dos defuntos da India served as chief probate
judge and so on. The Relacao constituted the sole regularly sitting judicial
board III the Estado and as such it acted as a high court of appeals for the
decisions of all other Crown officials and judges. These might include the
decisions reached by captains or circuit judges (ouvidors) in the various
fortresses, district judges (ouvidors da Comarca) or even municipal bod-
ies like the Senado da Camara in Goa. The important dellberations of the
Relacao also commanded a respectable salary from the Crown, some 1500
xerafins a year. The Procurador da Coroa or Royal Attorney, also func-
tioned within the royal bureaucracy of the Estado, and was charged with
overseeing the operation of the system and protecting the Crown's inter-
ests."
The financial structure of the Estado had also evolved gradually smce
the days of Albuquerque. Administratively, the commercial and fiscal in-
terests of the empire were under the control of a House of Accounts or
Caza dos Cantos, headed by the Comptroller General of Finance or
Vedor-geral da Fazenda. As the empire grew, changes had logically fol-
lowed. In the Spanish period, a 1589 royal regimento had set up a Board
and Court of Accounts (Meza e Tribunal dos Contos) to facilitate trade
and ideally to check corruption. This board was headed by the Viceroy
and included the Comptroller of Accounts (Vedor dos Cantos) and 2 of
the most seruor accountants III the Caza. In 1615, the Meza was trans-
formed into a body called the Public Revenue Council or Conselho da
Fazenda. This new council included the Viceroy, the chancellor of the
High Court, the Vedor-geral da Fazenda, the chief superintendent of ac-
counts (Prooedor-mor dos Cantos), the Crown attorney (Procuradur da
Coroa), the custodian of the property of the dead and absent (Provedor-
121 RENASCENT EMPIRE?
mor dos defuntos e ausentes), and a secretary tescriuao da Fazenda). This
Council met regularly on Wednesday evenings and discussed all matters
relating to the financial workings of the Estado. Ourfirting the ships of the
Carreira, procuring spices, minting money from tribute and other
sources, regulating salaries, administering all sources of revenues, sending
gifts to local princes, and even paying for pilots to conduct ships from
Mormugao to the Ribeira were all matters that received attention. The
Treasury Council voted on such issues; a formal assento was recorded by
the escrwao and signed by its members. '-4
The raison d'itre of the other major fiscal institutions of the Estado,
like that of the Treasury Council, was derived largely from the overseas
trade with Europe and the lucrative intra-Asiatic or country trade. The
Alfdndega or royal customs house, could easily trace its roots to examples
in medieval Europe, the Levant, as well as indigenous Asian kingdoms.
The most important of the alfdndegas established in the Estado was at
Goa. The customs house there paid most of its receipts Into the Caza dos
Contos, reserving a percentage of its tolls to pay the salaries of its various
employees. Its head held the title of juiz or almoxarife and served under
the Vedor geral da [azenda. At Coa, incoming and outgoing products
were taxed at the rate of 6% ad valorem until 1569 and 7.125% thereafter.
At Chaul, 8% was charged on imports and 6% on exports; at Diu 3.5%
and eventually 4% were charged, while at Melaka an attempt had been
made to reap 7% on the traffic through the straits." Customs revenues
played a crucial role in the economic and administrative life of the Estado.
In the sixteenth century, it has been estimated that customs revenues
Yielded c. 60% of total revenues from Goa, and that the percentage for the
Estado as a whole may have been as much as 65%. By the 1630S, these fig-
ures were 66% for Goa and 47% for the Estado:" The feitoria was an-
other key facet in rhe financial edifice of the State of India. As early as the
fourteenth century, the Portuguese Crown had dispatched a royal feitor
to Bruges to act as its official business agent, to buy and sell on the ac-
count of the king, as well as originally to oversee the kingdom's merchant
community there. As the empire had expanded along littoral Africa and
throughout the Indian Ocean basin, the [eitoria system had been exported
as well. As time went on, the factor abandoned one of his initial functions:
that of chief of the Portuguese private trading community. His "factory"
usually induded warehouse space, a staff and other accoutrements to fa-
cilitate his charge of profitably pursuing the Crown's trade. Feitorias pre-
dictably existed at the major fortresses the Crown possessed and all the
factors operated under the supervision of the vedor-geral da [azenda:"
Although no Conselho da Guerra existed in Goa to assist the Viceroy,
a third major de facto department of administration existed relating to
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armed commercial policy and warfare. As noted above, the Portuguese
had sought from the outset of their empire in Asia to create a system
which would allow them to either monopolize or tax the most profitable
sectors of the Indian Ocean trade. Albuquerque's strategy of capturing
major strategic enrrcpots like Goa, Hurmuz, and Melaka had been sup-
plemented by a declared Crown monopoly in key spices on the Cape route
ro Europe utilizing the Carreira da India. At the same time, the intra-
Asian trade in other commodities was to be regulated by the cartaz or
pass system. Indigenous merchants were compelled to purchase these
passes from authorized Crown agents. These documents provided infor-
mation on the name of the captain, his crew, the size of the ship, and its
cargo. The amount of arms and munitions that could be legally carried
was also limited. At the outset of any voyages such ships were obliged to
proceed to a Portuguese [ortaleza and pay customs duties on the cargo, a
cash deposit was also demanded which insured that the vessels would also
stop to pay duties on the return voyage. Any ship that did not purchase
such a pass was liable to confiscation as a legitimate prize, and her crew
could be killed or enslaved. Since the cost of the cartaz was relatively low,
it is clear that the main objective of this policy was to furnish the Estado
with the vital stream of custom revenues that it so badly needed." In part
to attract more indigenous merchants to this system, the Portuguese also
promised armed convoys or cafilas on the more lucrative trade routes to
provide protection against pirates and other threats. The most successful
of these cafilas were established on the Goa to Gujarat route (largely in
textiles) and the Goa to Kanara route (largely in rice]."
The foundation of this exaction system from the outset was the supe-
nor naval power and technology, especially in shipbome artillery, that
the Portuguese possessed. To enforce it as the decades wore on meant that
the Portuguese had to continually send out their regular fleets to search
for and punish interlopers. During the "glory" years of the 16th century,
fleets had been sent out from the main strategic fortresses throughout the
Indian Ocean basin. By the mid-rzth century, Goa was forced ro bear the
overwhelming brunt of this task. This meanr that the Viceroy was ex-
pected CO outfit and send out 3main armed fleets each year: a squadron to
the Straits of Hurmuz that would intercept ships in that region and collect
the custom revenues that the Crown had been granted in the Persian port
of Gombroon or Bandar Kung; the 'fleet of the North' that would patrol
the waters around the lucrative trade in the Gulf of Cambay region near
the Province of the North; and the 'fleet of the South' that performed a
similar duty along the pepper rich Malabar coast towards Cape Comorin
and Ceylon. These deep-water squadrons were normally made up of rea-
sonably well-armed naos, and referred to as armadas de alto bordo. To
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assist and protect the coastal trade armadas do rerno made up of oared
galleys were generally utilized. To provide the vital materials for this mili-
tary work, the Viceroy could call upon the Casa da Po/vara (Gunpowder
Factory) and the royal Ribeira (Dockyards). The former established on
the Mandovi river approximately halfway between Panjim and Velha
Goa utilized indigenous saltpeter to produce perhaps the most crucial
commodity for shipbome artillery, while the later could ideally provide
the ships and weapons to pursue royal policy."
This hierarchical bureaucracy, of course, had furnished a more or less
workable governmental model for a century and a half. By the early 1660s,
however, years of relative neglect from Lisbon and the ravages of warfare
made the need for reform imperative. With his usual precision, Antonio
de Mello de Castro outlined many of the more glaring problems to D.
Luisa Gusmao in letters of 1662 and 1663. He lamented; "Everything one
writes from India has this same uncertainty, since our friends are dimin-
ishing while our enemies are increasing. ",. The Viceroy maintained that
he had "only 500 soldiers with which to defend India". The Dutch had
7000. Clearly he could not defend "anything without men," and this lack
of manpower was forcing him "to lose grand opportunities"." "A great
reformation" was needed in which leaders "demonstrate that they are ca-
pable of providing an example that their subjects might follow"." When
Lencasrre and Mendonca Purtado had assumed power there had been
I70,000 xerafins in the Treasury. These Governors had not only "spent ev-
erything, but they had even taken the money on deposit from the tax-
farming accounts". As a result, there was not"a single penny" to assist re-
form." Administrative problems abounded in the Fazenda: officials
looked more to their own interests than those of the Crown and "in such a
vital thing" regular receipts and expense accounts were not even kept.
Loans were almost impossible to obtain since old debts had not been hon-
ored." At the Casa da Polvara, exorbitant prices were paid with Crown
funds for saltpeter, which was then diluted with salt and sand, and yields
artificially maintained while the remaining saltperer was stolen and sold
privately. Poor record keeping facilitated this process." The tax-farming
machinery had so many abuses "that it is not believable"." Mendonca
Furtado had been charged with relating these problems to the Crown on
his return to the Remo. In the meantime, Mello de Castro prayed that
"God would assist me in such a manner in which I might conserve what
Your Majesty still possesses, and that things might recuperate"."
Mello de Castro's call for reform had been echoed by of Sac Vicente in
January 1667. Utilizing a medical metaphor, he argued that the Estado
was indeed sick, suffering from a wide variety of aliments including the
sale of fortress captaincies, corruption in the administration and, on a
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more moralistic note, a system that favored the priorities and Interests of
men "without Faith, and with money". The Estado, in his view, was sur-
rounded by Hindus taking advantage of it, the insolent English, deceiving
Moslems, the strong Dutch, and perhaps undermined "above all [by] m-
solent vassals". Nunes da Cunha maintained that the "benefit of time,"
would teach the Portuguese how to improve the Estado, and he would do
all he could to begin the process. Sac Vicentc's preferred strategy was to
allow the patient to convalesce a bit before the really "strong medicine"
was administered. Nevertheless, he evidently recognized that time was
running short and the patient's wounds "were becoming cancerous".
Therefore, he called for a restoration by "fire and iron"." There is ample
evidence to suggest that the Crown heeded the sage advice of these two
Viceroys and that meaningful administrative and military reforms took
place 1Il the Estado beginning in the late 1660s following the assumption
to power of Pedro.
First, a serious effort was made to rehabilitate the Portuguese force of
arms in India. Nunes da Cunha's call for "fire and iron," the fact that na-
val and military power remained at the base of the system of commercial
compulsion, and the belief it was the commodity that the Reie Vizinhos
"respected" most, all helped to prompt action on this issue. After receiv-
ing a plethora of complaints on the lack of manpower to garrison the for-
tresses and serve 1Il the fleets, the Conselho Ultramarine considered the
matter in a session of December 1669. Based on figures from Goa, the
Council estimated that the major garrisons at places like Diu and Mozam-
bique were pitifully undermanned with fewer than 50 men each at these
forts that should have had 300 and more. The fleets were also virtually de-
void of Portuguese soldiers. In the past, as many as 5000 Portuguese men
had served in these functions, now that number had been reduced to per-
haps 500. In the councilor's view, the principal cause of this evil was not
that the Crown had failed to send out sufficient numbers of men but that
certain factors which confronted them upon their arrival in Goa had re-
sulted in this diminution. What were corrupting influences? For a start, a
sufficient number of officers was not present to form them into compa-
nies, instill order, and provide some form of monetary support given the
dearth of a reliable pay system. The quality of the men sent over as sol-
diers had also contributed to the problem of desertion: it was common to
Impress relatively young boys and to send convicts or degredados as fod-
der for the forts and fleets. The Reis Vizmhos and the Religious orders
had demonstrated great facility in artracnng such men to their service; the
former through the lure of reasonably lucrative pay, the later with prom-
ises of a relatively comfortable lifestyle. Many of these desertions were en-
couraged in the streets of Velha Goa, the huge metropolis of Portuguese
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Asia with a population of as many 200,000 in the mid-r-th century, before
these men ever reached their garrisons."
The Council made several important recommendations to Pedro. First,
the Principe should send as many men and ships as possible in the
Viceroyal fleet of Mendonca Furtado in the spring of 1670. Second, the
Crown should encourage all officers with experience in the recently ended
Restoration war up to the rank of mestre de campo and all qualified 00-
bles to enlist for service in the Estado by offering royal merces at home
and a level of fixed salaries in Asia. Third, the Prince Regent should form
a permanent royal Terco of some 800 men and officers to form the new
basis of military power in the State of India, a force that could be utilized
to meet extraordinary threats confronting the Viceroy throughout his do-
mains. The Council made it clear that this Terce should be comprised
only of well-qualified and experienced officers and soldiers. Neither
rapazes (young men) nor degredados would be allowed to serve in this
unit, "since these two types are not of any real use," and had traditionally
deserted in droves upon arrival in Goa. The Council admitted that the
normal revenues of the Estado were not sufficient to hear the economic
cost of this new Terce, destined as they were for existing and fixed ecclesi-
astical, military, bureaucratic, as well as extraordinary expenses. It is sig-
nificant, and indicative of the renascent interest of Lisbon in reviving the
fortunes of the Asian empire, that the Conselho recommended that these
new expenditures should be met with the share of the money the Estado
had been assessed for the peace with the United Provinces. In his marginal
notations to this consulta, and in a series of letters from r670-1672, Pedro
made it clear that his firm conviction "de acudir a India" had prompted
him to accept this plan." Despite problems relating to shortfalls in the ac-
tual yield of the donativo, this new royal Terfo was in fact formed by
Mendonca Furtado after his arrival in Goa with the experienced officer
corps from the Reino and the rest of the empire that the Conselho had en-
visioned."
At the same time, the Crown continued to send out additional man-
power in the ships of the Carreira to supplement this new fighting force.
Despite royal recognition of past problems, these soldados continued to
be drawn from traditional sources: forcible recruitment of young peasant
boys, "sturdy beggars" from the cities and villages, and convicts. The
harsh justice of Old Regime Portugal ensured a steady supply of criminal-
soldiers, many of whom received long sentences overseas in the various
parts of the empire for a variety of minor and capital offenses. Orders
generally went out to district judges or corregidores da Comarca in the
weeks before the departure of the Indiamen, reminding them to round up
and arrest likely victims for such service "not only ... such persons as live
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to the prejudice and scandal of the common weal by committing crimes,
but also those who live in idleness"." While most of the manifests listing
these degredados have not survived, it IS likely that nearly every Carreira
ship carried its quota of such recruits. An extant document from the ship
Nossa Senhora da Ajuda under Chrisrovao Ferrao de Casrelbranco,
which left Lisbon in April 1669 and reached Goa III September of that
year, provides a reasonable sample on the numbers of men, their crimes
and royal sentences involved fat this period. This nao carried 79 convicts
to serve out their sentences as soldiers in the Estado. Table 6 provides de-
tails for all those with information on their cnmes and sentences."














12. Marcos da Costa
13. Antonio de Meduros
14. Antonio da Silva



















































Involvement in a death
General Lawlessness
Sentence
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
4 years in India for 5 in Brazil
10 years in India for Life in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
Life in India for Life in S. Tome
Life in India for Life in S. Tome
6 years in India
6 years in India
(; years in India
2 years in India for 5 in Brazil
8 years in India
8 years in India
Life in India
10 years in India
Life in India
Six Years
10 years in India
2 years in India
2 years in India
2 years in India
Life in India
Life in India
10 years in India
2 year in India
10 years in India
2 years in India
,) years in India
Other
Same Crime as #1
Woman from
Brother's House
Same Crime as #10
Same Crime as #12
Same Crime as #23
Same Crime as #23-
24
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Table 6: Some Details on Degradados Aboard the Nossa Senhora da Ajuda, 1669 (continued)
- - - --
Name Crime Sentence Other
33. Francisco jorge
34. M. de Souza Salvado
.35. Estevdo Rodrigues
36. Father Luis da Silva
37. Father joao da Motta
38. Father M. Magalhaes
39. joao Frig. Semedo?
40. jofio de Feiras


















8 years in India
3 years in India
Life in India
Of these 79 convicts, crimes were listed for 41 or about half. Of the overall
total, there were only four men sentenced from the privileged orders of
Portuguese society: 1 noble, Manoel da Cunha; whose crime was not
listed, and the 3 priests sentenced for theft, flight from authorities and
other crimes. In an effort to bolster manpower for the Estado, IO men had
had longer sentences in Brazil commuted to service in Asia; another two
had had life sentences in Sac Tome commuted to a similar term in the
Estado. Theft, murder, and involvement in a wrongful death were the
most common crimes. The harsh sentences for rape, fleeing with a
woman, and adultery, are interesting for what they say about the moral
tone of the times and societal views on women. The lack of more com-
plete documentation makes it difficult to determine the number of such
convict-soldiers that were sent out between 1668-1682. Nevertheless, at an
average of even 60 degradados per royal nao, the number would ap-
proach more than IOOO for those years on naos alone. Whatever the pre-
cise number, there can be little doubt that this source of manpower
continued to provide problems. As Boxer has noted, the regular importa-
tion of these criminals "aggravated an already difficult social situation"."
Pedro and his councilors at least tried to deal with the main military prob-
lem relating to the degradados. As early as April 1669, the Prince Regent
had issued firm orders that all infantryman, as soon as they arrived in
Goa, were to be put into the nearby forts of Panjim, Mormugao, Aguada,
and Gaspar Dias where they were to be formed into companies. Special
orders were also required before these recruits could visit the Velha
Cidade, where most had traditionally deserted. This regular flow of
so/dados, and especially the formation of the new royal Terce, provided
the Viceroyalty with a level of available manpower that had been badly
lacking in the early and mid-recos."
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The final years of the Durch struggle had not only witnessed the grave
disruption of the Carreira trade with Europe, with no ships reaching Lis-
bon or Goa for years at a time, it had also rendered the fleer-cafalia system
largely ineffective. The costly peace with the United Provinces, the mar-
ginally pacific years rhar followed, and the ability to maintain relatively
stable levels of revenue in the Estado allowed Sao Viccnte and his succes-
sors to rejuvenate the armada system dispatched from Goa. Receipts from
the aliandega, rents, tax-farms and other regular sources of income re-
mained stable for most of the rzth century. In 1630, revenues for Goa and
her dependencies had been 321,923 xerafins: in 1634, 3°4,346 xeratins: by
1680 that figure would rise to 359,579 xeraiins; and in 1687, 356, 310 xerafins
would be collected," Whenever the huge extraordinary expenses associ-
ated with open warfare could be avoided, a healthy saldo or balance re-
sulted since regular payments in salaries to the bureaucracy and elergy
generally rotaled c. 230,000 xerafins. Although extant Or(amentos or
State Budgets evidently exist only for the years noted above, it neverthe-
less appears likely that favorable balances were the general rule from the
late 1660s until at least the mid-rexos." In these circumstances, it was feasi-
ble to dispatch formidable fleets once again to the Straits as well as to
Cambay and Kanara financed either with Treasury funds or alternatively
through loans that could again be obtained from the leading merchants in
Goa. As the Mon<;oes and Treasury Council records demonstrate, after a
long lapse Straits fleets were sent out under D. Jeronimo Manoel, Antonio
de Mcllo de Castro, and D. Hieronimo Manoel nearly every year between
1667-1680. Moreover, fleets to Cam bay and Kanara were also sent out
with regularity. After the dismal decade of 1652-r662, a respectable Portu-
guese force of arms had been re-established. As the Dutch Governor-Gen-
eral johan Maetsuycker noted: "It seems the Portuguese are making
serious efforts to regain their former reputation on the coast of India. ,"',
Another initiative undertaken, especially after 1668, was to restore a
semblance of control over the outlying areas of the Estado that had
largely fended for themselves during the final years of the Dutch struggle.
The contracto system of auctioning off captaincies like Mozambique may
have assured the Crown of a regular source of money and absolved it
from burdensome bureaucratic expenses, but it had also resulted in the
creation of petty fiefdoms for the contract holders, who frequently pur-
sued policies at odds with the interests of the Crown. The great distances
involved, poor communication, and lack of policing prowess on the part
of the Viceroy allowed such actions to be undertaken with impunity by
captains who believed that they could not or would not be held account-
able for such actions. Perhaps the most infamous example of such abuses
was the case of D. Francisco de Lima during his tenure as governor-cap-
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tain of Mozambique from 1654-57. De Lima excelled in extorting huge
bribes, protection monies, forced loans et al. from the merchant commu-
nity in south east Africa, amassing a huge fortune in the process. Al-
though he avoided any punishment for these crimes while in office, de
Lima eventually died as a fugitive from justice in San Lucar in 1678,
charged in the murder of the Marquis de Sande (1667). The reassertion of
effective royal control over the dependent [ortalezas was a necessary pre-
condition to stabilizing the Estado, both economically and politically."
As an April 1662 letter made clear, Macau, located at the other geo-
graphic extreme of the empire, "so distant from this kingdom, and also
from this State of India ...and so surrounded by enemies," was indeed in
dire straits." The loss of Melaka had exacerbated traditional communica-
tion problems between Goa and the remaining Crown holdings in China
and the Lesser Sundra Islands. The loss of trade with Japan in 1640 had
also forced Portuguese merchants in Macau to increasingly reorienr their
commerce toward Indochina, Macassar, Bantam, Solor, and Timor in the
decades that followed, with the sandalwood trade between the islands
and Macau yielding regular profits for many of the leading merchants
there." The struggle between Ming and Manchu and increasing monetary
demands by the Chinese rendered the Portuguese foothold in Macau in-
creasingly tenuous, especially during what Boxer has aptly described as
the years of crisis from 1662-1666, when Ch'ing authorities at Canton
seized 7 Portuguese country trader's vessels in 1663-64, and another 6 in
1666." The costs of the continental struggle with Spain and the overseas
war with the Dutch at this same time meant that Macau was forced to
fend for itself against this host of geo-political, economic, and military ri-
vals with virtually no support from Lisbon or Goa. In fact: "The city only
managed to save itself with a great loan from the king of Siam [at this
time] that permitted it to pay the exorbitant sums demanded by the Man-
darin Chinese.':" Although the extant records are scattered, it appears
that not a single royal ship reached the Mandovi from Macau, nor de-
parted for that fortresses between 1660-1666. The captaincy of the fort of
Sac Paullo in the City of the Name of God of China, as Macau was called,
remained vacant for a brief time, royal power was virtually non-existent,
and the casadc population had fallen to perhaps 1000or so by 1669, half of
what it had been in 1635.\\
As early as April 1662, the Queen Regent had written to Antonio de
Mello de Casrro, ordering him to keep communication open with Macau
by "whatever means" possible and to keep the Crown informed of events
there. Since priorities in Europe were draining the Crown's resources, the
new Governor was instructed to meet any demands for assistance that
were forthcoming." In a reply of December 1662, Mello de Casrro in-
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formed D. Luisa of the recent attempt of the Dutch to sack the city; a plan
that was only frustrated through a timely storm which had scattered the
attacking fleet. The dearth of recent royal aid had forced private citizens
in the city and others with a vested interest in the Far Eastern trade to
shoulder the burden of defense. Likewise, the resourceful merchant-ad-
venturer Francisco Vieira de Figueiredo, based in the kingdom of Macas-
sar, had provided money to hire infantry and the like for the defense of the
Portuguese trade there; and partly as a result the vac had broken with
that king and had sought to have Crown's subjects expelled from Macas-
sar. In the ensuing campaign, two Portuguese ships had been captured:
one recently arrived from Macau on the way to Goa, and the other of pri-
vate traders. Vieira de Figueiredo had also had a significant amount of
capital and goods confiscated by the Dutch. Given his own problems in
India and elsewhere, the Governor could only hope that word of a peace
with the United Provinces at home would relieve the military situation in
Macau and Indonesia and that until such a time, he ordered the Portu-
guese subjects in those areas "to continue with the same resolution in its
defense" ."
Other priorities in the Fstado, however, ensured that the situation
largely languished until January 1666, when Mello de Castro was at last
able to dispatch the galleon Sao Francisco to Macau. The Viceroy ordered
this ship to stop enroute at Timor, "which finds itself in great danger due
to the revolts that the monks of Sao Domingos have made" against the
Capitdo-mor there." In the first packet of dispatches sent out after the pal-
ace coup of late 1667, Pedro included a letter from Afonso to Sac Vicente
that informed the Viceroy of the peace that had been reached with Spain
as well as the fact that the Queen had left him and wanted to marry the
Prince Regent. A significant point in this rather bizarre document is that
both Afonso and Pedro, who ultimately signed the letter, were keen to
dwell upon the positive advantages the peace would have for Macau since
the agreement permitted official Portuguese trade from there to Manila.")
In their reply of January 1669, Manuel Carte-Real de Sampaio and Anto-
nio de Mello de Casto informed Pcdro that Sac Vicente had been particu-
larly keen CO assist Macau. The late Viceroy had compiled a long memoire
on the issue of the conservation of that [ortaleza and had indeed sent the
Penha da Franca to China and the Lesser Sundra Islands in Aprilr668 to
provide assistance. This ship carried textiles, rice, tobacco and other sup-
plies for Macau as well as some specie to assist the economic activities of
the Crown in the Lesser Sundras. (,0 The loss of hope for a Ming revival in
China also prompted Sao Vicente to sanction the embassy of Manoel
Saldanha to the Manchu or Ch'ing court of Emperor K'hang-hsi to
Beijing (1667-1670):' In 1669, two ships were sent to Macau on similar mis-
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sions: the frigate Nossa Senhora de Nazereth e Santo Antonio under Cap-
tain-mar D. Antonio Misq.ta Pimental (January) and the frigate Nossa
Senhora do Sacramenta do Carmo (April). A new capitao-geral of
Macau, D. Alvaro da Silva, had also been sent out to improve Crown au-
thority there."
In February r670, the Prince Regent lamented "the miserable state and
great problems that one finds in the City of Machao by the lack of assis-
tance in men, munitions, and foodstuffs", from Goa. While acknowledg-
ing the efforts of Mello de Castro and Nunes da Cunha, especially with
Saldanha's embassy, to address these problems, Pedro ordered Mendonca
Furtado to continue with and escalate such efforts given the great impor-
tance of this possession." In his March 1671 packet, the Prince Regent is-
sued similar orders regarding Timor. A letter from Father Manoel
Trindade had reached the Overseas Council regarding missionary activi-
ties in Indonesia, with special emphasis on the attempt to forward the in-
terests of the Crown by converting local rajahs to Christianity. The
Overseas Council had considered this and other relevant materials relat-
ing to Timor and Solar. Based on these discussions, Manoel Barreto de
Sampayo, secretary of the Conselho, had compiled a letter on the "impor-
tance of the conservation" of forts in the Lesser Sundra Islands both
"with respect to the propagation of the Faith, as from the [financial] bene-
fits that will result for the vassals of this State and the conservation of the
city of Macau". The new Viceroy was instructed to give "particular appli-
cation and assistance to the conservation of these islands, encouraging the
vassals who serve me there with all types of honors and favors". Good re-
lations should also be sought with the Reis Vizinhos. Above all,
Mendonca Furtado should strive to "give shape to the civil, military, and
ecclesiastical government that is totally lacking" in those possessions."
In October 1671, Mendonca Furtado responded to these orders. The
Viceroy promised to do everything he could in this matter, despite the ex-
treme shortage of men and money that confronted him. In May of that
year, two frigates under Manoel Cardozo and Hieronimo Correa de
Mendonca had sailed for China loaded with muskets, gunpowder, other
munitions, and a new Captain-general for Macau, jorges Borges da
Silva.' Moreover, Mendonca Furtado agreed that it was vital to conserve
Timor for its commercial benefits, especially its traditional trading ties
with Macau: "There is no doubt Senhor that it will be of great importance
to conserve these islands as much for the benefit that Your Majesty's vas-
sals can gain commercially, principally the city of Machao." The Vice-
roy's long experience, however, tempered his enthusiasm for this task.
"There are so many problems with the officials and subjects in those
parts, as much by the captains and representative of Your Majesty, as by
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the Dominicans... the distance is great, and manpower small." While
Mendonca Furtado agreed to do everything he could, past experrence had
shown that the Captains who served there had "their own interests" at
heart and not the "reputation of the Crown". The "bad example and in-
dignity provided by the clerics of the Dominican order," who had for-
saken their duty to propagate the Faith in favor of private business
activities and scandalous living habits only exacerbated these problems."
In early 1672, the Viceroy consulted with his council of State as well as
the Treasury Council, and by early spring had formulated a policy to ide-
ally rehabilitate the influence of the Crown in China and the Lesser
Sundras. The Coa hierarchy had decided that it was vital to rccsrablish
the traditional voyages from China to Manila and Indonesia undertaken
at Crown expense, "that have been extinct for many years" .(,- A new Cap-
tain of the voyages to Timor had been named: joao Anrunes Portugal, a
(idalgo da caza, and he had sailed to Macau aboard the Nossa Senhora da
Guia in May 1672. Portugal's ship earned munitions, naval riggings, and
other supplies for the outpost. The caraoella Bom Jesus da Trmdade was
also outfitted for the voyage to China at this same time.' The new Cap-
ram was order to stop at Macau and disembark these supplies before
heading to Timor to oversee the traditional trade in sandalwood between
the two pracas. To exploit the provisions of the recent treaty with Spain
and further bolster Crown trade in the region, Mendonca Furtado ap-
pointed Antonio Misquira Pimcnral, another (idalgo da caza, as Captain-
general of the royal voyages between Macau and Manila. For the initial
voyage, Pimental was expected to lease a ship in China. The Viceroy
promised to provide a nao for ensuing voyages the following year. To en-
sure "good administration" over these voyages, Mendonca Furtado had
appointed a s-mart Junta to oversee them. This Junta would monitor the
ourfitting of ships, be they royal or leased; set salaries for sailors and offi-
cers; establish liberty chest rules; either borrow money or Invest profits as
necessary; and report all information to the Treasury Council and Vedor-
geral to allow al(imdega rights to be collected. To facilitate regular Crown
voyages to Timor, a "person of trust and satisfaction would be nominated
to serve as Treasurer of this trade route, who would likewise report to the
Conselho"
Mendonca Furtado's flexibility in this quest for stability in the Far
East was revealed in [673, in the wake of the return of the Born Jesus da
Trmdade from Macau and Timor." The situation in the Lesser Sundra Is-
lands, like that in Macau, during the crisis years of c. 1650-[666, had wit-
nessed the firm entrenchment of a local power elite made up of
Portuguese casadoe and a mixed Eurasian clan system, known as
larantuqueiros on Timor and Flares, especially in the principal towns of
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Lifao and Larantuka.' The Viceroy had thought of sending out the mestre
de campo of the new Goa Terce, Manoe! de Mello, as the new Captain-
General of Timor. But news aboard the Bom Jesus convinced him to in-
stead embrace the de facto Captain-general in Timer, Mattheus da Costa
a "natural of those parts who occupies the post of Captain-major of those
islands, is accepted by all, and proceeds well in the service of Your Maj-
esty, seeking always to act in obedience to [you]". Da Costa clearly
seemed to be someone that the Goa hierarchy might work with. Sending
another rival Captain might "ruin everything and cause a great uprising
in those parts, and lead to total ruin of the said populace". In these cir-
cumstances, Mendonca Furtado had chosen to confirm da Costa as
Capitdo-mor. Antunes Portugal would remain as Captain-major of the
voyages to Timer, and might fully expect the largesse of Da Costa, while
Pimental would remain as Captain-major of the Manila voyages. As for
Manoel de Mello, he would instead be appointed Admiral of the Straits
Fleet."
Yet, the situation on Timor was a good deal more complex that
Mendonca Furtado allowed in his letters of 1673. At that moment Da
Costa, who died that same year, was still in the midst of a long civil war
against a rival Eurasian clan headed by Antonio de Homay." While
Mendonca Furtado certainly described the situation, and particularly Da
Costa's virtues, in highly exaggerated and favorable terms to the Crown,
it appears that the quid pro quo the Viceroyalty entered into with him,
and thereafter with Homay, at least yielded tangible economic results.
Despite persistent problems, regular voyages were indeed reesrablished
between Goa, Macau, and the Lesser Sundras during the 1670S. Ships in-
cluding the Santo Antonio e Almas Benditas, Nossa Senhora do Mar e
Almas Benditas, and Santa Clara, Madre de Deus all made the voyage."
Misquira Pimental, meanwhile, strove to forge a regular legal trade be-
tween Macau and Manila as allowed by the treaty with the Habsburgs.
Ironically, this enterprise was hindered by the lucrative profits that had
been generated for private merchants and Crown officials alike in these
ports by the flourishing illegal trade that had characterized the war years
from ,64°-1668. These men had little reason to cooperate in the establish-
ment of a royal trade in which the Crown would derive the majority of the
benefits, and therefore Misquita Pirnental's task was far from facile."
Nevertheless, the notable strides that were made with respect to reestab-
lishing a regular commercial intercourse and permanent Crown authority
in key outlying fortresses like Macau and Timor says much about the seri-
ousness of the Lisbon hierarchy toward rehabilitating its interest in Asia
and remedying the abuses of the preceding decades of crisis in the Estado.
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Another key area of administrative reform during these years related
to the resumption of regular royal fleets to enforce the cartaz system and,
by extension, to ensure a continuous flow of alfdndega receipts, monies
that furnished a majority of revenues for operating the Estado. During the
late 1650S and early 1660s, the Straits fleet had very rarely sailed from the
Mandavi. According to the Treasury Council records, it appears that the
fleet to the North (Cambay) had been more regular, sailing in 166r, r663,
and 1664.'" The fleet to the South (Mala bar and Ceylon) had similarly
managed to sail in r660, r662, and r664." The financial and military de-
mands on the Pozenda, however, guaranteed that all three had never been
dispatched in the same year during this period. This state of affairs began
to change in r667 with the arrival of Sac Vicente. Utilizing the funds accu-
mulated by the wise fiscal management of the Mello de Castro years and
borrowing some 102,000 xerafine from leading Christian merchants in
Goa like Diogo Fonseca da Silva and joao de Prado, Nunes da Cunha out-
fitted and sent out all three." In late January of that year, an armada do
sui of three ships under joao Sousa de Preire had sailed for Malabar carry-
mg some 20,000 xerafins in textiles to be traded for pepper, cinnamon,
and rice. That same month, the armada do norte under D. Ruy Gomes da
Silva departed for Bassein. Finally in April 1667, a much desired renascent
Straits fleet under D. jeroniruo Manoel and Joseph de Melto de Castro left
for Hunnuz."
This powerful armada ushered in a period when the regular dispatch-
ing of the Straits fleet once again became the rule. As Sac Vicente and his
successors m the Viceroyalty well recognized this fleet was not only im-
portant to enforce the cartaz system, it was also needed to offset the rising
maritime power of the Omani Arabs in the Persian Gulf region and the
Swahili coast of Africa, a shift in affairs that had been particularly worri-
some to the Portuguese since the r650 loss of Maskat to the Sultan bin Saif
al-Ya'rubi of Oman." The Straits fleet was also crucial, as the Treasury
Council records admirably reflect, since this force usually carried the cus-
toms revenues from Bandar Kung to Goa. Since this post was one of the
few possessions that consistently produced a sizable surplus of revenue
for the Crown, the importance of such voyages can hardly be overesti-
mated. In an average year c. 20,000-40,000 xerofins would be dispatched
to Goa.'-' As will be detailed below, Nunes da Cunha viewed the Straits
fleet as not only a way to rejuvenate the waning military reputation of the
Estado bur also as a weapon for the Faith against the heathens and infi-
dels of the Middle East and Asia. He therefore spared little expense in out-
fitting the initial five-ship armada of r667. It appears that the flagship of
this fleet was the recently arrived Santa Tbereza de Jesus, with 56 guns, 86
sailors and 400 soldiers aboard. Five frigates: the Nossa Senhora dos
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Millagres, the Sac [oao Baptista, the Sao Pedro, and Nossa Senhora dos
Remedies de Cassabe, and the Sac Salvador completed the fleer."
The great preparations in the Mandovi in 1667 predictably attracted
the attention of Portugal's European rivals in the trade. As the Surat Presi-
dency informed the English Directors in March of that year: "There is ar-
rived from Portugall in September past a new Viceroy to Goa, who hath
busied himselfe ever since his coming in proxiding & setting forth a con-
siderable fleet of Eight shipps & 40 [to] 60 small frigatts, with which he
hath declared to goo himselfe in Person, but the Designe not certainly
knowne."" Meanwhile, the Governor-General reported to Amsterdam:
"It seems that the Portuguese are making serious efforts to regain their
former reputation on the coast of India. "" The vac was sufficiently
alarmed that their Director at nearby Vingurla kept a watchful eye on
these preparations and secretly purchased purloined documents that were
forwarded to Batavia in order to divine the likely destination that was
mistakenly believed to be either Ceylon, Cochin or even Baravia! Al-
though the Dutch combined the ships of the three fleets into one super-ar-
mada, their statistics provide valuable information on the firepower that
Sao Vicente assembled in the first year of his tenure. According to these
documents, between January and March 1667 some 20 ships were outfit-
red at Goa. These vessels, both alto bordo and remo, carried some 325 can-
non, over 500sailors, and more than 3200 soldiers."
The campaign to outfit regular fleets to the Straits, norte, and sui
proved successful for at least the remainder of the 1670S. D. Jeronimo
Manoel commanded a string of naval forces to Hurmuz during that time:
a s-ship fleet in 1668, a o-ship fleet in 1669, a 7-ship fleet in 1670, as-ship
fleet in 1673, and a c-ship fleet in 1674."" Antonio de Mello de Castro took
an rr-ship fleet to the Straits in 1672.'7 As the Treasury Council assentos re-
flect, these fleets not only returned with badly needed specie from Persia,
but many prizes that were judged to have violated the cartaz system were
seized as well. The 1667 Straits fleet, for example, returned to Goa at the
end of that year with 2 prize ships loaded with horses that were sold at
public auction as well as gold and silver." The 1669 fleet also succeeded in
inflicting a damaging defeat on the Sultan of Oman's navy, further rejuve-
nating the maritime reputation of the Portuguese." The 'fleet of the
North' and caiila system also functioned well during these years. D. Ruy
Gomes da Silva, Domingos Barreto, Andre Coutinho, and D. Manoel
Lobo da Silva all commanded this fleet that departed nearly every year
from Goa. Munitions of all types were usually carried on the outward
voyage in search of interlopers, while textiles, specie, and prize ships were
usually in evidence on the return leg to the Mandovi." The sul fleet also
sailed most of the time during this period under commanders like joao
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Sousa de Freire. This force was generally charged with arrangmg pepper
and other spices for eventual transshipment to Lisbon via the Carreira, as
well as rice for Coa." Much has traditionally been made of the inability of
Goa to produce sufficient quantities of rice and the resulting dependence
of the capital on imports." Nevertheless, it should be noted that ship-
ments of rice were regularly made from the capital to outlying factories
during these years, as the Pazenda records clearly indicate."
Perhaps the most difficult reforms to implement and enforce were
those within the Crown bureaucracy itself. A myriad of crippling admin-
istrative problems existed relating to the Fazenda, the Ribeira, the Casa
da Polvora and the Rendas at this time. A few days after Christmas 1664,
Antonio de Mello de Castro wrote a long letter to Afonso VI outlining
many of these problems. According to the Viceroy, "the origin of all the
problems relating to the Fazenda" was that the traditional orders on this
institution were not being followed. During the years of crisis immedi-
ately preceding his arrival, his predecessors had been very "careless" in
this regard, harmful practices had become entrenched, and arranging a
"solution" had thus become increasingly difficult. Among other things,
the regimento governing the Treasury had evidently been hidden or de-
stroyed, accounting had been lax at best with no books being kept on re-
ceipts and expenditures, and funds had been improperly allocated to
places like China, Bengal, and Mozambique. As a result, sufficient funds
had not been found in the coire to assist other key pracas, prepare the
fleets, or defend the Estado. In an attempt to regularize receipts and ex-
pcndirurcs, Mello de Castro had ordered that henceforth the cofre would
be located in the Collegio of the Jesuits with three keys held: onc by the
vedor-geral, one by the feitor of Goa, and the third by the Viceroy, so that
no one could spent Crown funds without proper authorization."
In April 1665, Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor responded to such com-
plaints by endorsing Mello de Castro's anions, by ordering that regular
account books once again be kept in the Pazenda, and by sanctioning se-
vere punishments for any Crown ministers involved in crimes related to
their offices." In response to a January r664leuer from the provedor-mcr
of the Caza dos Cantos, complaining of a lack of expenence and skill on
the part of the contadcres in the House, the Crown ordered that new reg-
ulations and examinations be implemented, a step that was in fact under-
taken by joao Nunes da Cunha m January 1667.';(, Another legacy of the
crisis years relating to the Pazenda was addressed in I670' when Pedro or-
dered that all outstanding Crown debts should be authenticated and reg-
istered by the escrioao da [azenda and 3000 xeratins per year allocated
toward their repayment." finally, the I670 death of Simao Falcao Sono
Mayor, longtime provedor-mor of the House of Accounts, allowed
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Mendonca Furtado to appoint Dr. Lourenco de Azevedo Mora to this
post in late 1671. The Viceroy had complete confidence "in the talent of
this subject." He was educated, intelligent, experienced in business, and
capable of righting the plethora of abuses in the Fazenda that had charac-
terized much of the 1650S and early 1660s. This talent had been admirably
demonstrated in Mora's initial months in office, when he had been able to
quickly accumulate more than 40,000 xerafins in the Treasury, which
Mendonca Furtado had devoted to founding the Royal Terce! The
provedor-mor's subsequent acts in conjunction with those of the Viceroy
and his Councils would no doubt result in the financial stability reflected
in the Crcamento of 168o.'"
As Mello de Castro noted, great abuses had also developed in the royal
Ribeira (Dockyards) at Goa, a huge complex along the Mandovi that in-
cluded a carpentry house, a rope factory, a smithery, a coopers house, a
gun foundry with three kilns and all the tools needed to cast cannon and
mint currency. These problems ensured that the Bibeira had come to con-
sume a great part of the Fazenda of the Estado. Above all, the almoxerife
and other officials had avoided keeping receipt and expense books for the
vast storehouses located along the Mandovi. As a result, receipts of as
much as 20,000-30,000 xeratins had sometimes gone unrecorded and then
disappeared. Another common abuse resulting from lax record keeping
had been for the almoxerife and his assistants to both overcharge for and
underdeliver the goods paid for, keeping the balance for themselves. The
mestre and constable-major of the Ribeira had also skimmed materials
and profits from Crown contractors, especially those supplying wood.
Since these same officials had not been required to sign receipts for the
materials they took from the storehouses, theft was rampant. The arms
storehouses were also in a lamentable state: the roofs leaked badly during
the monsoon, causing significant losses, and the cannonballs were not
stored efficiently according to caliber, causing long outfitting delays.
Moreover, an accurate list of the number and caliber of artillery pieces in
the forts of Coa did not exist. Mello de Casrro also complained of the
long-standing practice of covering the decks of the ships at anchor during
the monsoon with palm fronds. Water still leaked in, which in conjunc-
tion with the great humidity of that season caused the wood to rot
quickly, damage that had to be repaired each fall. The hot tropical sun
also dried these fronds out quickly, even during the monsoon, and fires
frequently resulted."
Mello de Castro undertook reforms to remedy these abuses in the
Ribeira, measures that were supported by the Lisbon hierarchy. Among
other things, this Viceroy ordered that precise ledgers on receipts and ex-
penditures would henceforth be kept and rhar formal, signed receipts
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would be provided for all materials taken from the storehouses and
armouries. To reduce repairs on "wintering" ships in the Mandavi, the
custom of using palm fronds for coverings would ideally be abandoned in
favor of cloth that had been water-proofed with tar and pitch. The Vice-
roy also cracked down on the harmful practice of allowing royal artillery
to be used on private merchant ships.:" Mello de Castro also went to great
lengths to prevent the very capable mestre da Ribeira, Francisco
Goncalves, from returning to the Reino in 1666. In the Viceroy's view,
there was "not another man in India that will be able to fill his shoes, and
that we would lose totally the ability to build ships in this State, if [he] is
removed from it" :0' Another vexing issue relating to the Ribeira focused
on the question of what to do with royal ships serving in the armadas once
they were no longer seaworthy, Although a decree of March 16, r6I3 had
ordered that unserviceable navios de remo should be burned in the
Mandovi, larger ships were not covered by this law. As the Treasury
Council records reflect, Mello de Castro and his successors, with Pedro's
approval, continued what had become the de facto policy in Goa: strip-
ping and selling such ships at public auction with the profits being used to
finance the trade in rice with Kanara, textiles with Cambay, and other
state projects."
The situation at the Casa da Polvora, the gunpowder factory near
Ribandar whose grinders sometimes produced 800 Ibs. of this commodity
a-day in the mid-1640S, was hardly more commendable than at the Ribeira
at the outset of the 1660s. As Mello de Castro lamented, "Your Majesty
has great abuses... because the people by whose hands one receives and
expends are accustomed to dealing more in their own interest than in the
Service of Your Majesty". Bookkeeping at the royal factory along the
banks of the Mandovi was indeed a rarity. Saltpeter was also purchased at
greatly inflated prices by the officials of the gunpowder factory. This vital
commodity was frequently mixed with salt and sand, both before and af-
ter it reached the Casa. At times, this diluted saltpeter contained perhaps a
third of the pure product that had originally been contracted and paid for,
while the rest was stolen. The Viceroy sought to improve the situation
there by cracking down on corruption and by introducing new produc-
tion methods to the factory." As a letter from Manoe! Salgado, the
provedor of the Caza and Francisco da Silva, the mestre da caza reveals,
Mello de Castro, despite his unpleasant voyage to India aboard English
ships, had been sufficiently impressed to bring in new engineers for the
Caza, including an Englishman to introduce more efficient techniques in
manufacturing the gunpowder."
A January 1666 letter from Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor sanctioned
this work and instructed Sao Vicente to continue it both by eradicating
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any remaining "thefts and abuses" and by embracing the more efficient
production methods of their European rivals at the old factory and per-
haps even by building a new factory." As Nunes da Cunha was forced to
admit, however, while the former charge was possible, the later had been
complicated by the defection of the new English engineer to the "land of
the Moors", where his skills had no doubt yielded more lucrative re-
wards! Nevertheless, this Viceroy had committed himself toward produc-
ing quality gunpowder in the old factory by traditional methods in as
efficient manner as possible in order to assist the vital work of the arma-
das. A new factory would have to await new engineers and, more impor-
tantly, fuller state coffers." In March 167I, Pedro further solidified
matters in the Caza by finally sending out a highly qualified polvarista
aboard the fleet of Christovao Ferrao de Castelbranco. This engineer first
examined the extant stocks of gunpowder in Mozambique and then as-
sumed the position of mestre polvarista of the Goa factory, where his ex-
pertise evidently yielded favorable results for the remainder of the
decade."
Dealing with abuses in the royal tax-farms or rendas should remind us
that the administrative reforms heretofore discussed affected overwhelm-
ingly only the Portuguese hierarchy itself, Portuguese subjects in the Asian
possessions, and those indigenous Christians living under European law.
Although population figures are sparse and inexact, these groups proba-
bly did not total more than c. 50,000 or so in the late seventeenth century.
Moreover, this number constituted perhaps only 20% of those living
within Portuguese domains. Therefore, the vast majority of the king's
"subjects" in the Estado were allowed to live according to their custom-
ary laws." Beginning with Albuquerque, the Portuguese had wisely
sought to utilize and exploit extant indigenous structures to their advan-
tage, for both logistical and financial reasons. In Goa, for example, local
village community organizations had been allowed to flourish. Village
councils or ganvkari made up of representative headmen or ganvkars of
the various clans or vangads, along with the district headmen (thanadars),
exercised a wide variety of powers, especially in local matters." It was
only in matters of revenue collection and "certain judicial cases, or law
and order problems which the village administration was unable to cope
with," that a branch of the Crown machinery of a "link organization" ex-
isred." While the Yedor-geral da [azenda, the procurador da Coroa and
military captains of Bardez, Salsette, and Tisvaldi ultimately protected the
Crown's fiscal, proprietary, and military interests, the actions of these
officers rarely impacted on the daily life of the peasants, fishermen, and
others in the villages once the basis quid pro quo between conqueror and
conquered had been established in the early reth century. The resiliency of
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indigenous structures, therefore, demonstrated itself throughout the years
of Portuguese dominion in Asia."
The Portuguese also discovered that indigenous capital and expertise
could not only be utilized to ensure the regular flow of revenue from local
villages into royal coffers, but that Hindu merchants and businessmen
could also play a vital role in the commercial and tax-farming sectors of
the imperial economy. In recent decades, much has been made of the vital
economic role of such merchants in the economy of the Estado.
Scammell, De Souza, and Pearson have all argued in one fashion or an-
other for indigenous dominance over the Goan and imperial economy
with "by far the best evidence," found in the Renda records" As in early
modern Europe, the Portuguese Crown embraced a tax-farming system in
its Asian empire. These rendas were farmed out to the highest bidder
(with a guarantor and deposit of surety) for a usual term of three years on
everything from custom duties to taxes on the sale of official paper,
spices, cloths, betel-nut, and tobacco. According to Pearson's estimates,
between 1600-1670 rendas averaging 344AOO xerafins (=300 reis) a year
were let out, with 80% of the people holding these rendas Hindu (62.7%
of these held by Saraswar Brahmins according to names), and the other
20% were farmed out to Christians. In terms of overall value, Hindus held
6p% (Saraswars 69% of Hindu total and 44.9% of overall total) and
Christians 34.8%.''' The significance of these figures for the hisroriography
is apparently definitive: Hindus and especially Saraswat Brahmins domi-
nated the economic life of the rendas, ergo Hindu merchants must have
played a dominant role in the economy of Portuguese Asia. But is it as
simple as this?
The extant documentation for the oth century tells us two things
about the rendas: (I) that the issue of indigenous dominance may not be as
dear cut as has recently been suggested; and (2) that grave problems in
fact existed within the entire system that were only addressed in the late
1660 and 1670S. The recent historiography is no doubt correct in maintain-
109 that indigenous merchants played an important role in the economy
of the Estado. As noted above, the Portuguese logically sought to exploit
local expertise, wealth, and connections and were frequently willing to
forego official legislation and royal decrees all such matters in the quest
for marenal wealth. Hindu and Jain merchants living both inside and out-
side the territorial confines of the Estado also possessed great wealth and
were capable of exerting a profound influence on the coastal trade, espe-
cially along the western coast of India between Goa and the Province of
the North. On this point, we need only consider the contemporary evi-
dence of no less an authority than Luis de Mendonca Furtado e Albuquer-
que: "All the merchants of Europe combined do not have the capital of
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any of these Hindus that are called Rich... [who] dominate the trade of all
the ports of India. ""4 Nevertheless, any assertion for indigenous domi-
nance is based on very shaky documentary evidence. There are, for exam-
ple, virtually no a/(lindega records for Goa for the rrth century. Data on
cargoes for the official Crown trade is also sparse and widely scattered.
Only recently has it been possible to compile reasonable figures on the
Carreira da India for the period 1668-r680 based on scattered and rather
sparse documents from Goa, Lisbon, and Evora." As for the yearly Bud-
gets or Oryamentos of the Estado, there is a gap from 1634 until 1680, and
not more than a half-dozen extant for the entire rrrh century. More dis-
turbing is the fact that virtually no documentation exists for the private
trade between Goa, Europe, and the rest of the Asian empire during the
rzth century. This trade, in terms of volume and value, was probably far
more important than the official Crown trade.
Moreover, the very nature of the rendas, that IS to say the tedious pro-
cess of collecting these local taxes, lent itself to the utilization of indige-
nous merchants more commonly than virtually any other sector of the
colonial economy. These records, therefore, provide data 00 a segment of
the colonial economy that would almost invariably reflect a larger degree
of indigenous involvement than almost any other sector. Pearson's figures
showing that 80% of the renda holders were Hindus, controlling 6502% of
these taxes by value, therefore may suggest a far larger degree of indige-
nous involvement in the colonial economy than in fact may have been the
case. We should also note that such a system also facilitated the process
whereby the Crown could increasingly integrate local indigenous mer-
chants into the colonial system, providing them with a relatively lucrative
vested interest in the continuance of that system. At this same time, Pedro
was in the midst of utilizing a similar methodology in the Reino to attach
the nobility to such a State by providing lucrative offices at home and in
the imperio:"
An examination of the relevant codices also reveals that the Crown
usually reserved what could be considered the most important rendas for
itself or Christian bidders; that is to say the custom revenues of Goa,
Cochin (until 1663), and the ports of the Province of the North. This sug-
gests that even within the rather narrow limits of the rendas, the Crown
attempted to maintain a degree of control over the key links in the colo-
nial economy. The Crown also made sure that the most lucrative rendas
that were actually farmed out were almost always granted to Portuguese
or, less frequently, local converts, evidence that seems to bolster the argu-
ment for effective centralized control. Thus we find that the increasingly
lucrative and important tobacco renda for Goa was farmed out from 1663
until 1692 to either Portuguese casados like Francisco Lopes (I66J-I667, at
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between 25,500-26,700 xerafins a year) and Thomas Vaz (1667-1668, at
26,700 xerafins a year) or converts like joseph de Miranda (1668-1671?, at
ll,2.00 xerafins a year) and Antonio de Miranda (I689-1695?, at between
33,000 xerafins and 33,650 xerafins a year}." According to Pearson's esti-
mates, this renda alone would have constituted nearly 10% of the average
yearly tax-farming rorals."
Whatever the priorities of contemporary historians regarding the ex-
act role of indigenous merchants in the imperial Portuguese economy, it is
clear that in the 16705 the Crown not only strove to ensure that Portuguese
or Christian converts held the most important rendas, but also undertook
badly needed reforms for a system that had been undermined by abuse in
the 1650S and early 1660s. Antonio de Mello de Castro first complained of
serious abuses in the system in late 1664. In order to raise the bond of
surety, sometimes 25% of the total, rendciros would frequently "sell"
property to associates at inflated prices with the understanding that it
would later be "resold" with monies raised from the renda. The Crown
had also been very lax in examining the bens of these guarantors for many
of the rendas, "accepting any dreg", for this vital function, a practice that
placed the interests of the [azenda at risk. Renda holders, moreover, had
frequently collected taxes far In excess of their bids and had reaped nota-
ble profits on this practice." In June 1664, these abuses, the lost revenues
that resulted to the Crown, and the need for the Estada to contribute c.
12.0,000 cruzados each year for the donatioo for the peace with Holland
had prompted Antonio de Meilo de Castro to suspend the increasingly
Important tobacco renda and substitute a fixed per diem tax far each cou-
ple in its place." Although Afonso and Casrelo-Melhor had accepted this
experiment, a plan that would ideally yield some 1O0,000 cruzadoe per
year to the Treasury, it was abandoned by Sac Vicenre in 1667 as unwork-
able.'''
Afonso also accepted Mello de Castro's recommendations on cleaning
up other abuses In the system. In February 1666, he ordered that a new of-
fice be created where all property deeds had to be registered within three
days of any transaction in order to be valid." In a January 1667 letter,
Nunes da Cunha pointed out that such an office would be redundant
since the existing financial structure could implement such a policy, pro-
vided it was well administered, a goal he promised to achieve. At the same
time, Sac vicencc began to levy controversial propinas or fees on the
rendas that benefited himself as well as ministers of the [azenda." In
March 1669, Pedro responded to many of these same problems by echoing
the sentiments of his brother: henceforth the regimento on the rendas
would be scrupulously enforced, all guarantors would be examined, all
deeds would not only be registered and notarized but approved by the
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Procurador da Coros.:" The following January, Mello de Castro and
Carte-Real de Sampayo informed the Prince that to achieve the desired re-
sults, the Procurador's powers over the entire system should be increased.
The Governors also pointed out that the 9% propinas introduced by
Nunes da Cunha, fees that were to be shared by the Viceroy, the Vedor-
geral and the ministers of the Treasury Council, would proportionally re-
duce renda yields. Although this prediction had been challenged by the of-
ficials involved, since it would ideally affect only those rendas which were
farmed out at an increased rate, there can be little doubt that this sizable
charge had a somewhat chilling effect on the renda marker."
The issue of the propinas had been addressed by Pedro, his councils,
and Mendonca Furtado in 1671. In April of that year, Pedro had found
these fees to be "in opposition to my orders, and as such prejudicial to my
fazenda". In a strongly worded letter to the Viceroy, he had therefore or-
dered that "neither you, nor any minister of my fazenda," would either
levy or accept them. In fact, Mendonca Furtado was ordered to compile a
list of those propinas that had been collected since r667 so that they might
be registered in the livros of the Treasury." Before he had even received
these instructions from Lisbon, the astute Lavradio had gauged the nega-
tive impact of the propinas on Crown receipts. He had provisionally or-
dered his ministers to refuse to accept these monies, which totaled some
15,500 xerafins for the period involved, and informed all rendeiros that
this fee would instead he applied to the rendas involved. In October 1671,
the Viceroy informed Lisbon that this action had "resulted in a consider-
able increase in the rendas that in this short time had been farmed out".
He reiterated that the 15,5°0 xerafins collected from January 1668 on had
adversely affected the tax-farming market. "It is certain that Your Maj-
esty has in your Treasury less money since the rendeiros bid in this time as
merchants in the tax-farms with attention to the expense of the propinas,
which when halted increased as I have informed Your Majesty." In the fu-
ture, such practices would not be allowed, since "one finds Senhor, this
empire in a state in which it cannot suffer these abuses in the royal trea-
sury". It was vital that not only for the Viceroy, but all of his ministers
and officials to have "the greatest care," in their behavior in order for the
Estado to survive."
Overall, the late I660s and I670S witnessed a notable effort by the
Crown and its representatives in Asia to effect badly needed reforms in an
imperial system that had been largely allowed to atrophy in the crisis
years after 1640. As Diogo do Couro had noted a century earlier, the
Estado could always run profitably if it were administered properly. In
addition to seeking meaningful reforms with this seminal goal in mind,
there is evidence to suggest that efforts were made to appoint truly quali-
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fied people to key offices in the eastern empire, a practice that had not al-
ways been adopted over the years. The best evidence that this criteria was
utilized in these years was the appointment of the extremely capable and
experienced Luis de Mendonca Furtado to the Viceregal post at a crucial
period in the Estado:w history, and convincing him to remain in that ca-
pacity for two terms. Lavradio In turn demonstrated a fierce desire ro ad-
vance the interests of the Crown by appointing men of similar
backgrounds to other key positions in Asia. For example, in October 1673
he resisted the appointment of Manoe! Mendes Henriques, "an entirely
ordinary man", who had made his money in a shady fashion in Maskar
and Bandan Kung, to a position in either the fazenda or the judiciary."
About that same time, he complained bitterly to Lisbon about the ap-
pointment of joao Correa de Sa, "who has no service in India", as general
of the Straits fleet, and sought to mitigate this by selecting well qualified
caprams for the 5ships." In December 1674, Mendonca Furrado also com-
plained about the appointment of "various subjects, who are not capable
of serving in the most minor infantry company," to captaincies of for-
tresses and the harm that resulted. Lavradio asked that in the future the
Viceroys might have to discretion to examine all candidates and make a
final deCISIOn in such cases."
A brief examination of some of the information provided in the extant
orcamentos or state budgets from the rrrh century as contained in Table 6
tells us much about the success of these reform efforts of the late 1660s and
1670S and the continued viability of the Estado:"
Table 6: (Rjccciprs, (Ejxpcnditurcs, and (Bjalances for the Estado (in xcrafins]
Estado Receipts Expenditures Balance
1630 801,992 960,172 -158,180
1634 1,185,164 1,1 15,455 +69,809
1680 731,818 454,663 +171,164
Goa/Depend.
1630 .>21,923 409,232 -87,309
16.14 304,346 339,414 -35,078
1680 359.579 111,485 +148,094
These figures, and especially the totals for 1680, demonstrate that when-
ever wise administrative polices were undertaken and overweening ex-
traordinary military expenses were avoided, as was indeed the case from
c. 1665-1682, the Estado remained both viable and profitable. The Viceroy
could be assured of relatively stable revenues from Goa and her depend-
encies, usually c. 340,000 xerafins a year, for the entire 17th century. The
revenues for the Estado as a whole also remained generally stable: 801,992
xcratins in 1630,731,828 xerafins in 1680, a figure that is even more impres-
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sive when one considers that a Junta run Mozambique was not included
in the totals for this orcamenta. This stability in receipts shows that the
sources of regular revenue the Portuguese had established in the empire:
customs duties, taxes, rents, tribute et at. remained relatively secure de-
spite the military, dynastic, and administrative chaos that characterized
these years in Europe and ASia. When the Crown and its representatives
devoted sufficient attention to governing and exploiting the eastern pos-
sessions, as was indeed the case during the late 1660s and 1670S, and ill-ad-
vised warfare was avoided, the Estado da India therefore remained a




Foreign Policy: Diplomatic Relations with the Reis
Vizinhos and European Rivals, 1640-1683
By the year 1662, the Portuguese Crown and its servants had maintained
diplomatic relations with various indigenous kingdoms in Asia for more
than 150 years. During that time, the nature of these relationships had var-
ied widely depending on time and place: open and aggressive bellicisrn,
mutual peaceful respect, and diplomatic fawning in the quest for favor-
able trading concessions. Relations with European rivals in the Indian
Ocean dated in earnest only to the initial decade of the 17th century when
the agents of the EIe and vac had arrived in search of their own share of
the spices and riches of the Asian maritime trade. It is interesting to note
that Portugal's experiences with her European competitors had been ev-
ery bit as contentious as with the Asian states they had encountered in the
initial decades of the reth century. The Protestant Reformation had even
guaranteed that the zealousness of the religious crusade against Islam
could, to a degree, be continued against these heretic merchant adventur-
ers of northern Europe. Overall, however, open warfare had character-
ized a good deal of the history of the Estado. The Portuguese Crown, as a
legacy of the reconquista against Islam and the cultural norms of the late
medieval and early modern state had predictably embraced armed force
as a crucial aspect of its foreign policy and economic system since the days
of Albuquerque.'
It was perhaps fitting then, that as Antonio de Mello de Castro an-
chored near Bombay in the fall of 1662 aboard Marlborough's fleet he
would be confronted with the final chapter of the long story of Dutch ag-
gression against the Estado which had characterized much of the r-th cen-
tury. In the wake of successfully expelling the Portuguese from Melaka,
Ceylon and elsewhere, the vac extended its campaign to the pepper rich
Malabar coast of India and the remaining Estado fortresses on that coast:
Cannanore, Cranganor, and Cochin. Rijckloff Van Goens, the capable
and bellicose Governor of Ceylon had taken a powerful fleet to Malabar
in late 1661. This force quickly captured Quilon and Cranganor and soon
thereafter appeared before Cochin and Cannanore, intent on reducing
these remaining Portuguese strongholds on this pepper rich coast.' In the
years that followed, the Crown and Viceroyalty would be confronted
with daunting diplomatic challenges on how to meet such military as well
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as geopolitical and economic attacks. In the late 1660sand early 1670S, the
Portuguese once again had to face the eternal question of their Asian ex-
perience: to fight or not to fight in order to protect and advance their 10-
rerests? This complex issue confronted them not only with respect to their
European rivals but also a host of indigenous kingdoms throughout mari-
time Asia known as the Reis Vizinhos or neigh boring kings. Before exam-
ining the specific decisions embraced by the Crown and its servants in
Asia during this crucial period, it is useful to provide historical back-
ground on some of these powers and their relations with the Estado dur-
ing the rrrh century.
The most formidable indigenous military power that the Portuguese at
least potentially confronted for much of the rerh and 17th cenrunes was
the Mughal empire, the powerful Muslim state that dominated much of
north central India and which under the emperor Aurangzeb was poised
to extend that power to the Deccan and the south. These areas had indeed
witnessed much warfare since the decline of the once flourishing Hindu
empire of Vijayanagar in the mid-roth century, with relatively large and
powerful Muslim sultanates like Bijapur and Golconda as well as a host
of petty Hindu principalities vying for power in that region. Moreover,
while the Maratha revolt of Shivaji was still in its initial stages in the mid-
17thcentury, this movement would eventually come to pose a threat to the
entire subcontinent.' Portuguese relations with the Mughals dated from c.
157." when Akbar annexed Gujarat to the empire. Relations between this
emperor and the Estadc were generally cordial. Akbar allowed the Portu-
guese to remain at Daman in his Gujarat subah, he promised not to har-
bored the Malabar pirates, he also agreed to merely one cartaz free
pilgrimage voyage to the Red Sea a year, and invited the Jesuits to reside
at hIS court and encouraged their proselytization. For their part, the Por-
tuguese recognized both the formidable military might of the Mughal as
well as the pivotal economic importance of the province of the North and
fortresses like Diu, Daman, and Bassein to the Estado. Not surprisingly,
therefore, they sought to cultivate pacific relations with him.'
Akbar:s death in 16°5, coinciding with the formation of the rival Dutch
and English East India Companies and their arrival in Asia, had ushered
in a period of more strained relations between the two powers. Jahangir
(I6os-1627) and Shah [ahan (T627-1658) both sought to utilize these Euro-
pean rivals as a counter-weight to the erstwhile power of the Estado. De-
spite fierce opposition from Portuguese agents at Agra, favorabie farmans
had been granted for factories and commercial activities m places like
Surar that threatened to undermine the hitherto unassailable position of
the Portuguese m the rich trade in textiles and indigo of Gujarar. At times,
the Viceroyalty had resorted to force to oppose such actions, including
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the seizure of Mughal shipping, and open warfare had resulted. In 1613,
for example, Daman had been besieged by land. The threat of English or
Dutch seapower being exploited to complement such actions thereafter
convinced the Crown to pursue more measured policies with respect to
the Mughals, and the emperor's ships were frequently allowed to sail
from Gujarat without cartazes, provided custom duties were paid at Da-
man. Nevertheless, Shah jahan's reign had also witnessed rocky relations
between the two powers. The strategic post at Hughly in Bengal had been
overrun and captured in 1633, nominally to punish the assistance the
Estado had provided to Bijapur in its own struggle with the Mughals.'
Moreover, in 1636, Shah jahan conquered the sultanate of Ahmad-
nagar. This victory ended the rule of the Nizam Shahi line and absorbed a
traditional buffer state that had demonstrated a long-standing tendency
to favor the interests of the Portuguese in the search for allies against the
Mughals. This act and the defeat of the ruler of Ramnagar at about this
same time not only placed Daman at permanent risk, but it had also
forced the Portuguese there to pay a contribution or chauth to Agra, hith-
erto owed to Ramnagar. In 1658, the zealous Aurangzeb had captured the
Peacock throne after a bloody succession war that had witnessed the im-
prisonment of his father, Shah jahan, and the defeat of his brother Dara
Shukoh. The mercurial Aurangzeb was committed to the long-held desire
of his predecessors to extend their power throughout the Deccan and the
south. Aurangzeb also wanted to spread a "pure" form of Islam in the
process. Both these goals obviously poised a very real threat to the contin-
ued viability of the Estado, especially in its crisis years of the late 1650S and
early 1660s. The Viceroyalty was therefore forced to tread a very danger-
ous line in their relations with Agra when Mello de Casrro reached India.
Fortunately, this Viceroy and his successors would receive unexpected as-
sistance in the form of the Maratha threat under Sivaji during these same
years. This revolt served to distract the full weight of Aurangzeb's might
from the Crown's possessions, especially in the province of the North.
Unfortunately, the Marathas would prove to be a formidable danger in
their own right:
As an examination of the Monsoon Books reveals, it was common
practice for the Viceroys and Governors to devote at least one letter in
each packet sent to the Reino to matters relating to the Reis Vizinhos.'
These letters, when combined with the extant correspondence with the
neighboring kings, provide a relatively complete picture of the foreign
policy pursued by Goa with respect to the Reis Vizinhos.' Given the ex-
treme demands placed upon Mello de Castro from the day of his arrival,
most particularly news of Van Gocns's marauding fleet on the Malabar
coast, it is not surprising that the new Governor could not immediately
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devote much time to matters regarding the Reis Vizmhos, including the
Mughal empire. In January 1664, Mello de Casrro compiled his first major
letter to the Crown on this issue. Among other things, he outlined the
huge extent of the empire, "beginning at the frontier with Persia and ex-
tending until Bassein," and what he perceived as a growing threat to the
Estado, Aurangzeb's victory in rhe succession struggle boded 111 for the
Portuguese m the Governor's eyes since this prince was "our great enemy,
and he has the special desire to conquer our fortresses in the North". As
evidence of this antipathy, Mcllo de Castro noted that a Mughal army
had entered the lands near Bassein the previous September "and caused
damage in our villages". He sent Luis de Miranda Henriques with 10 ships
and 300 troops to assist that fortress. These reinforcements had convinced
the Mughals to stop their hostilities and ask for peace, a course the Gover-
nor favored since "it is incredibly difficult to carry on warfare in those
parts where his [Aurangzeb's] power makes it impossible to defend".
Mello de Castro noted that rumors of Aurangzeb's death had reached
Goa, but proffered that such reports had neither certainty or even proba-
bility."
For the remainder of the 1660s and throughout the I670S, the Viceroy-
alty was nevertheless able to maintain the relatively shaky peace that
Mello de Castro arranged with Aurangzeb's envoys at Bassein in 1664. In
letters of 1665 and 1666, the Viceroy noted that although no further moves
had been made on the province of the North, the fact remained that the
Grand Mughal still desired "our lands". The primary reasons that
Aurangzeb did not act on such impulses were the emperor's preoccupa-
tion with Shivaji and the Maratha uprising, which had enjoyed a notable
success in the 1664 sacking of Surar, as well as his escalating campaign
against Bijapur that would eventually culminate in the capture of that sul-
tanate in 1686. In addition to these growing distractions, the emperor also
recognized that the Portuguese posed no threat to him on land and could
thus not significantly complicate his escalating problems in Gujarat and
the Deccan. Moreover, as past diplomacy had demonstrated, the more
European powers vying for his largesse the better. All the same,
Aurangzeb respected the continuing reputation of the Portuguese high
seas fleet, especially off the coasts of Gujarat, and he continued the prac-
tice of purchasing cartazes from them throughout this period. As for Goa,
while periodic incursions into the neighborhood of the provrnce of the
North were disquieting, they were far preferable to open warfare on land
against the huge Mughal army."
The extant Reis Vizinhos correspondence focuses largely on these
themes and issues. In January 1666, for example, Mello de Castro noted
that Aurangzeb continued to be preoccupied with revolt of Shivaji as well
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as problems with Bijapur. These military endeavors had continued to dis-
tract the Mughal emperor from any advances against the Estado. How-
ever, the chaos engendered by these struggles exposed fortresses from Diu
to San Theme to eventual attack, certainly a tenuous state of affairs in
some of these outlying posts given the fact thar "nothing more is neces-
sary to destroy us [there] than deny us provisions"." Letters from Sac
Vicente and Manoel Carte Real de Sampayo and Antonio de Mello de
Castro in 1668 and 1670 reiterated this same state of affairs. In the course
of the warfare with Shivaji, Aurangzeb's armies had briefly entered the
neighborhood of Bassein. Nonetheless, the emperor continued to seek a
cartaz for one ship a year to sail to Mecca, paying 1200 xerafins for this
ship as well as much more for the ships of his vassals to make the same
voyage." In his letters from 1671-1674, Luis de Mendonca Furtado noted
that Aurangzeb had committed to maintaining the peace through envoys
to Bassein, and additionally purchased cartazes for passages to Surat.'
For the remainder of the 1670S and into the 1680s, the fragile peace with
Aurangzeb endured. On one hand, this arrangement continued thanks to
the Muslim emperor's continuing problems in Gujarat and the Deccan; at
the same time escalating foreign policy problems for the Estado also con-
tributed to this state of affairs. In short, neither power could afford addi-
tional enemies. The recognition of this indisputable fact in Agra and Goa
ensured pacific relations between the two states.
As T.R. de Souza has noted, long-standing cultural, linguistic, and reli-
gious ties linked the indigenous community of Goa with the Marathas far
in advance of their rrth century revolt against the Mughals." In 1636,
Shivaji's father, Shahji Bhosle, had requested assistance from the Portu-
guese in his struggle with Shah Jahan and Adil Shah of Bijapur. The Vice-
royalty may have refused military assistance, but it at least offered refuge
for his family. In the years that followed, the Portuguese had initially
looked with great favor upon the rise of Maratha power as a counter-
weight to the Mughal threat. As long as their activities were confined to
the Deccan and away from the fortresses of the Estado great praise could
be heaped upon Shivaji's successes and heroic exploits in defying the
Mughals. By the late 1650S, however, these victories brought the Maratha
leader much closer to the holdings of the Estado. Between 1657-1659
Shivaji added much of the north Konkan to his possessions. His rivalry
with the Siddi of Danda and his plans to express his power by also con-
structing a navy were more than sufficient to engender a careful reevalua-
tion of the merits of the Maratha revolt in Coa.' Given the sparse
resources of the Estado during these years, and its host of other military
commitments, the Viceroyalty could do little more than adopt a policy of
superficial friendliness and sub rosa obstructionism with regard to the
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Marathas. In point of fact, their best diplomatic hope in the years immedi-
ately preceding Mello de Castro's arrival was that Aurangzeb and Shivaji
would remain so obsessed with their campaign against one another that
they would both ignore the extremely vulnerable possessions of the
Estado on the west coast of India.'"
For most of the 1660s and 1670s, the Estado was able to maintain rela-
tively peaceful relations with Shivaji, despite vastly different opinions
among the Goa hierarchy on the best policy to pursue with respect to this
threat. Fortunately, the Maratha leader frequently had more pressing
problems than dealing with the Portuguese. In the view of Antonio de
Mcllo de Casrro, Shivaji was a practical leader who would listen to rea-
son.In January r664, the Viceroy believed an agreement was possible that
would safeguard the possessions in the North, especially since Shivaji had
recently "not shown us bad intentions". After sacking Surar in that year,
the great Maratha leader may have entered the province of the North, but
he had left without causmg great harm and passed instead to the territo-
ries of Aurangzeb." During this period, however, the Portuguese also
sought to retard Shivaji's advances toward their territories by supplying
the Siddi of Danda, the desais of Kudal, Pernem and Bicholim, and
Aurangzeb's general Mirza Raja jai Singh with weapons and other sue-
cor." While Sac Vicenre focused his foreign policy energies on issues re-
garding the straits of Hurmuz and the Omanis, Shivaji exacted revenge
for this assistance to his enemies by invading Bardes in November 1667,
raking some booty, men, and oxen before being expelled."! Carte-Real de
Sarnpayo and Mello de Castro had subsequently taken a more jaded view
of the Mararha leader's exploits. Shivaji may have conquered most of the
Konkau, but in doing so he had usurped "the rights that belong to others,
by which the inhabitants received the greatest vexation". Moreover, by
these conquests, he had become an incredibly bad neighbar to the Estado
who could not be trusted. "He is inconsistent in whatever he promises,
and when he shows friendship, even then it IS necessary to have the great-
est caution!" As a result, the Council had done its utmost to reinforce the
fortresses along the northern border of Bardes, especially after the Mara-
thas again threatened Bardcs and Salsette in 1668.'"
l.uis de Mendonca Purrado was also wary of the growing power of the
Maratha leader on the Konkan coast south of Chau!. His rising maritime
ambitions posed a direct threat to the naval pretensions of the Estado as
well as to those of the Dutch, English, and French, who were all estab-
lished in factories at Surar and elsewhere along the Bay of Carnbay. As the
Viceroy noted: "When I reached this Estado, I found Sivaji, rebel vassal of
the king Idalxa [Bijapur] so arrogant, and mighty as any of the Reis
VlZillhos, by reason of having sacked Surrate and other ports of the
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Mogor king, and having taken from there much treasure.':" In early 1672,
the Maratha menace had become more immediate on land, as Shivaji
made threatening gestures toward the environs of Goa. As Lavradio re-
ported in a letter in August of that year, Shivaji. "This past winter sought
to cause an uprising in the lands of Bardez and Salsette, but my fine pre-
vention caused him to desist in this intention. ,'" Byearly 1673, the Viceroy,
by his intelligence, care, and desire, had reconfirmed a shaky peace with
the Maratha leader. Nevertheless, as Lavradio reiterated in January 1676,
Shivaji: "is very inconsistent in his actions ... if he shows himself as a
friend, he has already decided on some betrayal and thus one proceeds al-
ways with much vigilence and caution" with him." During the last years
of Shivaji's career, tensions escalated between the powers. Portuguese
support for the Siddi of janjira, their refusal to pay any chauth to him,
and the pleas of Hindu merchants in the Estado feeling the exactions of
the Inquisition all played a role in this escalation. Although Shivaji's
death in 1680 forestalled an attack, the fortification of Anjidiv island in the
early 1680s prompted Shivaji's son, Sambhaji to launch a concerted offen-
sive on Goa and Chaul in 1683. This substantial threat was only averted
thanks to Mughal pressure on Sambhaji's flanks. Nevertheless, the huge
cost of meeting this offensive temporarily threw the surplus budgets of the
1670S and early 1680s into the red. Thereafter, peace was restored for the
remainder of Sambhaji's rule unril teso. '-l
Among all the Reie Vizinhos, diplomatic relations were perhaps most
immediate with the sultanate of Bijapur, the Muslim kingdom from
which Albuquerque had wrested Goa in 15IO. The other "old conquests"
of Bardes and Salsette had also been taken from Bijapur III 1543. For the re-
mainder of the reth century, relations between the Estado and the Add
Shahi rulers of the sultanate were predictably stormy, with frequent at-
tempts made to regain these lost territories. For much of the ryth century,
however, relations had shifted somewhat and become generally more cor-
dial. On Coa's part, this shift was mainly due to the importance of
Bijapur as a supply cenrer for various products in great demand in the em-
pire: cloth, precious stones from Golconda, saltpeter for the Casa da
Polvora, as well as sailors for the coastal fleets were all provided by or
transshipped through Bijapur. A 1571 treaty recognized the importance of
the kingdom by agreeing to allow the Adil Shah six free cartazes and the
free importation of 25 horses each year; other duty free annual goods to
the value of 6,000 gold pardaus, as well as a half share of all booty taken
from ships without cartazes captured in the ports of the sultanate. On the
part of the Adil Shah, such inducements and the very real fear of Mughal
and Mararha invasions compelled a more pacific policy." This is not to
say, however, that relations between the two powers were entirely with-
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out friction. In the 1650S, for example, the Adil Shah invaded the Bardes
and Salcere on two occasions. Tensions had risen at about this time due to
the concessions the Adil Shah had made to the Dutch and English on the
Konkan coast, allowing factories to be established at Karwar, Rajapur,
and Vingurla. In 1654, Dutch pressure to attack by land and the desire to
exploit the administrative chaos engendered by the overthrow of the
count of Obidos by D. Braz de Castro resulted in a large but ill-fated inva-
sion." In 1659, similar motives along with Portuguese harboring and en-
couraging of renegade Bijapuri provincial officials called desais resulted
in a more modest military incursion in which Luis de Mendonca Furtado
played a notable role."
By the early 1660s, the twin threat of Aurangzeb and Shivaji upon the
sultanate substantially eased Bijapuri pressure on Goa and the Estado.
Nevertheless, religious, geo-political, and historical factors all rendered
the peace between the powers tenuous. As Antonio de Mello de Castro re-
ported to Afonso VI in early 1664: "Today, the Idalxa has a good corre-
spondence with us, but it is not secure, because every time that he has a
[suitable] occasion he tries to take advantage of it by using it against us. ""
The 1664 decision to provide some munitions to Kanara had also invoked
the wrath of the sultanate. For a time, it appeared that renewed war
would resulr. The Adil Shah had dispatched some 2000 cavalry and infan-
try to the border of Salsette, but ultimately used these troops in an ill-
fated campaign against Shivaji." In 1665-1666, Bijapur's continuing frus-
tration in the war with the Mararhas continued to save the Estado from
the glare of martial attention from the sultanate. As Mello de Castro
wrote: "The Idalxa with whom the Estado shares a border from the Rio
do Sal, which is the last port in Salsette, until Chapora, that similarly is
the frontier of Bardes, finds himself today in great difficulty because one
of his Hindu vassals called Shivaji has for many years men against him. "'0
Aurangzeb's escalating campaign against Bijapur also complicated
matters for the Adil Shahis and forced them to seek assistance from pow-
ers like Golconda, which according to Sao Vicente provided some 30,000
cavalry to resist the Mughal threat in the late 1660s."According to Corte-
Real de Sampayo and Mello de Castro, a seminal problem in these strug-
gles was that the dynasty was having difficulty effectively administering
its own domains. "The king Aly Idalxa is the nearest neigbbor to this
State, but he is not capable of governing a limited [Provinces], Ict alone
the kingdom of Vizapor, his captains are absolute and the do whatever
they wish, and for this reason the Mogor has taken several of his cities. ""
Although these provincial officials or desais frequently sought aid and ref-
uge in the Estado, open warfare was avoided during the 1670S and into the
early 1680s thanks largely to the defeats Bijapur suffered at the hands of
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the Marathas and Mughals. In the initial stages of this campaign, these re-
verses robbed Bijapur of many of its possessions on the Konkan coast. Ul-
timately, the struggle against both Shivaji and Aurangzeb would cost the
Adil Shah dynasty its entire sultanate. These critical problems ensured
that the Estado enjoyed a degree of stability with respect to Bijapur that
would have seemed unthinkable in the time of Albuquerque.
Along the lush coast immediately south of Goa, the Portuguese had in-
creasingly been forced to deal with the Nayaks of Ikkeri as the rrth cen-
tury wore on. For most of the previous century, the Kanara coast had
been made up of a series of petty principalities that had enjoyed a good
deal of autonomy from both Vijayanagar and Bijapur. The region held
great importance for the Estado since it supplied rice, pepper, and teak to
the Portuguese, all vital commodities. Before 1600, the relative weakness
of these principalities had allowed the Portuguese to dictate very favor-
able treaties that usually included bales of rice as tribute and quintals of
pepper sold at very reasonable rates. To protect these interests, fortresses
had been established at Basrur [Barcelor], Honavar [Onor], and Mange-
lore. The rapid rise to power of the Nayaks of the Keladi ruling family un-
der Venkatappa Nayaka (I592-1629}, and the extension of that power
under Virabhadra Nayaka (1629-I64S) and Shivappa Nayaka (I645-I660)
had greatly complicated relations with Kanara. These rulers not only cre-
ated a significant domain between the Mirjan and Chandragiri rivers,
they also exploited the weakness of the Estado during the crisis years of
the mid-r-th century and the Dutch onslaught to fundamentally alter the
relationship between Kanara and the Estadc. Initially, this shift was em-
bodied in a marked revision of previous treaties. By the 1630S, it was the
Portuguese who were agreeing to purchase pepper at fair marker rates
each year while allowing two cartaz free voyages and 12 duty-free horses
annually! By the 1650S, Shivappa Nayaka had managed to expel the Portu-
guese from all their fortresses on the coast. The political machinations
ushered in with Shivappa's son, Somashkar Nayaka, in 1660, however,
would afford Goa the opportunity to reverse the legacy of defeat that had
characterized its experience on the Kanara coast for most of the oth cen-
tury."
Somashker Nayak's reign began with the dispatching of an embassy to
Goa charged with negotiating the issue of having the Portuguese reestab-
Iish their factories in Kanara. Initially, these talks went well. Mello de
Castro and others, however, were anxious over Dutch influence at court
and the fact that the Omani Arabs had been substantially increasing their
presence on that coast, buying up various commodities including rice.
Nevertheless, the Viceroy eventually came to an agreement that promised
the restitution of the erstwhile factories, Cambolim, and 10 ships with
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their artillery that had been lost during the tenure of D. Francisco de
Mello de Casrro." D. Manoel Lobo de Silveira, capitao-mor of the mar do
suI, was sent in the fall of 1664 with Il naos, 2 galleys, and 1 storeship with
artillery and other stores to explore the possibility of reoccupying these
fortresses. Nonetheless, after taking over Cambolim, a fleet under
Rijckloff Van Goens had appeared off Mangalore and Basrur and forced
the Portuguese to abandon their plans. Despite the fact that Mello de Cas-
tro had also provided assistance to Somashker Nayak 10 his dispute with
Bijapur, the dominant group at court quickly shifted its favor to the
Dutch." By December 1666, Sao Vicenre had decided that Somashker
Nayak's renewed promises of restitution were disingenuous. At a Council
of State meeting late that month, he argued that "doubting the entrance to
the ports of Canara on the part of the said king, it would be convemenr to
first seck the island of Cambolim, either by an amicable deal, or by means
of hostilities to possess it". Nunes da Cunha also suggested that all ship-
ping belonging to Somashker Nayak and Arab merchants found along
that coast might also be seized as pan of such an offensive. Despite oppo-
sition to this course of acuou on the part of the Council, a large fleet un-
der joao de Sousa Freire departed from the Mandovi in January 1667 and
hostilities soon thereafter commenced. ;/.
This warfare with Kanara did not go particularly well for the Portu-
guese. In January 1669, Carte-Real de Sampayo and Mello de Castro com-
plained bitterly of Sac Viccnte's decision to resume hostilities In a letter to
Pedro. "One year after arriving the Count Viceroy resolved to make war
on Canara, against the advice of everyone, which has resulted in State ex-
pense and a lack of foodstuffs for the city without providing any benefit."
Reflecting the casado view in Goa, the Governing Council in 'lam asked
that in the future any decision to wage war be made only with the advice
of the Council of State." Even during these hostilities, however, both the
Goa hierarchy and the indigenous ruler allowed an illegal trade in food-
stuffs to continue carried on by Hindu merchants, as a lerter of January
1670 makes dear." The Governing Council had also reestablished negotia-
tions with Somashker Nayak for peace and restitution of the erstwhile
fortresses through Jesuit intermediaries. In February 1671, Somashkar
Nayak sent a letter to Goa agam offering restitution of Mangalore,
Basrur, and Honavar with some trading privileges, provided certain stip-
ulations were met. Somashkar's conditions included rhe demand that
only single walls with no bastions should be built around these factories,
that no forcible conversions should be made among the indigenous Hin-
dus, and that no Brahmins or cows were to be harmed.'
In Apn11671, Carte-Real de Sampaio, Antonio de Mello de Castro, and
rhe Council of State discussed rhis offer conveyed to Goa by Vitula Malo,
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Somashker Nayak's ambassador. Bythe time Mendonca Furtado arrived,
these negotiations were nearly completed. While the new Viceroy was not
adverse to continuing the military struggle, "a lack of manpower and
money" compelled him to conclude these negotiations. At his insistence,
the final agreement included the right to position artillery within the fac-
tory walls and for Somashkar to encourage all Christians in his domains
to obey Portuguese clerics in ecclesiastical matters." Reestablishing facto-
ries at Mangalore, Basrur, and Honavar, however, was far more difficult
than might have been imagined during the spring of r67I. First,
Somashkar Nayak died in December of that year and his infant grandson,
Basava Nayak, assumed the throne. Succession feuds threatened for most
of the r670s, and this political instability certainly complicated the imple-
mentation of the treaty. In the end, power remained with a group led by
the queen mother and her favorite, Timmaya Nayak. The vac, at the
height of its anxiety over the entrance of the French into the trade in force
at about this same time, was also determined to prevent renascent Portu-
guese ambitions on the Kanara coast and did its best at court and with pe-
riodic squadrons off the coast to frustrate the reoccupation of Mangalore,
Basrur, and Honavar. Finally, the Omani Arabs continued to increase
rhcir presence on this coast. The Omanis had evidently received permis-
sion to establish a factory in the kingdom and their rice purchases had
driven the pnce up on this vital foodstuff from 8 to 14 pagodas for a score
of rice bales."
Although temporary arrangements were made to reesrablish the facto-
ries in question, the issue of an Omani settlement In Kanara evidently
caused a further rupture in relations between the two powers and re-
newed warfare resulted in the mid-J670S. High-seas fleets under
Domingos Barreto da Silva and Manoel Tavares da Gama had carried on
the campaign against Kanara.' But as Luis de Mendonca Furtado noted
in January 1675, this warfare had badly affected available foodstuffs to
Goa and its environs, a serious state of affairs given the endemic warfare
in the region between Aurangzeb, Bijapur, and Shivaji. Nevertheless, the
succession struggle in Kanara improved the bargaining position of the
Portuguese since both sides coveted European artillery and the Viceroy
also recognized that arranging another peace settlement with provisions
similar to the 1671 pact was desirable for the economic and geopolitical
needs of the Eetado:" For the next three years, warfare and negotiations
continued. By late 1678, another treaty of "peace, alliance, and com-
merce" was concluded with Kanara. Antonio Paes de Sande and the
Council of State discussed the offer brought to Goa by Chrisna Naique in
a meeting of 10 December 1678. The final treaty, signed five days later was
perhaps even more favorable to the Portuguese than the 1671 agreement.
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Among other things, Basava agreed to pay the Estado some 30,000
xerafins to compensate for Portuguese expenses in the war, while re-
nounong any claims toward compensation for the ships Da Silva and Da
Gama's fleets had captured. He also agreed to provide stone and wood for
the factory at Mangalore, to pay an annual tribute for Mangalore and
Basrur, to provide 1,500 sacks of clean rice annually, and raze the factory
of the Omanis and cue off trade with them, and to allow Catholic
churches to be built at Mizeo, Chandor, Bharkal, and Kalyan.' Although
Omani trade continued on this coast, the 1678 treaty with Kanara cer-
tainly signaled a notable rehabilitation of Portuguese power on this valu-
able coast, a renascent presence that would have been unthinkable during
the crisis years of the 1650S.
A final major Indian power with whom the Portuguese had relations
was the sultanate of Golconda on the Coromandel coast. A rich textiles
trade and the legend that the apostle St. Thomas was buried at Mylapore
had first attracted the Portuguese to this region in the early reth century,
settling at San Theme de Mylapore III 1517. By 1600, San Thome was a
town of "riches, pride, and luxury ... second to none in India"." For most
of the rcth century, the Portuguese had lived, traded, and prospered at San
Theme under the aegis of Vijayanagar and then under the petty principal-
ities which had succeeded it. The sultanate of Golconda originated in the
early reth century, "a conquest state ruled by a Turco-Persian dynasty,"
dominated by a Muslim political and military elite through a military fief
system, and supported by the labor of indigenous Telugu speaking Hin-
dus. By the mid-r-rh century, the sultanate had expanded to include most
of the territory contained in the modern state of Andhra Pradesh. Col-
conda was a wealthy kingdom: traditional revenues from landed property
had been supplemented by the development of the most important mines
and market for large diamonds in the world, as well as a trade in textiles,
indigo, foodstuffs, saltperer, and iron." In 1646, Mir jumla had claimed
suzerainty over San Theme for Abdullah Qurb Shah. The arrival of the
Dutch and English on that coast with factories established at Pulicar and
Madras significantly complicated the diplomatic situation for the Portu-
guese. By the early 1660s, the heavy diplomatic and financial pressure at
the Qurb Shahi court at Hyderabad and general apprehension over the
place falling into the hands of yet another European powet, had con-
vinced Abdullah to support a Dutch naval blockade with a besieging
army under Neknam Khan. This combined force succeeded in expelling
the Portuguese in May 1662, a defeat that Mello de Castro and his succes-
sors were determined to redress in the years that followed."
The next two decades witnessed various diplomatic machinations to
convince Abdullah Qutb Shah and his successor, Ahul Hasan, to restore
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San Theme to the Estado. In the wake of Neknam Khan's victory, the siz-
able Portuguese merchant community of San Theme had settled in nearby
Madras under the auspices of the English fort-factory at Fort St. George.
Led by men like joao Coelho and joao Pereira de Faria, this vocal group
consistently pressured the Goa hierarchy to facilitate a settlement that
would restore them to their erstwhile property and trade:' In February
1663, Antonio de Mello de Castro wrote to Abdullah, complaining of the
unjust occupation of San Theme, an act prompted by the nefarious urging
of the Vac. This move had violated the strong desire of the Portuguese to
conserve peace and good friendship with Golconda, a policy expressly re-
confirmed in his orders from Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor. The Viceroy
noted that he would soon send an envoy to discuss the matter, and evi-
dently chose Fr. Diogo de Madre de Deus and Manoel Antunes de
Carvalho, formerly sergeant-mar of San Theme, to undertake this mis-
sion to Hyderabad." ByJanuary 1666, it was dear that Abullah was in no
mood to consider a restitution. His first reply to Mello de Castro's envoys
was evasive, suggesting that he had taken the town due to some transgres-
sions on the part of the Portuguese and a desire to keep the Dutch from
capturing it. The English presence at Madras had also complicated mat-
ters since the Abdullah evidently wanted to restrict the European presence
in his domains. A second diplomatic missive had been rudely received and
thereafter ignored by the Qutb Shahi court. Neknam Khan had, more-
over, already ordered substantial improvements in the town's fortifica-
tions." Meanwhile, Mello de Castro sought to improve the position of the
expelled Portuguese residing in Madras through a series of appeals to the
English Governor, calling upon him to honor the terms of the 1661 alliance
between the powers and affording them protection from any further mis-
fortunes at the hands of Abdullah's armies. He also sought to quiet the in-
cessant complaints from his own subjects living there by promising them
a relatively swift recuperation of San Theme.'
In January 1665, the Viceroy informed Afonso VI that no such restitu-
tion had indeed taken place. Mello de Castro also admitted that he had
not yet resolved to use the only significant weapon he possessed in this
dispute: a high-seas fleet that could "strangle" Abdullah's seaborne trade.
His recalcitrance to utilize this strategy resulted from concern over the re-
action of the vac, which had still not demonstrated any long-standing
desire to honor their peace with the Crown." By mid-reec, however, the
continued intransigence of the Qurb Shahi court had already convinced
the Viceroy to embrace more forceful measures. As Mello de Castro in-
formed Afonso: "The king of Golconda pays no heed to us, nor has he
even responded to a letter I wrote him asking for the restitution of Sac
Thome.i.I have determined to send several ships that will impede the com-
FOREIGN POLICY
mercc of his kingdom; because the losses that he will receive from this
[act] will oblige him to restore the city, and have a better correspondence
with us.?" While the reaction of the vac remained uncertain, the Vice-
roy could at least count on Angle-Dutch rivalry and rumors of the im-
pending arrival of Colbert's company into the trade to temper the
Hollander's response. The most significant Portuguese victory in the en-
smng war was the capture by the carrack Siio Pedro de Alcantara under
capitao-mor D. Nourel de Castro of a very rich prize ship belonging to
Abdullah near the Straits of Hurmuz departed from Masulipatnam and
was bound for Persia. Predictably, it carried no cartaz and was loaded
with textiles, precious stones, and other goods. The revenue from this ves-
sel, that was certified as a legitimate prize in a Council of State meeting of
May 1666, was substantial. After the Crown and Mello de Castro had re-
ceived their shares, some 40,000 xerafins was paid to the sailors and infan-
try aboard the Sao Pedro de Alcantara. The remainder of the cargo was
eventually sold at public auction in Bassem, with the proceeds funding
other State projects."
At the very least, this maritime victory generated some attention from
Abdullah, who soon sent ambassadors to Goa to discuss the matter.
Mello de Castro had then discussed in a straightforward quid pro quo
with the king's envoys: restore the Portuguese to San Theme in return for
the prize ship. For the next few years, negotiations continued over these
matters. Abdullah's representatives challenged the claim that the ship had
been a legitimate prize and demanded the restitution of both the vessel
and its cargo; while Mello de Castro and then Sac Viccnte continued to
demand the return of San Theme and were apparently willing to return
the ship but not the cargo." As Carte-Real de Sarnpaio, Mello de Castro,
and Luis de Mendonca Furtado lamented from 1670-1672, a state of war
between the two powers continued while no definitive settlement could be
reached." Somewhat ironically, after these years of political and military
machinations on the part of the Estado designed to win back San Theme,
a large royal French fleet under Viceroy jacob Blanquet De La Haye man-
aged to capture the town from the Qurb Shahis on a single day in July
1672." Mendonca Furtado and his Council of State still considered San
Theme to be rightfully part of the Estado and evidently hoped that the
French would restore the town to them. The Viceroy also advised Pcdro
to seek a diplomatic solution to this end in Europe."
Lavradio's most immediate problem was to ensure that the long suffer-
mg Portuguese community in Madras did not rush back to San Theme
lured by an offer of personal restitution of property that La Haye had
made, an admittedly attractive ploy designed to gain de facto recognition
of french sovereignty over the place. J030 Pereira de Paria had warned of
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such an exodus in a letter of late July 1672, and the Viceroy had thereafter
written to joao Coelho to hopefully forestall a mass acceptance of the
French offer and to vigorously discourage any armed support for La
Ha ye's fleet. "The city of San Theme belongs to His Majesty ...the vassals
of His Majesty [should] not alter the state they are in.?" There was, of
course, virtually no chance that the French would restore this town to the
Portuguese. Colbert and La Haye had made efforts in both Lisbon and
Goa to arrange an anti-Dutch alliance in the period immediately preced-
ing the outbreak of the Third Dutch War. '0 As will be noted below, the
rather wise rejection of this tempting diplomatic offer by Pedro and his
Viceroy carried the price of negating even the remote possibility that the
French would consider turning over the town. For the next two years, the
Goa hierarchy kept a careful watch on the large-scale siege that developed
at San Theme between La Haye's forces and the armies of the new king of
Golconda, Abul Hasan. By September r674, a concerted land siege by the
Qurb Shahis and a Dutch naval blockade finally succeeded in expelling
the remnants of La Haye's once powerful fleet. Unfortunately, this experi-
ence reinforced the view in Hyderabad that no European power should be
allowed to take over the town again, and Abul Hasan's armies razed most
of its fortifications and the Portuguese were never able to reestablish
themselves in any significant fashion on the Coromandel coast:'
In addition to these major Indian powers, the Estado also maintained
regular diplomatic relations with a plethora of other indigenous king-
doms throughout maritime Asia: the Manchu or Ch'ing dynasty in China;
Indonesian powers like the sultan of Bantam, the sultanate of Aceh, the
ruler of Makassar; the Safavid dynasty in Persia, as well as a host of Afri-
can rulers along the Swahili coast and inland that will be detailed in chap-
ter 7. Nevertheless, perhaps the most daunting foreign policy questions
confronting the Viceroyalty during these years related to the rising politi-
cal and military power of the Omani Arabs. As Boxer has noted, the
Omani had been a seafaring people for centuries before the arrival of the
Portuguese in force in the Arabian Sea during the early reth century and
the capture of Ormuz and Maskat. Initially, however, their maritime
technology was inadequate to challenge the shipborne artillery of the Eu-
ropeans." This state of affairs had begun to change with the accession of
the Ya'rubi line of Imams in Oman, beginning with Nasir ibn Murshid
(r624-r649). This sultan succeeded in unifying much of Oman and at the
end of his reign besieged Maskar, the most important Portuguese fortress
in that region. Although Nasir ibn Murshid died before reducing this city,
his objective was soon obtained by his successor Sultan ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi
(1649-1679). After the capture of Maskat, ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi succeeded in
building up and maintaining a formidable fleet of warships, based largely
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on the European mode!, that engaged the Portuguese in a running war in
the Gulf of Oman, in the Arabian Sea, along the Swahili coast of Africa,
and on the west coast of India that lasted well into the rgrh century. This
challenge would command the attention of the succession of Viceroys ap-
pointed by the Braganzas beginning in the early 1660s:;
Following the loss of Maskar, the fortress at Mombassa was judged to
be at particular risk and ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi's forces unsuccessfully be-
sieged the city in 1660-1661. Mcndonca Purtado and D. Pedro de Lencastre
had tried to assist Mombassa by sending the Sao [oao e Sao Jacinto there
in December 1661, captained by Gabrie! Neto de Souza and loaded with
gunpowder, arms, rice, and 2000 xerafins?' In April 1662, D. Luisa
Gusmao ordered Mello de Castro to do everything he could to further re-
inforce the place so that no additional "disgrace" would befall the
Estado" In January 1664, Mello de Castro sent the caravel N.S de Naza-
reth e S. Antonio and two storeships to that city "with the provisions nec-
essary to sustain and defend it". A new captain, joseph Homen da Costa,
sailed with this small fleet with orders to punish the ruler of Pate who had
supported the Omanis in their most recent attack." As noted above, the
campaign against ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi took on renewed vIgor with the ar-
rival of the zealous joao Nunes da Cunha as Viceroy in the fall of 1666.
Sac Vicente took the campaign against Islam very seriously. In fact he
spent his first five months in office, and most of his energies during that
time, assembling a large armada to carry on the campaign agamsr the
Omanis. Exploiting a treasury surplus accumulated by Mello de Castro
and borrowing an additional 102,000 xeraiins from leading Christian mer-
chants in Goa, the Viceroy formed a powerful fleet under D. Francisco
Manoel that was ready to depart by the early spring of 1667. At the same
rime, Sac Vicenre sent a four-frigate fleet under D. jeronimo Manoe! to
protect the fortresses of the Norte from Omani attack.'
Contemporary sources attest to the formidable power embodied in D.
Francisco's fleet. Most of its commanders were seasoned vererans of
Asian warfare; a notable portion of the c. 1800 soldiers aboard were Euro-
pean; while the gunners were the best available m Goa." Unfortunately,
extant reports on the actions of the 1667 fleet after it departed from the
Mandovi in early April ate very sketchy. Nevertheless, it appears that the
squadron bombarded Maskat and other positions on that coast con-
trolled by ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi to some effect. A freak storm, however,
thereupon scattered the Portuguese armada, forcing D. FranCiSCO to re-
group at Congo or Bandar Kung before returning to Goa in late August
with at least two prizes." One indication of the relative success of D. Fran-
cisco Manoel's fleet is the extremely dynamic military response it engen-
dered from the Sultan of Oman. At the same time, this perceived 1667
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Table 7: The 1667 Straits of Hurmuz Fleet
- ------- -----
Ship Type Captain Guns Sailors Soldiers Other
.. -------------
Sr.a Thereza de Je- Nao [os. de MeJlo de 56 86 400 Admiral
sus Castro
St. Jean St. Jacinth N,o Fran. de Lucas 38 62 200 Vice
Cabreica
NS dR de Cassabe Frigate Pran. Range! Pinto 22 36 180
Penha da Franca Frigate Fran. Comes de 32 40 200
Lago
NS de Nazareth Caravel Manoel Carvalho 20 30 170
de SA
Frigate D. F. M. de Albu- 24 30 180
querque
Frigate D. Garcia 18 30 150
Frigate D. Pereira Sono? 18 30 150
Frigate Vesco Lour. da 18 30 150
Gama
Total: 246 374 1780
-- ------
victory may have resulted in comparatively lax preparations in Goa for
the continuation of the campaign in 1668. In any event, the outgrowth of
this conjunction of affairs was the sacking of the town of Diu by ibn Saif
al-Ya'rubi's high-seas fleet and troops in November 1668, where a sizable
amount of damage was done and a notable amount of booty carried off.
As Carte-Real and Mello de Castro pointed out nearly a year later, the
devastation caused to Diu continued even then: a regular trade had still
not been reestablished, alfandega receipts were virtually non-existent,
and the apparent ease with which the Omanis had sacked the place had
given encouragement to other enemies of the Estado. In the words of the
Governors, a prompt "remedio" was needed given the fact that Diu was
"the principal fortaleza in India" .'0
Significantly, the response of the Goa hierarchy to this stinging defeat
was both prompt and effective. The very able Antonio Paes de Sande, who
then held the key posts of Vedor-geral da [azenda and secretario do
Estado, was sent north to assess the damage and propose a course of ac-
tion to rehabilitate the area." The Treasury Council, meanwhile, handed
down a series of decisions which facilitated the economic recovery of Diu,
including a March 1669 assento which cut the usual custom duty rate at
the alfandega in that city by half for the next six years." To exact revenge
for the Omani attack, Corte-Real de Sampaio and Mello de Castro also
dispatched a Straits fleet in March 1669 under D. Jeronimo Manoel. As the
Governors informed the Crown: "Having given an account to Your Maj-
esty of the entrance of the Arabs into Diu, and for this reason, we have or-
dered an armada to Mascare." This fleet consisted of four ships of alto
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bordo, and five de remo. The galleon Sao Bento (capitania) had a crew of
30 as well as 80 soldiers; the nao Nossa Senhora dos Remedios sailed with
a crew of 20 and 55 soldiers; the frigate Sac [oao da Riheira had a crew of
18 and 50soldiers; and the caravel Nossa Senhora de Nazareth had a crew
of 14 and 47 soldiers. The five galleys carried another 90 soldiers including
indigenous lascarins. Among the Portuguese notables aboard this fleet
were joscph de Mello de Castro, almirante of the fleet and son of the for-
mer Viceroy; Antonio de Castro de Sande and Francisco Paes de Sande,
both sons of the Secretario do Estado; and joao Antunes Portugal."
Manoel's squadron reached Maskar on April 18, and bombarded that
city for several days to some effect. A rumor that 5 Omani ships were
headed for the Portuguese factory at Bandar Kung prompted Manoel to
break off this action. The Captain-general then headed for Persia both to
protect this factory and to take on water and supplies. Ibn Sad al-Ya'rubi
evidently sent a 25 ship fleet, mostly pataxoes but with 5 large warships,
under the same admiral who had directed the sacking of Diu the previous
year in search of the Portuguese. On the June 18, 1669 the two fleets met off
the island of Queixome or Qishm near Hurmuz. This naval engagement
lasted until late on June 19, with the Portuguese more than holding their
own. According to the extant Portuguese sources, this setback further in-
censed the Sultan who finally sent out an even more powerful fleet of ID
large warships, 4 frigates, 2 caravels, and some 7000 men under the com-
mand of Ali de Rostaya [sic] from Mecca, who in the past had besieged
Mombassa. On the 29-30th of August, this fleet met Manoel's squadron in
a fierce battle off the Cape of Macaodao (Ras Mussendom) near Hurmuz.
Although badly outnumbered, Manoel's squadron fought gallantly and
inflicted a crushing defeat on the Omanis: sinking 5of their ships, forcing
others to withdraw for repairs, and killing and wounding more than 2000
of the Arabs. As Carte-Real and Mello de Castro graphically informed
Lisbon: "The natives [on that coast] did not eat fresh fish for many days
because of the dead corpses that fouled the seas and beaches [rhere].""
This naval warfare with the Omanis continued with varymg degrees of
intensity throughout the 1670S and into the r680s, with neither side win-
ning a definitive victory. Initially, the Portuguese held the upper hand
thanks to the victory of Manoe!. As Carte-Real de Sampaio and Meilo de
Castro informed Pedro, this stunning success over ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi's
forces had prompted the friends of the Estado to promptly send ambassa-
dors to Goa with congratulations and the enemies of the Portuguese to
send envoys to treat with them:' In January 1670, the Governors had
sought to exploit this victory by sending D. jcronirno Manoel back to the
Straits with an even stronger fleet of seven ships de alto bordo, armed
with nearly 150 cannons, over 500soldiers, and 428 sailors. Manoel's fleet
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returned in November with at least one prize ship from its successful so-
journ at Bandar Kung and Hurmuz that had evidently witnessed another
Portuguese victory off the island of Qishm." In a letter of October 1671,
Mello de Castro and Carte Real de Sampaio boasted: "The Omanis re-
main so broken by the encounter they had with our fleet near the island of
Queixome, that they gathered the little that remained to them at Maskat,
not even sailing this past summer, a great occasion, by which we contin-
ued the Straits voyage that promises, not only credit, but also great advan-
tages.''" Nevertheless, Ibn Saif al-Ya'rubi had sent a fleet to attack
Mozambique in 1670, an action that was only deterred by the effective ac-
tions of Gaspar de Sousa Lacerda and the timely arrival of Mendonca
Furtado's Viceregal fleet in the summer of that year."
After Luis de Mendonca Furtado reached Goa, the foreign policy em-
phasis shifted somewhat more to diplomatic questions involving the Eu-
ropean powers on the eve of the Third Dutch War. Nevertheless,
Lavradio did not neglect the Omani campaign. In January 1672, he in-
formed Pedro that he was sending a ten-ship fleet to the Straits under An-
tonio de Mello de Castro: six do alto bordo and four more de remo under
the capitiio-mor Antonio de Castro de Sande." This fleet departed in
March 1672 and by May of that year, Mello de Castro had evidently nego-
tiated a treaty with Sayeide Hasan, governor of Mecca. Among other
things, this treaty allowed the Portuguese to bring goods to Mecca with-
out fear of attack, with ships from Diu, Daman, and Chaul paying only a
3% custom duty, and Mello de Castro's fleet exempt from any taxes. The
Captain-general was also paid a lump sum of 10,000 silver patacas [1=C.
320 reis], that as Mendonca Furtado later pointed out was the principal
advantage of this agreement." In 1673, joao Correa de Sa took a fleet to
the Straits of 3ships of alto bordo and 6 de remo that succeeded in obtain-
ing a new [arman from the Shah of Persia which reconfirmed the long-
standing claim of the Estado to half the custom revenues collected in the
port of Bandar Kung.'
By early 1676, the Omanis had recovered sufficiently from their earlier
mauling to send another fleet of I2 ships against Diu. This time, however,
the Portuguese were better prepared than some eight years previously.
Despite a plethora of demands on the Viceroyalty, Lavradio had seen to
the defense of the Norte in general and Diu in particular by sending the
capable Manoel de Mello as capitao-mor of an rr-ship squadron. This
force in conjunction with the squadron of the north then cruising the
Gujarati coast had proven equal to the task of repelling the Omanis.'
While the Portuguese were thus able to hold their own against Ibn Saif al-
Ya'rubi in this warfare of the 1660s and 1670S, the cost of this campaign
was high as several fidalgos pointed out to the Crown as time went by.
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Nevertheless, revenues from Bandar Kung flowed into the [azenda real
during this period and the renascent demonstration of naval power or-
chestrated by Sao Vicente and his successors at least succeeded in keeping
the key Indian fortresses of the Estado safe during this volatile period.'
While the Portuguese had therefore been willing to pursue a bellicose
foreign policy at times in relation to some of the Reis Vizinhos, the adop-
tion of a more pacific policy with respect to European rivals in the trade
would, in contrast, facilitate the rehabilitation of the Estado. In the early
1660s, the Dutch and English remained the only major European competi-
tors for the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean trade. As noted above, the
powerful VOC had been viewed as the"Antichrist" in Lisbon for most of
the rrrh century, and with some justification. After all, these Protestant
"heretics" had expelled the Portuguese from major fortresses in Indone-
sia, from Melaka, Ceylon, and elsewhere between c. 1630-1660. As D.
l.uisa de Gusmao's ambassadors in northern Europe informed her, de-
spite their efforts to arrange a formal peace with the States-General, there
was little prospect of a respite in this campaign as the new decade began.
The Dutch were making stringent demands: the granting of the same
commercial privileges as those ceded to England in 1654, or, failing that,
adequate monetary compensation, supplemented by a sum for the loss of
erstwhile possessions in Brazil. The diplomatic task in the United Prov-
inces was also complicated by attempts to arrange a peace with England
which might be jeopardized by exorbitant commercial concessions made
to the Dutch." As the count of Miranda informed the Queen Regent in let-
ters of February [661, the VOC was also making preparations to dispatch
a large fleet to continue the campaign with the Estado."
In April 1661, D. Luisa informed Mendonca Furtado and Lencastrc that
she was hoping for a peace with the Dutch; "in order to improve things
there," and that definitive word might be sent along with the new Viceroy
the following September. Nevertheless, she also forwarded letters from
Miranda indicating that a Dutch fleet of some 30warships and 8000 men
might soon be sent against Goa. Whtle the Queen promised to send out
this new Viceroy "with the greatest help that the possibilities of the king-
dom permit, in the meantime, I am certain that with your work and indus-
try and above all your valor and that of your vassals," this challenge
could be mer." In the end, of course, the continuing drain of the continen-
tal campaign against the Habsburgs and the imperial warfare with the
United Provinces prevented D. Luisa and her advisors from sending out
any meaningful supporr to Goa in the final stages of the Dutch onslaught.
Instead, the Portuguese hierarchy sought to find an alternative source of
reinforcements and succor for the tottering edifice of the Estado: the 1661
marriage treaty with Charles II and England. As detailed above, the idea
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of arranging a formidable alliance with England cemented by a royal mar-
riage to solve the Crown's problems was a long-standing priority of the
Braganzas. Francisco de Mello e Torre's offer to Charles of marriage to
Catherine of Braganza with a 2 million cruzado dowry, the cession of
Tangier and Bombay, and the continuation of the commercial privileges
set forth in the treaty of 1654 had finally been accepted in June 1661 and rat-
ified in late August of that year. Articles XV, XVI as well as a secret article
pledged the English king to defend Portuguese commercial interests
against the Dutch in both Europe and Asia."
Diplomatic relations with the Dutch and English for the next two de-
cades, and especially regarding Asian matters, were largely determined by
actions relating to the new Portuguese Viceroy's arrival in India in Sep-
tember 1662. Miranda's negotiations in The Hague had finally resulted in
an agreement between the two powers in the summer of 1661; Dutch mer-
chants would henceforth receive the same commercial privileges as
granted to the English in 1654, while to compensate for the loss of territory
in Brazil, the Queen Regent agreed to pay the sum of 4 million cruzados, a
hefty commitment that the Crown expected to meet largely from the rich
salt trade of Setubal. Significantly, although this treaty was signed in Au-
gust 1661, it was not ratified by D. Luisa and her Council until May 1662,
nor by the States-General in December 1662. Moreover, the publication of
the treaty did not occur until the following March." This delay, of course,
greatly facilitated the work of Maetsuycker and Van Goens, in the final
stages of their attack on the Estado, then focused on the remaining Portu-
guese possession on the Malabar coast. In January 1662, Van Goens had
captured Cranganore. He next besieged Cochin in February 1662, an un-
successful action that he resumed in the fall of that year. This aggressive
campaign embodied a less than welcomed reception for the new Portu-
guese Viceroy, Antonio de Mello de Castro, when he reached Bombay in
September 1662. At least initially, however, Mello de Castro assumed that
he possessed a sufficient weapon to combat this threat; the English fleet
which had carried him to India."
Soon after reaching Bombay and learning of the continuing Dutch
campaign of aggression to the south, the Viceroy asked Marlborough for
prompt military assistance. Charles, after all, in the secret article to the
treaty had promised that Marlborough's fleet would "go well furnished
of all the necessaries as well as of instructions, to defend, aid, and assist all
the possessions of the Portuguese in the East Indies," should they come
under Dutch attack." Ley, however, refused to commit his fleet to such a
dubious enterprise. The earl of Marlborough, moreover, had clearly had
enough of the new Viceroy and his retinue of fida/gos on the voyage from
Lisbon and was anxious to return to Europe once the transfer of the is-
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land had been arranged. Further complications, including the tardy ar-
rival of the ship Mary Rose with Sir Abraham Shipman aboard, alone
commissioned to demand the transfer of Bombay, and the failure to pro-
duce acceptable credentials as specified in Mello de Casrro's instructions
furnished the Viceroy with a convenient pretext for refusing to hand over
the island." This bold act set the stage for Angle-Portuguese relations
both m Europe and ASia for the next two decades. In turn, Ley's refusal to
mrervcne against Van Goens's marauding on the Malabar coast, as well
as the continuing infirmity of Goa's response to the military offensive of
the vac, allowed the Dutch to successfully complete their campaign. The
renewed siege of Cochin was finally completed by early January J663
when the Portuguese captain Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho surrendered
the town to Van Goens. In early February, the town of Cannanore also
fell to the vac, thus expelling the Portuguese from the Malabar coast for
the first time since the initial years of the rcrh century." The attempt to re-
coup these towns from the Dutch, both captured after the peace had been
ratified between the two powers would similarly set the stage for the
Luso-Dutch relations during the 1660'S.
In a letter of May 1661, D. Luisa de Cusmao had initially informed
Mcndonca Furtado and Lcncastre of the pact with England that conceded
Bombay to Charles 11 in return for the "utility that from the union and
friendship with the English nation can result to this Estado"." The follow-
mg October, the Queen Regent had reiterated her belief in the benefits of
becoming "brothers III arms" with the English in Asia in another letter to
the Governors." In March 1662, Charles 11 had also written to Mello de
Castro m terms designed to facilitate the transfer of Bombay, promising
"on land, as at sea, we will defend as our own lands, all the possessions
and territories of Portugal" .'"There is every indication that D. Luisa ex-
pected the English to be good allies who would help stabilize the rocky
status of the Estado. Nevertheless, to help ensure compliance with the
terms of the treaty, the Queen Regent had also written to Charles II to re-
mind the English king that he had to send arms for the defense of the
Estado? Mello de Castro had also received rather precise instructions on
turning over "the river and land of Bombay," upon his arrival, aSSllmmg
Charles lived up to his obligations in the quid pro quo:' In October 1662,
however, the Viceroy informed D. Luisa de Ousruao and the Council of
State in Coa that despite his orders of April 1662 ordenng him to turn over
the island, he had refused to do so, since Shipman had not presented the
necessary instrument for the transfer." Mello de Castro elaborated his po-
sition on this issue in letters of December 1662 and early 1663 after he had
reached Goa. These documents make it dear that the principal reasons
for his refusal to turn over the island were: (I) Marlborough's failure to
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provide any military assistance for the Estado, (2) the great economic and
strategic potential of Bombay, especially as it related to the Province of
the North; (3) the threat to Catholicism embodied by the English; and (4)
the fickle nature of any alliance with Charles U!' To ensure their prompt
arrival in Lisbon, the Viceroy sent the Jesuit Manoel Godinho via the
overland route with copies as well as dispatching others aboard the gal-
leon S. Francisco:"
From late 1662 until early 1665, the imbroglio engendered by Mello de
Castro's act played out in Europe and Asia. Charles II and Clarendon, of
course, were not amused with the news of events at Bombay and took an
extremely hard line in subsequent talks with Afonso VI and Castelo-
Melhor. From the very beginning of negotiations with D. Luisa de
Ousmao, the prime objective of any alliance with Portugal from the Eng-
lish perspective had been clear. As Charles succinctly wrote in his August
1661 instructions to his representative in Lisbon, Richard Fanshawe: "One
of the principal advantages we propose to ourself by this entire conjunc-
tion with Portugal is the advancement of the trade of this nation and the
enlargement of our own territories and dominions." Fanshawe had also
been instructed to press for the cession of Bassein, and to use the weak-
ness of the Portuguese in the face of the Dutch onslaught to his greatest
possible advantage." In May 1663, after word had reached Whitehall of
Mello de Castro's rebuff, Clarendon notified Fanshawe: "This act is so
foul that less than the head of the man cannot satisfy for the indignity."
Moreover, if Bombay was not handed over promptly: "Farewell to the
friendship with Portugal and they are not to wonder if they hear that we
and the Dutch are united in the East Indies and that we do all else to their
prejudice.":" In February 1664, Afonso wrote in a rather stern tone to
Mello de Castro. While they had read the Viceroy's dispatches sent with
Godinho, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor could not understand why Bom-
bay had not been turned over. In this letter, the Crown reiterated its ear-
lier orders to carry out the transfer as quickly as possible, allaying any
doubts on the part of the Portuguese residents on the island by assuring
them that their [azendas and religion had been safeguarded in the treaty."
In a November 1664 letter, Mello de Castro acknowledged receipt of
his second set of instructions to turn over the island. Leading fidalgos in
Goa at that time, including Ignacio Sarrnenro de Carvalho had pressured
him to respect these orders. Carvalho had also advised the Viceroy not to
allow the death of Shipman on nearby Anjidiv island, where the English
force had landed in early 1663 after their less than cordial reception in
Bombay, to delay this course of action. Mello de Castro, however, re-
mained adamant in his refusal to honor the quid pro quo embodied in the
treaty, when the English had, in his opinion, not fulfilled their part of the
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agreement. As the Viceroy informed Afonso, there were still two "great
difficulties" in honoring the king's orders: first, the failure of the English
to provide "their promised assistance to Portugal," and in turn the risk of
altering the peace between the two Crowns; and second, the faulty instru-
mcnr that the English had presented him." By early January r665, how-
ever, Mello de Castro had received additional letters via England that
finally convinced him to relent and facilitate the long awaited transfer of
Bombay. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that he did so with very
little enthusiasm. As the Viceroy lamented; "Only the obedience that I
owe as a vassal can prompt me to this action, because ... India [Portu-
guesaJ will end on the very day upon which the English nation takes
power in Bombay."'" Shipman's successor, Humphrey Cooke, finally
travelled to Bombay with Mello de Castro's envoys, Luis Mendes de
Vasconcellos and Sebasnao Alvares Nigos, and took possession of the is-
land in mid-February r665.'''"
The formal transference of the town, however, did little to improve the
strained relationship between the "allies" that had originated with the
events of September 1662. The genesis of most of these problems related to
the conditions that the English had been forced to agree to in r665 in order
to finally assume possession. This astute list of conditions drafted by
MelJo de Castro was highly favorable to the Portuguese cause. Among
other things, they restricted the English to the island and port of Bombay
alone, retaining Portuguese control over other nearby dependencies of
Bassein including Mahim, Thana, and Salserre island. Catholicism would
be protected as would the property rights of the current landowners, who
would also not be liable to more [ores than they were currently paying.
Tolls would not be levied on Portuguese goods passing by Bombay, while
English goods coming from the mainland would be subject to custom
charges and other tolls at Thana and elsewhere. The English also prom-
ised not to receive deserters from the Estado and to immediately return
any "Kunbis, Bhandaris, and the rest of the people Abunhados," subject
to Portuguese landowners in the Province of the North. Given his dwin-
dling forces on Anjidiv, the approaching war with the Dutch, and Mcllo
de Castro's amply demonstrated attitude on the matter, Cooke had very
little choice but to accept these conditions in early 1665."'"
Not surprisingly, both the royal governors of the island down to 1668,
Cooke and Henry Gary, as well as the Company Presidents Oxenden and
Ccrald Aungier, following the leasing of the place to the EIC by Charles If
m 1668, chafed under these constraints and sought to circumvent them by
any means possible. Complaints and counter-complaints on these issues
littered the diplomatic correspondence between Goa, Bombay, Surat, Lis-
bon, and London during the ensuing years. In particular, the English com-
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plained mightily against the collections of tolls at Thana and elsewhere
rhat added 10-12% to the cost of importing commodities from the nearby
mainland. Cooke and Gary did their best to avoid these charges, at times
sending troops in English craft to defy demands for rolls." The [IC
adopted a somewhat more subtle approach. In December 1672, Aungier
forwarded a set of proposals to Mendonca Furrado designed to arrange a
more specific alliance between the two powers in Asia. Foremost among
his demands was: "That no duties be charged on imporrs excepting at the
parr of arrival and landing, and that they be free of all tolls over rivers,
bridges etc., and that punishment be meted out to the Mandovis ofTanna
and Caranja for their unbearable insolence, and the exorbitant duties and
taxes which they arbitrarily impose on the subjects of His Majesty the
King of England. '''0' Throughout these years, of course, the Portuguese
continued to collect these monies whenever possible. The English, after
all, had agreed to the conditions of the transfer, and legally the position of
the Estado appeared strong. English complaints were therefore largely ig-
nored, especially by Mello de Castro, who in January 1666 had decried
Cooke's initial excesses including the illegal occupation of Mahim, and
branded Henry Gary "a terrible heretic," and "a great enemy of the Por-
tuguese nation"." As late as March 1677, Charles II was still writing with
very little effect, to Mendonca Purtado on the issue hoping to arrange re-
lief from these tolls."
In turn, Portuguese landowners on Bombay decried the unjust usurpa-
tion of their estates. The most vocal of these complaints came from the
two largest landowners under the old Portuguese regime: D. Inez de
Miranda, the widow of D. Rodrigo de Moncauto, whose manor house
had served as the locus for the transfer ceremony with Cooke, and the Je-
suit order which, as elsewhere in the Estado, had amassed significant
property on the island. Statistics on these losses can be found in two docu-
ments: a Lista das Fazendas, que os Inglezes repetidas vezes confiscariio
aos vassalos de Portugal, em Bombaym e Mahim, and 0 que tomado os
Inglezes uzurpado sem causa ... na ilha de Bombaim e seu districto dos
moradores nella:" Based on these sources, it appears that by 1668, nearly
160,000 xerafins in rendas alone had been lost. In 1667, for example, D.
Inez had been stripped of [azendas that returned 9,000 xerafins per year.
That same year, the Company of Jesus had been deprived of various
fazendas that returned 25,100 xerafins per year." Cooke, Gary, and
Aungier were thus successful in their attempt to expropriate the erstwhile
expropriators on the island. Pedro attempted to use these losses to his ad-
vantage in negotiations with the English regarding future payments on
Catberine of Braganza's dowry, ordering Mendonca Furtado to prepare a
comprehensive list of these losses for this task." While this task eventually
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resulted in the documentation noted above, the Portuguese in fact re-
ceived very little satisfaction in attempting to redress these violations of
the 1661 treaty. During the 1670S, Aungier would exacerbate continuing
tensions between the powers by turning Bombay into a thriving, well-de-
fended base for the operations of the EIe. Above all, his policy of reli-
gious freedom in the enclave did much to lure indigenous capital from the
Province of the North and in doing so, threaten the economic stability of
Chaul and Bassein, as Mendonca Furtado pointed out in letters of 1671
and 1672. Only on the eve of the Second and Third Dutch Wars did the
English briefly adopt a more conciliatory rone."
For the Portuguese, therefore, the promise and potential that D. Luisa
had hoped for when she made the treaty with Charles in 1661 had been
rapidly supplanted by a jaded resignation that the English would never
prove to be saviors to the Estado. As Mello de Castro and Sac Vicenre rec-
ognized early on, in addition to being recalcitrant military allies, the Eng-
lish simply did not have the power required for the role. As Mello de
Castro proffered to Afonso in January 1662: "The English have so little
power in this Orient ... that it is necessary for them to live in our
shadow. "", In January 1667, Nunes da Cunha informed the Crown that
not only were the English not living up to the commitments of the 1661
treaty, but: "The English do not possess in the said Orient neither the
force, nor money, nor government [to do so], living m the shadow of the
arms of Your Majesty.":" In fact, the English had been and never would
be more than ruthless geopolitical and commercial competitors to the
Estado, whose policies in Bombay exacerbated the drain of Indigenous
merchants and capital from the Province of the North. Mello de Casrro
and other fidalgos clearly wanted the Crown to purchase Bombay back
from Charles II and there is solid evidence that Afonso and Casrelo-
Melhor seriously considered this option beginning in 1665. The problem,
of course, as the king pointed out in a letter to the Viceroy was that the
Crown, due in part to the continuing war with Spain, already had suffi-
crent difficulties in meeting the dowry obligations to England and the
dcnativo promised in the treaty with the United Provinces. Quite frankly,
the king did not have the cash required for the purchase and the Cartes
was hardly likely to provide such a sum. Unless Mello de Castro could
raise "most of the asking price", nothing could be expected." In the end,
therefore, the English alliance proved to be a great disappointment with
regard to Portugal's Asian empire. The fundamental foreign policy ques-
tion as the 1660s wore on thus became how to rehabilitate the Estado lO
light of this dearth of assistance from London. The resolution to this semi-
nal question related to relations with the United Provinces and increas-
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ingly the rather mercurial entrance of France into the Indian Ocean trade
as part of jean-Baptiste Colbert's grand design for world trade.
In the years Immediately following the peace with the United Prov-
inces, Afonso and Castelo-Melhor concentrated their diplomatic efforts
toward effecting the return of Cochin and Cannanore." These efforts
were predictably rebuffed. De Win and the Heeren XVII based this stance
on Clause VI of the 1662-1663 treaty. This article stated that an hostilities
would cease between Portugal and the United Netherlands "in Europe
within two months from the date that this treaty shall be signed by both
parties, and in the other parts of the world from the date of the publica-
tion of this document" ."0 While it is quite possible that the Dutch delayed
publication until March 1663 in order to facilitate the work of
Maetsuycker and Van Goens, this did not abrogate the legal force of the
treaty. Legally as well as diplomatically, therefore, Afonso and his envoys
did not possess much of a case to press in The Hague and Amsterdam.
Down to 1668, the Portuguese hierarchy In both Goa and Lisbon recog-
nized that very little could be done to either exact revenge or to force a
restitution of their erstwhile possessions in Asia. As Mendonca Furtado
and D. Pedro de Lencastre had made clear to the conselho ultramarino as
early as 1662, the Dutch were "absolute masters" of Asian waters." Exac-
erbating matters were additional Dutch vexations during these years. As
Antonio de Mello de Castro noted in a letter of January I666, the Dutch
had done much more than merely refuse to restore Cochin and
Cannanore. They had also captured a Portuguese ship sailing from Brazil
to Angola, done much to prevent the Estado from retaking its fortresses
on the Kanara coast, to upset Portuguese trade III Macassar and elsewhere
in Indonesia, and even to have them expelled from Bandar Kung.'''
Following the accession of Pedro to power, an exceedingly tempting
offer for revenge in Asia surfaced in the form of Colbert's Asian strategy.
Colbert had begun his bold challenge to Dutch preeminence in the Asian
trade, in much the same fashion as he began his internal economic re-
forms of the 1660s: with the hope that it might be possible to undermine
the much vaunted position of the vac by means of "peaceful" economic
competition. Operating within the theoretical constraints of mercantilism
and its tenets of finite global wealth, he judged the Indian Ocean trade to
be the most lucrative in the world, the "only considerable one", which
yielded the Dutch over 12,000,000 liures annually. This enormous font of
merchant capital was not only the cornerstone of the Dutch global com-
mercial edifice, it was also the root of many of France's economic ills. To
address this festering inequity in overseas trade, Colbert had formed his
own Asian Compagnie in September 1664, replete with a mirror image of
the corporate structure of the vac, a nominal capital pool of 15,000,000
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liures, and monopoly privileges for 50 years. Fleets totaling 14 ships had
been sent in r665-1666 at a cost of over 2,700,000 livres. Francois Caron, an
experienced Director-General, had begun the daunting task of attempting
ro enrrench the French in the trade. Nevertheless, very little headway had
been made in Asia. In a March r669 Memoire sur l'estat present de la
Compagnie Oriente de France dans l'isle Dauphine et dans les Indes,
Louis's minister sought to address these early problems. By the early
spnng of r669, Col ben had in fact decided to fundamentaHy alter his erst-
while strategy of peaceful trading competition and to instead dispatch a
well-armed royal fleet that would once and for all establish French eco-
nomic power in Asia. This campaign, moreover, was timed to take advan-
tage of and complement Louis's approaching campaign in the Low
Countries. A vital component of this strategy was to forge an anti-Dutch
triple alliance in Asia with the English and Portuguese. Pedro's response
to this alluring missive would largely set the stage for the projected reha-
bilitation of the Estado during the decade and a half which followed."
In March r669, Colbert had sent off his formal instructions on these ne-
gotiations to hIS ambassador in Lisbon, the marquis de Sainr-Romain. He
began this important document by reminding Sainr-Romain that of the
four European nations then trading in Asia, the Portuguese had the lon-
gest experience and for many years had dominated the commerce of "all
the islands of Asia, and established diverse places and considerable posts
on the coasts of Africa, Persia, the Indies, China and Japan," noting "that
this great power had been notably diminished after the Dutch had intro-
duced their commerce in these same countries, and at present find them-
selves reduced only to the places of Goa, Diu, and several other less
considerable ones of the Coromande1 coast". In terms that anticipated the
thrust of Sainr-Romain's arguments to the Portuguese Crown, Colberr
contrasted the great wealth of the Dutch, whose annual fleets "rrans-
portjed] merchandise to the value of 10-12 million livres," and their mili-
tary power, with "more than '50 ships in the Indies ... land armies of
10,000 to 12,000 men, and at sea 40 to 50 warships," with the poverty and
weakness of the Estado, "which had neither warships nor ships". Accord-
ing to Colbert, this "prodigious difference" between the powers and the
insatiable desire on the part of the Dutch to augment their position and
entirely exclude the Portuguese from the trade, necessitated a "powerful
and effective remedy", namely, to form a commercial and military
"societe" with a nation of similar interests, not only to combat the nefari-
ous designs of the vac, but also "to take back from them a part of the
places that they have usurped by force". In Colbert's view, "only the
French," were capable of procuring this great advantage for the Portu-
guese. Sainr-Romain was therefore ordered to turn the 1667 treaty into a
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full-fledged commercial union in Asia, based on reciprocal trading rights
and the granting of at least one fortified settlement of the Estado to the
French."
Saint-Remain presented the French case to Pedro in April r669 and
continued talks well into the new year. In the course of his negotiations,
he logically attempted to exploit the influence of the French faction at
court; most visibly in the form of the able Marie Francoise, Afonso's erst-
while Queen and Pedro's Princess Regent, as well as the religious affinity
between the two Crowns. Following Colbert's advice, he also sought to
utilize the thirst for revenge against the heretic Dutch that was virtually
endemic in Lisbon at that time, and to stress the admittedly poor perfor-
mance of the English as allies and saviors for the tottering Estado in the
years after r66L This French offer was made at a crucial stage in the his-
tory of Portuguese Asia. As noted above, one of the most pressing ques-
tions confronting Pedro and his supporters following the ouster of Afonso
and Casrelo-Melhor was how to arrest and, if possible, reverse the alarm-
ing rzrh century decline of the Estado. Should the Crown, as with D. Luisa
de Cusmao in 1661, embrace a foreign alliance as the basis for such a turn-
around, or should peaceful internal reforms be adopted? As Saint-
Romain pursued his talks, Pedro was in the midst of resolving this Asian
dilemma, a resolution that was no doubt accelerated by the aggressive de-
mands in Colbert's instructions. In 1669, the decision had been made to
appoint the capable and experienced Mendonca Furtado as Viceroy, and
the royal fleet to carry him to Goa had begun to assemble in the Tagus
early the following year. While Sainr-Romain was evidently convinced
that a grand design was afoot in Lisbon regarding the Estado, it was not
entirely clear whether this restorador de Ceilao, as the new Viceroy was
styled, would achieve this notable goal by violent or peaceful means. Be-
ginning in January r670, the French ambassador, therefore, held a series of
meetings with Mendonca Purtado in an attempt to discover the answer to
this vital question, while hopefully generating support for the proposed
alliance."
In his talks with Lavradio, Saint-Remain received mixed signals. As he
informed Colbert and Louis XIV in letters of January and February r670,
the Viceroy had evidenced a "great desire to take some action against the
Dutch there", especially one aimed at the reduction of Batavia, which was
"the only good place that they had there and is the basis of their power".
Moreover, Mendonca Furtado did "not believe than one can diminish the
commerce of the Dutch in the Indies without waging war on them there".
Drawing on his decades of fighting the Hollanders in Asia, Mendonca
Furtado was also willing to furnish Saint-Romain with various stratagem
for waging such a war with the vac, including plans to exploit indige-
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nous assistance, to undertake "une simple guerre de pirates," as well as
basing such a struggle from a fortified French base near the straits of
Melaka and the ccntcr of Dutch power. Nevertheless, he refrained from
revealing the exact nature of his instructions from Pedro and continually
stopped short of embracing the proposed league with France as the
soundest means for restoring the Estadc to ItS former glory. As the French
ambassador discussed the matter with members of the Council of State
like the duke of Cadaval, the marquis of Fronteira, and the marquis of
Tavora, and members of the Overseas Council like Salvador Correira de
Sa e Benavides, the divisions among Pedro's advisors on the issue became
clear."
Nearly all members of the ruling hierarchy in Lisbon believed that a
Franco-Dutch rupture in Europe was inevitable. On this point there was
very little debate." Rather, the dispute acted out in the Terreirc do Paco
raged around the question of how best to exploit this impending struggle
for the benefit of the realm in general and the Estado in particular. Fortu-
nately, the opinions of some of Pedro's most important councilors on this
matter have been preserved in a document titled: Instruccao da Secretaria
de Estado e pareceres sabre a liga de Franca e IngIaterra. The pro-French
faction at court, championed by Marie-Francoisc and Fronrcira, argued
that such an opportunity could be exploited "to regain a part of the places
they had lost in the Indies" .'" In Fronteira's words, Colbert's proposal of-
fered "the most opportune and desired opportunity that the kingdom
could have to restore itself to the most glorious of all the conquests, which
is the Estado da India". In terms that reflected the mixture of dynastic
glory, mercantile benefits, and religious zeal that had long characterized
the Portuguese presence of Asia, the marquis concluded: "Without con-
quests one cannot have capital, [and] it is without doubt true that in order
to have a kingdom one has to have conquests, and in India, Your Majesty
pledges himself to the honor of God, the glory of the nation, [and] the in-
terest and remedy of your vassals. ''''') The opposing faction, led by
Cadaval, was not convinced that the proposed league was the best means
to rehabilitate the Estado, since external dependence had failed 10 1661
with the English and any league with France would very likely result in re-
newed warfare with Spain III Europe and the Dutch in Asia. In arguing
against an external alliance, Cadaval adroitly maintained there was
"great doubt of the recovery of India according to the treaty celebrated
between Your Majesty and the king of England, [and] if Your Majesty re-
covers India with the arms of France, that king will want the profit of his
expense". ""
The first official word that Sainr-Romain received on the proposed al-
liance came in August 1669, in a cansuIta of the Overseas Council. After
1711 RENASCEl'iT EMPIRE?
summarizing Colbert's offer, this document merely called for a strict ad-
herence to the provisions of the 1667 treaty but very little else. Thus, while
Portuguese commanders throughout the Estado were instructed to assist
French ships in need, it recommended to Pedro that Colbert's Compagnie
not be allowed to establish trading factories in the port cities of the
Estado, nor should Lisbon grant one of her fortresses to the French, as
Caron and others had suggested and Saint-Rornain had requested in his
talks." This news could not have been totally unexpected for the French
ambassador, since his dispatches to Colbert throughout the spring and
summer of that year indicate that Pedro was being gradually won over by
the Cadaval faction with respect to the alliance." Colbert was irked by
this initial rebuff from the Portuguese capital. Perhaps he had taken the
advice of the Jesuit Damiao Vieira to heart on the willingness of the Por-
tuguese Crown to embrace such an offer, "given its current and pressing
need". In any event, his impatience at what he believed was an ill-con-
ccived response emerges from his letters to Saint-Romain, in which he
constantly chastised Pedro and his advisors for being "blind" to the grim
reality of their situation in Asia. "The Portuguese cannot see clearly what
to me appears perfectly obvious, [that] it is impossible for them to exist in
the Indies, and resist the power of the Dutch, if they do not align them-
selves with another European power." Despite his disappointment,
Colbert ordered Saint-Romain to press for the league, or failing that, the
incorporation of pro-French clauses into the official orders or regimento
of Mendonca Furtado, as well as permission to build a French naval mag-
azine on the banks of the Tagus.'"
For the remainder of 1669 and 1670, Saint-Romain indeed continued his
talks with the Portuguese hierarchy to little avail. In December 1669, he
discussed the matter with Marie-Francoise, who informed him that
Schomberg had also raised the issue of granting one of the remaining
[ortalezas to France, a concession that she believed her husband was un-
likely to make." Although the ambassador tried to hold out hope of an
eventual agreement, it became increasingly obvious that Pedro had been
definitively won over by Cadaval's views on the issue. Nevertheless,
Saint-Remain informed Paris that he believed his efforts could help con-
tribute to the naming of Tavora as the next viceroy, when Mendonca
Furtado's term expired in 1674, an appointment that would bode well for
France's ambitions in that region. In the meantime, he argued that the ha-
tred towards the Dutch was such in many areas of the Estado that most
Portuguese there would offer to assist the French royal fleet then forming,
"even without orders from this court" ." This, of course, would prove to
be wishful thinking. Overall, the Portuguese made few concessions be-
yond the recommendations of the August 1669 consulta of the Overseas
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Council. Pcdro rejected Saint-Remain's call to include pro-French clauses
in Mendonca Purtado's formal regimento. He did, however, write letters
to Portuguese commanders in Brazil and the Estado instructing them to
favorably receive French ships in their ports. The Prince Regent also ac-
ceded to Colbert's demand that a French naval magazine be established
along the Tagus, something which might prove to be of benefit to the
French navy in the coming European struggle with the Dutch. In turn,
Pcdro's request that Mendonca Furtado's fleet be allowed to sail to India
in the company of Colbert's grand ASian fleet of 1670 was rejected in No-
vember 1669, as soon as it became clear that the Portuguese would in all
likelihood reject the comprehensive league in Asia that the French were
seeking."
Throughout the course of these discussions, English and Dutch diplo-
mats resident in Lisbon were extremely apprehensive about Saint-
Romain's efforts. l-rancis Parry, the English envoy, informed Lord
Arlington in August 1669 that he had broached the topic of the French am-
bassador's orders regarding the Asian trade with the Dutch resident and
had been told that the "Srarcsj-Gcneral] had now Sent him expresse Com-
mand to be vigilant m this business, and by all Arts imaginable to hinder
its taking effect"." France's rivals were especially wary of the close rela-
tionship that seemingly existed between Saint-Remain and Marie-
Francoise. A good deal, for example, was made in the diplomatic corre-
spondence with London and The Hague over the prominent role the
french ambassador played at the baptism of the royal couple's first child,
Dona Isabcl Luisa josefa, in 1669. As Parry advised Arlington in letters of
November 1670, these early fears were unfounded. As he wrote: "There
has been a Rumour some time about Towne of a League that is making
between the French king and this Crowne ... to make a joint warre on the
Hollander in the Indies. But there is a Person living in the french Ambas-
sador's house, and very well acquainted with all his actions, who assures
me that nothing yet is concluded." A week later, he was able to inform the
English secretary of state: "ll] now have it from a good hand that the
french Ambassador, notwithstanding all his persuasions cannot prcvaile
with these people to engage in any Acts of hostility against the Hol-
lander. ,,,.' Cadaval's arguments on the dubious nature of recovering any
Asian territory based on the arms of either England or France, the sincere
desire of the populace for the continued peace with Spain, and the simple
judgment on the part of the Council of State that the French were still no
match for the vac in an open struggle in Asia evidently decided the is-
'<'Isue.
For the remainder of the period before the outbreak of the Dutch War
in the spring of r672, and for the ensuing seven years of this important
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conflict, Pedro never wavered from the wise judgment for peace that he
had embraced by early 1670. After his arrival in Goa, Mendonca Furtado
would also reject the similar entreaties for an anti-Dutch alliance made by
Colbert's Admiral and Viceroy, jacob Blanquer de La Haye as his grand
fleet cruised the west coast of India in the early winter of 1672:'0 In fact,
only one time during this entire period from 1668-1679 does it appear that
the Prince Regent and Cadaval may have toyed with the idea of abandon-
ing this policy and breaking with the Dutch. A letter of August 1672, writ-
ten in the wake of the staggering early losses of the Hollanders at the
hands of Louis XIV's massive army in the initial months of the land cam-
paign in Europe, suggests that the pair may have considered joining in the
fray to share in the considerable spoils that it then appeared the French
king might be ready to win in both Europe and Asia." Even this brief flir-
tation, however, quickly ended as William of Orange began his notable
rehabilitation of the Dutch position in the continental campaign. In the
end, therefore, instead of embracing the admittedly timely and attractive
French offer for quick revenge against the Dutch for decades of setbacks,
Pedro and his closest advisors instead decided to remain as neutral as pos-
sible in the conflict, and to utilize the warfare that soon resulted among
their European rivals in the Asian trade to initiate badly needed reforms in
the Estado. This crucial decision, perhaps as much as anything else, ar-
gues for the effectiveness of Portuguese diplomacy, both with respect to
the European powers established in Asia and the Reis Yizinbos in the





An African Eldorado: The Quest for Wealth in
Mozambique and the RiDs de Cuama, c. 1640-1683
For the Portuguese Crown, the strategic Zambezi River basin or RIOS de
Cuama region as it was known, had long served as the focus of wishful
speculation regarding the rich mineral deposits located there. During the
early years of the empire, such beliefs had allowed Lisbon to hope for
quantities of gold and silver which might equal the riches that the Spanish
had found in Mexico and Peru with an accompanying economic boon. In
later years, especially in the period under consideration here, these sup-
posed riches were viewed as a mechanism which might help reesrablish
the golden years of the Estado da India. The Portuguese presence in
south-east Africa dated from the early reth century, with main [crtalezas
established on that coast at Mozambique island (1507) and Sofala (1505). In
addition, the Crown maintained minor coastal posts at Quelimane (at the
mouth of the Zambezi) and Luabo island; along with the interior settle-
ments uprivcr at Sena and Tete.' Relations with the African kingdom of
the Monomorapa, the paramount chief of the Makalanga confederacy,
had varied widely over the years. Dominican missionaries had tradition-
ally attempted to extend Portuguese power through their proselytizing ac-
tivities. They had, for example, convinced Monomotapa Mavura
(baptized D. Filipe) to allow churches and fairs in Zimbabwe during the
1640S, and also baptized his successor Siti Kazurukumusapa (thereafter D.
Domingos) in 1652.' Meanwhile, there had been periodic Portuguese for-
ays inland in search of gold and other lucrative trading goods. Perhaps the
best example of such attempts was the Barreto-Homem expedition of
1569-1575, sanctioned by the mercurial boy-king D. Sebastiao, led by the
vainglorious Francisco Barreto, and charged with conquering the rich
mines of Monomotapa. The inglorious defeat of this expedition and the
years of the Spanish captivity which began soon thereafter for a time re-
tarded the formulation and execution of such schemes on the part of the
Crown, a 1635 expedition being perhaps the lone exception.' Nevertheless,
resourceful Portuguese adventurers like Manoel Pais de Pinho success-
fully carved out huge private holdings or prazos where they exercised
near total authority, intermarried with the indigenous population, and
reaped the material benefits of the rich commerce of the region:
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The Crown, meanwhile, was content to restrict its presence in that
area largely to the fickle authority exercised by the captaincy of Mozam-
hiquc and Sofala, a lucrative and much desired administrative post that
was generally farmed out to the highest bidder, who paid the Crown a
fixed sum and in return enjoyed effect control over Portuguese interests in
the area and a plethora of commercial advantages as well. Not surpris-
mgly this system not only encouraged the type of abuses and corruption
typified hy the careers of captains like D. Francisco de Lima, but also en-
sured that private individuals and not the state received the primary com-
mercial and financial benefits that were generated by the region.' As
Axelson has argued, while gold production in south-east Africa may have
increased greatly from Co 1580-1600 to perhaps roO,DDD cruzados a year,
"this wealth, however, was of benefit ro the lessee of the captaincy, not
the state". Another major trade, that in ivory, may have yielded consider-
able revenue to the state, but provided "still greater profits to the individ-
ual". Exacerbating such problems was the unwelcome reality that the
captaincy system ensured that the state "was put to great and dispropor-
tionate expenses to maintain the Portuguese presence ... in money, m re-
sources, and in lives" ." The lucrative privileges formally granted to the
Captain, and the bevy of ill-gotten gams readily available to an unscrupu-
lous holder of that office, had also created a widening rift between Cap-
ratncy and the Portuguese residents of the region. As these moradores
pointed out in a 1663 petition to the Crown, trade was the basis for their
livelihood and the Captaincy system was increasing depriving them of it.
Although various regimentcs over the years had allowed them to trade
between Mozambique and the coast north of Cape Delgado, eastward
from the Comoros and Madagascar, and even allowed them 200 bares of
cloth as a liberty on the annual ship from Goa, the Captains had increas-
ingly confiscated their cargoes and put them in his own warehouse. This
practice and other abuses caused the moradores to call for the contact be-
ing given to private residents of Mozambique and Goa. While the Crown
subsequently ordered the Captains to respect such privileges no signifi-
cant reforms were Immediately forthcoming.'
In r656 and again m 1661, Antonio Alvares Pereira sought to rekindle
increased Crown interest in the Rios de Cuama in long letters extolling
the fiches of the region. In Pereira's words: "The Rios are very extensive
lands, and abundant in minerals, as much in gold as in copper, iron, and
silver." Cotton, wood for building boats, fertile land for growing wheat,
nee, and corn all existed there and could benefit the Crown. A link across
the continent to Angola could also be forged. According to Pereira, the
major problem in exploiting all these potentialities was "the tack of Por-
tuguese inhabitants" Jiving there. He estimated that perhaps as few as 80
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cazados currently resided in the region. He concluded, however, that an
investment of 30,000 xerafins in the coming year could fund the settling of
a nucleus of new families there, a start that should be supplemented each
monsoon with additional arrivals.' In April 1662, D. Luisa de Cusmao or-
dered Antonio de Mello de Castro to thank Antonio Alvares Pereira for
his second letter on the Rios de Cuama and to investigate all the possibili-
ties raised in this document. The Viceroy was also expected to discuss the
matter with the Goa Council of State and come up with formal recom-
mendations for the Crown.' In December of that year, Mello de Castro re-
ported his findings in a letter to the Queen Regent. The Viceroy concurred
with the glowing report of Pereira: "There is no doubt that the land of the
Rios is a great thing and of considerable importance." Yet, any plans to
increase the Portuguese presence in south-east Africa had to be severely
tempered by three unwelcome realities: (I) the plethora of other demands
on Lisbon and Goa; (2) the depleted state of the Fazenda Real; and (3) the
rather daunting specter of the vac in the general region of the Cape of
Good Hope and beyond. All the same, the Viceroy promised to do every-
thing he could to assist the region, provided it did not interfere with the
contracto rights of the Captain of Mozambique and Sofala." For the re-
mainder of the 1660'S, however, neither Lisbon nor Goa was in a position
to act on the recommendations of Pereira nor anyone else. Serious efforts
to exploit the potential of the Rios de Cuama region would have, like
many aspects of the rehabilitation campaign of the Estado, have to await
the accession to power of Pedro.
Interestingly enough, it was at least in part the work of Colbert's new
Compagnie des Indes Orientales on nearby Madagascar that prompted
the Prince Regent and his advisors to take a more active interest in devel-
oping Mozambique and the Rios de Cuama. French efforts to colonize
Madagascar had been underway for some time. Richelieu's Compagnie
d'Criern and even earlier private entities had all sought to establish a
French presence on this strategic island as a precursor to entering the In-
dian Ocean trade proper. In 1654, for example, a French ship had put into
Mozambique from Fort Dauphin in search of supplies, convincing D.
Francisco de Lima and others of even more competition in the years to
come." Colbert's well funded Compagnie had also ccntered its early activ-
ities on Madagascar. French fleets of 1665 and 1666 destined for the island
comprised some 18 ships; and carried officers, crews, infantry companies,
and colonists totaling more than 2500 people. The cost of these initial for-
ays came to c. 2,760,000 livresv' As early as March 1666, Afonso and
Castelo-Melhor had ordered Sac Vicente to take extraordinary care in re-
inforcing Mozambique given the increasing threat that the French Com-
pany posed." Colbert was clearly serious about his desire to break into the
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Indian Ocean trade. Just as importantly, he then enjoyed the firm support
of Louis XIV in this quest. Unfortunately for Lisbon, the original target of
these commercial affections was dangerously close to Mozambique and
the Rios, the very area that Pedro, Cadaval and others would increasingly
coming to view as a locus for Crown activities which could compensate
for earlier losses to the Dutch and 111 doing so serve as something of a cor-
nerstone for a rehabilitated Estado da India."
Beginning in 1669, Pedro and his advisors began a concerted effort to
address the lingering problems with Mozambique and the Rios. As noted
above, the decision of the Prince Regent at about this same time to reject
Colbert's tempting offer of an alliance against the Dutch certainly facili-
tated the ability of the Crown to undertake badly needed reforms in this
regtcn. Pcdro, Cadaval, and members of the Council of State and Over-
seas Council considered available documentation on the issue including
letters from Pereira, Manoel Barreto (1667), D. Antonio Lobo da Sylveira
(u668), and D. Francisco de Lima. A consulta of the Overseas Council
dated May 1669 summarized the general consensus of these reports:
namely that major reforms were needed in order to rehabilitate the region
and by extension the Estado. According to the Council, the problems in
Mozambique and the RlOS along with "new conquest that the French are
making on the Island of Sdo Lourenco, together constitute a very impor-
tant matter, and embody prejudicial consequences to the conservation of
the Estado da India". Nearly all of these reports called for the abolition of
the coruracto as a precondition for reform, with the trade to the Rios
opened to all subjects provided custom duties were paid. Lima argued
that the fortress at Sofala should be dismantled since the trade there had
dwindled badly. He also proffered that corruption could be cut down by
instituting a cofre with 3 keys in the future for all transactions involving
the Royal Treasury. Sylvcira called for increased fortifications in
Quelimane, Linde, Luabo and Sofala. Barreto also offered a most grandi-
ose plan for the systematic conquest of the region by a conquering
capitao-mor, This African conquistador would begin at Sena, wielding a
force of some 12,000 warriors, slaves, and 300 mulattos with firearms
along with roo Portuguese musketeers. In hIS view, this force would be ca-
pable of reducing Murrumbala, Tonga lands, Karangaland, and Butua.
Large estates could be carved out of these conquests and at that point the
other universal recommendations of these reports could follow: the intro-
duction of significant numbers of Portuguese settlers from the mainland
and empire.';
Many of these suggested reforms echoed recommendations made by
Anronio de Mello de Castro and Sac Vicente from 1664-1667. Mello de
Castro had urged that the contracto system be reformed, that financial
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abuses be curbed in part by adopting 3 key chests and that the attempt of
the new Captain D. Manoe! de Mascarenhas to restore and extend the
fortifications of fort S. Sebastiao at Mozambique be assisted by the
Crown, since "upon the security of it depends the conservation of this
Estado".'6 Sac Vicente had also railed against the frequent abuses of the
Captains, whose ill-gotten fortunes had allowed them to buy anything
they desired and ignore the just complaints of the clerics and casados of
the region: "I will only say to Your Majesty that India will not be won by
the Dutch, but lost by [such] unpunished injustices and tyrannies.''"
There can be very little doubt that the cumulative effect of all of these doc-
uments not only motivated the reforms of the ,670S but also set the guide-
lines for them as well. The exact timing of Pedrc's actions, however, may
have also been tied to continuing French activities off south-east Africa.
In addition to undertaking diplomatic negotiations with Pedro regarding
an anti-Dutch alliance, Saint-Remain had also kept busy informing Paris
of the supposed riches of the Rios region. In a letter of February 1670, he
advised Colbert: "The Portuguese have always believed they have rich
and abundant gold mines ... where the Cuama river flows." In the French
ambassador's view, since the Portuguese did not "have a settlement
within 60 leagues of the mouth of this river," Colbert's Compagnie might
easily accomplish something. With an eye towards a future reconnais-
sance of the area by the formidable royal fleet under La Haye then depart-
ing from Rochefort, he provided the following information: "The mouth
of the Cuama river is on the coast of Africa opposite from the isle
Dauphine [Madagascar] between 22 degrees of latitude and the Tropic of
Capricorn. "" The increasing interest of the French in the Rios and the im-
pending arrival of Colbert's grand Asian fleet in the waters off south-east
Africa apparently convinced Pedro and his supporters that forceful ac-
tions were necessary in order to safeguard this crucial area to the Estado
da India."
After extensive discussions, Pedro first informed Mendonca Furtado
of an impending shift in Crown policy regarding Mozambique and the
Rios in a letter of March 1671. The Prince Regent informed his Viceroy
that he had decided to send an infantry company of roo men, munitions,
and arms to assist the fortress of Mozambique in the coming monsoon.
Orders had been given to improve the fortifications there, and a new
polvarista would stop there on his way to the Caza da Polvara in Ooa.
New accounting procedures would also be instituted to cut down on fi-
nancial irregularities. Perhaps more importantly, the Prince Regent in-
formed Mendonca Furtado that beginning with the next appointment of a
Captain, the contract of a trading monopoly would perhaps be taken
away from that position, and instead the commerce of Mozambique and
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the Rios would be free to all Portuguese subjects on payment of custom
duties. These duties, it was assumed, would compensate for the loss of
monies yielded from farming out the captaincy. The Viceroy and Trea-
sury Council would be charged with establishing the alfandega in Mo-
zambique and selecting its officers. Pedro, however, indicated that he
would await Mendonca Furtado's advice before taking a final resolution
on the issue.'0
In October I671, the Viceroy responded to this letter. Mendonca
Furtado had been forced to "winter" at Mozambique and appreciated its
importance as perhaps the most important fortress in the Estado. Never-
theless, his long experience in Asia convinced him that the Crown was
considering an ill-advised course of action. Mendonca Purtado argued
that while the monopoly contract with the Captain may not have been
good for the vassals of the Crown, experience demonstrated that opening
the Rios to free trade would be even less be useful to the Treasury and
Pedro's subjects. In language that embraced certain tenets of mercantil-
ism, the Viceroy maintained that such a radical shift in policy would un-
leash potentially dangerous economic forces, with consequences not
easily remedied from Lisbon or Goa. Moreover, the influx of textiles and
other goods into the Rios would deflate prices and reduce the yields of
any alfimdega, whose receipts could thus not be expected to cover the rev-
enue lost by abandoning the contract."
After consultations with the Treasury Council, Mendonca Furtado of-
fered a somewhat less sweeping scheme to the Crown. An estanque or
Crown authorized monopoly run for the benefit of the Fazenda Real
could be established which could carry on the trade for Mozambique and
the Rios. This entity would control the level of goods imported and ex-
ported from the region, thus ensuring stable prices and returns; some
products might even be opened to private traders with customs duties
paid at an alfiindega at Mozambique. Mendonca Furtado proffered that
since the economic potential of the region was so great, with 100,000-
200,000 cruzados being made by men without much capital, the Crown
might expect to make a handsome return from such a system. As a final
critique of Pedro's idea, the Viceroy also offered that the main beneficia-
nes of such an action would most likely be indigenous Canarim and
Hindu merchants. On related issues, Mendonca Furrado reported that he
would send along a plan for the new fortifications of the fortress of S.
Sebastian. Engineers accompanying his fleet had begun exterior work
during his stay there, fixing the parapets on rhc ramparts and making
rhem more useful for protecting artillery. A lack of manpower had de-
layed work on building new bastions. Nevertheless, the Viceroy proffered
that it was not necessary to worry about a prolonged siege of the place
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since within two months all of the besiegers would probably perish from
disease. Nearly 250 men aboard his Viceregal fleet had died while winter-
ing there and this harsh attrition rate could similarly be expected to affect
any enemy troops."
In early March r672, before receiving these letters, Pedro resolved to
abolish the monopoly contract system for the Captain of Mozambique
and Sofala. In letters of March 7-8, the Viceroy was informed that based
on the advice of his Overseas and Treasury Councils, the Prince Regent
had decided to suspend the contracto and instead substitute comercio
lwre for Mozambique and the RiDS de Cuama? The following day a for-
mal alvara was issued by Pedro that henceforth established free trade for
all of his vassals resident in Portugal, the Atlantic islands, Brazil, and
other conquests; the right to send vessels to trade on the African coast be-
tween the Cape of Good Hope and Guardafui in all goods, including pep-
per, cloves, cinnamon, and slaves without impediment, provided customs
duties were paid. This new system would ideally commence in March r673
and one of the prime reasons for undertaking this radical shift in policy
was to facilitate the settling of the Rios with Portuguese subjects. The
alvara would be posted in all the main public places of the imperio, and
precise orders given to rhe Viceroy and all other officials not to intercept
nor interfere with the commerce that would result. That same day, the
Overseas Council approved a list of 24 skilled stonemasons, blacksmiths,
locksmiths, and carpenters that were to be sent to Mozambique aboard
the Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e Santo Antonio to assist with the work of
improving the fortifications there."
By September r672, Mendonca Purtado's letters criticizing this bold
free trade plan had reached Lisbon and been debated by the Overseas
Council. In a consulta of the fifth day of that month, this body recom-
mended a compromise position. While the Crown had taken its original
decision in order to save the Rios by populating them, the Viceroy evi-
dently believed that his estanque plan would also achieve this end. Never-
theless, the Council recommended that this scheme only be applied to the
erstwhile area of the contracto in Mozambique and the Rios. The rest of
the African coast should indeed be subject to the provisions of the free
trade aloara of the previous March. Mendonca Furtado should be ap-
prised of this decision without delay and he should immediately order it
into effect since: "This business is of the utmost importance for the con-
servation of the Estado da India." These prompt actions would also allow
the Viceroy to select an experienced group of private citizens to form a
Junta to oversee the activities of the eetanque." On September 22, Pedro
forwarded the advice of his Council while informing Mendonca Furrado
that he had decided to defer to his Viceroy's vast experience on such mat-
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ters, allowmg him ro do what was best for the interests of the Crown, the
Estado, royal and private profit, the conservation of Mozambique and
the settlement of the Rios."
In Goa, Mendonca Furtado had continued to lobby against the imple-
mentation of the free trade system. In January 1672, he probably encour-
aged Antonio Colaco da Silva to compile a long report, ultimately
destined for Pcdro's eyes, on the state of Mozambique and the Rios, argu-
ing against the implementation of comercio livre." In September 1672, at
the same time as the Overseas Council was recommending a compromise
solution, the Viceroy embarked a second series of letters on the issue
aboard the Bom [ezus de Nazareth. There was no disputing the fact that
Mozambique and the Rios badly needed attention: additional settlers, a
stronger military presence, and better administration. Yet, while this
banda was of the utmost importance, "it would be so prejudicial to have
the Rios open [to free trade]". The Captains may have paid c. 30,000
cruzados per year but under an estanque system, an efficient Junta could
easily generate 60,000 cruzados a year. This sum could be used to offset
the expenses of the praca. Moreover, the restoration of Mozambique
would also help the economic vitality of the Province of the North, whose
traditional trade to south-east Africa had sometimes yielded some 50,000
xerafins a year in alfiindega receipts before the abuses of the Captains and
the ravages of the Omanis had begun. The idea of allowing merchants
from Brazil and the rest of the empire to profit from this trade was also an
anathema to Mcndonca Furtado since "great harm" would be done to
vassals in Goa, Chaul, Basscin, Daman, and Diu who, given recent losses
to the VOC, did not have many other trading options."
In January 1673, this pressing matter was finally resolved. After consul-
tations with the State and Treasury Councils of Goa, the Viceroy estab-
lished a Tribunal da Junta do Comercio de Mor;ambique e Rios.
According to the regimento of the 23 January that set up this body, six of-
ficials would henceforth direct the trade of Mozambique and the Rios: a
superintendent, a casteliio, and ouuidor, the Restor of the College of S.
Paul, and the Prior of the Convent of S. Domingos, and finally an "bomen
de negocio e trato de Mossambique", nominated by the Viceroy. Accord-
ing to this regimento. the principal role of the Junta was to manage this
commerce for the benefit of the Fazenda Real: overseeing the procure-
ment, financing and shipping of products in a timely fashion, determining
"just" prices, establishing a distribution network throughout the Rios,
and enforcing the Crown's monopoly privileges over the trade. Fazendas
de lei including Ivory, gold, gunpowder, and firearms constituted a
Crown monopoly, while fazendas livres could be imported and exported
by pnvare subjects, provided that customs duties of 5% were paid at the
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alfandega established at Mozambique. Mozambique would thus effec-
tively act as the focal point of the Junta's administrative and commercial
network. The superintendent was expected to utilize royal functionaries
at Cape Correnres, Sena, Quelimane, and Sofala and their hinrerlands to
obtain trading goods that would eventually be shipped via "cafilas",
along with appropriate [azendas liures to Mozambique for eventual ship-
ment to Goa and the major ports of the Province of the North. Con-
versely, textiles and other goods from India would arrive at Mozambique
and thereafter be distributed to the subordinate settlements."
In the same packet of letters in which Mendonca Furtado informed the
Prince Regent that the Junta had been constituted, he also notified Lisbon
of recent reports indicating that rich silver deposits had been found in the
Rios. The Viceroy lamented that he lacked sufficient men to exploit these
possibilities and predictably called for additional manpower and fortifi-
cations. "I think that if it is as these men say that there will not be in India
more riches than the Rios promises." Men of quality were needed to mine
these riches, men that should first be sent to Goa to acclimatize to a tropi-
cal climate before heading for the more difficult environment of Mozam-
bique where so many Portuguese soldiers and sailors had died over the
years from disease. Fortifications for places like Sofala would be expen-
sive, but Mendonca Furtado hoped that these expenses could be offset ei-
ther from profits from the estanque in the Rios or by a direct barter
arrangement through the Crown's officers." Even before receiving this
news, Pedro had been encouraged to undertake more aggressive military
measures in the region. The Overseas Council in an adviso of September
1673 had highlighted the relatively troubled economic state of the imperio,
including Africa and Brazil, and recommended among other things that
the Crown undertake an expedition to the Rios, so "abundant in gold,
ivory, and amber," from which "many neighboring kingdoms have taken
many millions". In the view of his councilors, who invoked the examples
of D. Manoel I and the Spanish conquests in the New World, only bold,
prompt, actions would suffice: "Your Majesty should order everything
attempted, and everything discovered, because nothing is more evident
than these foundations, in order to obtain great riches. ,,,,
In the meantime, Mendonca Furtado was attempting the difficult
work of establishing the Junta and its trade. Manoel Serrao Alfaya had
originally been selected to serve as the Provedor mor da Fazenda dos
Cantos and superintendent and he had sailed for Mozambique in January
1673." Unfortunately, as joao de Sousa Freire informed the Viceroy in Sep-
tember of that year, Alfaya had died "a few days after his arrival". He had
been replaced by Antonio Correa de Sa." Other notables on the Junta in-
cluded Ignacio Sarmento de Carvalho, former Captain of Cochin; the
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reitor of the College of S. Paul, Scbastiao d' Almeida; and the Chancellor
of the Estado, Francisco Cabral Almada. joao do Valle Lemos was ap-
pointed to serve as Secretary and contador da [azenda dos Cantos. Initial
problems with the new system were daunting." Antonio Lobo da Silva, a
very rich landowner in the region had been spreading news that the whole
African coast was open to free trade, as Pedro had initially intended, thus
complicating the task of the Junta. The actions of other Portuguese sub-
jects had also resulted in warfare with the Tongas and Manica, relations
with the Monomorapa were hardly better given continuing usurping of
the emperor's lands by Portuguese adventurers. The naval power of the
Omanis also posed a threat to the cafila system that junta proposed to un-
dertake along the east Africa coast. The garrison and fortifications at Mo-
zambique remained in an inadequate state to meet these challenges.
Finally, the example of the voyage of the Nossa Senhora de Nazareth e
Santa Antonio, which had carried Serrao Alfaya to Mozambique showed
that the liberdades carried would probably be far in excess in what should
have been allowed." The only good news initially was that Sousa Freire
had sent silver samples to Goa which promised great future wealth;
wealth which might even allow (he Portuguese to have a "great treasury
in India", redeem all their past debts and purchase goods to a degree
which would threatened the position of (he VOc. <c' In January 1674,
Mendonca Furtado informed Pedro that the Jesuit Andre Furtado was re-
turning to Lisbon and would inform the Crown of everything that was be-
ing done and should be done to exploit the potential of the Rios. ,-
That same month, the Deputies of the junta furnished a detailed ac-
count of (heir early activities to the Overseas Council and Crown. In Sep-
tember 1673, they managed to send roupas to the same value as the
Captain of Mozambique to the Rios. Unfortunately, the untimely death
of Serrao Alfaya had caused the trade to be a bit atrasado at the outset.
Correa de Sa had demonstrated great skills at the Fazenda Real but a
dearth of initial capital for the Junta had undermined their actions and
undermined their credit. Sales of this original shipment of textiles had
also been slower than anticipated because joao de Sousa Freire had also
flooded the market with roupas during the final captaincy of the old sys-
tem. The Deputies believed that future years would be more lucrative and
that once some profits had been generated the trade and the junta's credit
would be substantially improved. Moreover, in their view, Pedro could
not conserve anything more important in Europe or Asia than the Rios.
The lack of a sizable Portuguese community along the course of the Zam-
bezi remained a fundamental problem for the success of the Junta. One
way to remedy this "depopulation" was to send ships each year loaded
with orphan girls from the Reino who, in a time honored practice, might
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be provided with estates in the Rios as dowries in order to attract hus-
bands and thus populate the region. On a related issue, the Deputies ar-
gued that the Crown should do everything it could to improve the
economic state of Diu, which had traditionally maintained strong trading
ties with Mozambique and tbe Rios, but which had recently suffered
some exceedingly difficult years."
The Viceroy spent the next two years dealing with such problems and
considering these and additional recommendations of the Deputies. The
Junta, for example, had also asked that six small frigates with a crew of 40
be stationed at Mozambique to protect the trade on that coast. To reduce
the traditionally high attrition rate among Crown troops at that fortress,
the Superintendent and his colleagues had also recommended that a
proper hospital be established that could be staffed by the Order of Sac
jofio de Deus, which was noted for performing such work. More settlers
and more fortifications were also needed in order to solidify the Portu-
guese presence in that region and to guarantee the success of the Junta.In-
dividual members of the Junta had also made more specific suggestions.
The Superintendent Correa de Sa urged the appointment of a person of
authority by the Crown in order to reduce Portugal's wayward subjects
and enemies in south-east Africa to obedience. Such actions could not be
delayed, since the salvation of the Estado and the Reino rested on the suc-
cessful exploitation of the wealth of the Rros!" The Chancellor of the
Estado, Francisco Cabral Almeida, in a long letter of November 1674
asked that a fortifications be undertaken at Quelimane, both to preempr
the intrusion of any European rivals into the area, and to make the new
monopoly and alfandega system more effective." Although Mendonca
Furtado was able to inform Pedro in December of that same year that the
first fruits of the Junta had been harvested, 70 oncas of amber that had
reached Goa in September I674, daunting problems certainly remained:'
In January 1675, Lavradio addressed many of these initial problems
with the Junta. The very capable former captain of Mozambique and 50-
fala, joao de Sousa Freire, was sent back to the Rios as Captain-general
with 40 Portuguese soldiers. He was charged with quieting problems with
the Karanga and Manica and with negotiating the matter of opening the
recently discovered silver mines. The abuses of the reiigiosos emboldened
by the belief that they were "absolute masters" there and beyond, were
also to be addressed by the new Captain-general:' The following January,
Mendonca Furtado informed Pedro that constraints imposed upon him
by the relatively depleted state of the royal treasury would not allow him
to provide the 6 frigates requested by the Junta; two however were even-
tually provided. The activities of the Junta had also been undermined by
the arrival of a ship directly from Brazil that had conducted a brisk busi-
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ness and thus deprived the estanque of badly needed capital. Moreover, a
ship coming from Cape Correntes had gone down with 150 bars of ivory.
He favored a hospital run by the order of S. [oao de Deus, but once again
money remained a problem. The Viceroy certainly agreed with the need
for sending Portuguese couples to the Rios, but argued that Goa as the
capital of the Estado also needed such subjects and thus could not spare
any for Africa. Instead, Mendonca Furtado suggested that Pedro could at-
tract such settlers in the islands where many were poor and orphaned and
could he convinced by the lure of wealth and property."
In Lisbon, the Overseas Council also devoted much energy from 1675-
1677 seeking to solidify the Portuguese presence in Mozambique and eco-
nomic activities of the new Junta in the Rios. In consultas of January 1675,
this body had been largely content to recommend the adoption of the ini-
tial demands of the Junta's Deputies, while doubting that sufficient funds
existed to fundamentally reform the government of the Rios. Salvador
Correa de Sa had also urged that a person "of total authority" be ap-
pointed immediately to the area in order to reduce Portugal's enemies and
subjects to obedience. Corrca de Sa called for such strong actions since
upon the conservation of that conquest rested "the salvation of India, and
also of this kingdom". He also argued that a ship should be sent to the
Rios during the next monsoon, carrying IOO couples that could help popu-
late the region and solidify the Portuguese presence there. This suggestion
had been subsequently seized upon by the Council as a whole, which rec-
ommended that both couples and Crown orphans should be sent out, the
latter provided with dowries in the form of either access to royal offices or
perhaps even Crown lands to facilitate suitable marriages." In March
1675, Pedro confirmed the Letters-Patent creating the Junta. The Prince
Regent also ordered that Mendonca Furtado do everything possible to
help populate the region and to use all of his powers to staff treasury, war,
and judicial positions with the best candidates available in the Estado."
By mid-1676, further deliberations of the Council, a process that in-
cluded reviewing Manoel Barreto's 1667 memorandum and other key pa-
pers, had yielded a much more aggressive strategy for exploiting the
potential of Mozambique and the Rios. In a consulta of June of that year,
the Council recommended that a large expedition be dispatched from lis-
bon under the command of a capitdo-geral of "talent, experience, and
reputation". This royal officer would be independent of the Goa Viceroy,
and would be charged wirh establishing a separate government, towns
and in fact a new colony for the Crown. The cost of this expedition was
rather modestly judged to be in the vicinity of 250,000 cruzados, a sum
that could easily be recouped from increased custom revenues generated
by trade in the region. As the council argued, not only would the Crown
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and its subjects profit from such an arrangement, but a notable increase in
Christianity would also result in those pagan parts." While Pedro may
have been impressed by this plan, it appears that the estimated cost of the
expedition as well as the financial and administrative complexities of es-
tablishing a new government hierarchy in Mozambique convinced him to
delay implementing the project. For the next six months or so, nothing
more seems to have come of this radical proposal. It was only at the end of
that year and in the early months of 1677 that the Prince Regent would
come to embrace a modified version of the June 1676 plan for entrenching
Portuguese power in the region.
In December 1676, the Conselho Ultramarine reiterated several of the
crucial points made in its June consulta: settlers should be sent out forth-
with with estates granted to them, efforts should also be made to extract
the gold that had been found in the region, additional fortifications
should also be constructed to defend the Rios against incursions from ri-
val European powers, and finally some steps should be taken to facilitate
the eventual separation of the government of Mozambique from that of
the rest of the Estado. In its December consulta, the Council offered sev-
eral specific recommendations on these issues. Twenty married couples
should be dispatched in the coming sailing season. In order to defend the
area from any real or imaged threats from the Dutch at the Cape or the
French on the island of Bourbon, Quelimaine, at the mouth of the Zam-
bezi, should be suitably fortified." Sometime between the discussions that
resulted in this consulta and the annual packets dispatched aboard the
1677 Viceregal fleet that would carry D. Pedro de Alrneida to Goa, both
Pedro and the Council came to embrace an even more forceful strategy for
safeguarding Portuguese interests in south-east Africa. On April 4, 1677,
the Prince Regent informed Ameida of these new plans. As Pedro related,
the great economic and geopolitical importance of the Rios and Mozam-
bique to the Estado and Reino, when combined with continuing "disor-
ders" in that region with indigenous powers and threats from other
European nations had convinced him to send a powerful royal fleet to
once and for all entrench Portuguese power in that region. This fleet
would depart from Lisbon the following September and consist of five
ships carrying 600 infantry troops and their officers as well as 50 married
couples to populate the region. These settlers would disembark at
Quelimane."
The new Viceroy would proceed as usual to Goa with his fleet. After
disembarking, he was ordered to do his utmost to gain all relevant infor-
mation about conditions in the Rios. He was then to hand over the reins
of government to a governing council and then sail for Mozambique in
order to join up with the squadron then on its way from Lisbon. Once he
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had reached south-east Africa, Almeida was authorized to assume the title
of Viceroy from the Cape of Good Hope to that of Delgado, technically
including the nearby adjacent islands. One of his first acts was to utilize
this formidable military force to punish the actions of Muslim rulers
along that coast including most notably the sultan of Pate. After a two or
three year term, he was then ordered to hand over control of this new ad-
ministrative unit to the capable joao de Sousa Freire. To prepare for this
great expedition and settlement scheme, a pinnace would be sent out di-
rectly to Mozambique with news of the plan. The Superintendent of the
Junta and other officials would be instructed to gather as many provisions
as possible from the mainland, the islands offshore as well as Madagascar
and concentrate such stores at Quelimane in preparation for the arrival of
the expedition in early 1678.'" Sousa Freire was also ordered to do his ut-
most to facilitate the scheme, and remain in power until the arrival of D.
Pedro de Almeida." In April 1677, the new Viceroy sailed from Lisbon
aboard the galleon S. Pedro da Ribeira"
Throughout the spring and summer of 1677, Pedro and Cadaval sought
to utilize the royal bureaucracy to help raise the 600 infantrymen and 50
married couples foreseen in their plan. District governors throughout the
kingdom received letters from the Prince Regent ordering them to call for
suitable volunteers "of robust age" from the soldiers under their com-
mand These men might even be married, provided their wives and chil-
dren were willing to accompany them for the six years of service that had
been deemed necessary All such volunteers were ordered to be in Lisbon
by the end of July. To attract suitable settlers, young couples with chil-
dren who were still able to "propagate" were to be recruited. Decrees
were also Issued which heralded the mineral wealth of the region. Each
couple would receive some 20 milreis with a supplement for children,
along with provisions for the voyage and a short time thereafter. To offset
the traditional image of Mozambique as a graveyard for generations of
Portuguese soldiers and sailors on the Carreira voyage, settlement, it was
said, would only be undertaken in a very healthy place, where the climate
would be as mild as that in Portugal! Each settler would not only receive
land to farm, but also would be able to pass this property on to his heirs.
Any skilled artisan that embarked would also receive the tools and mate-
rials of his particular trade. Blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, and farmers
were especially encouraged to apply for the scheme at the Casa da India in
Lisbon by the middle of August. The specifics of this joint military-settle-
ment scheme largely followed the outlines established for it in a memo-
randum entitled: Relacac do que seia necessaria para a poooacdo dos
RIOS de Cuama, a dispender dos officios, evidently compiled sometime in
late 1676, early 1677."
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According to the extant documentation, it appears that a substantial
number of applications resulted from this campaign. These documents
were reviewed by the Conselha Ultramarino and thereafter submitted to
the Prince Regent for final approval. Among those accepted were 8 "re-
claimed women". Settlers might also come from the ranks of foreigners
and several indeed applied, including at least one Irishman. Initially, 20
missionaries were to accompany the expedition, in the end only 5 em-
barked. To facilitate the work of the order of Sac joao de Deus at the new
hospital in Mozambique, a physician-in-chief, a surgeon-in-chief, two
barbers, and a pharmacist were recruited. Pedro and Cadaval also ap-
pointed a series of Crown officials for the region including an ouuidor-
geral, a vedor, a contador-geral and a mestre de campo" As Eric Axelson
aptly declared: the "Conselho Ultramarine was indefatigable in organiz-
ing the expedition and providing against every eventuality"." Perhaps
more importantly, the RIDS expedition reflected the great strides in the In-
dian Ocean that had been made by the Crown; the degree of interest that
Pedro placed 00 rehabilitating the Estado; the pivotal role the Rios would
Ideally play in that process; and the wisdom of avoiding involvement in
the Third Dutch War, a decision which greatly facilitated the ability to
form and dispatch such a substantial fleet.
This expedition ultimately consisted of four royal ships and one frigate
outfitted at the expense of the Junta. The capitania, the nao sac Bernardo
carried c. 415 persons (295 of them soldiers); the nao Conceiciio and the
Junta frigate were to carry some 246 persons each (167 of them soldiers);
the pinnace S. [oao de Deus carried some 130 persons (including c. 65 sol-
diers); and the charrua Nossa Senhora da vizitacao sailed with 120 per-
sons (36 of them soldiers), excluding the settlers that also embarked on
this ship." The expedition sailed in October 1677 with, in the slightly exag-
gerated terms of the English envoy in Madrid: "At least 2,000 persons,
men, women, and children to inhabit that place whence is expected great
store of Gold.''''' It is unfortunate that the extant documentation tells us
very little indeed about the subsequent history of this fleet and the settle-
ment component of Pedro's grand plan for the Rios. It is probable that the
expedition reached Mozambique in early 1678, and the settlers thereafter
began there dispersal throughout the region. Axelson has argued that
since joao Sousa de Freire had made the voyage to India in the period im-
mediately preceding their arrival not much had been done to prepare for
their settlement." Nevertheless, even if this was the case, it is possible that
other royal officials or servants of the Junta might have facilitated the set-
tlement plan. In any event, the Crown remained committed to the scheme.
In October 1678, 25 settlers reached the Rios, while in 1679 another 52 ar-
rived aboard the Nossa Senhora de Guia. The ultimate impact of this
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plan on the Portuguese presence in the region IS difficult to gauge. There
can be little doubt, however, that the harsh climate and other factors cer-
tainly continued to undermine this serious Crown attempt to implant sig-
nificant number of Crown subjects in the Rios.
Fortunately, a good deal more evidence has survived relating to the
milirary component of the great Rios expedition of 1677. D, Pedro de
Almeida reached Goa in October 1677.") For the next month, Almeida
dealt with administrative and religious Issues while preparing for his voy-
age to Mozambique. On December 6, the Viceroy held a formal session
with the Council of State on the expedition to the RIOS, in particular he
sought advice on where the expected colonists should be settled and how
to best exploit the military might of the five ships and 600 troops from
Lisbon. These issues were discussed among the council members includ-
ing the Archbishop of Goa, D. Frei Antonio Brandao; the Vedor Cera! da
[azenda, Antonio Paes de Sande; the capitao-mor das naos da India, D.
Rodrigo da Costa; and the Inquisitor-general Francisco d'Algado Mates.
By the end of this session, it appears that no definite decision had been
made on any exact settlement location within the Rios.'"
As for the military priorities, Almeida and the Council decided to use
most of the force Pedro was providing to settle old scores with Arab rulers
along the African coast, especially the sultan of Pate. By the late ryrh cen-
tury, the Ba Barayk dynasty had created perhaps the most significant
power in the Swahili region of Africa. This dynasty had Arabian roots,
Shihr in the Hadramaut, and it rulers constructed the great center of Is-
lamic culture in the region. Not surprisingly, the successive sultans of Pate
had sought to expel the Portuguese from their remaining settlements on
that coast, had overthrown indigenous rulers who had traditionally fa-
vored the interests of the Iberians including the pnnce of Paza (or
Ampasa), and had welcomed the trade of the Omanis mro their posses-
sions.' By the end of 1677, Alrncida had decided to reassert Portuguese
power on the Swahili coast. As the Council of State assento stated: the
Prince of Paza would be restored to his kingdom "punishing the king of
Pate who has revealed himself against this State, negating the obedience
and vassalage that he should have for His Majesty ... [and] out of hatred
for us admitting the trade of the Arab enemies of this State and prohibit-
109 ours to the great prejudice of our altandega rights" ." Of course,
Almeida and Pedro expected at least two immediate benefits from these
actions: favorable trading concessions from the restored potentate, and
the alleviation of the significant expenses that the prince of Faza had been
occurring during his exile in Goa.
On the raeh of January, in preparation for D. Pedro de Almeida's de-
parture, the letters of succession were opened in the SaIIa Real of the Vice-
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roy's palace in Goa. These letters named the Archbishop of Goa, D. Frei
Antonio Brandao; the Vedor-geral Antonio Paes de Sande; and the Chan-
cellor Francisco Cabral da Almeida to the Governing Council that would
rule following Almeida's departure. Since Cabral da Almeida was already
dead, the other two men assumed control of government." The Viceroy
then sailed for Mozambique on the 27th of that month with a three ship
flotilla: the Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes, the Nossa Senhora dos Millagres,
and the Sao Paullo, the last outfitted at the expense of the Junta." D.
Pedro de Almeida's arrival in south-east Africa was not ideally timed at
least with respect to the Rios settlement scheme. Embassies exchanged
with the Monomotapa, as well as letters from the captain of Zimbabwe,
during the spring of 1678 confirmed that a smallpox epidemic was then
ravaging, exacerbated by other maladies as well. Huge mortality rates
had resulted: few men were left to work the paramount chief's mines, a
force sent out to attack the Tongas had been decimated by disease, and
the traditional trading fairs of Ongo and Dambarare had also been rav-
aged by outbreaks. The economic power of Canarins, as well as the mer-
cantile activities of the Dominicans in the region also complicated life for
the Junta. The Viceroy, however, had determined to pursue his military
strategy against the Muslim powers along the coast, and he would not de-
lay this campaign in order to assist either the settlement plan of Pedro or
the fledgling actions of the Junta da Comercio, initiatives that were
largely left to fend for themselves in the years that followed.'
As the Viceroy sailed north toward the island of Pate, he possessed a
formidable military force. His three-ship flotilla from Goa had been
joined with the five-ship fleet that Pedro had sent out in October r677. The
Portuguese anchored off Pate on August 9, I678 and three days later the
troops disembarked. The sultan's forces were driven back from the
beaches. A number of fortified positions were established around the
main town on the island and a siege begun. For the next four months,
Almeida and his officers conducted this siege in the face of mounting
problems. The heat of course was oppressive, sorties from the town were
common, supplies of meat, dried fish, and biscuits were soon depleted,
and pinnaces sent to the nearby Querimba islands did not return." Fortu-
nately, Almeida did receive assistance from Goa. The very capable Anro-
nio Paes de Sande had promised in his discussion with the Viceroy to aide
the expedition in every possible way, and this he did. Soon after beginning
the siege, Almeida had sent the frigate Nossa Senhora de Pilar back to
Goa with news and the request for munitions and provisions. As Paes de
Sande informed Pedro in January 1679, he had done his utmost to provide
such supplies including six artillery pieces to facilitate the siege, using
monies from the increasingly lucrative estanque de tabaco. "Because I
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have always believed that it is best not to separate the advantages and in-
terests of India, from those of Mozambique, holding as truth that one can
not operate in this fashion," improving conditions in south-east Africa
would not result in losing India. The Pilarand two other ships were evi-
dently sent back to Pate, perhaps with the long suffering Prince of Faza,
who ultimately raised some 1200 supporters for the siege including
Bajunes and Maracates.'
Thus reinforced, Almeida and his allies were able to press the siege to
their advantage in early December 1678. A general assault was ordered,
the Portuguese troops gained part of the town's wall and inflicted a good
deal of damage within. At that point, local dignitaries favored negotia-
tions: the Viceroy demanded that the offending sultan be surrendered as a
hostage and that 3°,000 cruzados be paid. This sum was intended as a sort
of fine for past transgressions toward the Estado, as a contribution to off-
set Almeida 's expenses, and as an inducement to prevent the further sack-
ing of the town. On the rvth of December, everything seemed to favor the
Portuguese cause. The sultan of Pate, as well as those of Siyu, Manda, and
Lamu had been rounded up and imprisoned aboard the fleet anchored
offshore. Almeida had taken up residence at the town's major mosque, an
action that did little to endear him with the Muslims, and waited as con-
tributions flowed in. Still, by the end of December, no more than 25,000
cruzados in gold, silver, ivory, tortoise-shell and other valuables were
forthcoming. In a rather rash and perhaps ill-advised move, the Viceroy
used this shortfall as a pretext to declare that original terms of capitula-
tion had not been met. After a sham trial, the four sultans were executed
and the town sacked until another 5,000 cruzados worth of booty had
been extracted. At rhar point, events took a decided cum for the worse for
the Portuguese; four Arab vessels, most probably belonging to the sultan
of Oman appeared offshore in early January to assist their ally. Troops
were landed and this contingent in conjunction with erstwhile supporters
of the dead sultan gradually expelled the Portuguese and pro-Faza troops
in house to house combat that lasted nearly a week. In the end, Almeida
was forced to take to a sickbed aboard ship with a fever, while his troops
executed a messy retreat, leaving behind as much as 20,000 cruzados in
booty.'
D. Pedro de Almeida and his officers had long diSCUSSIOns on the voy-
age south, touching on the ill turn the Pate campaign had taken and on the
question of how many troops should head for the Zambezi (Q assist the
Crown's settlement plan for the Rios. While some of his officers suggested
as many as 200 men, Almeida finally decided that only 30-40 troops would
remain as his personal bodyguard, the rest would head for India and addi-
tional duties. Unfortunately, the Pate fleet overshot Mozambique on its
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return voyage and a difficult month of beating against contrary winds
was needed in order to regain this port. Less than a month after anchoring
at Mozambique, Almeida again fell victim to a high fever and the Viceroy
died in early March 1679. The large royal fleet thereafter sailed for Goa.
The military component of the great Rios expedition therefore ended on a
decidedly mixed note." Nevertheless, in comparison with the truly lamen-
table state of affairs in 1662 when Antonio de Mello de Castro was forced
to take up his post aboard the Marlborough's fleet, the mere ability of the
Crown to put together such a formidable expedition reflects the effective-
ness of Pedro's reform program to resuscitate the Estado. The ease with
which the sultan of Pate was dispatched also reveals that Portuguese mili-
tary might was once again to be feared especially among the indigenous
powers along the Indian Ocean basin. There can, however, be little doubt
that the decision to attack Pate may not have been the most prudent strat-
egy for Almeida to adopt. One negative result of his decision was that it
helped to unite the Islamic powers on the Swahili coast and further thrust
them into the arms of the Omani Arabs. Yet, to suggest that the 1678 cam-
paign had any effect on the eventual loss of Mombassa is both overblown
and Whiggish in nature:" Thus, while Almeida's military policies were
misguided, the forces put at his disposal attest to the great strides the
Estado had made since 1660.
Almeida's untimely death did not, however, put an end to either the
Rios settlement plan or the economic functions of the Junta. What were
the results of these bold initiatives on the Crown's part? The scattered na-
ture of the extant sources make it difficult to render a definitive judgment
on the success or failure of these initiatives. On one hand, the influx of set-
tlers aboard the grand 1677 fleet as well as ships arriving from the Reino in
1678 and 1679 more than doubled the Portuguese population of the Rios.
On the other, the overall number involved was not particularly impres-
sive. Of the c. 200 settlers that probably landed at Mozambique from
1677-1679, only 78 reached the Rios: 28 married men, 29 women, and 21
children. Of this number, perhaps 20 soon died from the climate and dis-
ease. ByJune 1680, the total Portuguese population in the Rios could not
have been more than fifty or so with another 200 mulattos. This number
included 5 at Quelimane, Il at Sena, 16 at Tete, ID at Chicoa, 3 at the
Monomorapa's Zimbabwe, 1 at Ongo, 2 others in the lands of the
Karanga, and 2 in Manica. Yet, these settlers and those that followed
them into the Zambezi river basin operating in conjunction with the rein-
forced Crown presence at Mozambique and Sofala undoubtedly helped
to provide the nucleus that ensured a Portuguese imperial presence in
south-east Africa well into the present century." In the mid-reeos, it had
appeared likely that the continuing ravages of the VOC, the rising power
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of the Omanis, and the worrisome pretensions of the French on Madagas-
car might foreshadow grave difficulties if not the very extinction of the
Crown's political, economic, social, and religious presence in that region.
By 1680, the prudent policies of Pedro and his advisors had overcome
these concerns and established the basis for future colonial operations tn
south-cast Africa.
The extant evidence on the activities of the Junta is no less scattered
and perplexing. Several factors arc dear. First, the undeniable reality that
very significant obstacles existed in attempting to establish the trade of
the Junta. A harsh climate, the huge distances involved, opposition from
local interests, including Portuguese, Canarin, and indigenous magnates,
who all favored the status quo ante, as well as problems with the Reis
Vizmhos; all complicated matters. As Oliveira Boleo has noted, the at-
tempt to control contraband and smuggling was a near impossibility."
Yet, some minor successes did result for the Junta. Upon his return to the
Rios from Goa, joao de Sousa Freire had ordered Theodosio Garcia to
continue the long-standing search for silver. After an expedition up the
Zambezi that lasted nearly two years, Garcia in fact found rich mines for
this precious metal in the land of the Caronga. Unfortunately, Sousa
Freire died Just two days after receiving this welcomed news. His succes-
sor as governor of the Rios, the mestre de campo, Antonio Ribeiro de
Araujo also died soon thereafter and no decisive actions were taken to ex-
ploit Carcia's discovery." While it has been fashionable in the thin bisrori-
ography on the topic to criticize the effectiveness of the Junta and its
trade, the financial records of the Junta reveal a slightly different picture.
At least two of these types of documents are extant. First, a Conselho
Ultramarino coneulta of February 1680 which summarized the financial
transactions of the Junta from January J676 until January J677. Second, a
balance sheet for the year 1679.
According to the figures from J676-77, revenues for the Junta do
Comercio totaled 167,721 cruzados, 206 relS,generated overwhelmingly by
trade m the [azendas da Id of gold and ivory. Of this sum, 122,355
cruzados, 199 rs. had been obtained by the trade at Sena; another 7,568
cruzados, 361 rs. at lnhabame; II,518 cruzados.svs rs. from Cape Correnres,
959 cruzados 3 rs. from the voyage to Sangaicm; 2,622 cruzados, 225 rs.
from Angoxa; 10,195 cruzados 150 rs. from Sofala in 1675; and 12,5OI
cruzados 350 rs. from Sofala in 1676. Expenses for that same period had
come to r65,636 cruzadoe, 256 rs. These payments included IIO,377
cruzados, 112 rs. to the captains of Diu and Chaul for textiles and other
[azendas: 3°,600 cruzados had paid back the annual subsidy of 30,000
xerafins advanced by the Crown; 1,128 cruzados to cover leasing private
ships; 12,85° cruzados, 72 rs. repaying a loan to D.or Manocl Serrao
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Alfaya; 9,628 cruzados, 37 rs. to the Captain for Mozambique for troop
payments; and a loss of r,053 cruzados 35 rs. resulting from bad ivory
tusks. A positive saldo of some 2,084 cruzados, 350 rs. had therefore re-
sulted for this period."
The balance sheet for 1679 reveals 113A86 cruzados in revenue, and
I13,48s cruzados, 301 rs. in expenses. On the revenue side of the ledger, two
cargoes of gold from Sena, some 18,000 maticaes in weight had yielded c.
50,000 cruzados; 190 bars, I2 faracolas, and 10 mainas of ivory from Sena
and Quilimene had yielded 54, 451 cruzadcs, 99 rs; 8 bars, 1 [aracola of
ivory from Inhabame had resulted in revenues of I893 cruzados, }89 rs.; 73
oz. of amber from Inhabame had yielded 1460 cruzados; and 3791
cruzados, 84 rs. had been generated by I2 bars, 7.5 faracolas of ivory from
the island of Angoxa. The majority of expenses for this year, some 75,000
cruzados, had been utilized to repay a portion of monies advanced to the
junta by the Royal Treasury (some }I,OOO cruzados), or by private individ-
uals ( some 44,000 cruzados). Of the remaining }7,500 cruzados, some
5,500 cruzados had covered the operating expenses and mantimentos for
the officers and other personnel of the junta; u, 692 cruzados had been
contributed to the grand armada of D. Pedro de Almeida, and some 20,349
cruzados had been given to the feitor Pedro Rebello de Aguiar to cover
other expenses."
These figures suggest that despite the problems inherent to establishing
the junta, a relatively stable trading network was indeed established in
the Rios during the 1670S. Given the traditional tenets of monarchical
monopolism that had long determined Portuguese actions in the Estado,
the Crown campaign to more efficiently exploit Mozambique and the
Zambezi basin embodied a truly innovative strategy. The measures
adopted by Pedro and his councils in Lisbon, along with the efforts of
Mendonca Furtado, D. Pedro de Almeida, and Amonio Paes de Sande in
Asia all combined to more firmly entrench a Portuguese presence in
south-east Africa. While the eldorado that the Prince Regent and his ser-
vants were seeking in the Rios did not materialize, a good deal of success
accompanied the renascent interest of the Crown in this region. The colo-
nization scheme of the 1670S resulted in a larger population of Portuguese
settlers along the Zambezi with whom to conduct trade. The junta de
comerao created by Lavradio carried on a relatively respectable business
at Crown expense. This solution also cut down on the notable corruption
and concentration of power inherent in the old contract system. Private
merchants were also allowed to reap the benefits of the trade under the
auspices of the junta. Finally, while D. Pedro de Almeida's attack on Pate
may have been somewhat misguided, it did at least herald a rejuvenated
military presence in the region that was a badly needed buffer against the
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encroachments of the Omani Arabs and other European powers. When
all of these factors are considered, there can be very little doubt that the
Portuguese position in south-east Africa in c. 1680 was far preferable to
what it had been some twenty years earlier. The renewed interest and re-
forms of Pedro not only allowed the Estado to survive in that region, but




Portuguese Asia, c. 1683
As this study has attempted to demonstrate, the twenty or so years begin-
ning in 1660 were crucial in the long history of the Portuguese Estado da
India. The mixed legacy of the Habsburg era, almost endemic warfare
with both indigenous powers and European rivals, and the very real con-
straints of limited demographic and financial resources at home, had con-
fronted the Portuguese Crown with the very real possibility of losing their
erstwhile Asian empire in toto during the early Braganza period. It is,
therefore, unfortunate that the historiography on Portuguese Asia has
largely ignored this critical period. The very scant literature that does ex-
ist on these years has tended to embrace the doomsday lamentations of
the Jesuit accounts of the mid-rrrh century on the post-rceo Estado, or to
accept the nefarious and corrupt administrative practices described in
Diogo do Couto's Dialogo do Soldado Pratico as both accurate and un-
changing. Above all else, the dictum of "stagnation and decline" has held
sway in the scholarly literature.' By almost universally embracing the loss
of Cochin and the other Malabar coast possession in late 1662, early 1663
as the death knell of the Estado, historians have thus failed to accord the
importance that is due to the years following in the wake of those events.
As opposed to the traditional orthodoxy, it in fact appears that the years
from c. 1663-1683 represented an era of reawakened Crown interest in the
Asian empire, of periodic policy innovation, sustained reform, and the
creation of a degree of stability that permitted Portugal to remain a power
in the Asian trade and an imperial power in the Indian Ocean basin well
into the present century.
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the setbacks of the
late Habsburg and early Braganza years constituted a fundamental threat
to the continued existence of the Estado da India. By the time of Antonio
de Mello de Castro's arrival off Bombay in late 1662, the situation, as his
initial letters to Lisbon admirably reflect, was critical. A nadir had been
reached in virtually all areas affecting the eastern empire. The Carreira da
India, the very lifeblood of the imperial edifice, was in a shambles with
only an average of a single ship a year reaching Goa from the metropole
and less than that making the return trip to Europe from 1658-1663. Long-
standing warfare with the VOC, which had already cost the Estado
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Melaka and Ceylon, was poised to culminate with the ravages of Rijckloff
Van Goens fleet on the Malabar coast. The Omani Arabs had already
stripped the strategic base of Maskat from the Estado, thus beginning a
naval war that would only escalate as the years passed. The Nayak of
Ikkcrri had expelled the Portuguese from their positions on the Kanara
coast. The annual fleets to the Straits of Hurmuz and along the coasts of
India and Ceylon, once a cornerstone of the cartaz system and perhaps the
most visible display of Portuguese naval might in the Indian Ocean, had
been all but abandoned. The dispersed nature of the empire, an adminis-
trative system that tended to embrace money and connections instead of
talent, and tendency of joao IV, D. Luisa de Cusmao, and Afcnso VI to
neglect Asia in favor of Europe, Brazil, and Africa had facilitated the erec-
tion of virtual fiefdoms among outlying governors and captains. Finally,
the simple arithmetic embodied in the deeds of transfer for the Viceroy-
alty showed that the possession of 20 major fortresses in 1652 had been re-
duced to half that number in 1662. To adopt the metaphor of Fr. Manuel
de Godinho, the Estado, "If it had been a tree, ir was now a trunk".'
Yet, it is illuminating to extend this metaphor beyond the traditional
limits of the historiography, which have equated Godinho's lamentations
with irretrievable, irrational decline and ruin for Portuguese Asia during
the late rrrb century. A careful examination of the extant manuscript
sources suggests that the great "tree" of the rcrh century had indeed been
reduced, but a more accurate description of the losses of the mid-rrth cen-
tury might be the radical pruning of an overextended "tree" that had been
allowed to flourish beyond any reasonable and sustainable limits during
the glory years of the 1500s. As much of the traditional literature suggests,
Portugal's financial, demographic, and military resources were probably
not sufficient to maintain such an empire in the face of sustained chal-
lenges from its European competitors in the rzth century. Nevertheless, it
is clearly erroneous to suggest that Portugal was not capable of sustaining
a relatively lucrative Asian empire during the early modern period. The
"pruning" process of the mid-rzth century which had cost the Estado
more than half of its fortresses had been indeed radical. However, in this
process, a more manageable edifice had resulted. A detailed examination
of the Orcamentos or State Budgets of 1630, 1634, and r680 reveals that
most of the fortresses which were lost in this process had been a serious
drain on Crown revenues during the middle years of the r-th century.'
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State Budget Revenues(r), Expenditures(e), and Balances (b), (in xerafins)
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As these figures show, Maskat had registered a loss of 78,648 xerafins for
the years I630 and 1634; Melaka a loss of 48,88I xerafins for those same
years; and Colombo a loss of 33,467 xerafins for the year I634 alone. This
of course is not to suggest that the Crown desired to be rid of Melaka,
Ceylon and Muscat, strategic fortresses that had been closely associated
with the fame and power of the Estado since the days of Albuquerque and
Manoel l. However, whatever glory had accrued to the Crown from the
possession of these long held fortresses had been seriously tempered by
the serious financial drain on the Estado's resources that they had become
in light of the protracted war with the VOC and indigenous powers. Their
loss, while tragic for the g/oire of Portuguese Asia, did not embody the
end of the Estado, its financial or geopolitical viability, or, to continue
with our adopted metaphor, the actual felling of Godinho's tree. More-
over, a bare trunk was not all that remained in 1663; instead a viable tree
did survive that with proper care could live and perhaps even flourish
again. Credit for recognizing this seminal fact must go to Prince Regent
Pedro, the duke of Cadaval, members of the Overseas Council like Correa
de Sa, and Luis de Mendonca Purtado. These able men realized that de-
spite the earlier losses of the rzth century, what remained of the Estado da
India could serve as the basis for a continuing and profitable Asian em-
pire. As the September consulta of the Overseas Council declared, the re-
maining fortresses the Crown possessed, if properly exploited and
administered, along with the further exploration of Mozambique and the
Rios could serve as the foundation for a renascent Estado:'
During the years from 1640 through I668, the Crown had demonstrated
little interest in such a campaign. All of the early Braganzas had been con-
fronted with the omnipresent and pressing challenge of winning the resto-
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ration war with Habsburg Spain, and this life and death struggle certainly
absorbed a good deal of the kingdom's energies and attention. However,
the huge overseas empire carved out by the Aviz dynasty was a key com-
ponent and considerarion for any ruler who coveted the throne of Portu-
gal. Moreover, the Braganzas could not neglect imperial concerns even in
the midst of the Iberian struggle. In matters regarding the tri-dimensional
empire, to employ the terminology of Oliveira Marques, the Estado re-
ceived scant attention under joao IV, D. Luisa de Gusmao, as well as
Afonso VI and Castelo-Melhor. The erstwhile duke of Braganza regarded
Brazil as his "milch-cow'' and the locus for further colonial greatness and
largely neglected the Estado in favor of combating the Dutch in South
America and Africa. His wife had at least made an ill-advised attempt to
salvage what remained of Asia Portuguesa III the midst of the VOC on-
slaught by seeking the rather dubious assistance of the English Crown.
Castelo-Melhor and Afonso had made a half-hearted attempt to continue
this mteresr in the Estado, while devoting most of their energies to conti-
nental affairs. It had therefore been left to Pedro and his claque of sup-
porters to address the festering situation in Asia in the wake of the palace
coup of late 1667. This dynastic coup d'etat had profound consequences
for Imperial policy in general and the fate of the Estado da India in partic-
ular.
It is not entirely clear why the new Prince Regent, unlike his immediate
predecessors, sought to vastly elevate the relative importance of the
Estado over what it had been in the years since 1640, and one might argue
the late Habsburg years as well. Perhaps Pedro's interest was a logical dia-
lectical reaction to the priorities and preferences of his father and older
brother. Perhaps his decision to reform the Estado in systematic fashion
emanated from the newfound interest in the Asian trade that France un-
der Louis XIV and Colbcrr were convincingly demonstrating at this same
time. After all, Bourbon France was in the midst of becoming the most
powerful European state under the Sun King and his chief minister, while
the long-standing pretensions of Habsburg Spain were on the wane. Louis
and Colbert were spending huge amounts of capital seeking to establish
the position of their new Compagnie Royale des Indes Orientales and in
doing so, spreading the gIoire of the king and the mercantilist financial
calculations of his minister.' As Car! Hanson has shown, the French abso-
lutist example, as interpreted and advanced at court, by Duarte Ribeiro
de Macedo and the count of Ericeira, had a significant impact on Portu-
guese society under Pedro.' It is thus reasonable to assume that the pivotal
importance Colbert placed on the Asian trade in his economic schema
may also have had a direct impact on Portuguese Crown imperial and
economic policy as well. Finally, it is possible that Pedro's interest in reha-
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bilitating the Estado may have simply resulted from his emotional and in-
tellectual acceptance of the view expounded by the marquis de Pronreira
when he noted that "without conquests one cannot have capital, [and I it
is without doubt true that in India, Your Majesty pledges himself to the
honor of God, the glory of the nation, [and] the interest and remedy of
your vassals". For Fronreira, of all the Crown's conquests, the "most Im-
portant and glorious" was the Estado da India.'
The foundation for the rehabilitation that cook place under Pedro and
in particular Mendonca Furtado was the pivotal decision in Lisbon in late
1669 and 1670 to reject the very tempting offer of an anti-Dutch alliance
proposed by Colbert through the French ambassador the marquis of
Saint-Remain. At first glance, this projected Asian triple alliance directed
at the vac seemed to have every advantage working for it in the Portu-
guese capital. Decades of bitter setbacks at the hands of Maersuycker,
Van Goens, and their cohorts that cried for revenge; a sizable and influen-
tial pro-French group at court headed by the shrewd Princess Regent Ma-
rie-Francoise of Savoy and supported by Schomberg and Fronreira; the
religious affinity of the two Crowns that might serve the true faith in Asia
together; the very large shadow of Louis XlV's anti-Dutch diplomatic and
military preparations in Europe unfolding in majestic fashion at this time;
and the traditional penchant of the Portuguese Crown for conducting its
business relating to the Estado based primarily on the militaristic precepts
at the core of the monarchical monopolism that had established that em-
pire. Despite these seemingly overwhelming factors in favor of the French
alliance and the continuation of long-standing warfare with the vac in
Asia, Pedro and Cadaval instead chose the path of neutrality and peace in
the Third Dutch War of 1672.' This single ground breaking decision in turn
permitted the Portuguese to implement badly needed reforms in Asia
while their European rivals were busy warring against one another. By the
time the Dutch War ended in 1679, Pedro and the Viceroyalty in Goa had
already achieved a good deal of what needed to be accomplished.
Militarily, these reforms embraced advice advanced by Francisco
Rodrigues de Silveira in his Reiormaoio da Milicia e Governo do Estado
da India Oriental (c. 1600-1619), an important work calling for fundamen-
tal reforms that has been largely ignored in the extant historiography on
the r-th century Estado. Silvcira argued that the eastern empire rested in
large part on effective military power; with the State of India's wealth cre-
ated primarily by the Portuguese naval force in the Indian Ocean. In his
view, the once formidable military might of the Estado had been under-
mined by a combination of factors: the insatiable greed of the viceroys
and ruling classes in Goa; an inadequate pay system; and the lax discipline
endemic in the outlying fortresses.' Whether Pedro and his advisors were
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familiar with Silveira's Reiormacao is not entirely clear. Nevertheless,
many of the reforms of the late 1660s and 1670S directly addressed these
long-standing problems. The prompt assignment of soldiers to their re-
spective garrisons upon their arrival in the Mandovi and the prohibition
of travel to Old Goa during their early months of service were initial steps
In reasserting order. Above all else, the formation of a permanent terra in
Goa staffed by an experienced officer corps and soldiers was a crucial step
in attempting to reassert the military power of the Estado. The fact that
the Prince Regent and his Council were willing to allow the Viceroyalty to
utilize the badly needed monies for the donativo for the peace with the
United Provinces to achieve this end merely reinforces the laudable
Crown commitment to this project. The generally favorable sa/dos that
resulted during the peaceful years of the Dutch War also facilitated the
process of dispatching the annual fleets to the Straits of Hurmuz, the
Malabar coast, and elsewhere, traditionally the most visible manifesta-
tion of Portuguese naval power.
Religiously, the reforms of these years also reflect the fact that Pedro
and his advisors were willing to depart from long-established policy pri-
orities regarding the Asian empire. Serious attempts were made to temper
the more glaring abuses of the plethora of reiigiosos in the Estado. These
steps included decrees designed to prevent the unlawful obtainment of
lands and rents by the religious orders, to improve the qualifications of
clerics spreading the faith, and ordering a special junta, with indigenous
representation, to reform the abuses relating to D. Sebastiao's decree on
Hindu orphans. Such steps were prompted primarily by economic consid-
erations, and reveal that the capitalist priorities of the Protestant rivals of
the Fstado had affected the policy calculations of the Lisbon and Goa hi-
erarchies. Men like Mcndonca Furtado, with long years of experience in
the Asian trade and long years of struggling against the vac and EIC,
had come to realize that economic priorities had to triumph over religious
zealotry if the Estado were to survive. There were, however, limits on the
extent of religious reform possible as the ill-fated attempt of Pedro to ar-
range substantial New Christian investment to assist the Estado in return
for protection against the ravages of the Inquisition in the early 1670S
demonstrates. This setback admirably attests to the resilient vestigial
power of the more traditional elements III Baroque Portugal and the diffi-
culties that the Prince Regent would continue to have in instituting truly
radical internal reforms in the kingdom. Goa, however, was relatively far
removed from the metropo!e and the buffer of time and distance perhaps
gave Pcdro more latitude in implementing religious changes.
Economically, the situation, given the nature of the extant sources, IS
more complex to analyze. The best documentation perhaps exists for the
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official Crown trade from Lisbon to Goa carried on by the Carreira da In-
dia, and even here the sources are relatively sparse. This qualification not-
withstanding.the years from roughly 1668-1682 witnessed the stabilization
of the Carreira da India after a truly dismal period. Reforms regarding the
Carreira reinforce the argument for the willingness of the Crown to break
with long-standing priorities of the past. In this case, Portuguese naval
technology adapted and integrated many of the changes previously
adopted by the Dutch and English to such great effect in the trade. Build-
ing relatively smaller, more seaworthy ships for utilization on the Cape
route along with the reiteration of the need to strictly enforce traditional
sailing roteiros on the passage around Africa yielded impressive results
for the re-establishment of regular interchange between Iberia and India.
Crown trade in traditional products like pepper via the Cape, although
badly reduced from the glory years of the rsth century, also stabilized.
The documents also suggest that the Crown and Viceroyalty were sensi-
tive to market forces regarding supply, demand, and price structure, and
also willing to branch out into other products including textiles and dia-
monds when conditions demanded it. Private trade is more difficult to
gauge, given the paucity of sources. Yet the important work by james C.
Boyajian for the Habsburg period and some documentation for the early
Braganza years suggests that the percentage of private cargoes carried
aboard the Carreira, both by weight and value, continued to expand dur-
ing the rvth century. Despite increased European competition and other
problems in the years after 1640, casado investors in Goa and elsewhere,
including Old and New Christians, also continued a relatively lucrative
intra-Asian trade in products ultimately destined for the Carreira or the
plethora of other commercial centers throughout the Indian Ocean ba-
sin."
As noted above, an examination of the Crcamentos for the rrrh cen-
tury demonstrates that when properly administered, and above all when
at peace, the State of India was not only self-sufficient but could also con-
sistently yield a very positive sa/do for the Crown. Moreover, during the
construction of the absolutist state in Portugal, one must also remember
that the nature and function of the empire itself may have been slightly
modified from what it had been in the Aviz and Habsburg periods. In a
kingdom where previously the military orders and church had come to
monopolize large tracts of lands, capital, and social prestige at home, the
Estado had traditionally served as a proving ground and source of reward
for a loyal noble class. This process continued and perhaps even acceler-
ated during the years after 1640. As the example of men like Mello de Cas-
tro, Nunes da Cunha, Mendonca Purtado, and D. Pedro de Almeida
demonstrate, the provincial nobility that had followed joao of Braganza
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to Lisbon increasingly demanded titles, offices, and other honors as the
price for supporting a king that like his royal cousins throughout Europe
was seeking to entrench a more centralized state at the expense of at least
some of the traditional prerogatives of the nobility. In the Estado da India
and the rest of the empire, the Crown found such badly needed forms of
largesse. On the level of European and Asian diplomacy, a rehabilitated
Estado, and the accompanying gloire that accrued to the Prince Regent,
also served the interest of the Portuguese Crown during these years.
Yet, it was not only the Crown and nobility that benefited from a reha-
bilitated Estado da India, the New Christians continued to generate prof-
its on trade via the Cape and on the more amorphous intra-Asian trade.
Even the peasantry could periodically utilize the empire to evade the rigid
class or estate system of early modern Portugal. The settlers in the 1677
scheme for Mozambique had a chance for land and a better life serving
the Crown instead of groveling in the mud for the nobility at home, even
fallen women from the streets of Lisbon and Porto were accepted. As for
the Church, while the Crown indeed attempted to end the more glaring
abuses of the first estate, 111 itself a logical outgrowth of rising absolutist
tendencies in Portugal, the regular clergy and religious orders continued
to hold a sizable bevy of social, intellectual, economic as well as spiritual
advantages both in the reino and the imperio. Although Pedro may have
alienated some segments of the first estate with his religious reforms in the
Estado, he could also pose as the champion the Counter-Reformation
Church in the guise of the Goa Inquisition, an institution that also penod-
ically served to placate the nobility anxious of the economic advances of
the New Christians. To win favor with the popular classes, who were
more insular and nationalist in their perspective, the Prince Regent could
highlight his struggle for traditional Portuguese prerogatives in seeking to
adhere to the monopoly embodied in the Padroado Real and opposing the
interlopers of the Propaganda Fide based in Rome.
All of these varied benefits made the sustained attempt to rehabilitate
the Estado da India well worth the effort for both Pedro and his subjects.
Perhaps the most compelling contemporary evidence for the success of
rhis campaign was the grudging admiration that the reforms of Pedro and
Mcndonca Furtado engendered among Portugal's rivals in the trade. Ger-
aid Aungier, the English President at Bombay and the man largely respon-
sible for the increasing prosperity of the EIC on that coast, provided such
evidence. In a letter to London of January 1674, Aungier outlined the tra-
ditional problems of the Estado, induding administrative corruption and
the overweening power of the Padres and fidalgos, but concluded that
"the Prudence of this Viceroy hath raised them much, both in the one and
in the other". Two months later, Aungier was forced to admit: "The Por-
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tuguese follow their trade as wellin India as Europe vigorously." Such
successes in fact had made them too "insolent" for Aungier's taste and he
advised the Directors that means should be found to remedy this state of
affairs." William Langhorn, the Governor of Madras voiced similar opin-
ions in his letters to London at about the same time." Although there were
many successes in this reformation campaign, perhaps the single most im-
portant success was the ability of Pedro and his advisors to restore a level
of confidence regarding the Estado da India on the quays of Lisbon, at the
Casa da India, in the solars of the nobility, and perhaps even in the mer-
chant houses of the New Christians. This was a seminal precondition for
a rehabilitated Estado since, in the final analysis, the Portuguese State of
India "for its survival" depended "not so much upon the quantity of
spices and drugs annually transported to Europe as upon the strength and
loyalty of the soldiers and gentlemen" who administered it, fought for it,
and above all, as time went on, invested in it." The attention of all seg-
ments of Portuguese society had in fact been reawakened to the potential
of the Asian empire by c. 1683, thanks to the efforts of Pedro, Lavradio and
others. Given the circumstances which had confronted the Crown some
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Nation in Portugal pp. 135-40; and J. Childs, "The English Brigade in Portugal, 1662-
68" Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research UII (197\) pp. 135-47.
43 For details on the final stages of the war, Boxer Salvador de Sa pp. 354-5,; Liverrnore,
New History pp. 192-93; Kamen, Spain, 1469-1714 pp. 257 ff.; j.H. El!iot, Imperial
Spain, 1469-1716(New York, 1963, 1977} pp. 3P-)3.
44 For details on the negotiations resulting in this dynastic marriage, Presrage, Diplo-
matic Relations pp. 84-88, 166·69; Boxer, Salvador de Sa pp. 3,2-\9; and Livermore,
New History pp. 192·94.
45 In the view of Boxer, Salvador de Sa p. 352.
46 Livermore, New History p. 193.
47 On these machinations in Lisbon and the 1667 treaty, d. Boxer, Salvador de Sd pp. 3)2
ff.; and Livermore, New History pp. 19)-94. The 1667 treaty can be found in ,.F.
Borges de Casrro, Colleq:ao de Tratados, convencoes, contratos. e actcs publicos
cefebrados entre a Coroa de Portugal desde 1040 ate 0 presente (8 vois., Lisbon, 1856-
NOTES '1 r
SS) 1:338-53. For Sourhwcfl's summary of the articles of this treaty, cf. PRO SP 89/H £os.
132-37, Southwell to Arlington, 1611Vh667.
48 On the loss of San Theme, cf. William Foster, The Eng/ish Factories in India, 1661-64
(Oxford, 1923) p. 146n.r; H.D. Love, Vestiges of Old Madras, 1640-[800 C~ vols., Lon-
don, 1913) 1:302-10; and Livro dos Reis vmnhos [LRVI No.2 fo. 10, Antonio de Mello
de Castro to King of Golconda, 1\(?)1Jlh663.
49 The hest account of Antonio de Mello de Casrro's voyage to India remains Foster,
cd., The English Factories in India, 1661-64 pp. 123-43.
SO CL Francisco Luis Ameno, "Noticia Chronologica dos descohrimentos que hzerao
os Portugueses ate a India Oriental, e das Armadas que os Revs de Portugal tern
mandado aquelle Estado ate 0 presente anno de 1762," Bib/ioteea Publica de Evora
[BrEI Codex CXVh-2I fos. 91-94, summarized in Ames, "The Carreira da India," pp.
17-18. The only exception to This pattern was the four ship Viceregal fleet of [odo
Nunes da Cunha.
)1 Ci. Lnrm das Mon(oes do Reino [MRI Volumes 29-33 covering the years 1662-1667.
12 On this conjuncture of forces combining against Castelo-Melhor, d. Livermure,
New History p. 194;Oliveira Marques, History 1:332-33; Boxer, Salvador de Sd pp. 352
H.; Colbarch, Account !:43-4H, 58-H9; and PRO SP 89/8 fos. 24-)4v., Sourbwell to
Arlington,4/'lIh 667·
IJ Details on the coup of late 1667 and its aftermath can be found in PRO SI' 89/H fos.
200-98 which contain the letters from Sourhwell to Arlington describing these events
as well as copies of relevant supporting documents. Cf. also his Narrative ofthe pro-
ceedings in the court of Portugal, concerning the discharge of the Crmde de Caste!
Me/hor, the Secretary ofState, and others, from their offices, in August, September,
Octoher, November, /667 forwarded with his dispatch of 15/XU!667 all given in
Sourhwcll Letters pp. 218-319. Perhaps more interesting is a letter from Pedro to
Charles IJ of 24/'XU1667 found in PRO SI' 89/8 fo. 246 ff. in which he stated that
Afonso's trust m unworthy individuals had created such chaos in the kingdom that
the "Camara, the nobility, and rhc povo of this city had obliged me almost with vio-
lence to take possession of this kingdom.'
14 Quoted in Livermore, New History p. 195.
55 For details on the proceedings to annul the royal marriage, cf. PRO SI' 89/8 fos. 27j-
79, Documents relating to the hearing forwarded to Arlington by Southwel1; A.
Baiao, Causa de nulidade de matrimonio entre a rainha D. Maria Franciscolsabel de
Sahoya (' 0 rei D. Afonso VI (Coimbra, 1925); and Doria D. Maria Franc/sea pp. 242"
5+
,6 Cf. Colbarch, Account 1:3-1. As Hanson notes, however, the Prince Regent's "sallies
into the nighr " would also result in him probably contracting "veneral disease some-
time during the early 1670S." Pedro's mood swings were also quite severe, ranging
"from deep and persistent despression to bawdy euphoria," bchavior which suggests
that "he may have been manic-depressive". Cf. Baroque Portugal p. 15.
S? CL Hanson, Baroque Portugal pp. 10-38.
S8 CL Hanson, Baroque Portugal pp. 108-4°, 160-84. The letters of Duarte Ribeiro de
Macedo from Paris during the late 1660'S and early 16]0's can he found in Arqu/vo
Nacional da Terre do Tornbo [ANTTJ MNE LPI' I and 2. This correspondence has
been examined by Virginia Rau ill her l'olitica Economica e Mercantilismo na
Correspcndencia de l)uarte Ribeiro de Macedo (1668-'676) in Do Tempo e da
Histona (Lisbon, 1968),and "Cenas de vida parisiense na ccrrespondencia de Duarte
Ribeiro de Maccdo (1668-1676) Bulletin des Etudes Portugaises 30 (1969) pp. 91-117.
The hest work all Colbert remains C.W. Colc, Colbert and a Century of french Mer-
cantilism (2 vols., New York, 19.19).
'i9 On the power of the New Christians over the private sector of the Carreira trade, d .
jarues c. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade ill Asia under the Hahshurgs pp. 29-42.
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60 On these reforms, cf. Hanson, Baroque Portugal pp. 143-84.
61 According to Boxer in Salvador de Sa pp. 371-73-
62 On Pedro's rebuff to the pro-French faction at court and the conclusion of the 1668
treaty, cf. Livermore, New History pp. 196-97; Boxer Salvador de Sa pp. 366-67; and
Hanson, Baroque Portugal PP.I3-I).
63 On this belief, cf.Arquivo Historico Ultramarino (AHU] Codex i- fos. [22V.-24, Res-
olution of the Overseas Council, 91lXh673-
64 On the monetary drain of Ceylon for the VOC, cf. India Office Library [IOL], Lon-
don, Original Correspondence (Eh/n) 3749 "Extract of Letter from Governor-Gen-
eral and Council in Batavia to the Heeren XVII," fos. 1 ff. As Johan Maetsuycker
wrote: "What a fearfull charge dorh Ceylon ... draw after it, and how many years
harh this continued in hopes of a profitiable issue ... yet I think the Company will
never accomplish there [sic] proposed profit ... God in mercy put an end to these bad
times."
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On the office of Viceroy, cf. Bailey Diffie and Ceorge B. Winius, Foundations of the
Portuguese Empire, 141,-1,80 pp. 247n. 3and 323; pearson Portuguese in India pp. 34-
)). It should be noted, however, that the author of the Roteiro of Vasco da Carna's
voyage also used the term "visorrey" in his narrative. Cf. Roteiro da Viagem de
Vasco da Gama em MCCCCXCVIT (Lisbon, and ed., ]861) p. 26.
2 Cf. Danvers, The Portuguese in India 11:1-9; Diffieand Winius, Foundations p. 247n. 3.
Cf. Diffic and Winius, Foundations pp. 323-25; and Danvers, The Portuguese in India
n:487-88 for a list of the Viceroys and Governors and their length of service.
4 Based on Danvers, The Portuguese in lndia II:487-88.
, Cf. Diffie and Winius, Foundations p. 324; and Boxer, A India Portuguesa pp. 24-2).
6 Cf. Diffie and WinlUs, Foundations p. 32);and for the salary of 30,000xerafins during
this period HAG Codex 23[6 fos. 3-5.
7 Cf. Anthony R. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur: The Count of Linhares at
Goa in the 1630'S" in R. Prak and D. Rctbermund (eds.), Emporia, Commodities, and
Entrepreneurs in Asian Maritime Trade, c. )400-1750 (Stuggart, 1991) pp. 427-44; and
Virginia Rau, Fortunas ultramatinas e a ncbreza portuguesa no seculo XVll
(Coimbra,1961).
8 According to Disney in "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur" p. 428.
9 For details, cf. Disney, "The Viceroy as Entrepreneur" pp. 429-44.
10 For details on the family and personal background on the Governors and Viceroys of
this period, cf. ANIT Chancelarias Reais for joao IV, Afonso VI and Pedro Ih jose F.
Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis da India, 1,05-1917 (Lisbon 1935); Felgueiras Gayo,
Nobilario de Familias de Portugal (28 vols. Braga, 1939-41); D. Antonio Caetano de
Sousa, Histone Genealogica da Casa Real Portuguesa; Afonso Eduardo Martins
Zuquere, Nobreza de Portugal (Lisbon, 3vols., 1960-61); Anselmo Braamcamp Freire,
Brasoes da Sala de Sintra (Coimbra, 3vols., 1921-30); and HAG Codex 6)0 "Catalogo
dos Vice-Reis e Governadores da India, 1604-1837".
1I The most comprehensive evidence for examining the policies of the Viceroy and
Governors is the Livros das moncoes do Reino or Monsoon Books series at the
HAG, containing the official correspondence and supporting documents between
Lisbon and Goa. Volumes 28A-43 cover the years 1660-1679, cf. HAG Codices 37-,0.
12 Cf. HAG MR 28A, Count of Ponte to D. Luisa Cusmao, fo. 232, 71Ilh661; fo. 236,
I4ilU1661 and MR 28A Count of Miranda to D. Luisa: fo. 238, IOIIU1661; and fo. 234,
JlIIU[66J.
13 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 212, D. Luisa Cusmao to Governors of India, IJlIVh661.
NOTES
14 Cf. HAG MR 28A fo. 215, D. Luisa Gusmao to Governors of India, 201IVh661; and
also HAG MR 28A fo. :u8, 26IIVh661.
15 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9; Martins Os Vice-Reis pp. 14')')0.
16 Cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9; Martin Os Vice-Reis pp. 149-50; and BPE Codex CXV!I-21
fO.9 I V.
17 For background on Mendoncn Punado's family and early career, cf. Gayo,
Nohi!iario de Famitias de Portugal XX (Braga, 1939) pp. )3-56; Caetano de Souse
Historia Genealogica XI (Coimhra, 1953) pp. 260-61; Martins Zuqcete Nobreza de
I'ortugal 11 (Lisbon, 1960) p. 678; Braamcamp Freire Brasoes da Sala de Sintra 11
(Coimbra, c. 1923) pp. 366-67; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Boxer A India Portuguesa
pp. 43-44,59-61; and Queiroz, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest ofCe},lon, trails.
by S.G. Perera (Colombo, 1930) p. 990.
18 Cf. Pem.to de Queiroz, The Temporal and Spiritual Conquest of Ceylon, pp. 1000-
1002. For additional details on the 1658-59 campaign in Salsette, cf. Boxer, A India
Portuguesa p. 60 and the sources cited therein.
19 Cf. Martins Zuqucre, Nobreza de Portugal 11:678.
20 Cf. Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis pp. 149-50.
21 On Antonio de Mello de Casrro's family and early career, cf. HAG Codex 650 fo. 9v.;
Ferreira Martins, Os Vice-Reis pp. 151-)2; and Cayo, Nobiliario de Famitias de Portu-
gal XI:44.
22 For the English account of this voyage, cf. EF r66(-1664 pp. 123-4+ For Mello de Cas-
n-o's side of the story, cf.j.R]. Biker, Coltecoo de tratados e concertos de pazes que 0
Estado da lndta Portuguesa fez corn os Reis e Senhores corn quem teoe reiacoes nas
partes da Asia e Africa Oriental desde a principio da conquista ate 0 fim do secuto
XVlll (14vols., Lisbon, IR81-R7) Hl:3 H.; HAG MR 2RA, Mello de Casrro to D. Luisa
Gusmao: fos. 243-44, 16fX1J662; fo. 36, 28fXllh662; and 28B fa. 469, IR/Xh662.
!3 For the relevant correspondence between Mcllo de Castro and the Reino, cf. HAG
MR 28A-35; AHU DAl Boxes 25 (166J-J(63) through 27 (1666-1668). Cf. especially,
HAG MR 28A fa. 149, Mello de Castro to D. Luisa Cusmao, 30/XIUI662; MR 30 fo.
117, Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 14!UI664; MR 30 fos. 141-4IV., Mello de Castro to
Afonso, 29IIh664; MR 31 fo. 160, Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 201X1Ih664;MR 3' fos.j-
6, Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 281XIU1664; and MR 35 fa. 165, Mcllo de Ccsrro to
Afonso, 291U1666. For a traditional treatment of Mello de Castro's tenure, cf.
Danvers, The Portuguese in India 11:327-56.
!4 On ]030 Nunes da Cunha's family background and early career, cf. Gayo, Nobilario
de Fami!ias de Portugal X;147-48; HAG Codex 6)0 fos. 9-10; Martins Zuquete,
Nobreza de PortugallIl:3S6; Ferreira Martins, Os Vic:e-Reis pp. 153-)4; and BPE Co-
dex CXVh-21 fos. 93-93v.
25 Cf. 11AG MR B fo. 92, Sao vicente to Afonso, 251U1667.
26 CL AHU DAI Box 27, Dowment 99, Sao Vicenre to Afonso, 21/1Xh667.
17 Cf. 101. OC 3213, President and Council in Surat to Directors, )/lVIJ667.
18 Cf. HAG MR 35 fos. 149-49\'., Mello de Castro to Afonso, 28IIh666.
19 Cf. HAG MR B fo. 21, 251U1667; and MR 33 fa. 92, 2511h667.
jO Cf. HAG MR.13 fa. 305, S. Vicenrc to Afonso, 291U1667.
lJ Cf. HAG ,'vIR 33 fa 330 (?), S. Vicente to Afonso, yfIU1667.
12 CL HAG Codex 650 fo. 9V.
l3 The 'Auto da sucessao da Covernanca da India e Via q. p.a ella se abrio na Capela
rnor da casa profeca da Cornp.a de Jesus desra Cid.e p. falecimenro do Ex.rno Sot.
Joao Nunes da Cunha de Sam V.re V. Rey c cap.m g.l da India' from the Council of
State records found in HAG Codex 9H5 "Axsentos do Concclho do Esrado, 1655-
1676" (No. 6) is given in ACE IV:195-98.
\4 Cf. ACE IV:190-200.
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cf. HAG Codex 650fo. 10; Martins, Os Vice-Reis pp. 155-56; and Gayo, Nobiliario de
Familiae de Portugal XI:39-40, 7I.
36 Cf. HAG MR 34fo. 203, Governors to Pedro, 184-84V., 26fIh670.
37 CL ACE IV:203-17. It is interesting to note that in a letter of 8January 1669, the Gover-
nors pointed out that S. Vicente had also been responsible for "only" 7 or 8 consultas
during his tenure. CL HAG MR 35 fo. 23.
38 Cf. HAG MR 35 fo. 17,Governors to Pedro, 81U1669.
39 CL for example, Governors to Pedro: HAG MR 3\ fo. 3, 7/Ih669; MR 35 fo. 9, 8Jlh669;
MR 35 fo. I, 131U1669; and MR 34fo. 158, 24fl/1670.
40 Cf. HAG MR 34fos. 277-77v., Governors to Pedro, 281U1670; and MR 34fos. 303-OjV.,
Governors to Pedro, 18fIh670.
41 CL Ames, "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682" pp. 25-27.
42 CL HAG MR 35 fo. 7, Governors to Pedro, 81Ih669; and BPE Codex CXVh-21fo. 93V.
and Ames, "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682" pp. 19-22 and the manuscript sources
cited therein.
43 On Mendonca Furrado's return to the Reino and activities there from 1664-1670, cf.
Boxer, Salvador da Sd pp. 352 ff.
44 For details on Mendonca Furrado's assumption of his new titles and his voyage to
Goa, cf. BPE Codex CXVh-21 fos. 93-93V.; HAG Codex 650 fos. 9-10; Martins Os
Vice-Reis pp. 157-58; ANIT Registro de Merces: Ordens Militares Book 12 fo. 453 and
Book 14 fo. 9V.; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal II:678; Assentos IV:217-23;
and HAG MR 36fo. 405, Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 14!Xh67I.
45 Sainr-Romain's summaries of these conversations and other information relating to
the proposed Franco-Portuguese alliance can be found in AAE CC fos. 97-100V.,
"Exrrait des Lettres de M. Saint-Remain," 21/XIIh669-I2IVh670; fos. 10}-05, Saint-
Remain to Colbert, 3OfXIIh669; fos. nO-13v., Saint-Remain to Louis XIV, 221IJ1670;
and fos. 119-20, Saint-Remain to Colbert (in cipher], 4i'!V1670.
46 Cf. Ames, "The Estado da India, 166}-1677" pp. 38-46 and the manuscript sources
cited therein.
47 As Gerald Aungier, the able English President in Bombay wrote as early as 1674on
Lavradio's attempt to address the traditional banes of bad government and the
abuses of the religious orders and nobles "the prudence of this Viceroy harh raised
them much: both in one and in the other". Cf. 10L OC 3929, Aungier to Company
Directors,2\1U1674·
48 For details on the family background and early career of D. Pedro de Almeida, cf.
Martins, Os Vice-Reis pp. 159-60; Braarncamp Preire, Braeoes II:366-67; HAG Codex
650 Io. 10; Martins Zuquete, Nobreza de Portugal Ihz8; and Gayo, Nobilario de
Familias de Portugal II:74-75.
49 Cf. AHU Codex 17 fos. 122v.-24.
50 CL HAG MR 28A fos. 150-50v. This letter was dated Goa, 161IXh66I.
5J Cf. AAE CC fcs. 123-25, Saint-Rornain to Colbert, 19nV1670.
52 Cf. HAG MR 41 fos. 177-77v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 24J'I/1677.
H For details on the Pate expedition, cf. Assentos IV:304-15; BPE Codex CXVh-21 fo.
95V.; HAG MR 43fos. 208-09, Pedro to D. Pedro de Almeida, 5nVh677; HAG MR 43
fc. 218, Pedro to Governors, 8IIVh677; Eric Axelson, The Portuguese in South East
Africa, 16oo-IJoO pp. 151 ff.; and AHlJ DAM Box 3, Document 16, Consulta of the
Overseas Council on the Pate Expedition, 2YVVI677.
54 The "Entrega que faz 0 exm.mno S.or Dom P.o dalmeida V. Rey da India da
governanca della aos Il.mos Sores Dom Fr. Antonio brundao, Arc.o de Goa, e Primas
da India e Antonio Paez de Sande, ambos do Concelho de S.A." is given in ACE
IV:3II-13·
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55 For details on the family background and early career of Antonio Paes de Sande, cf.
Antonio Paes de Sande e Casrro, Antonio Paes de Sal/de: 0 Grande Gouemador
(Lisbon, 1951) pp. 9-l6.
56 On Antonio Paes de Sande's career in Crown service from 1666-1677, cf. Paes de
Sande e Castro, Antonio Paes de Sande pp. 12-22; Martins, Os Viu-Reis pp. 159-61;
HAG Codex 6so fa. II; HAG MR 33 fa. l42, "Cerndao de Antonio Paes de Sande,"
211U1667; and Assentos IV;167-l98.
57 Found passim in HAG MR 42-4S covering the years 1677-81.
\8 On the war with Canara, cf.Pacs de Sande e Castro, Antonio Paesde Sal/de pp. n-aa;
ACt; IV:J38-39; HAG MR 33 fo. 139 "Carte do rei da Canara' s.d. le. 16661" MR 33 fa.
IS, S. Viceore to AfoIlSO, l)lIh667; MR 33 fa. 1}8, S. Vicenre to Afonso, 261U1667; MR 3S
fo. 17, Mcllo de Castro and Carte-Real de Sampaio to Pedro, 81U1669; and MR 4}fa.
239, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 171U1679.
\9 Cf. Paes de Sande e Casrro, Antonio Paes de Sal/de pp. zz-z.j , 35-37; HAG MR 43 fos.
206-o6v., Paes de Sande to Pedro, 201U1679.
60 Cf. ACE IV:3S0-52; HAG MR 4_~ fo. l39, Paes de Sande to Pedro, 171U1679.
(;1 On the religious policies of Paes de Sande, cf. Paes de Snnde e Casrro, Antonio Paes
de Sande pp. 24-l8. For a discussion of abuses relating to the "gcnno" orphans during
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of the Estado, d. Ames, "The Estado da India, 166}-1677" pp. 4i-4l and the manu-
scrtpr sources cited therein.
ta For the 1680 figures, cf. HAG Codex l}16 fo. l7. These sa/dos are contrasted with the
1630 figures in Ames "The Estado da India, 1663-1677" p. 46.
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CL Roteiro da Viagem de Vasw Da Gama p. SI.
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d. Pearson, Portuguese in India, pp. 116 ff.; Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire pp.
6)-83. n8·48; Diffie and Winius, Foundations pp. 335-37; Antonio da Silva Rego,
Hetona das miseoes do padroado portugues do Oriente, 1500-1)42 (Lisbon, 1949),
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l36 RENASCENT EMPIRE~
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14 For details on these inducements, cf. Boxer, Seaborne Empire pp. 67-68; Pnolkar,
Goa Inquisition pp. 141-43.
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38 HAG MRlp fo. ,,9, Afonso to Mello de Castro, I+,IVh66s.
39 Cf. HAG MRl3) fos. 149-49V., Mello de Casrro to Afonso, "81V1666.
40 HAG MRJ35 fo. 1"5, Mello de Castro to Afonso, ,,8/1h666.
41 Cf. Mello de Casrro to Afonso, "91U1666, HAG MRl35 fo. 96 and 145.
42 Cf. HAG MRlU fo. 174, Afonso to S. Vicente, 71VJ666.
NOTES '37
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47 HAG MRln fo. 92, S. Viccnte to Afonso, 20h667.
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49 HAG MR/n fo. 30" S. Vicente to Afonso, 291V1667.
50 HAG MR/33 fa. 330{?}, S. Vicenre to Afonso, YI1h667.
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70 HAG MR/36 fo. 415, Pedro to Mendnnca Furtado, 2oflIIh671.
71 Cf. HAG MRf36 fos. 2\9-59V., Hindu Merchants of Bacaim to Mendonca Furtado,
19N 1h 671.
72 CL HAG MR/36 fo. 2,7, Pcdro to Mendonca Furtado, 2l1IIU1671.
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MR/3HA fos. 113-1)\'., IO/Xh673; and MR/41 fo. 59, 101V1677.
85 HAG MR/J7 fa. 14, Mendonca Funado to Pedro, l2IIXh672.
S6 CL Mendonca Purrado to Pedro: HAG MRh8B fa. 287, luXh673; and MR/42 fa..'1,
l2lIh 677.
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87 HAG MRJ40 to. 125,Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, Z2iUI676.
88 Cf. HAG MRh7 fos. 274-74V., Mendcnca Furtado to Pedro, 241I!I6n
89 For details, cf. Mendonca Furtado to Pedro: HAG MRJ38B fos. 406·o6v., 2IiXUI673;
MRh8B fos. 378-78v., 201V1674; and MRJ38B fos. 456-57, 2olU1674, which contains an
assento of the Goa Council of State on the matter, dated 28IXIUI673. Pissurlencae
provides useful additional documentation on the discussions on this matter in ACE
rV:.229-31 n. I, and rV:287-91 n. I.
90 HAG MRJ38B fos. 378-78v., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 2olU1674.
91 Cf. MRh9 fo. 109, Mendonca Purrado to Pedro, 31XIV1674.
92 HAG MRJ38A fo. 128, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 27/IXJ1672.
93 AHU DAI Box 29, Document 1)0, Consulta of the Overseas Council on Foreign
Bishops in the Estado, 3oNIIIII6n
94 Cf. HAG MRJ41 fo. 58, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 0/1676.
95 Cf HAG MRJ42 fo. 110, Pedrc to Mendonca Furtado, 3r1IIVI677. The petition from
the Hindu population of Goa to Pedro can be found in MRJ42 fos. 138-38v. A similar
petition had been sent to Mendonca Furrado on 2r1IU1676, d. MRJ42 fos. 147-48.
96 The relevant documentation on this issue and the Junta can be found in HAG MRJ42
fos. 133-78; MRJ43 fos. 208-09.
97 Quoted in Priolkar, Inquisition p. 127.





102Cf. ACE IV:280-88; and Priolkar, Inquisition pp, 118-20.
103 HAG MRJ42 fos. 177-78. Cf. also Themudo's letter of 41XIUI677 found in MRJ42 fos.
144-45V.
104For details on this second meeting of the]unta, cf. ACt: IV:299-303. The law on this
matter can be found in HAG MRJ42 fos. 198-2oov.
Chapter 4
Cf. V.M. Godinho, Os descobrimentos e a econornio mundial; L'Economie de
l'empire portugaise aux XVe et XVIe sieclee; and Les Financesde l'etat portugais des
Indes Orientales (]F7-]6j5) (Paris, 1982); CiR. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Em-
pire; and From Lisbon to Goa, ]500-17W Studies in Portuguese Maritime Enterprise
(London, 1984); Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth
Century; M.N. Pearson, Merchants and Rulers in Gujurat: The Response to the Por-
tuguese in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley, 1976),The Portuguese in India; A.R. Dis-
ney, Twilight of the Peppper Empire: Portuguese Trade in Southwest India in the
Early Seventeenth Century; and James e. Boyajian, Portuguese Bankers at the Court
of Spain; and Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs.
2 Traditional surveys of the Estado include F.e. Danvers, The Portuguese in India;
R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power in India; Bailey Diffey and George
Winius, Foundations ofthe Portuguese Empire, ]4]5-]580; and Boxer, Portuguese Sea-
borne Empire. A recent attempt to update this hisroriography can be found in S.
Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia. For details of the rehabiliration of
the Estado during the late 17th century under Pedro and Mendonca Furtado, cf.
Glenn J. Ames "The Estado da India, J663-1677: Priorities and Strategies in Europe
and the East," pp. 31-46, and "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682: Maritime Enterprise
and the Quest for Stability in Portugal's Asian Empire", pp. 7-27.
Cf. Boxer Portuguese Seaborne Empire p. 206.
NOTES '39
4 For details on the roteiros of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, cf. Boxer "The
Carroira da India, 1650-175°", The Mariner's Mirror XL VI (196o) pp. 35-54. Alvaras
(royal decrees), regimentos and Crown letters governing the sailings for the Carrcira
for this period are found in Historical Archives of Goa [HAG] HAG MRh8A fos. 95,
193; MRfn fos H3-14; MRf34 fa. 214; MRf36 fo. 309; MRf37 fos. 22-25; and MRf38B fos.
4(;3,474;AHU DAI Box 27, Document 151; Box 28, Document 97; and British Museum
[BM] Add. MSS. 20879 fos. 31, 53-54.
The stimulus for this significant volte-face was most probably Joao Pereira Corte-
Real's Discnrtsos scbre la Nafvigaclon de las naos de la Indiaf de Portugal, Por Iuan
Peveyra/Corte Real, Caval/era Portufgues, para que V. Maggestadfsea seroido de
mandartuer (Madrid, 1622?). Cone-Real's distinguished naval career (Captain and
Captain-Major of at least four successful Carreira voyages, Admiral of the POrtu-
guese Fleet, Mestre do Campo of the Terco da Armada) and his pivotal importance in
design reforms for Portuguese lndiamen have been detailed by Boxer in his" Admiral
Joao Pereira Cone-Real and the Construction of Portuguese Easr-Indiamen in the
Early Seventeenth Century", The Mariner's Mirror XXVI (1940) pp. 388-406.
(, Cited in Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire p. 219.
Ibid. p. 207.
8 Cf. Bernado Gornes de Briro, Histonca tragico-maritima, em que se escrevem
chnmologicamente os naufragios que tiuemo as naos de Portugal, depots que se poz
em exeracio a navegaqao da India (2 vols., Lisbon, 1735-36 and later editions), and
Re/acion de las grandes perdidas de naos y galeones, que han tenido Ios Portugueses
en la India Oriental (Madrid, 1651). Works like these traditionally set the tone for
modern treatises on the subject like Duffy's Shipwreck and Empire: Being an Ac-
count of Portuguese Maritime Disasters in a Century of Decline (Cambridge MA,
(955). Cf. also Boxer's introductions to the Hakluyr Society's editions of The Tragic
History ofthe Sea, 1,89.1622 (Cambridge, 1959) and Further Selections from the Tragic
History of the Sea, 1,J9-1,6, (London, 1968); his "The Naval and Colonial Papers of
Dom Antonio de Ataide", Harvard Library Bulletin V (1951) pp. 24-50; "The Carreira
da India, 1650-1750" pp. 36-41; and The Portuguese Seahome Em/lire p. 119 ff.
') For examples, cf. Boxer, The Tragic History of the Sea, 1589-1622 pp. 2)·26, 55, 114-17,
and 191.
10 Boxer "The Carreira da India, 16)0-1750," pp. 37-40.
11 Cf. IIAG MRf18A fa. 193, Queen-Regent to Governors of India, 14i'Xlh660, and fo.
94, Queen-Regent to Antonio de Mdlo de Casrro, 301IIIh661. Cf. also BM Add. MSS.
2087') fos. 31, 53-54.
11 Cf. HAG MR/31 fo. 206, Antonio de Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 201X1lh664; MRf33
fa. 113, Afonso to S.Vicente, 81Ih666; and BM Add. MSS. 20879 fo. (0).
13 Cf. AHU DAI Box 17, Document 151, Consulta of Overseas Council on Embarkations
to Reino, 6/XIh668, with Regimemo from S. Vicente to Dinis de Mcllc de Casrro,
captain of the nao S. Pedro de Alcantara dated 29/1h667 attached; Box 18, Document
97, Consulta of Overseas Council on Embarkations to Reino, 21IUI670, with
Regimento from S. vicente to Francisco Range! Pinto, captain of the nao S. Thereza,
dated 4I11h668, attached; AHU Codex 208 fa. 339V., Pcdro to Mendonca Furtado,
IfIVh670; and MRf37 fos. 14-15, Regimento for Ships Returning to Reino, l1IIIh671.
14 For details on these generally dismal years, cf. Boxer, A India Portugesa em meados
do seculc XVII pp. 39-49.
I) lhid. pp. -u, 39-49.
16 Cf. HAG Codex 2316 Livro de Registro dos aiuaras de. de diierentes feitorias fos. 28·
39v .
17 AGA Codex 47. For the years 1668-1682, d. fos. lV.-14V. for a printed version of this
codex, cf. Silva Rego ed. Documenracdo Ultramarina Portuguesa IV:3ff.
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)8 Cf. BPE Codex CXVh-21. All this data can be supplemented by information from the
Monsoon Books and Treasury Council records from the HAG as well as details
found in the State Papers, Foreign series of the PRO in London. HAG MRJ33-44
(1668-1680) contain frequent references to the ships of the Carreira, including arrival
and departure dates, details on delays and mishaps, and even some information on
cargoes. The Assentos do Conselho da Fazenda vols. 11-14 (1666-86) at the HAG (Co-
dices u68-72) are valuable for arrival and departure dates, since the Council approved
expenditures for pilots to conduct arriving ships to the anchorage at Mormcgao and
homeward bound ships to take on water at Fort Agccda before departing. The State
Papers, Foreign, series at the PRO for Portugal (SPF89) is also useful since it contains
the correspondence between English diplomats resident in Lisbon and officials in
London. Given the keen interest of the English in the Asian trade it is not surprising
to find frequent references to the ships of the Carreira. For example, we have Francis
Parry's letter of 20/30 August 1672 (SPF 89hZ fos. 134-34v.) describing the great joy in
Lisbon at the arrival of three "richly laden" ships from India, "which is soe good a for-
tune as harh not been knowne here since Porrugall harh been a kingdome of irselfe''.
He was referring to the S. Joao da Ribeira, the Bom Jesus de S. Domingos, and the
Nossa Senhora dos Cardaes, which had arrived in the Tagus in August 8, 1672.
19 For example, 56French ships (both royal and Company) made the passage from Eu-
rope to les Indes Orientates between 1665-1682. Of these only 26or 37-4% made it back
to France. Cf. Paul Kaeppelin, La Compagnie des Indes Orientales et Prancois Mar-
tin (Paris, 1908) pp. 653-55.
20 From an analysis by the marquis de Fronteira of Colberr's proposed anti-Dutch triple
alliance in Asia with the English and Portuguese. Cf. BNL Codex 748 fos. 130-65 for
the Instruccao da Secretaria de Estado e paraceres sobre a liga de Franca e Inglarerra.
For Fronteira's views, cf. fos. 153v.-)"6v.
21 Cf. Boxer, "The Carreira da India, 165°-1]\0", pp. 36-37; and Portuguese Seaborne
Empire pp. 206-07.
22 For details on the Crown's attempt to enforce such orders and ensure prompt depar-
tures, cf. HAG MRJ34 fos. 213-13V., Pedro to S. Vicenre, 29nWJ669; fo. 214, Governors
to Pedro, 261U1670; MRJ35 fa. I, Governors to Pedro, 1J/'lh669; MRJ36 fo. 309,Pedro to
Mendcnca Furrado, I/IVh671; MRJ37 fo. 22, Pedro to Mendonca Furrado, 2lIIIh672;
fo. :23, Mendonca Purtado to Pedro, nJIXh672; fos. 24-2\, Instructions for Ships Re-
turning to Reino, 2lIIlh6]z(?}; fos. 236-36v., Mendonca Furrado to Pedro, 2lIh673; fos.
239-}9V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 14JJ1J673; MRJ38A fo. 144, Pedro to Mendonca
Funado, 281XIh672; MR/38B fo. 463,Mcndonca Furtado to Pedro, 26JJ1J674; fo. 474,
Pedro to Mendonra Funado, 131IIIh673; MR/39 fo. 86, Pedro to Mendonca Purrado,
wnIU1674; MRJ40 fo. 141, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 261IIU167S; and MRJ4z fa. 84,
Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 22lIIIh677.
23 Cf. The ASIan Trade Revolution ofthe Seventeenth Century and "The Dutch East In-
dia Company as an institutional innovation", in Dutch Capitalism and World Capi-
talism ed. by Maurice Aymard (Cambridge, 1982).
24 On the monetary drain of Ceylon for the vac, cf. IOL OC (Eh/33) 3749 "Extract of
Letter from Governor-General and Council in Barevia to the Heeren XVII", fos. 1 ff.
As Johan Maetsuycker wrote: "What a fearfull charge dcrh Ceylon ...draw after it,
and how many years harh this continued in hopes of a profitable issue...yet I think
the Company wiJlnever accomplish there [sic]proposed profit. ..God in mercy put an
end to these bad times."
1.5 For details on this process in Europe, cf. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist
State pp. 195-:>'3). The reforms implemented in the Estado after 1668 are outlined in
Ames "The Estado da India, 1663-1677", pp. 38-46.
1.(; Cf. Boxer "Admiral Joao Pereira Ccrte-Reai and the Construction of Portuguese
Easr-Indiamen in the Early Seventeenth Century".
NOTES '4'
~7 On the need to export silver to Goa and periodic problems with furnishing sufficient
quantities, d. HAG MR/37 fos. 139-39V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, ~41VlHh672;
and MRh9 fo. 60, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 191I1Ih674.
~8 Based on figures from HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v. and AGA Codex 47 fos. 2V.-14v.
~9 Cf. AGA Codex 47 fo. 4v,-5v, "Carra geral que vay para a India nesta moncao de 670
e por vice rey Luis de Mendcnca Furrado, capitam mor D. Amonio Mascarcnhas",
Ruy Fernandcs d'Almeida and Luis Alvarez Caroeiro to Miguel d'Almeida da Silva,
Lisbon 311Vh670; and HAG Codex 2,16 fos. 29v,-30v,
.10 For details on Colberr's Compagnie Royale des lndes Orientates and his attempt to
lure Pedro into an anti-Dutch triple alliance at this time, d. Glenn J. Ames "Coihert's
Indian Ocean Strategy of 1664-1674: A Reappraisal" ,pp. 536-59. Pedro's reasoning in
declining this tempting offer can perhaps best be gleaned from examining the opin-
ions of his Council of State members 00 the proposed pact found in BNL Codex 748
fos. 1.10-65.
31 On the sailings from Goa to Lisbon d. Ames "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682" pp.
10·27. The figures for Chart 1 arc based on data found in HAG Codex 1316 fos. 28"
.l9V., and AGA Codex 47 fos. 2V"14V.
,2 On the transformation of the ships and fleets of the Carreira over the years c. 1500-
1680,d. CR. Boxer The Portuguese Seaborne Empire pp. 205-27; "The Carreira da
India, 1650-1750", pp. 35-54; "Admiral Joao Pereira Cone-Real" pp. n8-406; and his
collected essays on the subject published as From Lisbon to Goa, 1500"175°.
Jl Derived from data on quantities and prrces found m HAG Codex 2316 fos. 28-39v.
J4 Cf. Boxer "The Third Dutch War in the East, 1672-4", The Mariner's Mirror XVI
11930) pp. 34!-86; and Glenn J, Ames "Colbert's Grand Asian Fleet of 1670", in The
Mariner's Mirror LXXVI (1990) pp. 227-40. For contemporary views on the impact of
such events on prices and availability of pepper along the west coast of India at this
time, cf. HAC; MR/37 fos. 139-)9V., Mendonca Furtado to Pedro, 2f/VIIUI672; MRI,9
fo. 60, and Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, 191IIU1674. 00 the impact of increased Euro-
pean competition, d. HAG MRJ41 fos. 177-77V., Mcndonca Purtado to Pedro,
24!UI677 and MR/42 fo. 86, Pcdro to Mendonca Furtado, 22JIlIh677.
.J'i Cf. HAG Codex 2316 fos. J9-39v. On the high profits made on diamonds and other
precious stones or pedraria in Lisbon, cf. Boyajian, PorhWuese Trade in Asia, pp. 49-
5'·
16 Based on estimates of Magalhacs-Codiuho and others examined by C.H.H, Wake
"The Changing Pattern of Europe's Pepper and Spice Imports, ea. 1400-/700", The
Journal of European Economic History pp. J78-81.
.17 For details 00 the liberdade system and the regimento's uf 1515 and 16)2, d. among
others, Boxer "The Carrcira da India, 1650-1750", pr.p-40; and Boyajian, Portu-
guese Trade in Asia pp. 38-40.
,8 AGA Codex 47 fos. 7v.-8v. and !lV,-l.'!.
.19 CL AGA Codex 47 fos. 7-8v., and HAG Codex 2.J16 fos. 37V,-38.
.ro On attempts to increase the efficiency of registering the contents of liberty chests, d.
HAG MRf17 fo. 22, Pedro to Mendonca Furtado, z/lIIh672; MR/42 fo. 84, Pedro to
Mendonca Furtado, 22JIIU1677; and MR/42 fo. 84-84v., D. Pedro de Almeida to Pedro,
IT/XlUI677.
41 Portuguese Trade in Asia p. 42,
42 Ibid. It is likely that cotton cloth became an increasingly important component of re-
turn bound private cargoes as the 17th century progressed. On this trend, d. also
HAG MRfJ5 fo. 16j, Mello de Casrro to Afonso, 2')/lft666; and MRJ.J4 fo. 214, Gover-
nors to Pedro, 261UI670.
4, Cf. Ames "The Carreira da India, 1668-1682", pp. 2,-27.
44 PRO (SPF) 89h2 fos. 2)2-53, Parry to Williamson, 15/VIIIh6n This project is also dis-
cussed in Hansou, Baroque Portugal pp. 94"100. For details on the interest of this
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community in the Increasingly important private sector of the Carreira trade, cf.
Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia pp. 36-42.
45 On the Terco, d. AHU DAI Box 28,Document 87, Resolution of the Overseas Coun-
cil, 91XIU1669; and Pedro to Mendonca Furtado. HAG MRJ,6 fa. 56, 61IIh670; and
MRJ37 fo. 75,IOfIIU1672.
46 On the factors undermining this plan, cf. PRO SPF 89tll fcs. 279·79V., Parry to Wil-
Iiamson, 5IXIIh6]3; and Hanson, Baroque Portugal pp. 94-100.
47 PRO SPF 89h3 fos. 1,1-3IV., Parry to Coventry, 171XIU1675.
48 For details on Pedro's declaration of Commercia Livre on the East Coast of Africa in
1672 for all Portuguese subjects and the eventual foundation of a Junta to oversee this
trade in the 1670'S, cf. Ames, "The Estado da India, 1663-1677", pp. 43-45.
49 On the vital role of the New Christians in this trade, cf. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade
in Asia, especially pp. 14-17 and 31-3). For Pedro's plan to lure sizable New Christian
capital into a scheme to resusitare the commercia! and military prowess of the Estado
in return for protection against the abuses of the Inquisition in the early 1670'S, cf.
Hanson, Baroque Portugal pp. 94-100; and for a contemporary account, PRO SPF
8g/1l fos. 186-87, Parry to Arlington, 26JXUI672; Party to Williamson: fos. 248-49,
I8NIUu'l73. fos. 252-)3, 15MIUI6]3; and fos. 279-79V., 5IXIUI6n
Chapter 5
Cf. ACE 111:200-04 for this regimenro dated 6fIXIJ651. The breakdown for these ships
was the following: 16 in Bassein in the armada of the Norte under Tristao da Silveira;
10in the armada of the south under Francisco Pereira da Cunha; 5 in Mormugdo un-
der Manoel Roil; 14 in the armada of the donativo; 16 near Maskar and 22 in the
Ribeira at Goa.
2 cr. ACE IV:87-89.
For details, cf. among others, Boxer, Seaborne Empire pp. 106-27; Suhrahmanyam,
Portuguese Empire, 144-80; Winius, The Fatal History; and Danvers, Portuguese in
India Ib68-n8.
4 Cf. Pearson, Portuguese in India p. 61 and ff.
5 On this system, cf. Pearson, Portuguese in India 61-70; Diffie and Winius, Founda-
tions pp. 311-23; Boxer, Seaborne Empire pp. 318-30; and Subrahrnanyam, Portuguese
Empire 60-79.
6 On the formation and functioning of the administrative system, cf. Diffie and
Winuis, Foundations pp. 301-:m Subrahmanyam, Portuguese Empire pp. 62-106;
Boxer, Seaborne Empire pp. 39-64; n8-48. 296-339; and Pearson, Portuguese in India
61-80. On the issue of New Christian emmigation to the Estado and their role in the
trade with Asia, cf. Boyajian, Portuguese Trade pp. 30-52 and passim.
7 Cf. Pearson, Portuguese in India p. 6).
8 Ibid. pp. 61-67.
9 Cf., for example, Danvers, Portuguese in India I:xxxix; R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of
Portuguese Power in India pp. 174, 324-25; W.W. Hunter, A History of British India
1:176-85; and Vincent A. Smith, The Oxford History ofIndia p. H). As Danvers noted:
"A laxity in Government, and a general corruption amongst the servants of the State,
in which each one, regardless of the public interests, sought hut his own benefit and
the accumulation of wealth, only too certainly prepared the way for the downfall of
Portuguese rule in India."
10 Cf. Pearson, "Corruption and Corsairs in Sixteenth Century Western India: A Func-
tional Analysis", in Coastal Western India, pp. 18-4°.
NOTES '4)
11 For a discussion of the abuses in the official system and the issue of whether such
problems increased in the 17th century as difficulties increased for the Estado, cf.
Pearson, Portuguese in India, pp. 66-70. 138-4J.
12 Cited in Boxer, Seaborne Empire p. 298.
J.'\ For details, d. Diffie and Winius, Foundations pp. 327-29; Pearson, Portuguese in In-
dia pp. 9\-99; and Boxer, Seaborne Empire pp. 296-317.
14 These figures arc quoted in Pearson, Portuguese in India p. 93.
15 Cf. HAG Codex [258, Livro de Homenagens (3) fos. 13-127.
I(i Cf. Whiteway, Tbe Rise of Portuguese Power in India pp. 12-1.'\; and D.R. Sar Desi,
"The Portuguese Administration in Malacca, 1511-1641", Journal of Southeast Asian
/-listory, X, 3 (1969) p. 504-
17 Cf. Boxer, Four Centuries of Portuguese Expansion, 141)-1825 (Johannesburg, J961)
pp. 19-20 .
18 According to Boxer, Seaborne Empire p. 129, who dares this quote as June 1669. I
have not yet been able to locate this exact passage in the Monr;oes correspondence or
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